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Abstract 
District heating and cooling (DHC) systems are a sound solution to environmental, energy 
security, climate change, and fuel poverty concerns in cities. As an environmental policy goal 
not fully controlled by government and subject to complex multi-actor negotiations, building DHC 
can be understood as requiring network governance patterns of behaviour. 
This thesis investigates the role of planning in delivering DHC, employing a conceptual 
framework of Actor-Centered Institutionalism to unravel the relationships between industry, 
government, and citizen organizations in governance networks. It contributes to a growing area 
of study on the intersection of urban development, energy infrastructure, and environmental 
policy goals. It responds to calls for further practical research on governance patterns of 
behaviour, applying a recognised network governance approach to the analysis of five 
international case studies. It also investigates the weight of institutional context and the 
purported connection between network interaction characteristics and policy outcomes.  
The research categorises a range of potential roles for planning organisations and planning 
interventions in governance networks for DHC. The comparative analysis suggests that 
planning organisations rarely negotiate for DHC but that planning interventions are regularly 
used  to initiate governance networks for DHC and to shape negotiations by other actors. The 
findings outline a number of specific institutional factors, actor orientations and capabilities as 
well as qualities of interaction which affect the capability of governance networks to deliver 
DHC. The research contributes to the explanatory ambitions of network governance research 
and expanded understanding of the capacity of planning in building and managing urban energy 
infrastructure. The findings can potentially be extended to other urban utility infrastructure and 
environmental policy goals.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
Cities also believe they are the work of the mind or of chance, but neither the one nor the other 
suffices to hold up their walls. You take delight not in a city’s seven or seventy wonders, but in 
the answer it gives to a question of yours.  – Invisible Cities, Italo Calvino 
 
The past decade has witnessed a growing recognition among scientists, politicians, and the 
media of the importance of cities in two great phenomena of this age: the simultaneous 
urbanization of humanity and a widespread concern about the environmental impact of human 
activity on the earth’s natural systems.  
Cities are both the problem and the solution to achieving a sustainable future. As the human 
population grows and congregates rapidly, urban areas increasingly become the sources and 
drivers of pollution, greenhouse gas emissions, overuse of scarce resources, and environmental 
degradation. However, urban areas can be more efficient in their use of energy, water, and 
land than suburban and modern rural development. They can provide transportation services in 
a relatively clean and democratic fashion, as Curitiba and Bogota have shown. Controlled urban 
densification, used effectively in London and Portland, helps to save natural areas and open 
space, relieving growth pressures and focusing development in appropriate locations. Urban 
living can reduce the use of resources per person; density and its accompanying economies of 
scale conserve scarce resources such as energy, and enable the efficient recycling of waste 
and water. 
An increasing recognition of the importance of cities is affecting the face of politics, business, 
and urban management. From mega-city mayors, city councillors, and planning policy officers to 
local energy companies and neighbourhood compost collection schemes, city management is 
evolving to reflect environmental awareness. These changes are generating a renewed interest 
in the role of urban planning. A review of planning by UN-HABITAT, Global Report on Human 
Settlements 2009: Planning Sustainable Cities, concluded that “Rapid urbanisation, widespread 
urban poverty, climate change, resource shortages, and conflict or post-disaster reconstruction 
are some of the challenges currently existing or emerging globally; essentially they demand 
state intervention to fundamentally change the nature of cities; and this implies the need for 
planning” (p. 13).  
Within both public policy and academic research on sustainable cities, there is a growing call to 
understand and improve the human-built infrastructure that manages urban resource use. 
Alongside the visible streets and buildings, cities are made up of significant systems (both 
physical and social) which deliver energy, remove waste, and provide and discharge water. The 
type and management of these systems affects their environmental impact. Particularly, 
decentralised energy systems such as district heating and cooling (DHC) systems are emerging 
as a potential solution for increasing energy efficiency within cities. The management or creation 
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of these infrastructures has been historically understudied in both urban and environmental 
domains.  
Therefore, this thesis focuses on the role of planning systems in delivering a specific urban 
energy infrastructure: district heating and cooling (DHC). The premise of the research is that the 
delivery of DHC as an urban environmental policy goal should require the negotiation between 
multiple actors across space and time, and that planning organisations and processes might 
have an important role to play in these governance networks. This premise is explored through 
a qualitative analysis of five DHC systems across four countries, covering both failed attempts 
and successfully operating DHC systems. 
Understanding the role of planning from this international perspective requires the research to 
give consideration to the formal structures and informal context of planning systems and their 
relationship with other urban policy processes and organisations. The research's focus also 
requires examination of the way in which modern urban policy is formed and enacted through 
collaboration and negotiation between the public sector, civic society, and private business; and 
the ability of such patterns of governance to organise and construct capital intensive 
infrastructure. 
This chapter introduces the context and focus of this thesis: the relationship between planning 
systems and urban energy infrastructure, and the network governance patterns of policy 
creation and delivery. DHC systems are explored as a solution to urban energy demands and 
positioned as a policy solution to multiple concerns of an environmental, energy security, 
climate change, and fuel-poverty nature which require local government coordination. The 
chapter ends by developing three research questions which structure the thesis.  
1.1 Urban Energy Infrastructure: District Heating and Cooling 
What is district heating and cooling (DHC)?  
A DHC system is a technology for the local generation and provision of hot or cold water, and 
the heating or cooling of multiple buildings. It can bring cost efficiencies and environmental 
benefits when compared to individual building heating or cooling systems. A 2001 World Bank 
study defined DHC as follows. 
A district heating system is a concept in which heat is produced 
centrally in precise location(s), from where heat is distributed to the 
consumers located in different buildings, in the form of hot water or 
steam circulating in a distribution piping network. Often, heat is also 
used not only to heat buildings but also to provide domestic hot water 
and for industrial purposes, such as process heat.  
A district cooling system is a concept in which the production of cooling 
is centralized in precise location(s), from where cold is distributed to 
the consumers located in different buildings, in the form of chilled 
water circulating in a distribution piping network. Alternatively, cold can 
be produced from heated water circulating in the network by using 
absorption technology, which enables the co-existence of DH and DC. 
(Gochenour, 1994, p. 1) 
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DHC should be distinguished from similar but distinct classifications of energy generation: 
‘decentralised’, ‘distributed’ and ‘combined heat and power’. Decentralised energy is a term 
which refers to energy which is generated close to where it is used, to minimise transmission 
losses associated with ‘centralised’ systems. It can also imply that the energy system is ‘off the 
grid’ and not dependant on traditional energy generation and supply networks. The term can 
apply to a wide range of energy systems operating at different scales; solar thermal panels and 
biomass boilers are both examples of decentralised energy (The Government Office for 
Science, 2008; Woodman & Baker, 2008). DHC can be considered a form of decentralised 
energy, although more often decentralised energy refers to multiple units of generation which 
serve a smaller physical area than a DHC system (The Government Office for Science, 2008). 
Distributed energy is a loosely defined concept which is generally used to refer to situations 
where activities rely upon small scale electricity generation, such as individual wind turbines 
powering several rural needs or a small scale gas-fired generator in an industrial application 
(Pepermansa, Driesenb, Haeseldonckxc, Belmansc, & D'haeseleer, 2005; Karger & Hennings, 
2009). Combined Heat and Power is a type of generation which uses an energy fuel input to 
simultaneously create both heat and electrical power, resulting in an efficient input to energy 
output. “CHP plants generally convert 75-80% of the fuel source into useful energy, while 
modern CHP plants reach efficiencies of 90% or more” (Moomaw & Moreira, 2001, p. 293). 
CHP is often associated with DHC, but DHC can be fuelled by a range of generation types 
(International Energy Agency, 2008).  
DHC systems are found around the world. They are particularly common in eastern European 
and former Soviet countries, having been the dominant technology for the supply of heating and 
hot water during that era. Examples of DHC systems currently in use include the Con-Edison 
district heating system in Manhattan, NYC, initiated in 1882, which runs on steam; the 
Copenhagen district heating system installed in the 1980s, which utilizes hot water produced by 
a waste incineration plant; and a district cooling system using electrical chillers serving the 
Dubai metro system, initiated in 2009 (Gochenour, 1994; Hope, 2009).  
Why is DHC used?  
There are a number of drivers for the use of DHC in urban areas to share energy. Historically 
the main driver has been cost efficiency, although more recently environmental concerns have 
also been cited as reasons for implementing DHC. Cost efficiencies and associated energy 
efficiencies are realised with DHC in two main ways: primarily, because it enables the re-use of 
‘waste’ heat from electrical generation or incineration and therefore reduces the overall amount 
of fuel consumed. This becomes more effective at larger scales, supporting a district approach. 
Secondly, efficiencies are achieved through economies of scale and the purchase and 
generation of the heat or cooling in bulk, rather than by individual boiler or chillers customers 
(Mancarella, 2013). Cost savings are linked to the density of heat or cooling load, as the cost of 
installing DHC increases at lower densities through additional pipework and transmission losses 
(TCPA, 2008; Gochenour, 1994; DTI, 2007). Proponents of DHC, such as the International 
District Energy Association, also contend that DHC systems are more reliable than other 
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heating systems and reduce development costs for individual buildings (International District 
Energy Association, 2009). Other efficiency benefits, such as the fuel efficiencies gained from 
fewer boilers at full load versus multiple boilers at part load, depend on the size and type of the 
system and on existing electricity and heat sources (Roberts, 2008; Carbon Trust, 2007; 
Mancarella, 2013). 
A separate driver for DHC adoption is energy security through the flexibility and resilience of the 
system over time, as DHC systems can be coupled with a range of fuels and heat generating 
technologies such as gas or biomass fuelled CHP, waste-to-energy, geothermal sources, or 
other heat sources such as bakeries, solar thermal arrays, or even sewage (Carbon Trust, 
2007; Gochenour, 1994; Mancarella, 2013). The choice of fuel source, size of network, and type 
of generation plant varies significantly between different DHC systems, and can influence the 
efficiency of DHC significantly. For example, in Iceland relatively cheap access to geothermal 
heat results in district heating supplying 99% of the capital Reykjavik (Gunnlaugsson, 
Frimannson, & Sverrisson, 2000; Randburg, 2010).  
DHC also has a number of environmental advantages compared to individual boilers or chillers; 
some of these are linked to the fuel source used although a DHC system has environmental 
benefits in its own right. The centralisation of boilers or chillers often results in better air quality, 
as aggregation of generation plant enables better control of the emitted pollutants, emissions, 
and chemicals such as refrigerant used in heating and cooling systems. The same aggregation 
enables better possibilities for noise insulation compared to building-level chillers and boilers. 
Thermal efficiency of the larger heat or cooling generators used by DHC systems is usually 
better than multiple small building–level boilers, resulting in further reductions in fuel 
consumption, reduced emissions to impact air quality, and fewer carbon emissions (Gochenour, 
1994; International District Energy Association, 2009). When a gas fired CHP generation plant is 
combined with DHC, fuel use efficiencies of over 80% are possible, reducing energy 
consumption and CO2 emissions by approx 20-30%, compared with multiple individual gas CHP 
plant (International Energy Agency, 2005; Difs & Trygg, 2009).  
Why is DHC not a more commonly applied technology?  
Tom Kerr, a senior energy analyst at the International Energy Agency identifies three main 
barriers to the widespread application of DHC: a lack of information about DHC, difficulty in 
recognising the benefits in the current framing of energy regulation, and a lack of strategic heat 
resource planning which is necessary to identify appropriate locations (Kerr, 2009).  
Additionally, the cost savings from the use of DHC vary significantly across implementations. A 
key factor is the density of heating (or cooling) demand which is influenced by the density of 
human activity and by external climate factors. To be the most efficient, the system should be in 
demand all day and night; therefore a diversity of heating or cooling demand is preferred, with a 
mix of building uses connected. Cities with temperate climates (e.g. Rome or San Francisco), or 
areas of lower-density heat demands (e.g. suburban housing, with low people densities and 
where heating is only needed during part of the day) are unlikely to realise significant cost 
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savings through DHC alone. This is reflected in the current spread of DHC systems, which tend 
to be concentrated in northern countries (for heating) or equatorial countries (for cooling) 
(Gochenour, 1994; International Energy Agency, 2008).  
DHC can have high establishment costs early in the project lifecycle (International Energy 
Agency, 2005; Mancarella, 2013). A 2009 report commissioned by the United Kingdom 
government illustrated this by calculating that a district heating system equivalent to Vienna’s 
(serving 270,000 households) would cost £1.5 billion to establish in the UK (Poyry Energy 
Consulting, 2009). The pipe network installation forms a significant part of the cost and this must 
be built at the outset (International Energy Agency, 2005).  
Two further barriers to DHC which are not often mentioned by technical energy journals or 
International Energy Agency publications, but which are identified in industry reports (TCPA, 
2008; London First, 2008; Woodman & Baker, 2008; Roberts, 2008), are concerns about 
consumer protection and associated competition regulations, and the multi-actor coordination 
required for delivery of DHC. Regarding the first point, as a fixed infrastructure, DHC requires 
carefully constructed administration and charging to avoid acting as a monopoly. Competition 
regulation and utility regulation can have perverse effects on the administrative organisations 
which operate DHC systems. For example, currently in the United Kingdom each DHC project 
must negotiate bespoke service and pricing level agreements between the energy company and 
the consumer; there is no standard approach (Woodman & Baker, 2008). Each project must 
consider competition law, allowing other suppliers access to customers and vice versa. 
Complex structures with separate generation and transmission companies often result, creating 
additional administrative burden and bringing a higher level of risk to financial investment in 
either company (London First, 2008). A summary of the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, 
and threats of DHC is provided in Table 1 (P indicatives potential). The barrier of multi-actor 
coordination is addressed below.  
 Strengths Weaknesses Opportunities Threats 
Economic   Reliability 
 Fuel flexibility 
 Installation 
costs 
 Cost 
efficiency(P) 
 Phaseable 
 Monopolistic 
(P) 
Environmental  Fuel efficiency (P) 
 Reduced air 
pollution 
 Suitable for urban 
areas 
 Requires 
strategic 
planning 
 Performance 
related to 
density  
 Reduced 
carbon 
emissions (P) 
 Can apply to 
existing areas 
 Lack of 
information 
Table 1: Summary of DHC strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats 
Why are multiple governments promoting DHC?  
As the introduction describes, society is increasingly aware of the growing impact of human 
activity on the earth’s limited resources and natural environment. In response, governments 
have been actively seeking ways to address resource use, and energy use particularly. There 
has been substantial discussion and literature on how both national and local governments 
could both regulate and incentivise business and industry to address resource challenges, 
particularly encouraging technological solutions. Over the past five to eight years, there has 
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been an increase in both national and local governments promoting specific renewable and 
local carbon technologies as a solution (UN-HABITAT, 2009; Lamia & Robert, 2009) in 
company with demand-side market interventions such as ‘accurate pricing’ of the environmental 
impact of fuel use through taxes. Sweden and Finland provide examples of a straightforward 
fossil fuel tax, and the UK has a similar tax on private businesses – the Climate Change Levy. 
Germany, Spain, and the UK provide examples of governments promoting specific technologies 
through direct financial support or financial mechanisms such as a Feed-In-Tariff or Renewable 
Heat Incentive.  
Within this discussion, DHC is supported alongside a range of efficient or renewable 
technologies and wider considerations of national energy generation and distribution systems. 
Particularly when looking at an urban area, the use of currently available low/zero carbon (LZC) 
or renewable technologies are limited by physical constraints, (London Renewables, 2004; 
Wiginton, Nguyen, & Pearce, 2010; Mark, Parnell, & Sullivan, 2006) particularly in refurbishment 
or retrofit scenarios as summarised in Table 2. As a LZC technology, DHC emerges as a strong 
energy efficiency contender for cities because of the benefits outlined above, its ability to retrofit 
to existing buildings through a phased approach (Lamia & Robert, 2009), and its ability to 
operate at ‘scale’ across whole city districts (Mancarella, 2013). 
Technology Renewable 
or LZC 
New 
Develop. 
Retrofit Technical constraints  
Solar Hot Water R Yes Yes Limited by external surface area and 
over-shading; low grade hot water 
Heat Pumps LZC Yes Depends Depends on energy demand and 
limited by ground or air conditions 
Wind Turbines R No No Wind interference reduces capacity 
Local CHP LZC Yes Yes Depends on energy demand profile 
Photovoltaics  R Yes Yes Limited by external surface area and 
over-shading 
District heating 
and cooling  
LZC Yes Yes More efficient at district scale; 
environ. benefits dependant on fuel 
source 
Geothermal  R Yes No Limited by geology 
Biomass R Yes No Air quality issues; depends on fuel 
source availability  
Table 2: Current renewable, low carbon technologies - technical viability in urban areas 
(compiled from (London First, 2008; Lamia & Robert, 2009; TCPA, 2008; London Renewables, 
2004; Mark, Parnell, & Sullivan, 2006; Wiginton, Nguyen, & Pearce, 2010; London South Bank 
University, 2007; Jennings, 2013; Pantaleo, Shah, & Kierstead, 2013).) 
A range of motivations and mechanisms for implementing DHC exist. Two examples of 
municipal governments promoting DHC primarily because of environmental benefits illustrate 
the reasons and methods of promotion. In 2008 the Hamburg city government updated a 1997 
Climate Protection Act to include the formulation of energy regulations within the scope of urban 
land use planning. In 2007, it passed a Strategy for Climate Protection, as well as a Climate 
Protection Ordinance, which specified heat insulation and energy-saving systems requirements 
for buildings, surpassing German Federal law standards (Local Government Association, 2009). 
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The strategy committed Hamburg to reduce CO2 emissions by 2 million tonnes by 2012; 20% 
less in comparison to 1990 and a per capita reduction of approximately 25%. The strategy 
included a catalogue of some 200 individual measures, among which was the extension of 
existing district heating networks and the conversion of power plants to cogeneration in order to 
serve the expanded network. In some instances, such as the Kronsberg project, the city 
mandated connection to the district heating network, using local bylaws, and planning powers 
(Hamburg, 2010; Institute of Building Services and Energy Design).  
The City of Vienna’s Climate Protection Programme (KLiP) set a 2020 goal for a reduction in 
greenhouse gas emissions per capita of 21% when compared to 1990. The KLiP II programmes 
include a total of 285 individual measures. One specific target is “increasing the share of district 
heating to 50%” (City of Vienna, 2009, p. 1) by planning and then building pipes to support 
expansion of the existing district heating network across the city (City of Vienna, 2009). The 
district heating system is controlled by the municipality through direct ownership and supported 
by national legislation (Wien Energy, 2008). In addition, the plans for expansion have been 
developed in collaboration between municipal planners, municipal environmental coordinators, 
and the district heating utility company (City of Vienna, 2009; City of Vienna, 2007).  
Does DHC require municipal planning?  
The importance of public sector and local government involvement to the successful 
implementation of DHC is recognised by industry associations such as the IEA, the World Bank 
(International Energy Agency, 2008; Poyry Energy Consulting, 2009), and more recently in 
research on pathways for the transition from centralised to decentralised forms of energy 
(Rydin Y, Turcu C, Guy S, & Austin P, 2013). Recognition of public sector involvement in 
existing studies arises from a practical, common-sense understanding of DHC systems, rather 
than any normative goal about state involvement in energy service provision. The IEA comes 
from a fiscal perspective, writing “Moreover, due to the highly capital-intensive nature of these 
systems, DH infrastructure supports a greater level of local government involvement in providing 
services. As a result, such systems may be communally owned, but funded by public and/or 
municipal authorities” (International Energy Agency, 2008, p. 15). A UK government report into 
the costs and benefits of district heating considered that “examples of European countries which 
have successfully developed extensive district heating systems strongly suggests that a drive to 
deploy low/no-carbon heat through district heating must be led by the public sector" (Poyry 
Energy Consulting, 2009). The report cited reasons such as DHC relying upon relevant planning 
powers and close relationships with social housing, implying both local institutional powers and 
publicly-managed private energy use was necessary.  
Two aspects of DHC which suggest the necessity of involvement of local government is the 
scale at which it is used, and the link between DHC and energy density. Individual DHC 
systems are rarely large enough to be a national concern in the way that road or rail 
infrastructure is. However, they are most efficient at district scales beyond a small number of 
buildings, and this suggests the need for coordination among multiple property owners and 
occupiers. They are also more efficient when high energy demands are concentrated together; 
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creating new DHC in cities requires an understanding of land use. Both these elements suggest 
that local government and their associated spatial planning organisations and powers could play 
a role in delivery of new DHC systems. Industry publications recognise that spatial planning 
practices and organisations could be involved: “Energy planning at town and city scale needs a 
strategic approach supported by strong planning polices and complementary enabling 
mechanisms.” (TCPA, 2008, p. 6). The International District Energy Association calls for energy 
plans, which identify and map out consumers of heat or cooling in relation to fuel sources, 
energy generation locations, and potential pipe connection routes, as they provide a focus for 
investment, enabling evaluation of cost, opportunities, barriers, and benefits (2009).  
The challenge of DHC: Implications for the research  
There is a valid technical argument for the use of DHC as one policy solution to multiple 
concerns of an environmental, energy security, climate change, and fuel poverty nature. DHC is 
a potential retrofit solution to existing urban areas. Existing buildings in urban areas are 
estimated to generate one quarter carbon dioxide emissions globally (B. Metz, 2007), and were 
featured as a potential focus for energy and carbon reductions in the run up to the 2009 climate 
negotiations in Copenhagen (United Nations Environment Programme, 2009).  
Preparing for and installing DHC in urban areas appears to need spatial coordination by a 
recognised authority or organisation with specific technical capabilities. DHC can be applied at 
many scales, but by definition it involves connections between individual buildings through 
shared infrastructure. This implicitly places some level of responsibility on the relevant municipal 
or local government authorities to coordinate DHC delivery. Chapter 2 explores in greater detail 
how local authorities have supported DHC. 
Existing literature on DHC is primarily from energy industry sources and aimed at a political or 
wider audience, often with a campaigning tone. These are accompanied by a limited number of 
planning and engineering publications which review energy efficiency and renewable energy 
technologies and establish DHC as a robust and viable technology. Both the academic research 
as well as the industry literature is poorly developed with regards to policy implications. There is 
a particular gap in reviewing the role of the public sector and local government in delivering 
DHC. In this light, research into the relationship between DHC and local government and its 
planning systems will support a greater understanding of urban environmental management.  
1.2 Why is Planning Relevant for DHC?  
What is planning, and what is it concerned with?  
Planning is described for the purposes of this research as the systems which coordinate 
intentional state activity in the making of, and the management of, inhabited places. Defining 
planning is “notoriously problematic” (Sandercock, 1998) because the notion of place and place 
management is deeply embedded in conceptions of society and state action. For this research, 
a definition is deliberately chosen which includes not only the diverse government institutions 
and organisations that undertake planning activities in different countries, but also the tools and 
processes such organisations use to manage place. This definition of planning is broader than 
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statutory minimums of land use control, including all policy actions associated with management 
of place: environmental policies, transport planning, housing forecasts, etc.   
Planning therefore occurs not just through government regulation of private activity 
(development control, building regulations) but also through direct action (government-led or 
public-private development, infrastructure investment), fiscal controls (taxation, development 
agreements, lease covenants), planmaking or policymaking (community visions, land use plans, 
development policy), and knowledge sharing and coordination (guidance, community 
consultation and engagement).  
Because of its focus – inhabited places – planning philosophy is necessarily concerned with 
human society and its use of space, the state and its investment in or management of inhabited 
space, and the market and its use of inhabited space. Planning practice and theory is self-
conscious (Healey P. , 2007) and has been concerned with the ethics and values of deciding 
about management of place. Since the 1960s, with the first criticisms of an apparently rational 
and socially neutral approach to planning activity, planners, and planning theorists have been 
concerned with decision-making for and priorities in the creation and management of place, 
grappling with questions of ‘who plans?’, ‘how’, and ‘for whom?’ (Meyerson, 1973; Banfield, 
1973).  
In response to these challenges, planning theory and policy has sought, often unsuccessfully, to 
elaborate a coherent intellectual foundation for the practice of planning. Advocacy planning and 
a political economy approach to planning have sought to position the planner as a politically 
responsible actor in society (Harvey, 1973). Issues of social justice (Fainstein, 2000; Young, 
1991) and social complexity or postmodern planning (Sandercock, 1998; Allmendinger, 2001) 
were considered in response to the effects globalization and the rapid growth of mega cities 
(Throgmorton & Eckstein, 2003; Scharpf, 2000; Sassen, 2002). One of the themes identified in 
that body of research is that cities must compete globally for capital, business, and skilled 
residents. Environmental health, quality of life, and place-marketing therefore become 
increasingly important aspects of urban economic success (Thornley, 2005). In international 
development literature this is often described as a call for ‘good urban management’ (Pfeiffer & 
Hall, 2000). This, alongside international pressure on global resource shortages and climate 
change, drives an increased social expectation of governments to manage environmental 
concerns (Borja, 1997).  
Why is planning concerned with energy use in cities?  
In one sense, planning systems are being called upon to coordinate changes to urban energy 
use because environmental policy goals have spatial implications. The causes and solutions of 
environmental issues are often locally specific, with implications for urban form, local 
government physical interventions, and social or human activity in defined locations (Campbell, 
2002). As one example, air quality can be affected by regional and national transport patterns 
generally, but resolves as an environmental or health concern in very specific areas; the 
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solutions are influenced by non-spatial policy (improved car emissions testing) but can also be 
locally deployed (traffic management, road spraying, tree planting, etc).   
This spatial manifestation leads governments to increasingly rely upon planning processes as a 
proactive regulatory tool in policy making and delivery for quality of life, environmental concerns, 
and other social issues such as housing values. Both applied and theoretical planning and 
public policy literature points to planning systems as a policy coordinator for a wide – and 
growing – range of ‘spatial’ policy issues (Healey P. , 2007; Crawford & French, 2008; Thornley, 
2005). Allmendinger and Haughton go further to argue that spatial planning should be re-
envisaged “in light of the broader dynamics of `reterritorialisation' of the state and allied to a new 
politics of scale” (2007, p. 1480). For them, understanding the role of planning systems requires 
“examining how land-use plans are both shaping and being shaped by other sectoral policies, 
such as housing, health, economic development, transport, environment, and social policy” 
(2007, p. 1480). This integration of social and economic concerns is often called spatial 
planning. 
Looking at the UK as an example, the increasing scope of the planning system is described in 
the Barker Review of Land Use Planning Interim Report (2006) which identified twenty-one 
areas where local authorities had been given additional responsibilities since the Town and 
Country Planning Act 1990: of these, eight relate directly to the environment. UK energy policy 
also demonstrates how planning is being called upon to address challenging policy problems in 
a spatial manner. The 1980s saw deregulation and privatization of the energy industries; since 
2000, the rise of environmental concerns about pollution, resource use, and more recently 
climate change have increased government desire to intervene in the liberalised market (DTI, 
2007; DTI, 2003). Government agencies began to promote specific decentralised and 
renewable energy technologies alongside market mechanisms such as the European Union 
Emissions Trading Scheme as solutions (Williams, 2010). Policy targets and associated market 
interventions in support of renewable technologies quickly encountered tension in the physical, 
spatial realm with other policy aims for land use, biodiversity, preservation of landscape, and 
ecological damage (TCPA, 2008; Smith, 2007; CLG, 2007). A further conflict emerged between 
government goals for energy efficiency in new buildings (e.g. zero carbon homes) and the 
capability of the existing planning process and authorities to regulate this via development 
control (Ellis, 2008; Williams, 2010; Keirstead & Schultz, London and beyond: Taking a closer 
look at urban energy policy, 2010). As a result, local planning authorities were given new remits 
to plan or coordinate local energy generation in national policy statements (Ellis, 2008; CLG, 
2010; CLG, 2007). This emphasis on local coordination and planning of energy generation 
continued in the 2012 consolidation of planning policy. The National Planning Policy Framework 
overtly recognises the need for a place-based strategy for energy needs which considers 
landscape constraints and community initiative (CLG, 2012). This trend is not limited to the UK; 
cities around the world are turning to urban planning processes and tools to manage local 
energy provision in response to carbon and energy concerns (Carbon Disclosure Project, 2013; 
C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group, 2011).  
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A second and arguably more fundamental reason that planning systems are being called upon 
to coordinate changes in urban energy use is that urban planning processes and products - 
visions for the management and future of cities - have energy implications. People use energy 
to go about their lives and operate their businesses; cities host this activity and the structure of 
cities influences the use of energy as well as its movement and generation. Well insulated 
homes and offices support business activities in the same way as non-insulated buildings but 
consume less energy to cool and heat. Building orientations shape the potential for local solar 
generation and the need for lighting inside. Dense housing which shares energy through walls 
or pipes consumes more energy per square meter but less per person than low density housing. 
By intentionally shaping the growth or regeneration of a city, planning is intentionally shaping 
the current and future use and generation of energy within that city.  
And as human activity continues to urbanise, the growing discussion on the importance of urban 
resource infrastructures should have important implications for how planning organisations 
approach the future of cities and spaces (UN-HABITAT, 2009; Sherriff & Turcu, 2012). Just as 
major infrastructure systems for water, sewerage, and electricity have structured cities in the 
past (UN-HABITAT, 2009; Graham & Marvin, 2001) a diversification of energy generation and 
supply will also impact the physical and economic shape of buildings and places.  
How has planning been concerned with energy use in cities?  
The relationship between urban form, urban management, and energy use has been a relatively 
neglected area within planning literature and practice (Williams J. , 2013; Monstadt J. , 2009). 
This weak tradition of planning for energy use and infrastructure for environmental concerns 
contrasts with a markedly stronger tradition of planning transport infrastructure for the efficient 
movement of people in cities (Bannister, 2002), or the tradition of controlling land use to reduce 
the effects of flooding.  
This disparity is notable in light of the recognition afforded to urban planning’s role in creating 
energy use and generation patterns seen in both the development literature (e.g. (Allen & You, 
2004) (UN-HABITAT, 2009)) and geography literature (e.g. (Betsill & Bulkeley, 2006; Campbell, 
2002; Bulkeley, Castan Broto, Hodson, & Marvin, 2010)), due to their concerns with 
environment, urban change, and transitions. The former tends to be concerned with managing 
the environmental impact of rapid population growth and the latter focuses on the complexity of 
urban energy and carbon flows and structural challenges of technology change. However 
implicit in both approaches is a recognition of the importance of place-shaping processes and 
organisations in addressing environmental concerns.  
This situation has evolved in the past few years, with a more nuanced consideration of urban 
planning's relationship to energy emerging in consideration of the roles of planning in 
addressing climate change (Romero-Lankao, 2012; Coutard & Rutherford, 2010; Brandoni & 
Polonara, 2012), and Williams' (2013) recent international investigation into the implications of 
planning's theoretical concepts and structural approaches for low carbon infrastructure. This 
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thesis can contribute to this important and emerging literature discussion, as Chapter 2 explains 
in more detail.  
How is planning understood as part of wider urban policy making and delivery?  
Current policy-making and policy-implementation in contemporary industrialised societies is 
regularly characterised by social scientists using the term 'governance' to describe a shift in the 
way policy goals are made and implemented. Jordan, in The Governance of Sustainable 
Development: Taking Stock and Looking Forwards explains that "By using the term 
'governance' instead of 'government'...draws attention to the empirical fact that these processes 
and reforms have meant that many contemporary policies are now implemented by a wider 
array of public, private, and voluntary organisations than would traditionally have been included 
within a purely `governmental' framework" (Jordan, 2008, p. 22).  
There is a broad consensus that patterns of policy making and implementation described by the 
term 'governance' are changes away from central government as the principal provider of 
control and regulation and towards a practice of coordinating activities among citizens, activist 
organisations, lobby groups, the private sector, and other stakeholders (e.g., Hirst, 2006; 
Kooiman, 2003; Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003). There is also a consensus that governance implies 
policy making and delivery is fragmented and often contested. As Bulkeley and Kern explain, 
the emergence of new forms of governing practice suggest that it is no longer possible to take 
for granted the context within which policy-making is being constructed and implemented. The 
complex interplay between shifts in levels of governing and relations between them, and 
between modes of governing, creates a “fragmented or ‘splintered’ governance landscape . . . of 
urban governance practices” (2006, p. 2242). As a result, policy is designed and implemented 
by coalitions of stakeholders which can take time to come together and the outcome is 
dependent on often evolving power relationships  (Stoker, 2000).   
Public policy literature often takes this dispersed but interconnected approach to policy and 
incorporates a 'network' perspective to governance, adopting conceptualisations and language 
from Castels' 'network society' and from inter-organisational management studies (e.g., Hajer & 
Wagenaar, 2003; Healey P., 2007). In this conceptualisation, policy is implemented and arrived 
at by networks of actors (individuals and organisations) who exchange information, agree on 
goals and negotiate implementation (Rhodes, 1997). Others argue that these interactions do not 
happen in a vacuum but within a context and history of relationships which provide a cognitive 
framework for policy making and implementation. Different disciplines have understood the 
influence of this 'institutional setting' on policy making in a variety of ways, generally arguing that 
underneath this pluri-centric and horizontal interaction there is an underlying culture which 
guides the structure of networks and the actions of actors (e.g., Lowndes V. , 1996; Immergut, 
1998).  
As planning is understood as the intentional state activity of the making and management of 
places, governance behaviours imply that coordinating urban policy and change happens in a 
context of institutional fragmentation, with a high number and diversity of actors who have 
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influence on urban policy implementation and urban development. Hooghe and Marks (2001) 
called this the 'multi-actor and multi-level game'. Bulkeley and Kern (2006) further describe how 
open and multi-stakeholder circumstances increase the complexity of policy formation and 
delivery in cities.  
To operate within governance patterns of policy making and implementation, planning 
organisations have to negotiate with other stakeholders to achieve spatial policy goals. Planning 
processes can be part of those negotiations; for example, a local authority permitting increased 
housing densification in exchange for improved public realm. Governance also challenges the 
use of traditional government-led planning processes and introduces the formation of new 
institutional arrangements, such as public-private partnerships or civic coalitions, which can alter 
the implementation of policy and the powers of planning processes (Healey P. , 2007). Salet, 
Thornley and Kreukels in Metropolitan Governance and Spatial Planning (2002) discuss the 
challenges of spatial coordination in governance patterns of behaviour. They specifically 
highlight the challenge of balancing environmental qualities in a context of institutional 
fragmentation and a growing separation of the 'material' boundaries of a city (its consumption 
and production footprint) from the morphological boundaries of authority control.   
Understanding policy creation and implementation with a governance network paradigm has 
also raised questions about democratic procedures (Booher & Innes, 2002), community steering 
(Sehested, 2009), and transparency and accountability in urban planning (Nyseth, 2008). 
Comparative planning authors have stressed that the ability of planning systems to undertake 
place management is influenced by the institutional (often legal) context of government control 
over land and therefore the power of planning systems in governance networks varies 
significantly between place and context (Newman & Thornley, 2005; Stead & Cotella, 2011).  
1.3  Research Aims and Thesis Structure 
Broadly, this research aims to contribute to theoretical and empirical dialogue on the potential 
contribution of planning systems, in relation to other urban policy and management 
organisations and processes, in building and managing urban infrastructure that will achieve 
environmental policy goals. Set within questions of a public policy nature, namely the interaction 
of the public sector, the market, and civil society in achieving desired societal and environmental 
outcomes, the research is particularly focused on the role of planning organisations and 
processes within governance networks in delivering DHC systems. 
DHC is a highly efficient form of providing locally generated thermal energy for heating and 
cooling urban environments, but requires strategic heat resource planning between many 
consumers and substantial financial investment to construct. The premise of the research is that 
the delivery of DHC as a policy goal requires the coordination and negotiation of multiple actors 
across space and time, and that planning organisations and processes might have an important 
role to play in this interaction.  
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There is a shortage of practical and policy insight into how planning systems shape or support 
the creation of new urban DHC systems. The research intends to contribute to planning 
literature and environmental policy thinking by undertaking qualitative in-depth analysis of the 
role of planning organisations in governance networks in five international attempts to deliver 
DHC. This comparative approach should enable the identification of how planning, institutional 
context, and governance networks can influence the creation of new DHC systems. 
Research questions 
Building on the literature context described above, three research questions are proposed. One, 
How do governance networks support the implementation of district heating and cooling 
systems? This question recognises the weakened regulatory or management capacity of the 
public sector in creating new urban infrastructure for environmental goals. It positions DHC as a 
complex policy change which requires public and private actors to interact in horizontal, pluri-
centric networks of coordination and negation. This research question seeks to understand how  
features of modern governance policy making and delivery constrain or enable the delivery of 
DHC in networks of negotiation and interaction among public, private, and civic actors. 
The second research question is How does the institutional setting influence the delivery of 
district heating and cooling systems? This question seeks to understand importance of 
historical or legal context on the ability of actors in governance networks to deliver urban energy 
infrastructure. It asks if the institutional setting is constraining or shaping the actors who engage 
in DHC as a policy goal and the ways in which they work towards delivery of DHC. Comparative 
planning studies indicate that legal and policy context is particularly relevant in understanding 
how planning processes and organisations might shape other actors.  
Together these questions help inform the third research question, formulated as, What is the 
role of planning, in relation to market, civic, and to other government organisations, in 
delivering district heating and cooling systems? The research aims to consider the role of 
planning organisations and processes both in light of a rising global trend for governments to 
address energy use in cities and increased expectations for planning systems to address 
environmental concerns.  
Structure of this thesis 
The subsequent two chapters review existing literature and understanding around the research 
questions, providing additional theoretical context and background. Chapter 2 discusses 
governance networks as observed phenomenon of policy making and explores what the 
existing literature reveals about the position of planning organisations and processes within 
urban policy. It builds on a desktop review to suggest potential roles for planning in delivering 
DHC systems. Chapter 3 focuses on the context for the second research question, describing 
how concerns of legal, regulative or social context inform governance behaviours. The 
implications for the role of planning and the third research question are discussed in both 
chapters. Chapter 4 considers how existing literature described in Chapters 2 and 3 informs the 
research approach to the three questions, discussing implications for the research design. The 
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text builds a case for the use of a conceptual framework, Actor-Centered Institutionalism (ACI), 
which can distinguish both governance behaviours and institutional concerns across a 
comparative analysis of international case studies. It provides a concluding section summarising 
the research approach and outlining the potential contribution of the research.     
Chapter 5 describes how ACI structures the research methodologies and case study selection. 
It describes the data collection and analysis, linking the case study analysis to the three 
research questions. Chapters 6 to 10 address each case in turn, using the structure of ACI to 
analyse the data and respond to the research questions. Chapter 11 then describes the 
comparative analysis across the five cases, using the presence of failed attempts to implement 
DCH to draw conclusions for the three research questions. The final chapter summarises the 
contribution of this research, discusses implications for future research, reflects on the limits of 
the research design, and proposes implications for practice.   
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Chapter 2. Planning for DHC in Governance 
Networks   
 
This chapter discusses existing literature on modern policy making and implementation, 
providing background to the research's concern with how cities can build DHC systems. It 
begins by reviewing strands of governance theory and portrays DHC as a complex policy 
problem which requires governance network patterns of behaviour. It then explores how 
planning systems can be understood in governance and how planning processes might support 
DHC. Implications for research questions one and three are summarised in a concluding 
section.  
2.1 Introducing Governance 
Due to its wide-spread use across many academic disciplines, the term “governance” has a 
multiplicity of definitions and uses. Paul Hirst in Debating Governance (2006) and Theories of 
Democratic Network Governance (2007) identifies five main applications. One, the use of ‘good 
governance’ by the World Bank in economic development, where it implies that an effective 
political framework is conducive to private economic action. Second, in international relations to 
describe supra-national platforms for decision making, such as the IPPC, the UN and the World 
Bank. Third, to refer to responsible structures for decision making in corporate bodies; 
‘corporate governance’. Fourth, in organisational studies to describe the application of 
commercial management styles, such as target setting, to public sector organisations (Sorensen 
& Torfing, 2007) (Hirst, 2006). 
Finally, governance is used by a wide range of disciplines to describe the patterns of public-
private cooperation and partnership to coordinate policy making (Sorensen & Torfing, 2007). It 
is this latter use of the term which concerns this research: governance as a characterization of 
observed behaviour patterns around policy goals. The patterns described are real changes 
away from central government as the principal provider of control and regulation and towards a 
practice of coordinating activities among citizens, activist organisations, lobby groups, the 
private sector and other stakeholders (Hirst, 2006; Kooiman, 2003; Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003). A 
shift towards a less centralised policy decision making and towards governance interactions has 
been demonstrated by a number of studies; Berger’s review of EU regions (2003) and Healey et 
al.’s review of the Grainger Town Partnership (Healey, De Magalhaes, Madanipour, & 
Pendlebury, 2002) are two of the more well known.  
Researchers of many stripes agree that governance patterns of interaction are a response to 
the failure of government and of markets alike to provide efficient solutions to policy problems 
(Marsh, 1998; Kooiman, 2003; Besussi, 2006; Rhodes, 2007). The failure results from the 
characteristics of the policy problems themselves and from structural changes in society and 
market forces (Sorensen & Torfing, 2007; Kooiman, 2003).  
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An often cited structural reason for the emergence of governance patterns in multiple countries 
is increasing societal diversity, referring generally to a fragmentation and specialisation of 
society and markets (Kooiman, 2003; Sorensen & Torfing, 2007; UN-HABITAT, 2009) and, 
particularly in the EU, to the introduction of multiple layers of government regulation and policy, 
from deregulated regions and local government to the European Union. Increasing social 
diversity and economic specialisation results in a greater number or range of policy initiatives to 
achieve desired policy outcomes, as no one policy can address everyone or every type of 
activity. Rhodes is particularly adept at illustrating how privatisation of previously state activity 
resulted in increased fragmentation and increased government (and governance) activity, not 
less (Rhodes, 2007). Scharpf also finds the context of ‘transnational interdependence’ as main 
cause of governance, arising from the cross-boundary nature of policy problems (transnational 
environmental pollution) and the multi-level nature of modern policy solutions which act at local, 
regional, national, and transnational levels (Scharpf, 1997). Economic globalisation and the 
privatization of previously public services, mixed with societal diversity combine to weaken the 
ability of a central government to enact top-down policy.  
Problem complexity is also cited as a reason for the shift to governance patterns: the increasing 
level of knowledge and power required to address policy issues and generate solutions 
(Kooiman, 2003). Stoker (2000) terms this ‘high bounded rationality’ and argues that gaining 
understanding for technical and complex policy issues is beyond any one organisation. Hajer 
and Wagenaar argue that this practical inability of governments to act unilaterally is 
supplemented by a change in social perception away from state activity as a positive, rational, 
and civilizing force to a ‘sense of unease’ about the capability of state action. This arises from 
an awareness of potential perverse consequences of large scale rational planning, such as the 
‘new towns’ of the United Kingdom, and a belief that market forces are efficient and lead to the 
‘best’ outcomes (2003). Therefore the formation of policy becomes a sensitive process and a 
testing ground for acceptability of policy implementation.  
Hajer and Wagenaar, in their influential book Deliberative Policy Analysis (2003), provide a 
robust summary of the reasons for the failure of government and markets to provide efficient 
policy solutions. Their five challenges for policy analysis can also usefully viewed as five 
challenges for policy solutions which require governance patterns of behaviour in response. As 
a litmus test for policy problems, their ‘new spaces of politics’ and related implications for 
governance decision making patterns are summarised in Table 3.  
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Challenge of policy problems Implications for government 
decision making patterns 
 Structural changes in society mean that 
challenges are no longer top-down or 
local/regional/central, but non-
hierarchical.  
 Politics and policy making often 
happen in configurations that do 
not conform to the old formats. 
 Politics and policy making under the 
condition of radical uncertainty. 
 Awareness of perverse consequences of 
large scale rational planning. 
 Deep unease about possibilities of 
effective and responsible state power. 
 Governments no longer make 
decisions 'once appropriate 
knowledge is available'. 
 Instead often make decisions in 
uncertain knowledge arenas (this is 
appreciated by public).  
 Increase importance of 'difference' for our 
understanding of politics. 
 Cultural complexity in society. 
 Understanding of issues, language 
issues, problem of translation 
 Importance of framing. 
 Acting upon an awareness of 
interdependence and need to collaborate. 
 Creating collaboration.  
 New modes of conflict resolution – 
shared problem solving.  
 Policymaking and the dynamics of trust 
and identity. 
 Lack of general trust in policies.  
 Policymaking process important for 
creating trust in politics. 
 Process as 'will formation' for policy 
goals.  
 Range of interactive, roundtable 
practices. 
Table 3: The new spaces of politics (summarised from Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003) 
Network governance 
A substantial portion of recent town planning and public policy literature on governance 
incorporates a ‘network perspective’ either in theoretical language or conceptualization  (Berger, 
2003; Healey P. , 2007; Nyseth, 2008). A network perspective on governance emerged from 
public policy (Rhodes, 1997) inter-organizational analysis (Hanf & Scharpf, 1978) and socio-
economic research and literature (Jones, Hesterley, & Borghatti, 1997), and their respective 
concerns with how to solve societal, economic or environmental problems with exchange based 
relationships. In all lineages, networks are a conceptualization of exchange based governance 
patterns in a complex multi-stakeholder environment (Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003).  
This research acknowledges the distinction between the policy networks of Rhodes and Kickert 
(1997), with an emphasis on the structural exchange relations between interdependent political 
bodies and the governance networks of Scharpf, Mayntz (1997) and Kooiman (2003), with an 
emphasis on horizontal, actor-led loose structural coupling between autonomous public and 
private actors creating a negotiated consensus which provides the basis for coordination. In 
both approaches, networks are not critical theories or normative goals, but empirical 
descriptions based on the operation of 21
st
 century democratic governments (Kooiman, 2003). 
Employing Sorensen and Torfing’s useful classification of governance network theories (2007), 
the policy networks of Rhodes and Kickert can be understood as ‘interdependency theory’ 
focused on conflict within a hierarchy of actors who are organisationally dependent on one 
another.  
Scharpf, Mayntz, and Kooiman’s governance networks are classified as ‘governability theory’ by 
Sorensen and Torfing: focused on coordination between many independent actors. Kooiman, in 
particular is clear that governance network patterns emerge when no single actor has sufficient 
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resources to act unilaterally, and the relationships between actors are complex and the 
hierarchy (if it exists) is not apparent or understood (2003). For Scharpf, Mayntz, and Kooiman, 
governance networks can be understood as more fluid than policy networks and involving civic 
and market stakeholders as well as traditional political institutions.  
Sorensen and Torfing (2007), writing in Theories of Democratic Network Governance describe 
network governance patterns as:  
1) A relatively stable horizontal articulation of interdependent, but 
operationally autonomous actors;  
2)  Who interact through negotiations; 
3) Which take place within a regulative, normative, cognitive and 
imaginary framework; 
4)  That is self-regulating within limits set by external agencies; and 
5)  Which contributes to the production of public purpose. (p. 9) 
 
In this definition of governance networks, policy objectives are generated and delivered by non-
subservient organisations and individuals (actors), who rely upon each other's resources and 
capabilities to generate policy but who are not able to command each other directly. Sorensen 
and Torfing are clear that 'horizontal' does not imply equality, but a lack of hierarchy. These are 
a mix of public, semi-public, and private actors who coordinate policy through exchange and 
negotiations, giving and taking knowledge and resources in a trust oriented manner without 
‘majority vote’ or other formal or legal mechanisms. These interactions do not happen in a 
vacuum but within a context and history of relationships which provide a cognitive framework. 
Finally, the aim of these interactions is for the public good; that is an outcome which addresses 
a policy problem (2007).   
Recent thinking on governance networks has been concerned with exploring normative aspects 
of governance network theory, particularly democratic problems and potentials (Sorensen & 
Torfing, 2007; Nyseth, 2008) and the potential for governance networks as pathways to 
sustainable development and good urban management (Allen & You, 2004; Pfeiffer & Hall, 
2000). This research is positioned within the latter approach, focusing on the particular 
challenges for large urban energy infrastructure.  
A governance network, as opposed to a policy network, approach to governance is considered 
as an appropriate interpretation for this research. Chapter 1 describes how the research's focus 
on DHC systems should address with the interaction between public, private, and civic actors 
needed to build and operate the systems. Rhodes’ policy networks are found in hierarchical 
patterns of behaviour between government actors and arise from government policy studies. 
Kooiman’s network governance approach which explicitly mixes the public and the private and 
is therefore more applicable to the investigation of DHC system. Additionally, the research's 
focus on the role of planning organisations in delivering DHC requires a research framework 
which concentrates on decision making among individuals towards the policy outcome (a 
governance network focus) rather than conflict between individuals (the policy networks focus).  
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Multi-level governance 
Other governance approaches have focused specifically on policy responses to environmental 
challenges. Multi-level governance is an approach towards understanding governance patterns 
on issues on climate change (Betsill & Bulkeley, 2006) and environmental policy within the EU, 
building on earlier framing of governance networks into 'vertical' and 'horizontal' levels (Hooghe 
& Marks, 2001). It contends that a city's capacity to address environmental issues is significantly 
influenced by links between and across scales of governance; for example national policy and 
targets as enablers or barriers to local action or transnational networks as facilitating knowledge 
exchange. In this literature, network forms of interaction often imply a sharing of knowledge and 
leadership among actors rather than explicit negotiations. Over the course of the past ten years, 
multi-level governance has made strong case for climate change mitigation and adaptation - 
including energy management - as an issue for urban actors rather than national or international 
actors. Adger, Jordan, Betsill, and Bulkeley describe how local actors draw on international 
knowledge and support to establish policy, positions, and strategies for climate change action 
(Adger & Jordan, 2009; Betsill & Bulkeley, 2013).  
However Betsill and Bulkeley's recent reflection on the state of multi-level governance analysis 
on climate change concluded the research has tended to focus on municipal activity and vertical 
relationships between local governments and national governments, leaving relationships 
between the public and private sector un-examined or assumed static. As they acknowledge, 
To date, there has been limited engagement with the ways in which, 
say, the activities of small- and medium-sized enterprises, the urban 
investment strategies of major companies and donors, or other 
processes that govern production and consumption, may serve to 
sustain, limit or contest urban climate responses. One example that 
has recently been highlighted is the limited extent to which studies of 
the multilevel governance of urban climate change responses have 
engaged with the dynamics of urban infrastructure systems. (Betsill & 
Bulkeley, 2013, p. 114). 
They highlight the spatially constrained nature of urban infrastructure systems like DHC. This 
implies that multi-level governance is unlikely to be an appropriate approach to guide the 
research aims and it is not proposed to be taken forward as a guidance concept for this 
research. However in light of their gap identification, this research's deliberate focus on the 
intersection of public and private activity on urban energy infrastructure has the potential to 
contribute to multi-level governance literature.  
Planning as governance  
Planning theory has also taken up governance investigations as a continuation of earlier 
stakeholder and advocacy theory within planning studies. Communicative planning and 
advocacy planning in particular have explored the role of planning in a modern world where 
government and social institutions, citizens groups, environmental activists, etc are all involved 
in the process of forming and delivering urban policy solutions beyond land use zoning or urban 
development growth (Healey P. , 2007). Communicative planning theory proposes that 
“Planners should not formulate and argue for the interests of the weakest but instead should 
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generate processes and dialogues which allow the weakest parties to formulate their own needs 
and interests”, applying Habermas’s theories on communicative action (Sehested, 2009, p. 245; 
Boelens, 2010; Healey P. , 1999). In this approach, planning organisations and planners are not 
explicit actors in urban governance negotiations, but instead guardians or stewards of 
processes which shape the scope and nature of governance interactions. "The planning project, 
infused with this understanding of socio-spatial dynamics, becomes a governance project 
focused on managing dilemmas of co-existing in shared spaces" (Healey P. , 2007, p. 3). 
Understanding planning processes as governance behaviours and focusing on process can be 
understood as a retreat from prescriptive policies in response to the 'new spaces of politics', an 
increased understanding of cities as complex and dynamic settings, and as a result of the 
growing number of stakeholders engaged in spatial planning processes (Newman & Thornley, 
2005; Sehested, 2009; Healey P. , 2007). More recently, considerations of planning processes 
as governance have shown an increased concern with democracy (Nyseth, 2008) and power 
relationships (Booher & Innes, 2002). In this approach, planning theory has moved beyond a 
normative role for planning processes in isolation and is now concerned with identifying 
normative processes and patterns of interaction between planning organisations and the other 
actors involved in managing space and society (Healey P. , 2007; Sehested, 2009; Nyseth, 
2008; Tewdr-Jones & Allmendinger, 1998). Communicative planning's focus on qualities and 
shape of process can be understood as a echo of network governance hypotheses about the 
quality and characteristics of the network interactions in shaping outcomes alongside actor 
resource.  
This theoretical understanding provides context to how planning systems might be conceived 
within modern policy making and suggests that planning processes and organisations might 
have specific, helpful roles in creating and supporting governance networks. The next section 
explores what governance means for DHC; a subsequent section explores how planning 
organisations can be understood as actors within governance networks and reviews existing 
knowledge about the role of planning in DHC.   
2.2 DHC Requires Governance Networks 
Chapter 1 describes how delivery of DHC is a complex policy challenge which requires spatial, 
intellectual, and financial coordination and exchange among multiple landowners, energy users, 
government organisations, and a range of other organisations and individuals. The barriers to 
the delivery of DHC were set out as: requiring local and expert knowledge, requiring strategic 
energy planning, the need to overcome a monopolistic nature through regulation, and potentially 
high installation costs. By its very nature DHC is a communal infrastructure shared by multiple 
parties and cannot be implemented by one organisation alone. 
The complexity of DHC is reinforced by external political and economic factors which mirror 
Hager and Wagenaar's ‘New Spaces of Politics’ (2003) which drive governance network 
patterns of behaviour. In liberalised and privatised energy markets, governments do not have 
the regulatory or political power to force the construction of DHC, and instead must deliver their 
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policy goals through interaction and exchange with the market (London First, 2008; Monstadt J. 
, 2009); a core feature of governance networks. As a technical solution, the complex variables 
for delivery, such as layout of pipework, cost, location for central plant, etc create a barrier to 
understanding among the various organisations involved. This also increases the difficulty in 
promoting DHC as a policy solution (London First, 2008; TCPA, 2008). As a spatially specific 
solution, the delivery of DHC requires that national policy goals need to be reconciled with local 
powers, policies, and capabilities. The technical complexities of DHC need to be conveyed in a 
public policy setting; therefore the framing and explanation of the drivers and benefits becomes 
important. To overcome these barriers requires national and local involvement by a range of 
organisations and individuals at many scales; the solution is both multi-actor and multi-scalar.  
Other characteristics of DHC which drive governance network patterns of behaviour arise from 
its delivery and management. The construction and ongoing administration of DHC systems 
requires exchange of knowledge and resources between a significant number of actors, from 
national ministers to local residents groups, and often including multiple government authorities. 
This is due to both fiscal and physical reasons. To obtain capital investment, a large customer 
or grouping of multiple loads to serve as a ‘base’ load is preferred; this usually involves local 
authorities and their institutional buildings, public housing, or their political ability to facilitate 
multiple private energy demands (London First, 2008; TCPA, 2008). Physically retrofitting a 
DHC pipe network into an existing urban area requires government coordination and political 
will, given the disruptive nature of the work and interface with other below ground services as 
well as development permissions. 
Because the cost and carbon efficiency of DHC are strongest at larger scales (e.g. district or 
city-wide systems) (International Energy Agency, 2005), the number of actors involved can be 
significant. In the Copenhagen district heating system, which supplies 97% of the city’s heating 
needs, the installation and ongoing management involves at least 22 agencies and institutions, 
not including financial organisations or heating customers (C40 Cities, 2010). Support of the 
general public is particularly crucial in a community energy approach, where a co-operative local 
organisation owns or manages the DHC system (TCPA, 2008). 
As a complex, multi-actor, and multi-scalar environmental policy goal, DHC delivery requires 
governance network patterns of behaviour. Revisiting Hager and Wagenaar’s summary of the 
five challenges for policy problems (2003), Table 4 summarises how delivery of DHC fits Hajer 
and Wagenaar's pattern of a policy challenge which requires governance networks patterns of 
action.  
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Challenge for Policy 
Problems 
Implications for Governance 
Patterns 
 Relevance for DHC Delivery 
No longer top-down or local -
regional - central.  
 
Politics and policy making often 
happen in configurations that do 
not conform to the old formats. 
Multi-level governance, regimes, 
etc.  
Reconcile national policy 
goals with local powers, 
policies, capacities, and local 
stakeholders (e.g. residents).  
Politics and policy making 
under the condition of radical 
uncertainty. 
Awareness of perverse 
consequences of large scale 
rational planning. 
Deep unease about 
possibilities of effective and 
responsible state power. 
Governments no longer make 
decisions 'once appropriate 
knowledge is available’; instead 
often make decisions in 
uncertain knowledge areas. This 
is appreciated by public. 
Need local and specialist 
knowledge to understand 
technical suitability of DHC .  
DHC requires government 
coordination and can be seen 
as an overly state-controlled 
activity 
Increase importance of 
'difference' for our 
understanding of politics. 
Technocracy. Cultural 
complexity in society 
Understanding of issues, 
language issues.  
Problem of translation 
Importance of framing 
DHC is a technological 
solution with different benefits 
to different audiences. 
Challenges conceptual 
relationship of government 
and utilities.  
Acting upon an awareness of 
interdependence and need 
to collaborate. 
Problem of discursive barrier. 
Need for collaboration. 
Creating communities of action. 
Technology with multiple 
actors involved; requires 
collaboration between many 
parties.  
Policymaking and the 
dynamics of trust and 
identity.  
Lack of general trust in 
politics. 
 
Policymaking process important 
for creating trust in politics and 
'will formation for policy goals. 
Range of interactive, roundtable 
practices. 
DHC as policy goal alone will 
not suffice; need to engage 
general public and technical 
support.  
Table 4: Comparison of DHC delivery characteristics with Hager and Wagenaar's (2003) five 
challenges for governance networks  
The actors of DHC 
This section reflects on the various organisations and individuals who could be involved in the 
creation and operation of DHC systems; they can be understood as actors in a governance 
network. A literature review did not uncover any reports or papers which expressly outlined the 
various actors, or their roles, involved in the delivery of DHC. To compensate, a desktop review 
was conducted on a number of DHC systems in operation. The following text includes examples 
selected to illustrate the range of actors who can be involved in DHC. 
Government organisations and departments can be an actor in DHC systems at a national and 
or a local level, and through a range of departmental responsibilities such as energy, urban 
areas, environment, and finance. At a national level, they can be involved by supporting DHC in 
policy statements, developing standard regulation for heat or coolth sales, or through direct 
fiscal incentives such as taxes or feed in tariffs. An example of a national government actor can 
be seen in South Korea where the Integrated Energy Supply Act of 1999 requires new urban 
developments to use district heating; it also established tax incentives for both suppliers and 
users (United Nations, 2002). At a local or urban level governments can be involved in network 
coordination and exchange in a variety of ways, from local policy statements, financial support, 
strategic spatial planning of the systems, through to direct investment in the DHC systems by 
32 
 
providing land for the energy centre(s). A local government actor example can be found in 
Denmark, where the (national) 2000 Heat Act sets out in Article 3, that it is “(..) the duty of each 
district council, in cooperation with the supply companies and other involved parties, to prepare 
a plan for the supply of heat in the municipality” (EcoHeat4.eu, 2010). Other roles can be seen 
in Southampton City Council, United Kingdom where the local municipality provided land at no 
cost, offered public buildings as the main customers, and helped to secure a financial grant to 
overcome the set-up costs of a local DHC system (London First, 2008).  
Businesses which are local to the DHC system can agree to becoming energy customers of the 
network. Other roles include providing land or space for the DHC network, or publicly supporting 
or opposing the DHC system. In San Diego, a 2.5 mile subterranean district cooling system 
feeds more than 4 million square feet of space, including hotels, theatres, and shopping 
centres, due to strong business demand for cheap cooling energy (NRG, 2005). Residents have 
a similar role as potential customers and as public supporters or detractors of a potential 
system. In Vienna, Austria, residents are encouraged to purchase energy from the DHC system 
through both active marketing and local government policy (City of Vienna, 2007; Wien Energy, 
2008).  
Industry alliances and civic campaign groups can actively promote DHC as a priority 
environmental policy goal, or share knowledge about its potential benefits and the technical 
options available. These types of actors include both global organisations such as the 
International District Energy Association, as well as local organisations, such as London First in 
the UK, and their promotion of DHC as an environmental solution in Cutting the Capital’s 
Carbon Footprint – Delivering Decentralised Energy (2008). Political figures and parties can 
also have a place in the delivery of DHC, through support or opposition or through leadership of 
the multiple organisations and individuals involved. In Copenhagen, it was an alliance of five 
mayors which initially enabled the city-wide district heating system to start up in the 1980s 
(Danish Board of Distict Heating, 2007).  
Energy utility companies have a potential role as installers, owners, and operators of the DHC 
systems. They often bring their technical understanding, and can further support the delivery or 
expansion of DHC through providing land or encouraging new customers. Vienna’s Wien 
Energy (2008) provides a good example of this, as does Utilicom which owns, finances, and 
operates the DHC system in Southampton (London First, 2008).  
Finally, another actor potentially involved in the delivery of DHC are banks and other financial 
institutions, who can provide the not insignificant financial capital for construction. The 
willingness of banks to provide the loans can depend on the level of national or government 
support for the system, as well as other factors such as perceived customer take up. In 
Southampton, finance was provided through the energy company, where in Denmark, Finland 
and South Korea the capital costs were financed through banking institutions (United Nations, 
2002; Danish Energy Authority, 2005; C40 Cities , 2010).  
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Table 5 is proposed as a potential categorisation of actors and their roles in delivering DHC 
based upon the research’s initial case study review. The review found that there is no ‘typical’ 
arrangement and that each case study involves different types of actors at different levels. This 
implies the research framework will need to be adaptable to a range of actors as well as 
different types of government structures and administrative legacies.  
Actor Predominant Roles Secondary Roles 
National 
government 
Fiscal policies and legal regulation in support  Promotion of technology 
Direct financial support 
Local 
government  
Government energy demand used as ‘base 
load’ 
 
Own or manage systems 
Provide land 
Guarantee financial risk  
Planning 
authority 
Identify appropriate areas of cities  
Regulate or incentivise connection 
Map energy demands 
Raise awareness 
Business Agree to or enable connection to network 
Purchase energy 
Provide land 
Support or resist 
installation 
Residents Agree to or enable connection to network 
Purchase energy 
Support or resist 
installation 
NGOs, 
campaign 
groups 
Promote DHC  
Raise understanding and share knowledge 
 
Politicians or 
political parties 
Support or oppose DHC 
Gain support for scheme among other actors  
 
Energy 
companies 
Install; bring technical knowledge 
Own system and supply energy 
Provide land 
Encourage new 
customers 
Banks and 
other sources 
of finance 
Invest in installation or maintenance   
Table 5: Potential typology of actors involved in delivering DHC 
2.3 Planning for DHC in governance networks 
Planning theory recognises planning processes as governance processes, as networks of 
relations between actors, but planning organisations can also be understood as actors within 
broader governance networks. Authors who examine municipal planning organisations as a 
force within urban governance networks have sought to understand how planning organisations 
communicate and negotiate with other civic, market, and public sector actors. Often writing from 
a global competitive cities perspective e.g. (Newman & Thornley, 2005) (Stoker, 2000), these 
approaches tend to see planning organisations as participants in governance through market 
forces; a public sector actor who acts to constrain or enable private investment in urban areas.  
One well known approach is set out by Tiesdell and Allmendinger, writing with Adams, who 
categorise four ways that planning processes can influence the shape of places (Adams D. , 
2008; Tiesdell & Allmendinger, 2005). Writing from regulatory perspective, they understand 
planning tools as instruments to intervene in an economic market which shapes cities. ‘Market 
shaping’ interventions are designed to shape the context within which market transactions 
occur; for example the production of a statutory development plan which excludes specific land 
from agriculture or development on the grounds of water pollution. Market shaping interventions 
can be either statutorily enforceable or persuasive but they provide ‘authoritative information 
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and state commitment’. A communicative planning perspective would suggest the process of 
developing such interventions could itself be a sphere of negotiation and collaboration, 
alongside the output itself setting the context for further governance activity.  
‘Market regulation’ interventions are designed to control market actions and transactions, 
ensuring some consideration of the public interest; Tiesdell and Allemendinger cite development 
control and building regulations as an example. Linking this to environmental policy goals for 
illustration, in the United Kingdom the grant of planning permissions is often conditioned with 
energy efficiency or pollution limitations. ‘Market stimulation’ interventions such as using 
government powers to enable land assembly, release, or grants, make the market work better 
by having a direct impact on the financial appraisals. An example here could be grants to 
support the redevelopment and rehabilitation of contaminated land, as exists in the United 
States. And finally ‘capacity building’ intervention builds capacity of government or market 
operators through such actions as encouraging public-private development partnerships, or 
promotion skills for sustainable communities (Adams D. , 2008; Tiesdell & Allmendinger, 2005).  
It is widely accepted that the market interventions of planning function best when the market 
shaping roles - visions for places, developed through stakeholder engagement - are active and 
strong. Tiesdell and Allmendinger's understanding of planning processes as interventions in 
urban governance provides a helpful categorisation of the potential roles of planning. A 
subsequent section below describes how these might apply to DHC.  
Category Role of Planning Intervention  
Market 
Shaping 
 
Shape the context within which market 
actions and transactions occur; Provide 
‘authoritative information and commitment 
Statutory Development Plan 
Environmental Plan  
Formal collaboration with market  
Corporate Plan to invest in area 
Market 
Regulation 
 
Regulate or control market actions and 
transactions 
Development control 
Building regulations 
Environmental tax  
Market 
Stimulation 
 
Make the market work better, by having a 
direct impact on the financial appraisals 
Land assembly  
Grants  
Financial incentives  
Direct government investment in 
development  
Capacity 
Building 
 
Build capacity of public sector or market 
operators 
Publicizing benefits or examples 
Study tours 
Skills development  
Sharing knowledge 
Table 6: Summary of Allmendinger and Tiesdell's (2005) conceptualisation of planning 
interventions 
Planning for urban energy infrastructure in governance networks 
The influence of planning organisations and processes in urban utilities has been historically 
understudied in both planning and utility literature (Williams, 2013; Gochenour, 1994; Kerr, 
2009; Keirstead & Shah, 2013). Monstadt, writing in Environment and Planning in 2009, 
identifies this relatively weak link between urban planning and socio-technical literature on utility 
infrastructure; “This interlinkage of infrastructural and urban developments has hitherto...been 
undertheorized and empirically understudied both in social studies of technology and in urban 
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studies.” (p. 1924). He argues that the city level dimension is particularly absent, as are 
environmental impacts of urban utility control and change. However two recent and useful 
explorations into the role of planning in low carbon infrastructure are discussed here to provide 
context for research question three.   
Simin Davoudi's 2009 report on the English government's use of planning systems to address 
climate change attempted a typology of planning interventions for climate change. While the 
report addressed a wider range of climate change policies, it suggested that planning has the 
greatest breadth of roles for large scale renewables supply, with substantial roles in small scale 
renewables and energy efficiency. Davoudi characterised such interventions as 'site allocation 
and identification', a regulatory 'infrastructure planning commission', regulatory powers of 
permitted development and planning conditions, and strategic collaboration with the energy 
industry and local communities (2009). All of these roles appear relevant to this research given 
the nature of DHC systems as described previously.  
Williams takes Davoudi's categorisation further in a 2013 article in Environment and Planning B, 
describing potential roles for planning in delivering urban low carbon infrastructure (LCI) as well 
as linking those roles to approaches of planning and mechanisms for delivery. The article 
reflects on international examples of LCI delivery, recognising a broader scope of planning roles 
because "systematic urban planning and regulatory functions of urban government have 
partially given way to project-driven practices, entrepreneurial and collaborative approaches to 
governance (Harvey, 1989; Healey, 2006)" (Williams J. , 2013, p. 685). Williams acknowledges 
that planning interventions and the multiple roles of planning are not mutually exclusive; multiple 
roles are possible in one context. She also illustrates how it is difficult to disassociate the impact 
of a particular approach from other drivers or influences on LCI, such as local and national 
energy subsidies. She highlights that institutional context is a significant factor on the role of 
planning and "may influence the extent to which the planning approaches .... are transferable 
without wider changes within the system" (p. 703), and the article usefully points at roles and 
mechanisms which might be more suitable in different contexts.  
For example, an approach where planning is part of citizen-led development projects for LCI will 
only be successful in a context where 'citizens are proactive' and 'pro-environmental' and there 
is long term political support. In this context, she suggests the role of planning is one of capacity 
building, expert guidance, and conflict resolution. A second typology, the system planning 
approach, attempts a more top-down, but holistic attempt to integrate LCI within the traditional 
or existing roles for planning of housing, transport, and economic infrastructure. Her third 
approach to the planning for LCI sees a focus on land-control mechanisms to support the 
market in building LCI, helping the private or third sector function better. Table 7 summarises 
Williams' categories of potential roles for planning.  
Neither of these papers directly addresses how the roles for planning organisations or 
interventions might be affected by or help address the implications of the ongoing privatisation 
and de-localisation of infrastructure. Nevertheless they provide useful categorisations and 
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typologies of planning interventions around energy use in urban areas, linking such roles to 
influence on the private and civic sectors.  
Approach Role Mechanism for Delivery 
Collaborative Capacity building 
Providing expert guidance 
Conflict resolution 
Citizen-led development 
projects 
Citizen-led consultation; 
Visioning and design exercises 
Systemic Involvement of LCI providers in plan-making 
process  
Coordination of: infrastructural LCI systems, 
land use and development 
Plans and policies for the delivery of LCI and 
development in cities 
Key stakeholders in the provision of LCI 
Strategic planning process 
Market 
Shaping 
Creating certainty for suppliers and markets 
Reducing build costs 
Raising funds for low-carbon systems 
Development control 
Zoning and coding 
Infrastructure levies 
Length of planning process 
Table 7: Summary of Williams' (2013) identification of the role of planning in delivering LCI 
Planning organisations and processes delivering DHC 
Building on these identified roles for planning in supporting LCI generally, the following 
examples call upon a desktop review to illustrate potential roles for planning in delivering DHC, 
employing Tiesdell and Allmendinger's (2005) categorisation of planning's market interventions.  
This provides initial context for research question three, What is the role of planning, in 
relation to market, civic, and to other government organisations, in delivering district 
heating and cooling systems?.  
In Amsterdam’s Zuidas district (Nuon Warmte; Nuon, 2010; C40 Cities, 2010) the council’s 
‘market shaping’ approach saw it undertake energy mapping (determining heat or cooling loads 
in existing buildings) and suggest locations for the district cooling pipework and energy centres 
in an area of new development, illustrating the role of planning organisations as coordinator of 
DHC systems, land use, and development. The institutional context permitted the planning 
authority to local DHC pipework in the city and coordinate new connections to it. This type of 
spatial task can also go a long way towards the ‘will formation’ of Hager and Wagenaar and is 
essential for coordination of delivery between multiple actors, particularly providing an indication 
of future investment and return for private energy companies.  
This spatial coordination can be complemented by municipal control or influence on new 
development through the planning approvals process. Development codes or policies which 
encourage or require connection to existing or envisaged DHC systems, as South Korea has 
done (Hayes, 2010), create certainty on demand for providers and funders of DHC systems. 
Development control or permitting powers can also support DHC by controlling any negative 
impacts or reducing conflicts with local communities. The varied fuel sources of DHC – such as 
waste incineration plants – can have air quality and other environmental health implications 
which can be regulated through planning organisations during the initial permitting process, and 
then by the local government more generally during operation. An example of this is London, 
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where the local boroughs have the power to refuse particular energy generation types on air 
quality or other grounds, and where the mayor promotes DHC as one solution through 
development policies and approval powers (Greater London Authority, 2004; Greater London 
Authority, 2006; Greater London Authority, 2007). Both examples illustrate planning's 'market 
regulating' powers in Tiesdell and Allmendinger's conceptualisation of planning interventions. 
However the level of control planning has over new development to connect is not universal and 
varies nationally.  
Williams (2013) uses Freiberg to illustrate the capacity building role of planning in low carbon 
infrastructure generally; this also applies to DHC. Actions in this role could be as a 
communicator of DHC benefits to a non-technical audience through consultations, harnessing 
local interest in climate change to build political support, or ensuring projects are accountable. 
Vienna’s government committed to raise public awareness of the environmental benefits of its 
DHC system in new developments to encourage its expansion (Austrian Energy Agency, 2009; 
City of Vienna, 2010; TCPA, 2008). Williams also illustrates how in a community-owned DHC 
system, where the generation and pipe network are installed and managed not by an energy 
company but by local resident group, planning organisations could play a very different role. 
Another role for local authorities is to create certainty about the future of potential DHC systems 
by leveraging public sector energy demand or public sector land ownership, a ‘market 
stimulation’ tool in Tiesdell and Allmendinger's categorisation. This may not happen through a 
planning organisation, but it is likely to use planning processes. For example, by requiring 
publicly owned housing or local government buildings to be connected to a DHC system, local 
authorities can provide financial certainty to private sector DHC operators. An example of this is 
the Southampton District Energy system in the UK, where the local authority used the civic 
centre as a main heat load to start a privately-operated DHC system, as well as giving land for 
the energy centre on a ‘peppercorn’ rent (London First, 2008).  
In some countries, the ongoing ownership and maintenance of DHC can be the responsibility of 
the local authority. In these situations, the municipal planning organisations could play a more 
involved role in the initial design and delivery of DHC and in safeguarding or expanding it 
through spatial planning procedures. An example of this role is Hamburg, where the local 
authority is considering re-commencing its local authority owned energy company (which was 
closed during early privatization drives) in order to meet its goals for DHC (Lutsch, 2009; City of 
Hamburg, 2007). This role is a slightly stronger interpretation of Tiesdell and Allmendinger’s 
‘market stimulation’ conceptualisation.  
2.4 Implications for the Research Questions 
This chapter discusses governance theories and planning theories relevant to the research 
questions. It describes how governance proponents such as Hajer, Wagenaar, and Kooiman 
understand the challenges of modern policy formation and subsequent delivery implications. 
Multi-level governance is discussed but discounted as not appropriate for the research focus. 
Planning processes can be understood as governance processes, as a structure guiding the 
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process of coordination and negotiation of others. A governance network approach is put 
forward as powerful way to conceptualise and approach the research; through this the research 
approaches DHC as policy goal which requires public and private actors interacting in 
horizontal, pluri-centric networks of coordination and negotiation.  
A governance network approach is significant for thinking about public-private relationships in 
delivering DHC in three ways. First, a network perspective can assist in understanding how 
governance addresses policy problems like DHC in both a process and outcome sense – it 
assumes causal linkages between the characteristics of interactions of a group of actors 
addressing an issue and the outcomes of that action. This goes beyond a description of 
behaviour patterns. Networked governance suggests that the quality and type of coordination 
and negotiations between actors has a direct influence on the outcome of the negotiations, 
alongside the actors and their resources. This proposed link between the quality of the network 
patterns and the policy outcomes needs further investigation; both Jordan and Lowndes have 
called for empirical research into this causal inference as a focus of future policy research 
(Adger & Jordan, 2009; Lowndes, 2009). This potential link can be explored by research 
question one.  
Second, it points at a way of conceptualising the research questions. It provides a useful 
vocabulary for defining and describing patterns of interaction between actors and institutions 
involved in DHC, such as planning organisations and utilities companies. Words such as ‘actor’, 
‘node’, ‘web’, and ‘interwoven’ provide a powerful conceptualization of relationships between 
institutions or forms of regulation, and enable a sense of power and relationship to be 
conveyed. The vocabulary, with its dual implication of a naturally generated system and 
‘internet-like’ ability to move information freely, implies biological levels of complexity and fluidity 
over time – the opposite of anthropogenic hierarchy. The vocabulary and mental images of the 
governance network approach are helpful in describing how actors behave when facing difficult 
and complex policy challenges like DHC especially where large numbers and/or types of actors 
are involved in solutions. Given the range of debate around these ideas and concepts, the 
research will have to be very clear about terminology and employ a strong analytical framework 
to structure analysis to address the research questions. 
Finally, a governance network approach has proven fruitful in generating cross-disciplinary 
analysis methodologies which could be helpful to this research. Hermans (2009) reviews a full 
range of methodologies in some detail, highlighting that while most popular methods can be 
grouped generally into stakeholder analysis, other methods such as discourse analysis and 
cognitive mapping are being employed with a spectrum of quantitative and qualitative results. 
Particularly, social network analysis, based in graph theory, has a history of providing useful 
quantitative analysis of governance patterns in response to policy challenges (Marsh, 1998). 
Chapter 5 will investigate these analysis methodologies in more detail.  
Therefore to address research question one, How do governance networks support 
implementation of DHC? the research design should be structured to understand individual 
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actor capabilities and behaviours, as well as the characteristics of interaction and negotiation 
between government actors, citizens, and commercial organisations which lead to delivery of 
DHC. The approach chosen will need to distinguish between different types and qualities of 
interactions between many actors; the content of negotiations should also be understood 
alongside the characteristics of interaction.  
The chapter ends with an initial outline of how planning might support DHC in governance 
networks. This begins to address research question three, What is the role of planning, in 
relation to market, civic, and to other government organisations, in delivering district 
heating and cooling systems?. The literature discussed in this chapter explains that planning 
systems, defined as organisations and interventions, can have a tripartite nature in governance 
networks. One, planning organisations as actors in the network, negotiating with other actors 
using planning interventions. Two, planning processes and tools as governance processes, 
structuring the engagement of other actors in building and managing urban areas. And three, 
planning interventions can be resources that other non-planning actors negotiate with. 
Therefore to address the third research question, the research structure will have to unpick how 
planning tools and activities influence and direct other urban actors at both an actor and a 
structural level. Tiesdell and Allemendinger provide a useful categorisation of planning's 
influence and power in governance networks, but the research design should recognise that 
planning interventions could be used not only by planning organisations but also by other 
market or other government actors.  
While the research can build on conceptualisations of planning processes in governance, the  
role of planning delivering DHC is a relatively understudied area in both planning and urban 
infrastructure policy. There is a historical absence of investigation into planning's influence on 
utilities or specific actors in support of major utilities infrastructure. The analysis conducted in 
this thesis should seek to build on the recent work of Williams and Davoudi by exploring in 
greater detail the activities and orientations of planning authorities and the use of planning 
interventions in delivering DHC systems. This research also has the potential to contribute to 
the ongoing evolution of communicative planning theories. 
In summary, the structural changes and ‘new spaces of politics’ that drive governance patterns 
in policymaking between public, private and civic actors apply equally as challenges to the 
barriers and opportunities of delivering DHC. Building on a desktop review, this chapter 
introduces potential actors in the policy formation and delivery of DHC, highlighting the range of 
actors that could be involved. These examples begin to illustrate the potential roles that 
planning might play for DHC, using Tiesdell and Allmendinger's market setting, regulation, 
capacity building and stimulation categorisations. The examples support an understanding of 
planning organisations and interventions interacting with and influencing market, civic, and other 
government organisations to support the delivery of DHC systems. This chapter's reliance on 
industry case studies also reinforces how the relationship between urban policy, planning, and 
DHC systems is not thoroughly studied.   
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The discussion in this chapter, and in particular the desktop review of DHC systems in urban 
areas, raises issues beyond governance networks and highlights the institutional nature of 
planning processes and control of urban infrastructure generally. There is variation between 
countries and cities as to the legal capability of planning organisations to influence civic and 
market actors, their structural relationships to other government organisations, and their 
practices, tools, and processes of place management. The next chapter explores this 
institutional dimension of urban governance networks and planning, assessing what current 
literature understands about the relationship between formal and informal context in governing 
and delivering urban energy infrastructure.  
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Chapter 3 Institutional Dimensions of Planning 
for DHC 
 
Governance networks are not the only perspective that provides an interpretation of current 
public-private relationships: new institutionalists add a further dimension by arguing that 
underneath this pluri-centric and horizontal interaction there is an underlying culture which 
guides the structure of networks and the actions of actors. This chapter turns to institutional 
considerations of planning systems and DHC, exploring how legislative, regulative, and 
behavioural context influence control of land use and the implementation and management of 
urban energy infrastructure. It provides context for research question two, How does the 
institutional setting influence the delivery of district heating and cooling systems?, in 
particular considering what multi-level transitions and geographies of infrastructure might imply 
for the role of planning and the functioning of governance networks. A summary sets out which 
concepts are being taken forward in the research approach.     
3.1 Introducing Institutionalism  
New institutionalism categorises a group of theories of social dynamics which emerged from 
political science during the 1980s as a reaction to behaviouralism (Hall & Taylor, 1996; Healey 
P. , 1999). Arguing for the importance of institutionalized social conventions to explain human 
action and inaction, new institutionalists like Lowndes (1996) and Immergut (1998) 
demonstrated that public policy institutions are not only formal government structures but are 
dynamic, historically embedded entities that sustain and disseminate systems of beliefs and 
practices (DiGaetano & Strom, 2003). Institutions are defined in this theory as established ways 
of addressing policy or political issues, not as the organisations themselves. As Healey explains 
“Institutions are the framework of norms, rules, and practices which structure action in social 
contexts” (Healey P. , 2007).  
There are many forms of new institutionalism; Hall and Taylor (1996) group them into three 
analytical approaches (historical, rational choice, sociological) but Scharpf (2000) divides them 
more simply into two (concerned with origins, concerned with outcomes). Lowndes (2009) also 
categorises governance approaches such as multi-level governance a strand of new 
institutionalism. Despite the wide range of approaches within the new institutionalist school of 
thought, they share the view that institutional factors are the most appropriate points of 
departure for social analysis (Pierre & Peters, 2005). Discursive or constructivist approaches to 
understanding institutions in public policy focus on the power of discourse to influence norms 
and ideas and legitimatise policy ideas (Schmidt V. A., 2002; Rydin, 2003), treating language 
and dialogue as an independent variable effective policy making - as an institution in its own 
right. Rational choice approaches to policy evaluation seek to derive characterisations of rules, 
behaviours, and institutions from empirical studies; these characterisations are then applied to 
further analysis (Hall & Taylor, 1996; Lowndes V. , 1996) to argue for normative institutional 
behaviours in defined policy contexts. Historical institutionalism builds on cross national 
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comparisons of public policy to emphasise the importance of formal procedures and legacies 
(Immergut, 1998; Hall & Taylor, 1996). 
New institutionalist theories and governance patterns of behaviour are not at odds; governance 
analysis recognises that patterns of behaviour between actors are situated in a context and 
institutionalist theories provide insight into that context (Kooiman, 2003; Sorensen & Torfing, 
2007). Kooiman in Governing as Governance classifies institutions as the second order of 
governance and argues that for understanding governance networks, the "variety of institutional 
theories is rather an asset than a hindrance to the understanding of governing institutions in a 
diverse complex and dynamic world" (2003). Sorensen and Torfing’s definition of network 
governance incorporates a new institutionalist perspective, in referencing that the negotiations 
“take place within a regulative, normative, cognitive, and imaginary framework” (2007, p. 9).  
However new institutionalists argue that governance theories are not sufficient to explain policy 
making and implementation.  
An approach which seeks to bridge governance and institutional analysis is Actor Centered 
Institutionalism (ACI) (Pater, 2005). ACI was developed by Renate Mayntz and Fritz Scharpf to 
study "governance structures and processes in a variety of service sectors (such as health care, 
telecommunications, and research and development) that are characterised by a high levels of 
state involvement" (Scharpf, 1997, p. 34) and provides a framework to analyse policy processes 
which gives equal weight to the agency of actors and the enabling or constraining effects of the 
institutional setting. In maintaining a conceptual separation between actors’ interaction 
dynamics and institutional factors, ACI is recognised as particularly effective framework for 
comparative analysis of public policy and processes of governance (Scharpf, 2000; Jackson, 
2009; Stead & Cotella, 2011).   
In summary, research question two exists in response to new institutionalist concerns, and 
forces the research to understand not only the actors and interactions of DHC but also the 
context in which the actors operate and are made legitimate. Institutionalist approaches offer a 
variety of approaches to analysis, but there is tension between governance and institutionalist 
methodologies and approaches to analysis; the research design will have to overcome this in 
selecting a framework and methodology.   
3.2 The Institutional Context of Planning 
In considering how planning organisations interact with and influence other policy actors and the 
private sector, the research must should respect new instuitionalist approaches, as context will 
affect the role of planning in delivering DHC. The institutional context for planning systems are 
heavily influenced by formal structures: government organisations, legal, and legislative 
frameworks shape not only who does planning activity and what it does but how the process 
interacts with other actors (Nadin & Stead, 2013). The activity of planning is also influenced by 
informal contexts, such as engagement with private and community actors, or the knowledge 
and technical capacity of planning organisations and professional cultures (Healey P. , 2007).  
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Albrechts, writing in Environment and Planning B: Planning and Design, provides a particularly 
clear description of how context influences the capacity of planning systems.  
The capacity of strategic spatial planning systems to deliver the desired 
outcome is dependent not only on the system itself, but also on the 
conditions underlying it (see also Mintzberg, 1994). These conditions 
including public and professional attitudes towards spatial planning (in 
terms of planning content and process) and the political will on the part of 
the institutions involved in setting the process in motion (Granados 
Cabezas, 1995) affect the ability of planning systems to implement the 
chosen strategies. The steps required to deliver and to implement the 
desired spatial outcome vary according to the underlying structure.  
(2004, p. 749), 
Given the global diversity of cities and nation states (and a subsequent diversity of institutional 
contexts for planning systems), it is no surprise that planning studies have struggled to develop 
comprehensive typologies or classifications of planning systems. Where large international 
comparisons exist they tend to concentrate on the governmental and legal systems 
underpinning state control of land use, recognising the importance of administrative and legal 
systems in driving the structure of planning organisations and processes (Nadin & Stead, 2013). 
Legal structures often dictate the form of the planning system: influencing the relationship 
between state and private land use as well as the relationship between central government and 
local authority. The formal institutional setting also influences the funding available to planning 
organisations and often the scope of issues planning systems are expected to address 
(Newman & Thornley, 1996). 
Newman and Thornley’s 1996 review, Urban Planning in Europe, analyses the characteristics of 
planning systems within the four main families of European legal and administrative systems. 
Despite seeking to make general conclusions, their book more accurately demonstrates the 
wide range of planning systems and struggles to find similarities between different planning 
systems. This is true even within the same legal and administrative family; for example the 
countries of the Napoleonic family (e.g. France, Netherlands, Belgium, Spain) have significant 
differences in planning powers to coordinate, control or deliver arising from historical context, 
political trends, resources available, and the legal enforceability of planning law.  
The variation in power and topical responsibilities can be particularly wide in the topical scope of 
municipal planning powers; for example in pre-European Union Berlin the Lander state owned 
and managed energy utilities and planning processes were closely linked to infrastructure 
through corporative arrangements at a municipal level (Monstadt J. , 2007). In France today 
energy companies (e.g. EDF) are private but associated physical infrastructure is coordinated at 
the national or regional level by a non-spatial policy department (Ashurst, 2009). In Berlin 
historically, the local planning authority had responsibility, knowledge, and power on urban 
energy infrastructure; in France today it is has neither the responsibility nor the powers to act.  
Newman and Thornley also provide examples of differences in legal enforceability of planning 
activity to illustrate how this influences the patterns of policy activity. For example, in France, the 
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legal system does not grant the government strong comprehensive planning powers, but 
planning law does provide local authorities considerable implementation powers. Therefore 
while authorities do not have strong land use planning remit, they can compulsory purchase 
land for public use, and undertake development to deliver on government aims. In Denmark, the 
legal system provides a strong basis for plan making and land use control, and regions are 
empowered to define the broad structure of the urban pattern, designate urban zones, and 
allocate large institutions and communication facilities. These are complemented by legally 
binding municipal and local plans; if a proposed development is in line with these it is 
automatically approved. Therefore state objectives can often be delivered through 
administrative procedures and plan-making – controlling the market – without active public 
sector delivery (Newman & Thornley, 1996).  
More recent studies have used focused comparisons to understand the ability of planning 
systems to participate in policy development and implementation. For example, Kantor and 
Savitch's (2002) Cities in the International Marketplace and Newman and Thornley's (2005) 
Planning World Cities both compare urban responses to globalisation, considering planning 
organisations and tools as one aspect within urban governance. These focus less on the 
differences between systems and instead on how variation in institutional context enables or 
constrains planning organisations and practices to participate with other actors in responding to 
external forces.  
The struggle of comparative planning studies to generalise suggests that this research must 
understand the specific legal and administrative setting within which planning sits to understand 
how it can support DHC. A straightforward answer for the role of planning in delivering DHC will 
be unlikely, even if the research could control for the institutional setting. The institutional 
context of planning systems is particularly important given the research's focus on an 
environmental policy goal, a contested area of public intervention. For example, Newman and 
Thornley suggest that the "issue for the future will be the extent to which environmental 
concerns are translated into urban planning policy. They would carry with them the implication 
that a long-term outlook is required and that there is a need to take account of the broader 
public interest. These implications lead to greater acceptance of public intervention and less 
reliance on the market.” (1996, p. 254).  
3.3 The Institutions of Urban Energy Infrastructure 
This section reviews sociological and political literature on urban utility infrastructure, 
considering how cultural and institutional context as understood through this lens can inform the 
three research questions. Socio-technical systems conceptualisations of infrastructure such as 
Large Technical Systems (LTS) see technical constraints and capabilities for infrastructure (e.g. 
urban telecommunications networks) as intertwined with social constraints and driving forces. In 
the 1980s researchers interested in LTS began to theorise on the relationship between 
networked technical utilities and the society dependent upon them (Coutard, 2005; Mayntz R, 
1988). This research focused heavily on the how LTS evolve, working to trace how and why 
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they grew. To describe their failures social reasons and concepts were called upon to help 
explain these changes and search for optimum approaches to management. For example, 
Hughes’ 1983 study of the invention, development and growth of electricity supply systems 
showed that LTS development cannot be explained rationally and is heavily influenced by 
external social factors (Mayntz R, 1988).  
This research is concerned with how to create new urban utility infrastructure and the LTS 
approach does not provide a robust conceptualisation of how policy actors could or should 
intervene to create new LTS. However the historical categorisation of networked utilities as 
systems whose delivery and operation are closely intertwined with society (individuals and 
organizations, legal frameworks, and institutional and political structures) supports this 
research’s position that delivering DHC is a governance challenge as well as the research's 
need to understand social and political context.  
Socio-economic relations of utility infrastructure  
Building on the rather technical nature of much of the LTS work, there is a growing body of 
literature which also rejects the purely 'technocratic' nature of infrastructure and considers the 
sociological and economic implications of a socio-technical infrastructure in a rapidly changing 
context. Capably led by Marvin Moss, Guy, and Graham, the work considers normative 
questions such as 'which' and 'whose' infrastructure; addressing topics such as inequality of 
provision and rights to access, describing how these questions resolve at specific physical 
places (Graham & Marvin, 2001; Marvin, Graham, & Guy, 1999; Guy, Marvin, & Moss, 2000). 
Graham and Marvin, in Splintering Urbanism (2001) provide a series of illustrations on how the 
privatisation of infrastructure and a simultaneous disconnection from local organisational control 
has separated infrastructure management from territorial governance and society and calls into 
question deeply political relationships between government, society, and infrastructure. They 
address a wide spectrum of infrastructure, including roads, but illustrate how the newly 
privatised nature of energy, water, and internet networks in cities exacerbates the 'splintering' of 
provision. To address this they propose a research agenda not on the urban infrastructure itself 
but on the process of its governance, touching on questions of new institutionalism and 
negotiation based governance. This socio-technical agenda has recently developed in two 
relevant directions: a more analytical approach to implications for regulation, and a more 
normative one on urban sustainability and climate change, linking with transitions literature.  
Privatisation and the regulation of infrastructure 
On the former, literature on the implications of regulation from the impact of the privatisation of 
utilities infrastructure (Marvin, Graham, & Guy, 1999; Offner, 2000; Adams C. , 2007; Hodson & 
Marvin, 2010) highlights that large privatized utilities are often managed by supra-national 
companies, with no local interest or representation; this has negative consequences for the 
ability of local authorities to influence or control these services. “There are some policy linkages 
between utilities and local authorities over the development of new networks, renovation, and 
refurbishment of existing systems and the provision of services to new development. But the 
main feature of these relations is the low levels of statutory control and influence over the 
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activities of utility companies.” (Marvin, Graham, & Guy, 1999, p. 154) The structure taken in 
any one city or authority depends upon the wider governance arrangement, for example citizen 
support for public ownership, local politics, historical development of the transport or utilities 
sectors and national laws and regulations (Marvin, Graham, & Guy, 1999). Particularly in 
Europe, where privatisation and liberalization have been driven by European policy, “crucial 
regulatory functions have shifted to the national or European policy level” (Monstadt J. , 2007, p. 
335). This shift has moved energy infrastructure ownership and regulatory functions away from 
a local or urban level, suggesting that city spatial considerations and planning organisations 
currently play a weak role in promoting DHC infrastructure (Marvin, Graham, & Guy, 1999; 
Offner, 2000). These authors also relate how the ‘hidden' nature of utilities infrastructure 
(Hodson & Marvin, 2009) hinders interest and understanding by both planning professionals 
and the general public.  
However, they also argue that the same structural changes can make planning’s processes 
which interface with market and civic actors (development control powers or masterplanning 
new development) more important as historic government influences and other types of 
regulation wane. Offner, in Territorial Deregulation: Local Authorities at Risk from Technical 
Networks, reflects on how the privatization of utility networks may create new possibilities for 
local policy and regulation. He suggests three potential areas of control for local authorities in 
regulating utilities provision: “control of public space; the localization and conception of network 
hubs; and the encouragement of the rise of user power as players in the regulation of network 
services.” (2000, p. 177). The first two are particularly relevant for planning systems with their 
spatial management remit; they can be classed as ‘market regulation’ and ‘market shaping’ 
tools. The ability of planning systems to dominate the conceptualisation of network hubs would 
relate to the influence of the local development plan; and also to how knowledgeable or capable 
the planning professionals are about energy utilities and infrastructure. Furthermore, Offner 
argues that control of public space (such as road space) in cities can hold real power given the 
congested nature of utilities under roads in urban areas. Given that DHC requires space for 
energy generation plant as well as road (or other) space for pipework connections, his 
suggestion points to local authorities as potentially having a controlling power relationship in the 
delivery of DHC. What this means for planning and DHC will depend upon the context and the 
institutional setting of the relevant planning system. For example, planning organisations could 
be mandated to plan DHC infrastructure through legal spatial plans or instead have a weaker 
power to control DHC development through land use and road infrastructure permits.  
Multi-level transitions and urban infrastructure 
This socio-technical literature did not originally focus on the environmental implications of urban 
energy and resource infrastructure; Monstadt in 2009 described how "the environmental 
aspects of utility restructuring tend to be treated as a sideline" (p. 1935). However as a socio-
technical perspective on urban infrastructure began addressing environmental challenges, 
authors began calling up on well developed concepts of transitions management, in particular 
multilevel transitions, to support conceptual discussion and analysis about the management of 
47 
 
change in society for sustainable urban infrastructure (Elzen, Geels, & Green, 2004). This 
approach has reinforced an awareness that changes to urban government and the urban 
governance of energy infrastructure are critical to achieving greater sustainability in cities 
(Bulkeley, Castan Broto, Hodson, & Marvin, 2010; Guy, Marvin, & Moss, 2000). Seeing 
governance as beyond the state, this transitions literature also emphasises the many 
organisational influences on energy use and distribution; e.g. the CLUES project explores the 
diversity of organisations and pathways which could be involved in changes to urban energy 
infrastructure (Rydin Y, Turcu C, Guy S, & Austin P, 2013). 
The transitions approach also recognises the need to look beyond the traditional boundaries of 
cities. In Cities and Low Carbon Transitions (2010), Spath and Rohracher provide a useful and 
illustrative comparison of two cities - Freiberg and Graz - grappling with energy transitions, and 
concludes that municipal processes in both were driven by a heterogeneous set of non-
governmental actors and by entrepreneurs within the city administration rather than by strategic 
actions of municipal governments. They suggest that "actor networks probably need to span 
beyond the municipal level for substantial changes to be achieved" (p. 103) and that a further 
condition of success is that municipal level resources are not too restricted. This chapter and 
the previous chapter suggest avenues to explore for the role of planning in DHC systems; 
planning organisations as policy entrepreneurs, the relationship between DHC and the financial 
capacity of local governments, and the relationship between city level planning organisations 
and national or multi-level actors.  
In a slightly different vein, Coutard and Rutherford investigate potential for governance of 
decentralised technology in The rise of post-networked cities in Europe? (2010) within Cities 
and Low Carbon Transitions (2010). They describe cases of local-scale governance 
commensurate with a decentralised technology, but also suggest that local authorities could use 
low carbon dialogue as a means for authorities to recover responsibility for basic service 
provision. This argues for greater 'government' in contrast to the intermediaries, niches, and 
regime influencing practices of more conventional transitions advocacy. 
Guy, Marvin, Medd, and Moss, in Shaping Urban Infrastructures, focus on the role of 
intermediaries in urban transitions and discuss the potential actors which can explore, nurture, 
and stabilise new infrastructure technologies. While they do not identify planning organisations 
as potential intermediary actor who "does not fit neatly into the three categories of provider, 
user, and regulator" (2011, p. 18), their exploration of the potentials and limits of intermediaries 
does suggest implications for the role of planning. In a similar vein, Quitzau, Hoffmann, and Elle 
(2012) explore how planning systems in particular can act as a niche support of transitions, 
creating 'protected spaces' for technological innovation in support of environmental goals.  
3.4 The Institutional Context of DHC  
Literature explored in this chapter outlines how the ability of DHC systems to be delivered as an 
environmental policy goal is likely to be constrained by structural trends of privatized utilities and 
local contextual trends of costs, and government capabilities and knowledge. Socio-technical 
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systems theory has been applied directly to DHC in a small number of studies (e.g. (Hawkey, 
2009; Palm, 2006)) which begin to illustrate how political power and planning organisations are 
indeed intertwined with the functioning of DHC. Building upon these studies and the wider 
literature, this section outlines institutional influences which are likely to be significant on the 
ability of cities to establish DHC as a environmental policy goal. 
For local government, prominent institutional influences on their ability to support DHC are 
formal settings such local government legislation, property ownership, and powers of 
procurement or partnership. Planning organisations are likewise shaped by the legal framework 
as a formal institutional context. As discussed above, these shape their participation in 
governance networks through constraints or enablers of scope and resources, for example, the 
ability of planning policy to control the environmental impact of development or the ability of 
local government to borrow money to procure new utilities.  
Formal, institutional context also affects the ownership and management of existing local utilities 
which could support DHC, by for example providing waste heat from electrical generation to a 
DHC system. The complex and 'splintered' nature of power and control over urban utilities 
identified by Graham and Marvin - a formal institutional factor - can shape actor constellations 
and may explain why some cases succeeded and others failed. Ownership of existing utilities 
would influence not only local government and planning actors but the wider actor set: the cost 
of energy from DHC or the level of competition to DHC providers. The cost of fuel for DHC is a 
similar further formal influence; for example, the shape and focus of negotiations among actors 
will be different if the DHC system is fuelled by mains gas or by geothermal heat.  
Informal conventions such as internal structures of local government departments and other 
existing civic or political relationships are likely to shape who engages with governance 
networks for DHC. Informal influences also include experience or history of DHC, societal 
expectations about government and utilities infrastructure, and societal pressure about the role 
of government in environmental goals. Experience and associated knowledge of DHC has been 
recognised as particularly relevant in a UK context. Hawkey's study Will district heating come to 
town? identified how privatisation of utilities in the UK has led to local authorities being less 
involved in utility service delivery and therefore challenged their ability to support DHC; "these 
skills are important to a local authority’s ability to act as a driving force behind developing a 
scheme" (2009, p. 47). While Palm's 2006 analysis of DHC in two Swedish municipalities 
illustrates how historical experience with DHC and conflicting departmental ideas of 
responsibility over environmental concerns shaped who engaged in DHC policy and drove 
decisions about future investment in DHC versus consumer energy demand reduction 
programmes.   
Table 8 outlines potential institutional influences which will be explored further through the 
research design in response to the second research question.  
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 Formal Informal  
Local government   Local government legislation 
 Local government powers of 
procurement and 
partnerships 
 Structure of internal government 
departments 
 Existing political relationships 
Planning 
organisations 
 Planning legal framework  
All actors    Cost of fuel  
 Existing utilities  
 Experience or history of DHC 
 Social pressure on environment 
 Willingness to change 
Table 8: Examples of institutional influences on DHC delivery 
3.5 Implications for the Research Questions 
What new institutionalism and existing literature on socio-economic context of utility 
infrastructure indicates for this research is that the relevant powers, culture, and perspectives, 
the ‘conventional wisdoms’ and ‘house views’, of all actors in the governance networks for DHC 
will have to be understood in order to comprehend why and how DHC systems can be 
delivered. The research will need to understand how actors, particularly planning organisations, 
conceive of their potential powers and tools and their role within wider society as well as their 
assumptions about other actors around urban energy. The recognition of has driven the 
formation of research question two, How does the institutional setting influence the delivery 
of district heating and cooling systems?.   
The new institutionalist approach also rejects the potential for an overarching generic 
explanatory theory about the role of planning organisations in multiple contexts, and calls for a 
contextually based response to the third research question. It also reinforces the need for 
governance network patterns of behaviour in delivering urban DHC, supporting the first research 
question. However on the whole the strands of literature reviewed in this chapter focus on 
universal or normative behaviours and do not explicitly address urban infrastructure as a 
governance network challenge requiring negotiation.  
Understanding urban infrastructure in context has highlighted the effect of privatisation of 
infrastructure, increasing the challenge of delivering DHC as a locally specific urban 
infrastructure solution to energy and environmental goals. This reinforces the research aims to 
understand the institutional context of DHC and suggests the research structure should seek to 
understand the nature of national or local control over existing and new energy infrastructure. 
An analysis of the governance network for DHC without this context is unlikely to form a 
contribution to policy or future research. 
The challenges and barriers identified in this literature also point at potential answers for the 
research questions and suggests roles for specific actors in delivering DHC. For example, 
Marvin, Guy, and Grahams' (1999) identification of the institutionally weak role of local 
governments and the potential for planning interventions and processes to be used as a lever 
over energy infrastructure; the concept of planning systems as between provider and user; and 
the need for entrepreneurial or beyond-city policy support. These all should be explored in 
relation to DHC through the case analysis.  
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The new institutionalist literature also highlights how the role of planning in shaping, creating 
and regulating urban utility infrastructure for environmental goals is only recently beginning to be 
addressed. There is potential for this research to contribute to transitions and low carbon cities 
literature by highlighting how planning could provide routes to greater engagement and leverage 
of urban actors in urban energy infrastructure. Finally, Actor Centered Institutionalism emerges 
as a potentially viable conceptual framework to address all the three research questions as it 
enables an analysis of individual actors as separate from but within an institutional setting; it has 
the potential to bridge governance and intuitionalist perspectives in a policy context of relatively 
significant government control of the built environment. This is focus of the next chapter.  
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Chapter 4. Bringing Institutions and Governance 
Networks Together to Understand DHC 
 
This chapter builds a case for the use of a conceptual framework which can distinguish both 
governance behaviours and institutional concerns across a comparative analysis of international 
case studies. Actor Centered Institutionalism (ACI) is then presented as a bridging conceptual 
framework which is necessary and suitable to address the three research questions. A set of 
questions for each case study to address are developed from the presentation of ACI. The 
chapter ends by summarising the research approach, linking case study questions to the three 
main research questions and considering the potential contribution of the research.   
4.1 Revisiting the Research Questions  
The literature and desktop review of DHC systems in Chapters 2 and 3 explored existing 
understanding around the research questions. The questions arise from two approaches to 
policy studies, governance networks and new institutionalism, which both drive a contextual 
approach to the research aims. While they are not at odds, the research design will have to 
bridge both approaches. As Kooiman writes, the research will have to be capable of 
"distinguishing an intentional and a structural level in governing interactions which articulates 
that governing actions and governance structure (culture) cannot be understood without each 
other" (2003).   
Chapter 2 argues that delivering DHC requires network governance patterns of behaviour 
among multiple actors. Addressing research question one, How do governance networks 
support the implementation of district heating and cooling systems?, requires the 
research to focus on individual actor capabilities and behaviours, as well as the characteristics 
of interaction and negotiation between government actors, citizens, and commercial 
organisations which lead to delivery of DHC. Governance network literature points at the use of 
specific analytical methodologies.  
New institutionalist approaches call for a focus on actors underlying perspectives, opinions and 
considerations of other actors roles in DHC. To address the second research question, How 
does the institutional setting influence the delivery of district heating and cooling 
systems?, the research should seek to analyse the formal limits and capabilities of actors as 
well as actor opinions and perceptions to understand how these formal and cultural factors 
influence governance negotiations and if they are important for the delivery of DHC.   
In approaching research question three, What is the role of planning, in relation to market, 
civic, and to other government organisations, in delivering district heating and cooling 
systems?, urban planning processes and tools can be understood as governance processes, 
structuring the engagement of other actors in building and managing urban areas; and planning 
organisations can also be understood as an actor in governance networks for DHC. But the new 
institutionalist approaches underscore how the legal and formal context of planning systems will 
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significantly affect the role of planning in governance networks for DHC. The research therefore 
needs to understand how planning organisations conceive of their potential powers and tools 
and their role within wider society as well as their assumptions about other actors around urban 
energy. Both governance and institutionalist approaches reject the potential for an overarching 
generic explanatory theory about the role of planning organisations in delivering DHC, and call 
for a contextually based response to the third question.  
The literature discussion brought to light how the research lies between multiple strands of 
discussion about urban infrastructure, not all of which have yet addressed each other. For 
example, Williams’ recent paper, which establishes a conceptualisation of the roles and 
functions of planning, provides a helpful base for this thesis to work with but it does not directly 
address trends towards privatisation and de-localisation of the management of urban energy 
infrastructure. Nor does the socio-economic or transitions literature currently address the 
breadth of planning studies which require government control of land use and utilities to be 
understood contextually. The analysis conducted in this thesis will seek to build on the work of 
William, Marvin, and others by exploring in greater detail the activities and orientations of 
planning authorities and the use of planning interventions in delivering DHC systems.  
Implications for research design 
Both governance networks and new institutionalism very strongly point away from a research 
approach which seeks a working hypothesis of governance and institutional effects on DHC 
which can be applied to any situation. Instead, a detailed contextual analysis of existing cases is 
likely to be more successful in addressing the research aims. This suggests an in-depth 
qualitative case study methodology for this research, where data gathering and analysis 
methodologies are receptive to local context and meaning, and which enable conflicting 
perspectives and understandings to be represented. Additionally, the network governance 
literature calls for a focus on the quality and characteristics of the connections and interactions 
between those involved in achieving the policy goal, to investigate the causal link between 
interaction quality and policy outcomes. This suggests a research design which provides for in-
depth analysis of specific situations. However within this qualitative approach the research 
design will have to sufficiently address both the actor level and the institutional context. 
An international, comparative, case study approach is proposed for the research. A comparative 
approach supports qualitative research by substituting for the experimental method. It supports 
an analysis of the variety of roles for planning organisations, a greater understanding of the 
mechanisms of network governance behind various DHC systems, and consideration of 
institutional settings by comparison between different countries. A cross-national approach also 
potentially broadens the applicability of the research findings, as answer to the research 
questions and the implications for network governance should be more transferrable to other 
contexts.  
Building on the literature review, the research proposes to employ an conceptual framework to 
structure this qualitative international comparative analysis. A conceptual framework can guide 
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the research, highlighting important factors and structuring a conceptual comparison between 
cases. Use of a framework is supported for two reasons by authors reflecting on the nature of 
social science research. Pierre, in Comparative Urban Governance: Uncovering Complex 
Causalities, argues that a framework provides guidelines for the search for explanations in a 
complex empirical setting, where universal assumptions cannot be applied (2005). And 
Mossberger and Denters argue that a conceptual framework helps draw ‘limited generalisations’ 
from small-n case studies which can be used for practical purposes in Building Blocks for a 
Methodology for Comparative Urban Political Research (2006).  
Building on the literature review discussion, a conceptual framework which bridges institutional 
and governance approaches to answer the research questions should have the following 
characteristics:  
 Actor centric: it should recognise the governance network patterns but enable focus on 
one individual actor (planning organisations);  
 Interaction oriented: it should be able to describe connection patterns in governance 
networks;  
 Institutions: it should recognise institutional settings as a variable and enable a focus on 
the effects of institutions on actors and their actions; 
 In depth and comparative: it should support qualitative contextual analysis and yet be 
rigorous enough to enable comparison between international settings and analysis of 
different governance patterns; 
 Causal factors: it should suggest ‘working hypothesis’ of factors that support the 
delivery of DHC.  
4.2 Actor-Centered Institutionalism: A Conceptual Framework 
for the Research Questions 
 
An approach which addresses the theoretical and methodological objectives and concerns 
outlined above, is “Actor-Centered Institutionalism” (ACI) developed by Renate Mayntz and Fritz 
W. Scharpf (Scharpf, 1997; Scharpf, 2000). ACI is an analytic framework for considering the 
conditions under which “politics is able to produce effective and legitimate solutions to policy 
problems” (Scharpf, 1997, p. 1). It does not claim to be a final theory but was proposed as an 
approach to the investigation of collective policymaking and decision making processes. ACI 
was initially outlined in a German-language publication in 1995, and the framework was detailed 
in a 1997 English-language book, Games Real Actor Play: Actor-Centered Institutionalism in 
Policy Research. 
Scharpf describes the ACI approach as “proceeding from the assumption that social 
phenomena are to be explained as the outcome of interactions among intentional actors (...) but 
that these interactions are structured, and the outcome shaped, by the characteristics of the 
institutional setting within which they occur.” (1997, p. 1). It treats institutions as one set of 
variables “affecting the interactions between policy actors and hence the greater or lesser 
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capacity of policy-making systems to adopt and implement effective responses to policy 
problems.” (Scharpf, 2000, p. 764). This approach is explicitly a governance approach which 
incorporates new institutionalist concerns (Stead & Cotella, 2011); it aligns with the concerns of 
this research to be both interaction oriented and perception oriented .  
ACI aims to transcend differences between actor-centred, rational choice and institution- 
oriented approaches in two ways: in that it gives actors analytical powers and does not assume 
that actors follow cultural norms or institutional rules blindly, and in that it assumes that the 
goals pursued by actors change and the goals are influenced by other actors behaviour 
(Scharpf, 1997). It proposes that there are five variables which drive policy outcomes: a  
particular institutional setting, which influences the remaining variables; a specific policy 
problem, which drives the specified actors, capable of strategy building around a picture of actor 
interactions, which happen with limited knowledge but rationally; and in particular styles, or 
characters, of interaction.  
Use and suitability 
ACI is recognised by public policy researchers as a constructive combination of institutional and 
actor approaches (Jackson, 2009) and is regularly used in comparative analysis of policy 
implementation between different countries (Mur-Veeman, van Raak, & Paulus, 2008; Mayntz, 
2003; Stead & Cotella, 2011). Of particular relevance to this research, Stead and Cotella argue 
in The Planning Review and that ACI "provides an interesting framework for exploring the 
evolution of spatial planning and territorial governance systems" because it complements both 
actor and contextual approaches while allowing organisations (e.g. community advocacy 
groups) to be conceived as composite actors (2011, p. 16). They also praise its ability to enable 
comparison between countries while still recognising the place-specific nature of actor 
influences on planning processes and powers. Similarly, Peters, in Institutional Theory in 
Political Science; the New Institutionalism (2011) and Reimer and Blotevogel in Planning 
Practice and Research (2012), praise ACI for enabling individual actors to clearly be described, 
rather than a set of rules and norms which apply to all actors. This supports the requirement of 
the research questions for planning to be understood separately, but in relation to, market and 
civic actors.  
ACI has been employed to structure analysis across range of topics and with range of research 
methodologies, including process-tracing in health politics (Ovseiko, 2008), statistical multi-level 
analysis in urban politics (Pluss, 2009), interviews and analytical narratives in work-based 
training and skills research (Van Lieshout, 2007), and secondary analysis in an international 
comparison of implementation of health care policies (Mur-Veeman, van Raak, & Paulus, 2008). 
In the 1997 book which sets out ACI, Scharpf describes how the framework can be applied with 
game-theoretic analysis based on qualitative methods. However the book’s introduction 
acknowledges that the framework can be applied to other methodological approaches. The ACI 
framework is both conceptually suitable for the research questions and is flexible in its potential 
to incorporate a range of research methodologies. 
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ACI in detail 
In ACI, the starting point for explaining policy-making processes and their outcomes is to 
“identify the set of interactions that produces the policy outcomes which are to be explained” 
(Scharpf, 1997, p. 43). Scharpf is clear that the set could be multiple types and kinds of 
interactions; he gives voting and conference negotiations towards the same policy outcome as 
an example. Building on the governance network literature, such interactions include 
negotiations, exchanges of resources, communications, interferences or more formal 
interventions. Kooiman defines interactions as “mutually influencing relations” making clear the 
intentional and connected nature of the actors (Kooiman, 2003).  
Scharpf's next step is to identify the actors, individual or collective, that are involved in the 
policy-making process. “Actors are characterized by specific action capabilities, preferences and 
perceptions” (p.43). The resources available to actors characterize their action capabilities: 
financial and human resources, knowledge, competences and the rights they possess. Actor 
orientations, their preferences and perceptions of other actors may be relatively stable or may 
be changeable, but “they are activated and specified by the stimulus provided by a particular 
policy problem or issue” (p.43). Preferences have three dimensions: individual and institutional 
self-interest, norms, and considerations of individual and corporate identity. Actors are assumed 
to be capable of making purposeful choices among alternative courses of action and they are 
assumed rational in the sense that they will attempt to maximize their own self-interest (in terms 
of payoffs); but they are not assumed to be perfectly rational or holding access to all 
information.  
Scharpf also encourages the concept of composite actors where it does not obscure the 
research interests, because it facilities the task of explaining and predicting policy outcomes in 
the real world, where collective actors - organisations, ministries, associations – are often the 
primary actors. The concept is reserved to groups of actors with intent, not mere exchange 
relationships – “the individuals involved intended to create a joint product or achieve a common 
purpose”. (Scharpf, 1997, p. 54). Scharpf and later Jackson (2009) discuss how these 
composite actors are influenced by institutional factors in two ways; first that they are created 
according to rules of organisation, and secondly that the common frame of reference within the 
collective actor can drive their perceptions and choices in negotiations.  
The third task in ACI is to identify ‘actor constellations’, which include a “static description of 
players involved, their strategy options, the outcomes associated with strategy combinations, 
and the preference of the players over these outcomes” (1997, p. 44). For Scharpf, ‘actor 
constellations’ are the bridging link between institutionally oriented research and interaction 
oriented research. The ‘actor constellation’ is a static picture of how the full set of actors 
perceive the policy problem, each other, and the potential options to achieve the policy goal; it 
builds up a picture of whether their aspirations and preferences are compatible with one 
another.  
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Finally, the static picture of actor constellations is then ‘played out’ in a variety of ‘modes of 
interaction’, which define the style character of the interactions themselves. The combination of 
the ‘actor constellations’ and the ‘mode of interaction’ produces ‘policy outcomes’. A given actor 
constellation does not alone drive the policy outcome; the mode of interaction between the 
actors must also be analysed and understood. “In other words, for a given actor constellation, 
the expected policy outcome would differ if the institutionalized mode of interaction is varied – 
and conversely, a given mode of interaction would lead to effective policy solutions for some 
constellations but may fail to do so when confronted with other types of actor constellations.” 
(Scharpf, 1997, p. 48).  
Scharpf describes four types of modes of interaction: ‘unilateral action,’ ‘negotiated agreement’, 
‘majority vote’ and ‘hierarchical direction’ (Scharpf, 1997). Scharpf describes and characterises 
these potential modes of interaction in some detail, using game-theoretic concepts to arrive at 
recommended types of negotiation for actors in governance patterns of behaviour. He highlights 
value of a negotiated 'positive coordination' approach as most promise for reaching goals which 
involve property rights; these combine 'problem solving' types of negotiation with 'distributive 
bargaining' negotiations. The former focuses on creating value; the latter focuses on a formal 
exchange of resources; positive coordination combines them. Positive coordination negotiations 
require transparent 'fair settlement' discussions, recognising the existence and legitimacy of the 
benefits and negatives on all sides (1997, p. 133). 
The ACI framework acknowledges that the actors, actor constellations, and modes of interaction 
are all largely, but not completely, shaped by the institutions and the institutional setting of the 
policy problem under discussion. However Scharpf argues that that institutional influences are 
an abstract concept and does not set out a theoretically defined set of variables that serve as 
explanatory factors in the framework; "Rather, we use it as shorthand term to describe the most 
important influences on those factors that in fact drive our explanations" (p. 39). Within ACI 
institutions are defined as rule systems that structure actor behaviour, but do not completely 
determine actor behaviour. Rule systems can have a more formal character (rules sanctioned 
by legal framework or public authorities) – the ‘administrative systems’ of Newman and 
Thornley, or a more informal character (norms, conventions and expectations) – the social 
conventions of Lowndes.  
The summary of the framework of ACI in Figure 1 is reproduced from Games Real Actors Play. 
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Figure 1: Framework of Actor- Centered Institutionalism (Scharpf, 1997, p. 44) 
4.3 Applying ACI to the Research Questions  
When the proposed research questions are applied to the framework of Actor-Centered 
Institutionalism, a research structure directly emerges. The problem is defined as the delivery of 
DHC in urban areas, and the outcome is the completion and operation (or failure to establish) of 
a DHC system. The details of the institutional setting, interactions, actors, and resulting actor 
constellations and modes of interaction will vary across countries and individual systems.  
An indication of likely examples can be given building on the literature review above. Following 
the framework, and starting with the set of interactions which address the policy problem, the 
literature review indicates interactions are likely to be both formal and informal interactions 
between public, private and civic organistaions. Examples identified through the case study 
review above include, among others: fiscal incentives, exchanges of knowledge, conferences, 
policy statements, public campaigns, exchanges of time and funding, donations of land, and 
more formal interventions such as the passing of laws or the creation of a regulatory framework.  
Building on Chapter 2, the actors who can potentially be involved are national government, local 
government, planning organisations and institutions, businesses, residents, NGOs or campaign 
groups, political parties and politicians, energy companies and banks or other sources of 
finance. The capabilities, orientations and preferences of these actors will be informed by the 
institutional settings – both formal and informal. These orientations and preferences will need to 
be uncovered through the research design and methodology. In the definition of planning 
adopted for this research – both organisations and interventions – planning will initially be seen 
by ACI as a collective actor, comprised of individuals.  
The research methodology will need to enable identification of the ‘actor constellations’ of ACI, 
which develop a picture of how the actors perceive other actors their capabilities, strategies and 
preferences. Not only are ‘actor constellations’ individual to specific situations of the delivery of 
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DHC, the factors that make up ‘actor constellations’ are difficult to discern from published 
reports, as they deal with conceptual potential. The need to understand how actors think about 
and perceive other actors and their potential strategies points at particular research 
methodologies. Chapter 5 reflects this in the development of the research methodology.  
Turning to the ‘mode of interaction’, the literature review illustrates that a ‘negotiated’ approach 
is likely, given the type of policy challenge that DHC presents and the governance network 
patterns of behaviour required to address it. Network governance theories assume a causal 
linkage between patterns and strengths of interaction within a set of actors, and the outcomes of 
that interaction (Marsh, 1998; Sehested, 2009; Jordan, 2008). Scharpf’s ACI framework, which 
looks at the set of potential interactions through the actor constellations and at how the 
interactions are played out through generic ‘modes’, does not specifically provide for qualitative 
patterns or characteristics of interaction to play a guiding role in the policy outcomes.  
To include within the framework space for these characteristics of interaction, the research adds 
an additional dimension of ‘relational characteristics’ to the variable ‘modes of interaction’. 
‘Relational characteristics’ are proposed as the patterns and quality of interactions among 
purposeful actors. Patterns are the arrangements of interaction: e.g. do all actors negotiate with 
all other actors? Are some actors at the centre of negotiations? Quality is the frequency of 
interactions between actors, and the strength of those interactions: e.g. do the actors negotiate 
or exchange more than once? According to governance network theory, understanding the 
answers to these questions will inform the answer to the research question. 
Figure 2 provides a summary of the research aims as applied to Scharpf's ACI framework, with 
the addition of the concept of relational characteristics as a quality of modes of interaction.  
Figure 2: The ACI conceptual framework adapted for the research questions 
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Addressing the research questions 
The conceptual framework described in Figure 2 can address all three research questions 
identified in Chapter 1. It can structure an evaluation of how negotiations and actor 
arrangements in governance networks support implementation of DHC. The inclusion of 
institutional context as an influence on both actors, actor strategies and modes of interaction 
robustly reflects the new institutionalists' call to understand how context affects policy. And by 
requiring the research to focus on the capabilities, orientations and preferences of individual 
actors as well as how strategies are played out through interaction, the framework can support 
the evaluation of the role of one actor - planning - and planning as a process or intervention 
which structures other actors' behaviour.   
The ACI conceptual framework can be applied to the individual cases for qualitative analysis as 
well as used to structure comparative analysis between the case studies. When applied to a 
specific attempt to deliver DHC in urban areas, a series of eight questions emerge for each case 
analysis to address:  
1. Who are the primary actors?  
2. How are the actors influenced by the institutional setting?  
3. What are the actors' self-identified capabilities, orientations, and preferences?  
4. How can the actor constellation be described?  
5. How can the interactions be characterised?  
6. What are the relational characteristics ?  
7. Is this network governance?  
8. How can the role of planning be described? 
The information needed to address these case study level questions will be gathered through 
the research design structure and addressed on a case by case basis. The responses to these 
eight questions will then be considered in comparison across the cases and thereby inform the 
three research questions. Chapter 5 describes the research methodology in detail.  
4.4 Summary of Research Approach and Potential Contribution 
to Knowledge   
As a conceptual bridge between governance network theories and institutional understanding of 
policy, Actor-Centered Institutionalism (ACI) is proposed as a suitable conceptual framework for 
the research questions and aims. It provides a robust vocabulary and analytical lens to structure 
a comparative study and develop response to all the three research questions. ACI will guide 
the empirical analysis to focus on the potential role of planning organisations, to understand the 
influence of governance behaviours and to evaluate the influence of the institutional setting. 
The research asks currently relevant questions about the ability of policy makers to deliver an 
environmental policy goal: urban energy infrastructure. It is particularly concerned to uncover 
the role of planning organisations and practices in supporting the creation of District Heating 
and Cooling (DHC) systems, and to evaluate the influence of context and governance network 
behaviours in urban energy infrastructure creation. The research will consider planning 
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organisations as one actor among other public, private, and civic actors, who have a collective 
understanding, the actor constellation, of each other's strategies and powers given the local 
institutional setting. The ability of the actor constellation to deliver DHC is affected by the set of 
actors, the constellation, and the characteristics of negotiation, all of which are influenced by 
formal and informal institutional context.  
Broadly this research aims to contribute to theoretical and empirical dialogue on the 
responsibilities and potential contribution of planning in relation to other stakeholders in building 
and managing urban infrastructure for environmental policy goals. It is set within discussions on 
the efficacy and functioning of governance networks and seeks to evaluate how patterns of 
interaction and negotiation support DHC. Through an international viewpoint, the research also 
seeks to weigh up the influence of institutional context in relation to network process. This area 
of urban policy is relatively understudied; in particular there is a lack of insight into how planning 
practices and organisations can support DHC.  
The research intends to further understanding of how planning organisations and processes can 
shape energy use in cities and support infrastructure goals for environmental reasons by 
examining what levers of power and relationships planning has in relation to other urban actors. 
The actor-centric, in-depth and comparative approach proposed can potentially lead to detailed 
recommendations on planning actions for urban energy generation and use. The literature 
review highlights that both of these areas of investigation are historically understudied and this 
research could make a contribution to ongoing categorisation and analysis of planning for 
environmental goals as well as make recommendations for practical policymaking and 
implementation. From a theoretical perspective, it could serve as evidence in the ongoing 
evolution of communicative planning theory by looking at the role of planning processes in 
delivering DHC and considering the importance of regulative and stimulating functions of 
planning in shaping private and civic activity for urban energy infrastructure.  
Turning to literature on policy making in cities more generally, a research structure which utilises 
a governance networks perspective and positions planning in relation to other actors may 
contribute to ongoing discussions about the capacity of governance structures to support 
change in urban energy infrastructure. The research can investigate the proposed link between 
quality and type of negotiations and the outcome of policy delivery. The case studies should 
enable consideration of the robustness of governance networks as an observed phenomenon of 
urban policy making and support the explanatory ambitions of governance network research. 
They will also provide a detailed account of governance network processes for urban 
infrastructure which could serve as a base for further evaluation of democratic and efficacy 
concerns around governance networks as a policy solution for large scale infrastructure.  
The international perspective of the research should enable the findings to evaluate influence of 
contextual institutional factors versus the negotiation and exchange characteristics of 
governance networks patterns. This evaluation could generate pointers for future research and 
understanding, influencing future urban policy studies. The same perspective means the 
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research will gather information of interest to theoretical discussions on the ability of cities to 
influence material flows of resources in a context of climate change, urbanisation and 
environmental limits. The findings could address identified gaps and questions about the scales 
of governance engaged in urban environmental responses.   
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Chapter 5. Research Methodology  
 
This chapter outlines the research design and methodology. It discusses the challenges and 
benefits of an international, comparative approach and applies theoretical and methodological 
guidelines on comparative study to the Actor-Centered Institutionalism (ACI) framework. ACI is 
then used to inform the case study selection, methods of data collection and analysis. The 
chapter ends with a summary of the research design and a statement of how the methods of 
research, structured by ACI, will address the research questions.  
5.1 Comparative Research 
The aim of the research is to understand the role of planning in delivering DHC, with planning 
organisations positioned as one actor in network governance patterns and within an 
institutionalist perspective which recognises the influence of structural settings on actors. An in-
depth and international comparative case study research design is proposed, with ACI serving 
as a conceptual framework to structure analysis, comparison and to answer the research 
questions.  
A comparative approach is supported by a series of papers which argue for greater use of 
comparative studies in urban politics and governance studies (Pierre J. , 2005; Sellers, 2005; 
Mossberger & Denters, 2006; Wolman, 2008). At the core of their call is a reminder that 
comparative study is a scientific method which substitutes for the experimental method. Wolman 
sets out an approach to valid causal inference in qualitative research, arguing that the logic of 
good qualitative and quantitative research does not differ (Wolman, 2008). The utility of 
comparative studies is illustrated further by Kantor and Savich for whom, comparison “more 
precisely shows how variables work differently in a variety of settings,” “affords a better to 
chance to understand how the discovery of anomalies within different social systems can be 
refined and ultimately enhance theoretical understanding,” and finally “provides contrast models 
that point up crucial distinctions within a given set of findings” (2006, p. 135). Employing an in-
depth approach comes with other strengths, argue King, Keohane and Verba in Designing 
Social Inquiry. Particularly, "one of the often overlooked advantages of the in-depth case study 
method is that the development of good causal hypothesis is complementary to good 
description rather than competitive with it." (1994, p. 45). Pierre, writing about urban politics in 
the Urban Affairs Review, is particularly supportive of comparative studies as useful for 
understanding patterns in urban governance: "understanding urban governance more broadly, 
that is, to investigate to what extent different social, political, and economic forces tend to 
produce different models of urban governance, requires a comparative approach” (2005, p. 
453).  
Approaches in comparative research 
There is a long history of comparative approaches employed in sociological, political and urban 
research, with a multiplicity of methods, perspectives and models. Kantor and Savitch (2006), 
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Lichbach and Zuckerman (1997) and DiGaetano and Strom (2003) group these into structural, 
cultural and rational choice approaches to comparative study, as described in Table 9.  
Approach to 
Analysis 
Perspective Proponents Characteristic 
Structural 
analysis 
Political  Marx, Weber emphasises the formal 
organisations of 
governments; seeks 
similarities 
Cultural analysis Anthropological Montesquieu, 
Weber, Mosca 
nuanced and detailed 
readings of particular cases 
to highlight differences 
Rational choice  Micro economic Hobbs, Smith, 
Pareto 
actors deliberately act to 
maximise their advantage 
Table 9: Approaches to comparative study (adapted from Lichbach and Zukerman (1997)) 
ACI was developed by Scharpf and Mayntz to explicitly combine the structural and rational 
choice approaches in an integrated framework. Scharpf comments, “what is gained by this 
fusion of paradigms is a better “goodness of fit” between theoretical perspectives and the 
observed reality of political interaction that is driven by the interactive strategies of purposive 
actors operating within institutional settings that, at the same time, constrain these strategies” 
(1997, p. 36).  
ACI's integrated approach is chosen to address the research questions. The delivery of 
complicated urban infrastructure across significant physical areas arises as the result of a 
sophisticated interaction of individual actors, social contexts, government powers and macro-
and micro-powers. The case studies are envisioned to be multi-actor and multi-scalar, crossing 
political and economic hierarchies, revealing relationships and arrangements which are too 
complex for structural analysis and too broad for cultural approach to analysis. An integrated 
approach enables interaction-oriented research (Scharpf, 1997), an analysis of how and why 
policy solutions are implemented in different settings.  
Issues in comparative research  
As many papers on global comparative studies have described, international comparisons have 
weaknesses as well; from the meta issues of cultural relativity and contextual meanings through 
to the more mundane of accessing data in other languages (Kantor & Savitch, 2006; 
Mossberger & Denters, 2006; Pierre J. , 2005). A review of the literature highlights two 
weaknesses for this research. One is that international comparative studies are “inevitably 
plagued with the small-n problem of too many variables and too few cases” (Scharpf, 2000, p. 
765); the lack of sufficient numbers of case studies. To address the problem of too many 
variables and too few cases, research can broadly choose between quantitative multi-variate 
regression, or follow a in-depth, narrative approach (King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994; Mossberger 
& Denters, 2006; Scharpf, 2000). Scharpf and Hall argue that undertaking cross-section time 
series regressions to identify statistical regularities is suitable for identification of stable 
relationships of structural character, e.g. the varieties of capitalism school of research (Hall & 
Soskice, 2001; Scharpf, 2000).  
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Scharpf (2000), Denters (2006) and King, Keohane and Verba (1994) argue that in depth, 
narrative-based comparative case studies are better suited to research “focused on empirically 
supported generalizations about the influence of policymaking institutions on the capacity for 
effective policy responses” (Scharpf, 2000, p. 767). All three stress that to arrive at potentially 
generalizable conclusions, the research must find ways to cope with the excessive variety and 
complexity of causal influences. An in-depth case study approach is preferred for this research, 
supported by the ACI framework which provides a structure to rationalise causal influences. The 
next section discusses how the ACI framework can cope with excessive causal inferences.  
A second relevant weakness in international comparative studies, particularly with in depth 
research is accounting for different contextual meanings between languages and political 
settings (Kantor & Savitch, 2006; Mossberger & Denters, 2006). For example, ‘regional’ or 
‘decentralised’ are words with substantially different meanings in different settings. Mossberger 
& Denters (2006), Kantor and Savich (2006), and King, Keohane and Verba (1994) argue that 
an in-depth approach can overcome this with care. Denters particularly argues that the research 
should be interested not only in the identity of measures but in their ‘functional equivalence’.  
5.2 Methods of Case Study Selection using ACI 
An in-depth, narrative approach to the research limits the number of case studies to be 
investigated on practical grounds. The following section sets out the research’s methodological 
approach to choosing case studies. It discusses the issues and rules for qualitative case study 
selection and then turns to apply these to the ACI framework. The case study selection process 
is then described.  
Methodological considerations  
Carefully designed comparative research enables intellectual rigor in qualitative research. 
However, as King, Keohane and Verba illustrate, the structure by which case studies are 
selected is central to the success of a qualitative study. They argue that “poor case selection 
can vitiate even the most ingenuous attempts, at a later stage, to make valid causal inferences” 
(1994, p. 115). King, Keohane and Verba, followed by Denters and Mossberger (2006), outline 
the methods in designing comparative study selection. They both agree that random selection of 
case studies is difficult, particularly in the social sciences. In intentional or purposive sampling of 
case studies they argue “there are two basic options available: selection on the dependent 
variable and selection on the independent variable”. The dependant variable(s) are also known 
as 'outcome variable' (e.g. DHC delivered), and the independent variable(s) are also known as 
the explanatory variables or observations, with the ‘key’ independent variable the ‘cause’ of the 
dependant variable. By holding some independent variables constant and varying the remaining 
independent variables, you come to understand what influences the dependant variable.  
Both papers are adamant that selecting case studies on dependant variable can lead to inability 
to test causal relationships between factors and variables in the case studies to be compared. If 
all case studies are successful in delivering DHC, and you conclude that x-variable caused the 
success, you cannot test for the absence of x-variable leading to failure.  
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King, Keohane and Verba (1994) provide further points regarding variable selection which are 
helpful. Firstly that “selecting observations for inclusion in a study according to the categories of 
the key explanatory variable causes no inference problems" (p. 137). Secondly that “the best 
'intentional' research design selects observations to ensure variation in the explanatory 
variables without regard to the values of the dependant variables” (p. 140). And finally that, 
though the research may look at a wide range of influences or observations in each case study, 
it is appropriate to control selected variables, to seek out the variables with the most substantial 
causal relationships to the dependant variable.  
Kantor and Savitch also sketch out limitations that restrict case study selection; firstly that they 
must have some similarities to enable like for like comparison, secondly that language can be 
an important factor in understanding, thirdly that comparable data should be available, and 
finally that conceptual parameters should be similar, e.g. the concept of ‘regional’ (2006). The 
challenge of conceptual language aspect is also covered in other papers but can be overcome 
with careful attention.  
To summarise, the research design should identify the dependant variable, the outcome of the 
causal relationships. Selection of case studies for independent variables or even key 
independent variables causes no inference problems. Within those case studies selected, a 
wide range of potential influences should be examined. It is appropriate to hold certain 
influences constant in order to better understand causality between influences and success.  
Dependent and independent variables in ACI  
This section applies the above case study selection guidelines to the preferred conceptual 
framework, Actor-Centered Institutionalism (ACI) described in Chapter 4. ACI proposes that, in 
reference to a defined policy issue in a specific institutional setting, policy outcomes are 
influenced by actors interacting according to actor constellations in a defined mode of 
interaction (Scharpf, 1997).  
For this research, the policy outcome is the delivery of DHC. Therefore, building on research 
design theory, the research is structured with delivery of DHC as the dependant variable – the 
outcome for which causal factors and relationships are sought. Case studies where DHC was 
sought by actors, but not delivered, are included in the case study selection; effectively this 
ensures that the research is not selecting case studies based on the dependant variable. This 
enables testing of causal relationships between explanatory variables, a core component of 
comparative research theory as described above.  
As the selection of case studies based on independent variables causes no inference problems, 
and ACI provides a structure which can cope with variety and complexity of causal influences. 
ACI concepts are employed to determine which independent variables to hold constant through 
the case study selection process. In ACI, there are five components which drive policy 
outcomes; the following text addresses how they will be considered in case study selection. 
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First, a particular institutional setting. To focus on network governance, the research selects for 
case studies with both public and private actors within them. It excludes case studies which are 
only private or only public sector driven.  Secondly, a specific policy problem: DHC should be an 
environmental policy goal in each case. The research selects for case studies where the 
environmental benefits are a publicly stated goal and excludes case studies where 
environmental concerns are not mentioned. Third, specified actors. The research selects for 
case studies where planning institutions are involved and excludes case studies where they are 
not involved in the delivery of DHC. Fourth, actor constellations. This component is collective 
picture of actor perceptions about the policy problem. Therefore it is not a variable and the 
research cannot control case studies based on this variable. 
Fifth, the mode of interaction. In network governance, actors are relatively stable, non-
hierarchical, interdependent but autonomous, and interact through negotiations. The research 
excludes case studies with explicitly horizontal connections between major actors to guarantee 
a level of network governance patters in each case; this is similar to selecting for case studies 
with both public and private actors. As described in Chapter 4, the research adds a further 
component within the mode of interaction on the success of governance networks in the form of 
relational characteristics. Relational characteristics are proposed as the patterns and quality of 
interactions among purposeful actors. The research does not propose to select case studies on 
this component. A summary of these implications for the case study selection process is 
provided in Table 10. 
 ACI Component Research Approach Case Study Selection 
DHC as an environmental 
policy goal 
Static independent variable All cases have DHC as an 
environmental policy goal 
Institutional Setting Independent variable  Cases have both public and 
private actors 
Actors  Independent variable 
 
Planning activity in support of 
DHC as a static independent 
variable 
Actor Constellations  Determined by problem and 
actor set 
 
Mode of Interaction- 
Negotiated 
Determined by nature of policy 
goal 
Cases are predominantly 
horizontal interactions 
Relational Characteristics Independent variable  
DHC delivered or not 
delivered 
Dependent variable Both delivered and not 
delivered 
Table 10: ACI and the selection of case studies 
Case study selection  
A literature review was unable to locate an existing review of case studies of urban DHC in a 
comprehensive or rigorous way across the globe. Therefore a wide range of sources of 
information have been used to establish a ‘long list’ of case studies:  researcher’s industry 
knowledge,  global energy company websites,  World Energy Council and International Energy 
Agency publications, Google searches, searches of academic journals, and energy statistics 
published by individual countries. These generated the long list of case studies in Table 11. 
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City  Country Dependant 
Variable 
Amsterdam  The Netherlands Delivered 
Barcelona Spain Delivered  
Berlin Germany Delivered  
Burlington USA Not Delivered 
Cambridge USA Delivered  
Chicago  USA Not Delivered 
Copenhagen  Denmark Delivered 
Dubai UAE Delivered  
Frankfurt Am Main Germany Delivered  
Hamburg  Germany Not Delivered 
Harbin  China Delivered  
Helsinki Finland Delivered 
London (Southwark) UK Not Delivered 
London (Kings Cross) UK Delivered  
Lerwick  UK Delivered  
Miami USA Delivered  
Paris France Delivered 
Portland USA Not Delivered  
Reykjavik Iceland Delivered  
San Diego  USA Delivered  
Seoul South Korea Delivered 
Singapore Singapore Delivered 
Southampton  UK Delivered 
Toronto Canada Delivered 
Victoria, BC Canada Not Delivered  
Vienna Austria Delivered  
Table 11: Long list of cities with DHC systems 
In practice, selecting case studies according to the dependent variable and holding static two 
independent variables tends to exclude the following groups of case studies. Case studies 
where long-standing tax regimes or the physical climate encouraged DHC on economic grounds 
were not included as for those situations DHC was not a messy policy problem and network 
governance patterns were not observed. Similarly, case studies in countries where DHC had 
been practiced for many years and was no longer perceived as a environmental policy goal but 
simply standard practice were not included. Case studies in non-urban or industrial settings, and 
DHC systems installed before approximately 1980 which have not been significantly expanded 
or upgraded in the intervening years were also not included; the significant structural changes to 
both urban policy (governance patterns) and energy markets (liberalization) since that time 
tended to signify that non-hierarchal governance patterns were absent.  
Further to the above ACI components which served as independent variables, the following 
influenced case study selection. First, the availability of information in English. The research 
avoided case studies were little or no desktop information was available in English; this was a 
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practical decision which led to the absence of Asian examples from the research scope. 
Second, access to actors. Due to the need to understand organisation and individual 
perceptions, it was important that the research be able to interview actors involved in the cases. 
Therefore the research focused on fairly recent case studies. Access to actors did remain a data 
concern throughout the research, as discussed below.  
Applying the case study selection criteria established above to the long list of case studies in 
Table 11, the following case studies were chosen for detailed study.  
1. Elephant and Castle, London   Not delivered 
2. Districlima 22@, Barcelona    Delivered 
3. Deep Lake Water Cooling, Toronto   Delivered 
4. Burlington, Virginia     Not delivered 
5. Lerwick, Shetland     Delivered 
To summarise, the research design employs ACI to inform the case study selection, being 
mindful of theoretical and methodological considerations of comparative case study research.   
Both case studies where DHC has been delivered and where it has not been delivered are 
chosen. Selection of case studies for the actor component causes no inference problems. It is 
appropriate to hold certain variables constant in order to better understand causality between 
influences and success; these variables were selected by employing concepts in ACI. Case 
study selection holds static a key component – ACI's policy goal (DHC as an environmental 
policy goal) - and excludes cases studies where DHC is delivered on financial grounds alone. 
Alongside the selection for cases with planning organisations actively involved, this focuses the 
case studies to situations which address the research questions.   
In support of the comparative methodology it is helpful to standardise terminology about 
government actors. For the purposes of this thesis, local government or municipal government 
indicates the lowest form of state organisation to pro-actively manage an urban area (e.g. 
London Borough of Southwark). Metropolitan government indicates the next step up within an 
urban context; this can be a collective of many organisations (e.g. Barcelona Metropolitan 
organisations, Greater London Authority). State government indicates a large sub-national level 
of government which can have varying degrees of autonomy and legislative power (e.g. State of 
Vermont, Generalitat de Catalyna, Scottish Government, Province of Ontario). National 
government indicates the highest level of government of a nation-state, with implications for 
citizenship and controlled borders.  
5.3 ACI Structures the Methods of Data Collection and Analysis 
This section considers suitable methods for data collection and analysis to inform the research 
design and respond to the three questions. The literature review identified that previous 
governance research and the proposed conceptual framework, Actor-Centered Institutionalism 
(ACI), point at specific analysis methodologies. These methodologies are discussed and then 
applied to the research questions, generating a detailed research design. This section draws 
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heavily on Hermans and Thisse (2009) and Reed et al (2005) and their review of multi-actor 
analysis methodologies.  
Hermans and Thisse (2009) review and explain a full range of governance analysis 
methodologies in detail, highlighting that while most popular methods can be grouped generally 
into stakeholder analysis, other methods such as discourse analysis and cognitive mapping are 
being employed with a spectrum of quantitative and qualitative results. Stakeholder analysis is 
the least analytical of the methods reviewed; Hermans and Thisse argue that its lack of 
specificity is offset by its practical usability. More analytical methods include social network 
analysis, multi-attribute assessments and vote-exchange models; their specificity is balanced by 
their limitation to specific sub-sets of policy processes, and their rigid data input parameters 
(2009). 
Chapter 4 describes how ACI points at a structure for the research design, clearly identifying 
focus areas for the research and proposing a research approach which can address the 
research questions. Looking at the first three components of ACI (policy problem, actors, and 
actor constellations), the methodology is required to address of a broad spectrum of kinds of 
interactions and be able to draw out and understand not only the capabilities of the actors, but 
also their orientations and preferences both generally and towards other actors. This 
requirement to understand the ‘perceptions’ of each actor towards the other actors’ strategies 
and preferences across a broad range of topics suggests a in-depth, qualitative approach would 
be more appropriate than specific, quantitative analysis. Stakeholder analysis, with its history of 
applications to many in-depth qualitative studies and its ability to be ‘inclusive’ the types and 
kinds of actors and interactions is particularly suited to these needs of ACI and the research 
questions. While Hermans and Thisse acknowledge that stakeholder analysis is stronger on 
identifying resources than perceptions, Reed et al believe that stakeholder analysis 
methodologies can also be strong in understanding actor relationships and perceptions 
(Hermans & Thisse, 2009; Reed, et al., 2009).  
Stakeholder analysis methods are proposed as the appropriate analysis tools to address the 
research questions. Stakeholder analysis methods are a loosely grouped range of flexible 
analysis methods which assist in understanding policy making as a process influenced by 
multiple actors. Stakeholder analysis methods are widely recognised as appropriate to generate 
information on the relevant actors and to understand their behaviour, interests, agendas and 
influences (Reed, et al., 2009; Hermans & Thisse, 2009). The methods attempt to structure the 
stakeholder (or actor) environment, to assess cooperative potential and threat of obstruction. 
The outcomes are a series of tables and matrices for actor classification and participation 
strategies. The analysis and matrices build on the ACI framework, as detailed below.  
This research employs an iterative approach to actor identification and matrix analysis, building 
on initial desktop research to undertake semi-structured interviews. The relationship between 
these analysis methods and the research questions is described below  
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Social Network Analysis and the challenge of messy policy problems.  
Social Network Analysis (SNA) was considered as potential quantitative analysis pathway to 
understand the relational characteristics of actors within the case studies. Hermans (2009), 
(Marsh, 1998). and Reed et al (2005) all highly recommend social network analysis (SNA) to 
understand network governance relational characteristics. The SNA approach was trialled on 
the Elephant and Castle Case study, where interviewees were asked to quantitatively rank the 
importance of other actors and their strength of communications with others. Two adjacency 
matrices were established and initial analyses run on communication, influence, reciprocity, 
centrality and equivalence. However the trial illustrated the difficulties of establishing a boundary 
set for actors engaged in the network and gathering sufficient quantitative information from each 
actor within the set. The boundary set is critical to SNA calculations which compare individual 
relationships against the total possible set; therefore while the results were interesting they were 
not considered robust. It would have been even more difficult to collect sufficient information for 
robust boundary sets across all cases; comparison of SNA findings across cases would not 
have been valid. Therefore the research did not continue with SNA.  
Relational characteristics are instead analysed through a qualitative approach. Size, duration, 
density, and centrality are judged instead through comparing the relative qualities in the five 
case studies.   
Data collection 
The research exclusively uses primary sources arising from the identified actors in each case 
study to undertake the ACI stakeholder analysis of actor powers, orientations and preferences 
as well as to analyse the collective actor constellation. Secondary sources of information or 
analysis not arising directly from the actors (e.g. other academic or industry publications) are 
used to inform an understanding of the institutional context and to corroborate patterns of 
behaviour emerging from the primary analysis.    
In ACI, the starting point for explaining policy-making processes and their outcomes is to 
“identify the set of interactions that produces the policy outcomes which are to be explained” 
(Scharpf, 1997, p. 43). Research into each case study begins with a review of publicly available 
information to identify these interactions. The review considers information available such as 
corporate and personal websites, government policies; research conducted by academics as 
well as industry bodies and published presentations by individuals. Reports and publications are 
sought through internet keyword searches, relevant planning, policy and energy research 
archives, and reference tracing. This stage establishes the set of interactions to be studied, 
identifies actors and potential composite actors, as well as actor capabilities, preferences and 
strategies used over time. It also begins to delineate the time and actor boundaries of each 
case study, as part of building up ‘the set of interactions which produces the policy outcomes to 
be explained’ (Scharpf, 1997).  
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Identifying actors, and identifying their voices  
From this review of the interactions around the particular DHC system, the research indentifies 
the actors, individual or collective, that are involved in the policy-making process. Given the 
governance network approach chosen for the research, boundaries of who constitutes actors 
and the actor set are not pre-supposed and instead emerge from an iterative process from 
desktop research and then the interviews themselves. In this way the actor set grows during the 
research process.  
Actors are considered possible to exist at both organisation and individual level. Coding and 
stakeholder analysis are structured accordingly, often dually coding as composite sets of actors 
as well as individuals. As described in Chapter 4, Scharpf encourages concept of composite 
actors where it does not obscure the research interests, because it facilities the task of 
explaining and predicting policy outcomes in the real world, where collective actors - 
organisations, ministries, associations – are often the primary actors.  
Desktop research, employing internet searches and academic sources, first identifies potential 
actors organisations associated with the network. Once a long list of organisations are 
indentified, further internet searches are conducted to 'trace' influences by other actors, such as 
consultants who might have advised actors. This iterative process continues during the 
interviews, where questions enquire about organisations and individuals with influence over the 
DH system.   
Analysis of actors – coding of data and inclusion in the stakeholder matrices – is undertaken on 
the broadest conception of an actor set using sources authored by actors. However the 
research also aims to interview 'primary actors' with direct influence on the case study 
outcomes; Scharpf distinguishes between a wider actor set and primary actors that are directly 
and necessarily participating in the making of policy choices" (Scharpf p 71). This narrowing to 
focus on influential individuals and organisations is supported by recommendations in 
Methodology Problems in Urban Governance (Gissendannero, 2003).  
Interviewees are contacted by email or phone to request an interview. At least two follow up 
requests are made if the initial contact was unsuccessful. It is not possible to interview all 
primary actors; in some cases actors declined interviews, and in others the individuals had 
moved on to another organisation and could not be found. At a minimum, the research 
interviews at least one individual associated with planning organisations, one individual 
associated with market concerns (either energy company or local business), and one individual 
associated with a government policy organisation in each case study. Table 13 provides a 
summary of interview coverage.  
Where individuals could not be contacted for an interview, written records from the desktop 
search or library research authored by that interviewee or their organisation are assumed to 
represent their actor orientations and preferences and coded as such. Where no information 
can be found, this is noted.  
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Academic research or third party commentators (e.g. industry body case study) which described 
the case study or analysed the case are never assumed to represent actor orientations and are 
not used in the stakeholder analysis to substitute for lack of directly authored information or 
interviews. However this secondary information is coded and used to understand the 
institutional context of actors and to reflect upon the results of the stakeholder analysis.  
Interview structure  
Semi-structured interviews are undertaken following the selection methodology described 
above. Semi-structured interviews are a popular data collection approach in social science 
research, Reed et al confirm they are useful for in-depth insights to stakeholder relationships 
and to confirm prior desktop or focus group research. The researcher is led by a pre-set list of 
questions, but remained flexible during the interviews, allowing the interviewee to respond in the 
manner of their choosing, and allowing the interviewee to contribute above and around the pre-
set questions. This approach, as compared to a more formally structured approach, is “most 
useful where the researcher seeks information regarding a specific, defined phenomenon (such 
as an event or document) .... but with significant depth or ‘richness’ (Reed, et al., 2009, p. 
1944). This flexible, open-ended approach is appropriate to support the perception oriented 
nature of the research, concerned not only with what but why and why them of the DHC system. 
The interviews seek to gather information on the actor capabilities, preferences and 
orientations, their chosen strategies, as well as information on their evaluations and preferences 
of other actors and of policy outcomes. Specific interview questions address the research 
questions about relational characteristics and institutional setting The interview pro-forma is 
provided in Appendix B. A schedule of interviews undertaken is provided below in Table 13. 
Table 12 enumerates the relationships between interviews and actor sets to illustrate the robust 
nature of the interview based data collection.  
 Interviews 
Conducted  
Number of 
Interviewees 
Number of 
Primary 
Actors 
Number of 
actors in wider 
set  
Barcelona 3 4 9 23 
Burlington 4 5 7 20 
Lerwick 4 8 8 15 
London 7 7 10 16 
Toronto 8 9 10 26 
Table 12: Overview of data collection and actor sets 
Given the international nature of the research, and classic problems of interpretation and 
vocabulary in policy analysis where meanings and context are closely linked (Hajer & 
Wagenaar, 2003), it is important to have the exact vocabulary used by the interviewees for 
cross-checking and post-interview interpretation. Interviews are recorded with permission of the 
interviewees using simple recording technology located within the researcher's mobile phone. 
The recordings are then transcribed into text, generally without the use of transcription software, 
before coding and analysis.  
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In two specific cases, professional transcriptions and translations were commissioned. For the 
case of Lerwick, the researcher had access to an academic transcription service with 
experience of the Scottish accent. Therefore transcription of the interview records was 
outsourced, and the resulting document was double checked with the researcher's personal 
notes and the sound recording. In Barcelona, a professional academic translator was 
commissioned to attend the interviews and transcribe the recordings to supplement the 
researcher's basic level of verbal Spanish. Two Barcelona interviews were conducted in English 
with support from the translator where requested by the interviewee. One interview was 
conducted whereby the researcher asked questions in English but the interviewees responded 
a mixture of Spanish and Catalan. Coding and analysis were conducted using the professional 
English translations of interview transcripts.  
Data quality  
The level of information about the cases and the mindset of actors within the cases - their 
preferences, orientations, and preferences of other actors – is considered sufficiently robust for 
all five cases. 
For the case of Barcelona, three interviews with four individuals were conducted, supplemented 
by email correspondence. Further information was primarily obtained through primary sources: 
government policy documents, urban plans, published organisational literature and a search of 
websites produced by the actors. Existing academic and industry analysis exists on Barcelona's 
governance and planning history; this was called upon where it added to understanding of the 
primary sources. Additionally, a master's thesis, Integrating Urban Infrastructure Solutions, had 
previously analysed the infrastructure delivery in the 22@ district (Torguet, 2009); information 
included in that thesis was not used in the stakeholder analysis but was referred to post hoc for 
a sanity check. Data quality is considered to be robust if uneven; views of local elected officials 
were primarily sourced through newspaper articles and authored introductions to published 
policy documents. The most significant gap in understanding is regarding the perspectives of 
the consumers of the Districlima system.  
For Burlington, five interviews with six individuals were conducted in August 2012. Other data 
was primarily obtained through a library search of local newspapers, the records of the planning 
department, and an internet search of relevant organisational websites. The local DHC 
advocacy committee also shared information on who attended the public meetings in 2011. The 
interviews provide a robust if uneven set of data; the research lacks interviews with a 
representative of the Burlington Electric Department, the University of Vermont, and Fletcher 
Allen Hospital. Their perspectives have been sourced from published documents and websites. 
The research was also not able to obtain feasibility studies dating to the 1980s; this is not 
considered a barrier as the analysis is directed to more recent (since 2007) interactions.   
For Lerwick, four interviews with eight individuals were conducted in November 2011, 
supplemented by email correspondence. Other data was obtained through an internet search 
and planning policy documents in the council offices. Online information, such as Shetland 
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Times articles and Shetland Charitable Trust documents, tend to extend back to the mid 1990s 
and therefore written records from the inception of the plant are weaker. There is one published 
academic paper on the DHC system in Lerwick, written by Neville Martin the manager of 
Shetland Heat and Power Limited and William Spence the Manager of the Incineration Plant 
(Martin & Spence, 2010).  
For London, seven interviews were conducted over the summer of 2011, supplemented by 
email correspondence and a survey designed to gauge the kind of interactions among actors 
(the results of which is not included in this thesis as described in above). The interviews provide 
a robust if uneven set of data; a more rounded view of local councillor and officer positions is 
provided by committee reports and newspaper articles. There are gaps in understanding the 
perspective of Lend Lease prior to 2008 and the direct perspective of the finance department. 
Other data was primarily obtained through an internet search. Newspaper articles, national and 
regional government policies and Southwark Council committee reports in particular provided 
useful sources of actor voices and perspectives.  
For Toronto, eight interviews with nine individuals were conducted in September 2012. The set 
of interviewees is robust and varied, although not all interviewees can be classed as primary 
actors directly engaged with the decision to proceed with Deep Lake Water Cooling. Other data 
was obtained through an internet search with newspaper articles and some company websites 
providing information, and via a electronic and library search of City of Toronto meeting minutes 
and councillor reports. The city council minutes provided a useful view into the often extended 
process of internal decision making within the council committees. 
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 Interviews 
Barcelona  Former Director of Infrastructure, 22@ BCN together with Head of Energy 
Infrastructure, Barcelona Regional. 27 November 2012. (Interview A3) 
 Chief Executive, Districlima. 27 November 2012. (Interview S2) 
 Technical Director, Barcelona Energy Agency. 14 December 2012. 
(Interview G4) 
Burlington  Local resident together with Managing Director of the McNeil Power Station 
(both on the BURDES committee). 30th August 2012. (Interview C2) 
 Joel Banner Baird, journalist at Burlington Free Press. 29th August, 2012. 
(Interview C3) 
 Director of Planning and Zoning, City of Burlington.29th August 2012. 
(Interview P4) 
 Senior Vice President, Ever Green Energy. 11 July 2012. (Interview A4) 
Lerwick  Manager, Shetland Heat and Power Company together with Financial 
Controller, Shetland Islands Charitable Trust together with Robert 
Henderson, Local Councillor and Trustee of Shetland Islands Charitable 
Trust. 7 November 2011. (Interview S1) 
 Energy Manager together with Energy Recovery Plant Manager, together 
with Waste Services Manager. All Shetland Islands Council. 8 Nov 2011. 
(Interview G3) 
 Town Planner, Shetland Islands Council. 8 Nov 2011. (Interview P2) 
 Site Engineer, Gilbert Bain Hospital, 8 November 2011. (Interview U1) 
London  Founder, Brian Dunlop Associates. 11 July 2011. (Interview A1) 
 Project Director for Elephant and Castle Regeneration, Southwark Council. 
2 August 2011. (Interview G1) 
 Head of Infrastructure and Sustainability, Lend Lease. 12 August 2011. 
(Interview D1) 
 Former Project Director of Elephant and Castle Regeneration, Southwark 
Council. 13 October 2011. (Interview P1) 
 Former Councillor and Leader of the Council. 20 October 2011. (Interview 
E1) 
 Director of Research, Clinton Climate Change Initiative. 30 June 2011. 
(Interview C1) 
 Director, Inventa Partners. 8 September 2011. (Interview A2 )  
Toronto  Director, Toronto Environment Office. 4 September 2012. (Interview G2) 
 Chair, Ontario Clean Air Alliance. 4 September 2012 (Interview C4) 
 Chief Executive, Enwave. 5th September 2012. (Interview S3) 
 General Manager, Toronto Water. 6th September 2012. (Interview G5) 
 Project Manager, Environment Zoning By-law and Environmental Planning, 
City of Toronto together with Senior Engineer, Energy Efficiency Office, City 
of Toronto. 6th September 2012. (Interview P5) 
 Joe Pantalone, former Councillor. 6th September 2012. (Interview E2) 
 Richard Gilbert, former Councillor. 6th September 2012. (Interview E3) 
 Senior Vice President, Oxford Properties. 24 September 2012. (Interview 
U2) 
Table 13 : Schedule of interviews undertaken for research 
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5.4 Analysis Methods 
This section describes the process by which the desktop research and interview data are 
analysed to address the research questions, using coding and stakeholder matrix analysis.  
The method of stakeholder analysis is the completion of a bespoke series of matrices, building 
on the Actor-Centered Institutionalism framework concepts. The matrices are completed 
through a coding process. All documentation – interviews as well as written documents - 
relevant to each case study is reviewed and coded using four types of codes. The codes arise 
from the ACI framework, and are grouped as follows: 
1. Type 1: Self-identified: Actor A thinks X of Actor A, e.g.: 
o A1A : A describes its own capabilities and resources 
o A2A: A describes its own orientations about the DHC network 
o A3A: A describes its own preferences for the DHC network 
o A4A: A describes its own marking shaping strategy for DHC 
o A5A: A describes its own regulation of DHC 
o A6A: A describes its own market incentives for DHC 
o A7A : A describes its own market capacity building around DHC 
2. Type 2: Other identified: Actor X thinks X of Actor B, e.g.: 
o A1B: A describes what it understands about B’s capabilities and resources 
o B2C: B describes what it understands about C’s orientations towards the DHC 
network 
o D3A: D describes what it understands about A’s preferences towards the DHC 
network.  
3. Type 3: Statements of fact: describing process, naming of actors involved, and methods 
of communication or collaboration. Three codes were used: 
o 20: A neutral description of the process of establishing the DHC network.  
o 21: A reference to the actors involved in the policy or decision making about the 
DHC network 
o 22: A description of communication or collaboration methods in establishing the 
DHC network.  
4. Type 4: Other commentary on the case study by actors not directly involved in delivery 
of the DHC network (journalists, other research, post-hoc perceptions, etc). This third 
party commentary was coded ‘23’.  
Coding is an iterative process with the interviews and desktop research, whereby actors 
identified in code 21 are then investigated and documentation associated with them added into 
the coding process. Coding is undertaken using Atlas TI version 5.6.3. These codes enable the 
completion of the stakeholder analysis matrices. Appendix C contains a list of all codes used in 
each case study and the full stakeholder analysis matrices.  
Stakeholder analysis matrices  
Four stakeholder analysis matrices are used to define the set of actors and the actor 
constellation and to inform the understanding of the mode of interaction. One 'self-identified 
actor' analysis matrix summarises the capabilities, orientations, and preferences of all the actors 
involved in one case study, as identified by each actor. Essentially, this matrix is a summary of 
what each actor thinks of itself. This was completed with codes A1A, A2A, and A3A, as Table 
14 illustrates.   
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Actor Capabilities  Orientation Preferences  
e.g. local 
government  
e.g. did not know about 
DHC; hosted workshops; 
owned local waste 
incineration plant 
e.g. promote energy 
and sustainability; 
concerned with price 
of fuel for residents; do 
not want to own 
utilities. 
e.g. encourage DHC; 
coordinate 
discussions between 
private energy 
company and private 
customers;  
Typical code LG1LG LG2LG LG3LG 
Table 14: Example self-identified actor matrix  
A second 'collective actor' analysis matrix represents the same information about each actor, 
but instead of summarising what each actor thinks of itself, it summarises the perception of each 
actor by all other actors. Using the coding process, it groups responses from all actors and from 
the desktop research, so that each specific actor is described in a collective way by all the other 
actors. The codes for this matrix have greater variation, examples such as: A1B, B1A, D3F, etc. 
This collectively identified matrix highlights conflict in perceptions among actors in terms of their 
perception of other actors, and also identifies where consensus exists. This collective actor 
matrix begins to build a picture of the actor constellations in each case study. The research is 
careful to note changes in perceptions of other actors, recognizing that actor constellations are 
not static but evolve over time, through the effect of negotiations or interactions. Table 15 
provides an example of a collective actor matrix; the full matrices are included in Appendix C.  
Actor Capabilities  Orientation Preferences 
e.g. Government 
energy ministry 
e.g. generate new 
laws, control land use, 
financial investment  
e.g. campaigning 
organisation, 
government 
department 
e.g. coordinating other 
actors, regulating the 
private sector 
Typical code LPA1GEM; B1GEM LPA2GEM; F2GEM LPA3GEM; H3GEM 
e.g. local 
planning 
authority 
e.g. control land use, 
require new buildings 
to connect 
e.g. policy department e.g. state goals and 
interfere in new 
development 
Typical code  GEM1LPA; C1LPA  GEM2LPA; D2LPA GEM3LPA; F3LPA 
Table 15 : Example collective actor matrix 
Actors and actor constellations are analysed in detail through a further two matrices which 
describe the market interventions of the actor set. These strategy matrices map the 'potential' 
and the ‘actual’ strategies for each actor against four categories of market intervention identified 
by Allmendinger and Tiesdell, as discussed in Chapter 2. The self-identified strategy matrix 
defines how each actor perceives their potential options given institutional constraints and 
powers, and what roles or policy influences that actor enables. This employs codes such as 
A4A, A5A, A6A, A7A, etc as described above. The collective strategy matrix summarises what 
all actors perceive of other actors potential and actual interventions, using codes which 
referenced other actors, for example A4F, C5B, D6A, E7Z, etc. Again, this 'what everyone 
thinks of everyone else' matrix highlights areas of conflict or consensus in perception of others. 
The ++ indicators represent a scale of regulatory options as identified by the researcher: 0 
(none), + (minor), ++ (medium), and +++ (significant). To illustrate, in the collective strategy 
matrix below in Table 17, Actor B has a minor market shaping role (e.g. participating in policy 
development) but a significant potential incentive role (e.g. providing infrastructure grants).  
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 Market 
Shaping  
Market 
Regulation  
Market 
Incentives 
Market Capacity 
Building 
Actor A + + 0 + 
Actor B  0 0 ++ 0 
Typical 
Code 
A4A A5A B6B B7B 
Table 16: Example self-identified strategy matrix  
 Market Shaping  Market 
Regulation  
Market 
Incentives 
Market Capacity 
Building 
 Potential Actual Potential Actual Potential Actual Potential Actual 
Actor A ++ + +++ + 0 0 +++ 0 
Typical 
Code 
C4A; D4A C4A C5A C5A B6A B6A B7A; F7A B7A 
Actor B  + + 0 0 +++ + 0 0 
Typical 
Code 
C4B; A4B C4B C5B C5B A6B; D6B C6B A7B; C7B A7B 
Table 17: Example collective strategy matrix 
Applied on a case by case basis, these matrices address the ACI questions concerning what 
strategies of action are available to actors, and how actors perceive of each other’s potential 
strategies. They describe the actor constellation. By comparing the matrix with the known 
outcome of delivery (or not) of DHC with the potential and chosen strategies across case 
studies, these matrices help the research understand if perceived and actual strategies – or the 
gap between perceived and actual - are a causal factor in the delivery of DHC.  
Full code lists and detailed analysis matrices for each case study can be found in Appendix C.  
ACI Framework  Established Through 
DHC as an environmental policy 
goal 
Desktop review  
Institutional Setting Desktop review 
Interviews 
Self-identified actor analysis 
Collective actor analysis 
Actors 
Planning specifically 
Desktop review 
Interviews 
Self-identified actor analysis 
Self-identified strategy analysis  
Actor constellations  Desktop review 
Bespoke Interviews 
Collective actor analysis  
Collective strategy analysis 
Mode of interaction - negotiated Selection of case studies  
Confirmed by desktop reviews 
Interviews 
Collective strategy analysis  
Relational characteristics Interviews 
Comparative analysis 
DHC delivered or not delivered Selection of case studies 
Table 18 : Research analysis methods in summary 
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Evaluation and research narrative  
The final step in the research methodology is to reflect on the stakeholder analysis and strategy 
analysis in light of the research questions. This is done at both a case study level and in a 
comparative, cross-case study level. For each case study, the research evaluates how the 
components of ACI result in the policy outcomes, using the matrices to ‘get to grips’ with what 
causes the success or failure of DHC as an environmental policy goal. This case evaluation 
considers the eight case study questions identified in Chapter 4.  
1. Who are the primary actors?  
2. How are the actors influenced by the institutional setting?  
3. What are the actors' self-identified capabilities, orientations, and preferences?  
4. How can the actor constellation be described?  
5. How can the interactions be characterised?  
6. Is this network governance?  
7. What are the relational characteristics?  
8. How can the role of planning be described? 
These questions are addressed for each case study in Chapters 6 to 10 through a combination 
of description of the actors, narrative describing the outcome of the stakeholder analysis, direct 
quotes from actors and stakeholders interviewed, and the researcher's reflection on specific 
research case study questions. A narrative approach is considered appropriate given the 
breadth of information presented; it unlocks the story of the governance network without 
labouring the coding procedures. The coding procedures and stakeholder analysis matrices are 
detailed in Appendix C.   
The answers to the eight case study questions enable the research to compare across the 
cases studies on how each component of ACI related to outcome of the attempt to establish a 
DHC network. Chapter 11 describes the comparative analysis which directly addresses the 
three main research questions.  
Data Collection Processing Analysis 
Desktop Research 
Semi-Structured Interviews 
Transcription 
Notes 
Coding of all texts 
 
Reflection on Institutional Setting 
Self-identified Actor Analysis 
Collective Actor Analysis 
Strategy Analysis 
Collective Strategy Analysis  
Reflection on Mode of Interaction 
Reflection on existence of governance 
network behaviours 
Reflection on role of planning.  
Comparative Analysis 
Table 19 : Summary of data collection, processing and analysis 
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5.5 Research Design: In Summary  
The aim of this research is to understand the role planning organisations can play in delivering 
DHC infrastructure through a comparative review of global case studies. To address this, the 
research must be concerned with the role of planning within governance networks, while 
recognising that institutional context affects actors and the shape of interactions. Three research 
questions have been proposed, as follows:   
1. How do governance networks support implementation of DHC systems?  
2. How does the institutional setting influence the delivery of DHC systems?   
3. What is the role of planning, in relation to market, civic, and to other government 
organisations, in delivering DHC systems?   
To address these research questions, a conceptual framework of Actor-Centered 
Institutionalism is applied to five in depth case studies, which positions the delivery of DHC as 
the result of actors, set in a constellation of potential strategies and outcomes, which are played 
out through a negotiated mode of interaction. The institutional setting, actor characteristics, and 
relational characteristics of interaction between actors are considered potential variables on the 
policy outcome: DHC delivered or not. The use of ACI enables the research to address all three 
research questions, bridging governance network and institutionalist approaches and also focus 
on one actor, planning.  
ACI structures the data collection, analysis methodologies, and selection of case studies. The 
data required, information on actor capabilities, preferences, powers, and opinions of others, is 
generated through interviews and primary source reviews. Bespoke coding and four types of 
stakeholder analyses are undertaken on this data for each case study; these address eight case 
study questions which flow from ACI's concepts. The analysis findings for each case study are 
presented in an engaging narrative form.  
Comparative analysis of the five case studies addresses the three research questions. The 
inclusion of both ‘DHC delivered’ and ‘DHC not delivered’ case studies will enable the 
identification of specific actors, actor capabilities, institutional factors, actor constellations, or 
network characteristics which influence the delivery of DHC systems. The selected case studies 
are varied in context with different legal, administrative, and cultural settings in each. This 
variation enables both the analysis of how the institutional setting affects the establishment of a 
governance network for DHC and a more robust understanding of how the components of ACI 
relate to successful outcomes for DHC systems. The location of the responses to the research 
questions can be found in the thesis as follows: 
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Research Questions  Location of Response  
How do governance networks support implementation of DHC systems? Chapter 11 
How does the institutional setting influence the delivery of DHC systems?   Chapter 11 
What is the role of planning, in relation to market, civic, and to other 
government organisations, in delivering DHC systems?   
Chapter 11 
Case Specific Questions which inform the research questions :  
Who are the primary actors?  Chapters 6 to 10 
How are the actors influenced by the institutional setting? Chapters 6 to 10 
What are the actors' self-identified capabilities, orientations, and 
preferences? 
Chapters 6 to 10 
How can the actor constellation be described?  Chapters 6 to 10 
How can the interactions be characterised?  Chapters 6 to 10 
What are the relational characteristics?  Chapters 6 to 10 
Is this network governance?  Chapters 6 to 10 
How can the role of planning be described? Chapters 6 to 10 
Table 20 : Research question response summary 
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Chapter 6. Barcelona, Districlima in 22@: 
Extending Urbanisme  
 
In September 2000 Barcelona City Council approved a masterplan in the form of a Modification 
of the General Municipal Plan (MGMP) for the renovation of Poblenou, a former industrial 
district in central south-east Barcelona. The plan created the ‘22@’ district, transforming 200 
hectares of industrial land in Poblenou into an innovation district aimed at creating a strategic 
concentration of intensive knowledge-based activities. Following a typical pattern in Barcelona, 
the city council linked the masterplan to a major event, the Universal Forum of Cultures 2004 to 
give the complex investment and regeneration process momentum.  
The Poblenou MGMP was accompanied by a Special Infrastructure Plan (SIP) which 
established a technical masterplan for a thorough overhaul of Poblenou’s energy, 
telecommunications, water, and waste infrastructure. The plan included designs for a district 
heating and cooling (DHC) system, setting out the physical location and connection points to 
buildings. All local developments and neighbourhood projects are legally required to conform to 
the SIP design standard.  
As part of the construction of the buildings for the Forum of Cultures, the city council hosted an 
‘ideas competition’ for energy companies to explore options for building and operating the DHC 
system. The council eventually contracted with Cofely GDF Suez to built a small district heating, 
hot water and cooling system to serve the Forum buildings which utilized waste heat from a 
nearby waste incineration plant. Named "Districlima" this DHC system began operating in 2002.  
In 2005, the city council issued a public tender for a 30 year concession to manage and extend 
the Districlima system. The expectation was that Districlima would expand to the significant new 
construction across the 22@ district, following the technical standard established in the SIP and 
serving new or refurbished buildings as customers. Through this second procurement process 
Cofely was selected by the council as the preferred partner to operate and expand the DHC 
system. The expanded Districlima is run as a public-private enterprise with Cofely owning 
50.8%, Tersa (municipal waste company and source of heat) 20%, Agbar (local water company, 
also owned by Cofely) 19.2%, IDEA (national energy institute) 5%, and ICAEN (Catalan energy 
institute) 5%.  
As of 2012, Districlima is the largest urban district heating and cooling system in Spain, serving 
67 buildings through 13km of pipe networks throughout Poblenou. A new cooling plant opened 
in 2012 and the system continues to expand. The city is also pursuing additional DHC systems 
through the Barcelona Energy Agency and its decennial Energy Plans. 
For context, a timeline of development of the Districlima system in 22@ is provided in Figure 3.  
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Timeline of Districlima 
1998 Planning process for 22@ began. (InterviewA3, 2012) 
2000 Modification of the General Metropolitan Plan (MPGM) to create 22@ use and 
22@ district. (Barcelona City Council, 2000) 
Publication of Special Infrastructure Plan for district. Heating and cooling system 
included as technical standard, mapped. (Barcelona City Council, 2000) 
Creation of 22 Arroba BCN society to promote and manage 22@ regeneration. 
(Barcelona City Council, 2012) 
2001 Ideas for tender and presentation to 22@ BCN committee. (InterviewA3, 2012) 
2002 Districlima established with 1st concession to operate Forum area DHC, financed 
by municipality. (Districlima, 2012) 
2004 Started operating at Universal Forum of Cultures event (Districlima, 2012) 
2005 Public tender for 2nd concession of extension to 22@ district. (InterviewA3, 2012) 
2012 Tanger chiller plant opens. (Districlima, 2012) 
Figure 3: A timeline of Districlima, Barcelona 
 
 Barcelona's multi-layered government context  
A Mediterranean costal city in north western Spain, Barcelona is the capital city of Catalonia, a 
nationality and autonomous community within Spain, and is Spain's second largest city with an 
urban population of over 1.6 million and a metropolitan area population of over 4.5 million 
people. By several measures it holds a top-50 global city status, and has been widely 
recognised as an "outstanding example of a certain way of improving cities" (Marshall, 2004, p. 
1) for repositioning itself throughout global financial and economic changes over the past 30 
years.  
Multiple layers of political power and control in Barcelona have been central to planning and 
urban development of the city. Marshall argues that "the element of conflict, of cross-cutting 
efforts" has helped Barcelona (Marshall, 1996) in several ways, including "creating an effective 
balance of public and private oriented policies" (p. 162). The city is affected by six levels of 
government: federal (Spanish), national (Generalitat de Catalunya), provincial (Diputació 
Barcelona), county (Consell Comaracal del Barcelonès), metropolitan (Área Metropolitana de 
Barcelona), and municipal (Ajutament de Barcelona) whose levels of legal or political influence 
varied during the case timeline (Marshall, 2000). By and large, the federal and national levels 
set out legislation which defines what metropolitan and municipal organisations can do; the 
provincial and county functions tend to coordinate or support policies across organisations and 
between levels. 
Across the relatively short time span of this case, both political control (elected parties in 
majority) and legal powers (particularly the Municipal Law) changed in ways which were 
relevant to understanding the government and governance of urban energy infrastructure in 
Barcelona. Both Marshall (2000) and Esteban (2004) trace the history of planning and 
government in the city in detail, and the impact on urban planning is covered below. This case is 
also notable for spanning the late 2000's global financial crisis, which had a significant impact 
on the capacity and outlook of local, regional, and national government, private businesses and 
property developers, and financial institutions among others.  
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Figure 4:The Metropolitan Region of Barcelona (Area Metropolitana de Barcelona, 2011) 
6.1 The Actors 
This section introduces the organisations and individuals who comprise the ‘primary actor set’ 
for the establishment of Districlima system in Barcelona, describing their institutional setting and 
capabilities. Appendix C contains the codes and information sources which provided this 
understanding of actor powers and capabilities.  
Local government and urban planning functions 
In physical location, the Districlima system and the 22@ district fall predominantly within 
Barcelona City Council boundaries, however the Tersa waste plant and a small number of urban 
blocks fall into the adjacent eastern municipality, Sant Adrià de Besòs. The Universal Forum of 
Cultures project was similarly shared between the two municipalities.  
Barcelona City Council is governed by 41 elected councillors, headed by the Mayor of 
Barcelona. Effectively it is a collection of committees which direct and oversee work undertaken 
by either permanent executive staff such as the planning department or consortia agencies such 
as the Barcelona Energy Agency. With regards to local planning authority, Barcelona has seen 
numerous changes in institutional organisation and responsibilities or powers for development 
processes in the past twenty years. Pre-1987 a metropolitan commission which covered 
Barcelona City and adjacent municipalities had strong control over planning, waste, and 
housing. The use of those powers was shaped by political influences, predominately socialist or 
nationalist Catalyunan party objectives (Marshall, 2004). After a consolidation and 
regionalisation of local government in 1987, Barcelona City Council had less control over 
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planning, waste, and housing, but Barcelona mayors and deputy mayors continued to have 
strong force in shaping the policies that influence the central urban areas, particularly around 
large regeneration and infrastructure (Marshall, 2000). During the course of this case study the 
various bodies dissolved in 1987 by the abolition of the metro level were reconstituted in a 
weaker form under the 2010 Law of the Metropolitan area (Ajutament de Barcelona, 2013). 
Planning's institutional setting 
To understand the role and powers of planning Barcelona in 2000, and how the local 
government planning body was perceived by others, it is useful to understand the history and 
tradition of urban planning Barcelona. The local government has been undertaking active and 
socially inspired forward planning and plan making (urbanisme) since the 1850's. Planning in 
Barcelona is characterised by political involvement and by a clear physical vision for what city 
should look like at grand and at detailed scale (Marshall, 2004). This context has been labelled 
as 'Napoleonic-urbanism' by Newman and Thornley (1996).  
Marshall, in Urban Planning and Governance: Is there a Barcelona Model? provides a detailed 
explanation of where planning powers of legislation, plan making, investment, coordination, and 
development control lie. In summary, the federal Spanish government sets legislation and 
determines national and urban planning organisational powers. The national Catalonian 
government sets regional planning policy and since 1987 has been responsible for public 
housing. The city council through Deputy Mayor connections has influence over many of the 
metropolitan government agencies for water and environment which officially operate at a level 
between national and local (2000).  
After 1987, plan-making and development control powers were consolidated into the federal 
government. Planning policy and plan-making since then has been dealt with by a 'commission' 
of various regional bodies, chaired by the Barcelona City Council Mayor. Planning decisions are 
dealt with by three commissions which provides for local district influence. Marshall also outlines 
how this evolved the 'metro' planning into an event-focussed activity and argues that a lack of 
effective implementation instruments weakened infrastructure and physical planning (2000, p. 
312). Since then, "strategic planning in the Barcelona sense has meant a kind of urban 
corporate planning, around a core of economic development goals, with certain social and 
environmental aims attached" (2000, p. 306).  
22@ BCN  
The 22@ BCN regeneration company was created by Barcelona City Council to manage the 
transformation of the Poblenou area and to influence the development through direct investment 
and regulation. After publication of the MGMP which established the 22@ district and land use 
designation, the company took over the city's urban planning functions in the area. The 
organisation was funded by money arising from development approvals (infrastructure levy in 
the SIP) and the city council (Barcelona City Council, 2012). 
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Figure 5: Location of 22@ regeneration district, Barcelona (Barcelona City Council, 2012) 
Barcelona Regional  
While officially and fiscally a private masterplanning and urban design consultancy, Barcelona 
Regional primarily exists to support the city's planning functions and projects. This can be seen 
in its structure; the board and shareholders consists of members of the city council (the chair is 
the mayor), various metropolitan agencies and representatives of the Zona Franca (a large 
government development agency), the port, the regional rail company, and the city's wholesale 
market (Barcelona Regional, 2012).  
In the context of both the 22@ regeneration and Districlima, Barcelona Regional brought 
significant knowledge and capability. The company has both project management capability for 
major regeneration projects and the knowledge and design capabilities to prepare major 
technical masterplans, as it did with the SIP for the 22@ district. As Marshall describes, 
"Barcelona Regional has become a significant actor in this field of metropolitan infrastructure 
planning, despite its limited resources. Broadly it has advocated infrastructure expansion, on the 
lines pushed by the strategic plans, but it has also commissioned work on ecological 
implications of changes in the region (see, for example, Folch & Parõ´s, 1998)" (2000, p. 309) 
Tersa  
Tersa, a 19% owner of Districlima, is a municipal waste company owned by a consortium of 
metropolitan agencies and government bodies. It operates one large waste-to-energy plant on 
the seafront east of the Forum. The incineration plant treats 359,107 T/year of residual solid 
waste and has an electric power of 23 MW and a production of 180,468 MWh/year of electricity 
on average (Ajutament de Barcelona, 2011). It is the primary fuel source for Districlima, with 
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almost all heating and a large part of cooling for the system produced using the steam obtained 
from the waste incineration (Districlima, 2012). 
Agència d’Energia de Barcelona 
The purpose of the Barcelona Energy Agency is to promote Barcelona as an exemplary city in 
the handling of energy matters and their repercussion on the environment. A public agency 
responsible to a Deputy Mayor,  it has the ability to identify and plan for efficient local energy 
use and for the location of renewables through the city's Energy Plan (first published in 2002). It 
has a staff of five people who support plan implementation, foster energy efficiency, carry out 
trials, and provide information and technical support to government bodies (Barelona Energy 
Agency, 2012). The agency's policies are influenced by European Union thinking, but staff 
believe that local resident understanding and awareness is more important (InterviewG4, 2012). 
Elected councillors and mayors 
Marshall (2004) describes how elected councillors and mayors in Barcelona support the urban 
planning visions for city, continuing this role even when powers were joined across Catalonia. 
The research interviews support his description of how individuals 'tied' together institutions, 
particularly around planning and projects. As the interviewee from Barcelona Regional 
explained, "Our President is Antoni Vives, who is the Alderman of the Urban Planning 
Department at Barcelona City Council, on top of that he is also the President of Àrea 
Metropolitana, that means that he is directing Àrea Metropolitana" (InterviewA3, 2012). 
Politicians such as Antoni Vives i Tomás are elected on a four year cycle, with deputy 
mayorships and other such appointments made at the request of the mayor.  
Districlima and Cofeley  
Districlima is a specially-created public-private enterprise operating a 30 year concession from 
Barcelona City Council to develop and operate the DHC system (also called Districlima). 
Technically it is a joint venture between the public and private sector with Cofely owning a 
controlling stake. Its shares are split between Cofely, Tersa, the regional water company, and 
two government energy institutions. Cofely is a multi-national utilities conglomerate which 
operates 180 district cooling and heating systems globally. It also owns AGBAR, the water 
distribution company which supplies much of Spain and Barcelona, and through this ownership 
it effectively controls 70% of Districlima (Districlima, 2012; Ajutament de Barcelona, 2011).  
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Figure 6: Founder partners of Districlima (Districlima, 2012) 
 
Actors in the wider set 
A summary of the primary actors is provided in Table 21 below. Other non-primary actors 
included Catalonian and federal Spanish organisations, whose engagement in Districlima is 
minimal due to legislative framework and politics around utilities infrastructure, with little 
expectation or preference for their active engagement. However the Institute for Energy 
Diversification and Saving (IDAE), part of Spanish Ministry for the Economy, participated in the 
creation of the Barcelona Energy Plan and is a small shareholder in Districlima (Ajutament de 
Barcelona, 2011). Likewise the Catalan Energy Institute (ICAEN), which is tasked with 
supporting initiatives and programmes for the development of energy technologies that improve 
efficiency (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2012).  
Developers and building owners in the 22@ district run the range from large institutional 
organisations down to individual residential owners. Interviewees perceived them as interested 
in costs and management, without a preference for greener or environmental infrastructure. The 
Chief Executive of Districlima commented "And this guy they want cheap building. And sell it 
and go on. All the efficiency all that is not important. Because the benefits of the network is for 
the maintenance and the final user" (InterviewS2, 2012).  And the former Head of Infrastructure 
at the 22@ regeneration company acknowledged the developer perspective they overcome: 
"We clashed with two important property developers but from then on, we succeeded at 22@, it 
was quite successful" (InterviewA3, 2012).   
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There a notable absence of civic actors which exist in other cases; this reflects on how the idea 
of district heating and cooling arose from within Barcelona's urban and energy planning 
technicians. 
Market Government  Civic 
Districlima Barcelona City Council  
Cofely GDF Suez  22@ BCN  
Barcelona Regional Tersa   
 Barcelona Energy Agency  
 Barcelona Urban Planning Functions   
 Elected Councillors, Mayors   
Table 21: Set of primary actors for DHC in Barcelona 
6.2 Analysis of the Actors and Actor Constellation  
This section describes the self-identified and collective actor analysis. Appendix C contains the 
detailed stakeholder analyses matrices which are described here.   
6.2.1 Where's the conflict? Self-identified actor capabilities and preferences  
All primary actors self-identify as generally supportive of the concept of a DHC system. They are 
also all supportive for the same two reasons: belief that new infrastructure makes a modern 
global city, and because of environmental concerns, particularly about carbon emissions.  
Barcelona City Council operated a wide-ranging leadership role; the council or its sub-
committees (headed by Deputy Mayors) were supportive of DHC in the 22@ district; they 
approved the Energy Plan, the 22@ masterplan and the SIP. Elected politicians form the city 
council leadership, but they also head up departments individually and two were publicly 
supportive of DHC. The forward to the Energy Plan by Mayor Joan Clos describes Districlima as 
“A real example of our commitment to being a benchmark for sustainable and smart urban 
development” (Ajutament de Barcelona, 2002, p. 1).   
Barcelona Regional was effectively the initiator of the idea for DHC in 22@. Their capabilities for 
infrastructure and DHC design are described above; the Head of Energy Infrastructure at 
Barcelona Regional described how the company grew its capability in district energy 
infrastructure by directly employing a previous infrastructure consultant. That interviewee also 
described how they investigated co-generation and district systems, believing that energy and 
environmental issues should be integrated into urban planning.  
While I was developing all the urban planning of the 22@, one of the 
recurrent ideas that Barcelona Regional had was we are going to 
provide this area, which is a technology district, with modern 
infrastructures. The feasibility studies were developed during many 
years, such as co-generation systems that could supply some blocks, 
a group of buildings, and we thought about the possibility of supplying 
4 blocks, 8 blocks, half of the district, all the district, we were analysing 
different possibilities. Then we thought, hey, instead of planning a new 
heating and cooling system for the Forum, the best solution would be 
to take advantage of the synergies of the existing infrastructures. 
(InterviewA3, 2012) 
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They followed through on this in the SIP, proposing a system which connected to the Tersa 
waste incinerator near the Forum. This was then approved by Barcelona's Urban Planning 
Department and politicians in the city council. In Barcelona's Napoleonic planning system, 
approved urban plans are legally binding requirements on developers, and the city had a 
tradition of setting specific public realm and building design requirements.  
In the 22@ district, the Planning Department and Barcelona Regional extended design 
requirements into underground infrastructure which had to be designed to a specific connection 
standard. The SIP reads, "The Technical Standards of the PEI in the annex, depending on 
specific situations, are legally binding in terms of criteria of actuation or recommendation." “To 
achieve the development of this project it is essential to co-ordinate a broad Special 
Infrastructure Plan which will act upon public areas as well as private community ones, 
determining surface land and underground land aspects" (Barcelona City Council, 2000). Their 
orientation for doing this was to ensure that new development reduced its impact on the 
environment, and to upgrade the district to meet the needs of a modern city. The plan also 
requires those private developments adding to currently extant floorspace to pay for waste, 
telecoms, and energy infrastructure.  
The previous Director for Infrastructures at 22@ BCN described in an interview how they 
accepted the need for the DHC system due to rising energy costs, and that they saw it as 
infrastructure the city council should lead on through initial investment and coordination. “And if 
had not been public, we would not have had a network. This happens with all public utilities. If 
you analyze what happened with the electric supply, public lighting, with the sewers, the water 
supply, in any public utility the initiative always comes from the local public sector.” However, 
they originally did not have the technical capacity to know how to procure such an infrastructure, 
and had to seek assistance from the private sector through an 'ideas competition' (InterviewA3, 
2012).  
The ideas competition led to a concession approach to procurement, which was tendered to 
Cofeley who set up the Districlima company to build and operate the DHC system. Cofely had 
knowledge of how to operate a DHC system and run a business investing in DHC systems for a 
profit, although they expected to lose money in the first ten years of operating the Districlima 
system (InterviewS2, 2012). Under the concession, the company does not own and cannot sell 
the pipework and engineering systems. It is also limited in what price it can charge residential 
customers. Cofeley believes it is a good thing for cities to be using DHC systems and want to 
grow this business across Spain.  
Later implementation of Districlima was supported by the Barcelona Energy Agency. Their 
Energy Plan explicitly promotes DHC systems such as Districlima, citing them as smart and 
energy in energy, economic, and environmental terms (Ajutament de Barcelona, 2002).  They 
agreed that a concession approach was the appropriate method to fund Districlima. During the 
process of establishing the concession the agency was made responsible for administering 
price controls over DHC systems in the city. In an interview, the Technical Director described 
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the agency as partners with the Urban Planning Department, and how the agency would prefer 
energy goals to be integrated into urban planning and land distribution. “At the end the problem 
is not an energy problem to be solved it is an urbanism problem that has to be solved.” 
(InterviewG4, 2012). 
What are the actors' self-identified capabilities, orientations, and preferences?  
Barcelona's set of actors for DHC is robust, with supportive organisations in the public and 
private sectors, a low-cost fuel source and supportive local politicians. The set did not emerge 
overnight, but it also grew quickly as new actors were brought in through partnership and 
concessions. The planning department and its consultants orientation that DHC infrastructure is 
important to regeneration and to environmental impact established the concept. The concept of 
district heating and cooling was not well known in Barcelona, but this was addressed this by 
hiring individuals into Barcelona Regional and into 22@ BCN who did have experience 
planning, designing, and procuring district infrastructure.  
The city’s planning powers and capabilities deliberately grew to include planning of district 
heating and cooling with the approval of local politicians. Politicians publicly promoted 
addressing environmental resource issues and built a base of expectations for the city council 
and city activities. The mayor's introduction to the 2002 Energy Plan reads "A decisive policy is 
required on the part of public administrations to reverse current trends in energy consumption, a 
policy oriented towards promoting the use of clean, renewable sources of energy, to achieving 
efficiency in the production of final energy and to reducing consumption by introducing 
technological improvements and the practice of conscientious" (p. 1).  
This pattern of development through urban visions and leadership from politicians follows 
Barcelona's tradition of urbanisme. The existence of familiar ways of working between all actors 
supports the lack of conflicting preferences over each actors role in procuring DHC and an 
acceptance of the SIP and Districlima by other city departments, other utilities in the city, and 
property owners. 
 6.2.2 Collective perspectives: Exploring success  
When the actor constellation is analysed from a collective perspective, underlying orientations 
about the role of the government in urban utilities provision helps to explain the low levels of 
conflict about actor roles and the successful delivery of Districlima.   
DHC was understood as integral to the 'innovation' theme in the 22@ district, alongside other 
vacuum waste management and fibre optic network infrastructure (Barcelona City Council, 
2000; Barelona Energy Agency, 2012). And therefore it was accepted by other actors that 22@ 
BCN should act as the responsible organisation to guide and coordinate infrastructure 
development. As part of this 22@ BCN also acted as liaison with developers in the area through 
the planning approvals process (InterviewS2, 2012). The former Director of Infrastructure at 
22@ BCN quoted the Deputy Mayor as saying to him:  
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"You should intervene in order to convince the developer about the 
advantages of the service and that is your job, you are the city council, 
explain it to them, and secondly, you should train the company to 
meet the needs of private customers."(InterviewA3, 2012) 
 
The 22@ BCN did not tender the concession for Districlima; this was managed by Barcelona 
City Council directly (InterviewA3, 2012). The research did not uncover public concern about the 
investment, dissenting councillors or existing utilities in the city who were resistant to the 
introduction of DHC. In interviews the importance of support from the elected councillors as 
leaders of the city council became clearer. The council was perceived as not only committed to 
supporting renewable and efficient energy through policy documents like the Energy Plan but 
also obliged to by environmental commitments at a federal and European level (InterviewA3, 
2012; InterviewG4, 2012). The interviews explained that while difficult to convince at first, the 
support of elected officials in charge of the planning process and other departments were 
necessary to provide the leadership and the will to make public departments work together for 
DHC. The planning and urban management experience of specific councillors were recognised 
by those interviewed, who cited the Olympic legacy as leading to knowledgeable politicians 
(InterviewA3, 2012).  
  
Figure 7: Photos of Districlima pipe installation, Barcelona (Cary, [Photographs of Districlima pipe 
installation], 2012)  
Other actors did not expect the council to mandate connection through the planning process, 
but they expected the council to finance the detailed design and initial investment, and direct 
third party energy companies through the concession (InterviewG4, 2012). Even Cofely 
understands the need for initial local government action to initiate DHC; "It's difficult to develop a 
project if the administration or somebody doesn't' put an amount of money in the beginning" 
(InterviewS2, 2012).  
During the negotiations for the concession, it became apparent that the city would also have to 
protect consumers by setting the price for residential purchase of heating and cooling. A fairly 
significant form of regulation and new role for the city, (it was delegated to the Barcelona Energy 
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Agency) it is not apparent that other approaches such as a third party consumer protection 
organisations were seriously considered (InterviewG4, 2012) (InterviewA3, 2012). This reflects 
on the sense of responsibility that the city and its elected officials felt for Districlima, as well as 
their willingness to intervene in utilities infrastructure in support of environmental and social 
goals.  
Barcelona's Urban Planning Department was perceived by others as the initiator of the concept, 
with an ability to draft the energy plan, set efficiency standards for new buildings, and raise 
money through an infrastructure levy (InterviewA3, 2012). Others elaborated the need for them 
to be involved; to plan out the system in line with the urban growth proposals and introduce 
potential users of the system with the DHC concept during the development phase 
(InterviewG4, 2012). With Barcelona Energy Agency and Barcelona Regional, other actors 
recognised their capabilities and their role in developing the DHC system, but did not show an 
awareness of their strong orientation towards the future potential of DHC in Barcelona 
(InterviewS2, 2012).  
Tersa, the provider of heat and 20% owner of Districlima, were understood to be responsible to 
the metropolitan government, rather than the city council. Despite this, there was no mention of 
difficulty or conflict in bringing them into the system through a heat transfer agreement with the 
city and then with Districlima. The former Director at 22@ commented, "Finally we reached an 
agreement. It was more a political agreement than a business agreement." Their partial 
ownership of Districlima was explained as a public statement of partnership and support for the 
concession (InterviewA3, 2012). 
Cofely were perceived as a safe partner to create and operate Districlima; they were not 
technologically aggressive with the DHC system design, but they were financially sound and 
already invested in Barcelona through their ownership of the water company. This existing 
presence was seen as relevant to the success of Districlima, and one of the reasons why they 
won the contract to operate the concession (first at the Forum, and then for the extension) 
(InterviewA3, 2012). 
Districlima itself was recognised as bringing environmental improvements, such as the use of 
waste energy, reduction of greenhouse gases and refrigerant losses, and reduction in noise and 
vibration. It was accepted that it required public investment to start, but that once built it would 
offer consumers lower prices than other ways of heating and cooling. The concession is for 30 
years and interviewees voiced an expectation a concession approach will be continued after 
that (InterviewA3, 2012) (InterviewG4, 2012). 
The collective strategy of market influences, regulation, and interventions also characterises the 
'market' for DHC in 22@ that is strongly shaped and regulated by Barcelona City Council. The 
city regulates DHC in all four of Tiesdell and Allmendinger's classifications. Direct regulation is 
supplemented by different activities from other city departments, such as the Planning 
Department and the Energy Agency. The city council through the Planning Department 
regulates what it can (the design of shared services) and incentives what it cannot (the 
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connection and supply). There is a wide spectrum of actors engaged in ‘market regulating’ 
activity; regulation was ‘created’ by the city to protect citizens and assist the arms length 
partnership of Districlima.  
Overall the collective strategy analysis finds relative alignment between expectations and actual 
actions of market influences across the actor constellation; this parallels the actor analysis 
above which also describes low conflict on expectations. Differences do exist. One is where 
Barcelona Regional established the concept of DHC in the SIP and MGMP; this is not normal 
practice in masterplanning in Spain and was a new form of market shaping influence that would 
have not been expected by other actors. Secondly, Barcelona City Council does not regulate 
development as much as Districlima would like it; Districlima would prefer for the council to 
mandate customer connection to the system (InterviewS3, 2012). 
An extension of existing governance patterns into urban energy infrastructure 
The Districlima approach to DHC where the planning process established a design and energy 
vision for DHC as well as regulated development to build and pay for it, with the city council 
supporting investment, was established early on and accepted by others in the actor set. The 
actor set as whole saw energy infrastructure in regeneration as part of urban design, as part of 
the importance of getting the built environment right for Poblenou.   
Therefore other actors accepted that the Planning Department should not only establish the 
concept but regulate the market through control of land use and urban design as well as design 
for infrastructure connections, and they accepted that the department's involvement was 
necessary to link urban growth and to influence customers during development control.  
For Barcelona, taking on the responsibility to build DHC is an extension of traditional ways of 
thinking about city development; an extension of urbanisme. If Maragall’s message was ‘It is 
critical to understand that improving public spaces is relevant to solving social and economic 
problems’ then the legacy of his message in the context of DHC is interpreted as 'it is critical to 
understanding that improving infrastructure and public spaces is relevant to solving social, 
environmental, and economic problems of the 21
st
 century.'  
How can the actor constellation be described?  
There is a notable consensus about a role for public leadership in DHC extending beyond 
establishing an energy and infrastructure plan. It was expected that public investment was 
needed to initiate Districlima, with initial infrastructure paid for the city. Within this consensus 
there were several orientations within Barcelona government departments which influenced 
their strategies and actions about DHC, as well as their preferences for other actors. On one 
hand, Barcelona’s city commitments around environment and carbon goals are expressed by 
local politicians as the main driver for Districlima, and the impetus for the Special Infrastructure 
Plan and the concession to Cofely (Ajutament de Barcelona, 2002). On the other, socialist 
political orientations of the mayors contributed to their support for urban investment and public 
sector leadership on infrastructure (InterviewA3, 2012). The system is also price regulated to be 
cheaper than a reference case for residential customers – clearly a political benefit to elected 
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officials. Finally, the SIP also raised money from private developers for a range of infrastructure 
benefits to the area's regeneration; not just DHC but also telecommunications, water, and waste 
infrastructure. The regeneration approach that delivered Districlima also delivered other political 
and physical benefits.  
 
Figure 8: Arial photograph of Tersa Waste Treatment Plant (Tersa) 
6.3 Interactions: Positive Coordination Negotiations 
How can the interactions be characterised?  
The process of procuring the Districlima concession was through negotiations, both formal 
tendering, and some open dialogue. However those interactions were supported by other 
interactions which included more hierarchical and unilateral exchanges. For example, the 
requirement for developers in the 22@ district to contribute funds towards infrastructure and 
build to a set of design requirements for utilities connection underground is a hierarchical market 
regulation intervention; this is based in the Spanish planning law.  
Using Scharpf's characterisations of negotiations described in Chapter 4, the tendering process 
for the Districlima concession can be characterised a positive coordination negotiations, where 
the actors recognise the risks and costs, but also the potential benefits. Cofely accepted that 
Barcelona City Council could not force connection, but was attracted by the Forum centre as a 
main customer, the existence of the Tersa agreement for low cost heat, and the planning law 
which supported potential connections. These positive coordination negotiations were 
supported by a side 'package deal' to control the impact on cost of energy for residents.  
What are the relational characteristics?  
The interviews indicate close, regular communication and high levels of information sharing 
between the Planning Department, advisory consultants, the 22@ BNC and the Barcelona 
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Energy Agency. The relationship with Districlima, Tersa, and local elected officials appeared 
more formal but that could be a function of the time which has passed since the concession 
began.  
The interviewees describe how in the run up to the concession agreements the exchange of 
information was controlled in two ways. One, in that the city council hosted an ‘ideas 
competition’ to facilitate sharing of knowledge and discussion prior to the formal tender – this 
assisted in forming expectations and preferences before formal negotiations.  
We told the world market "Gentlemen, we would like to create a 
network of central heating and cooling but we do not know if the 
business plan it’s going to work and how it should be done." Thanks to 
the idea competition we realized that we could not go for the “all-or-
nothing” approach. In this competition we received about twelve or 
fourteen bidders, and three or four of them were very good. 
(InterviewA3, 2012) 
The initial decision to host an ‘ideas competition’- a space to discuss the system among a wide 
potential actor set without engaging in negotiations provided knowledge and capability to many 
actors and influenced their preferences and strategies. Secondly, the tendering process 
followed a legally mandated structure, which limited communication. The former Director of 
Infrastructure at 22@ said "We’ve had some meetings but not a lot because lawyers are really 
strict with the level of information that you can provide, they want all the people are in the same 
situation in the moment of the competition" (InterviewA3, 2012). The ideas competition 
facilitated the formal negotiation process because it focused the formal negotiations on the 
costs and risks of a few options.  
6.4 Conclusions: Urbanisme Delivers 
Distinguished from other Mediterranean cities by relatively cool summers and from other major 
European cities by relatively warm winters, Barcelona is not a location which climatically lends 
itself to large scale district heating or cooling systems. And yet that is exactly what the city set 
out to implement in a large scale urban regeneration project, believing that building a modern 
infrastructure was crucial to its regeneration goals.  
In seeking to build a DHC system in Barcelona the actor set emerged from and relied on a local 
tradition of strong urban planning and political support of physical infrastructure investment to 
influence developers and other municipal organisations. Together this enabled the city to 
assemble an attractive package for potential concession and overcome the high cost of 
installation. Burdett, Colantonio and Taylor provide the following analysis in a 2010 LSE 
conference paper. 
The value created through these changes (creation of 22@ and 7@ 
with higher densities allowed) has been so effective at stimulating 
private investment that the €180 million infrastructure investment plan 
(including subterranean services, fibre optic networks and a 
centralised heating system) has been financed almost entirely through 
private investment, and much of the urban transformation has been 
97 
 
pursued by the private sector. (Barcelona: Global repositioning of an 
emerging metro. Conference paper. LSE Series.) 
And one result of this forward land use planning activity is the Districlima system; the first urban 
energy distribution system developed in Spain for heating, air conditioning, and sanitary hot 
water. As of 2012, the system has over 13 km of pipes connecting 67 buildings and it continues 
to expand. In 2010 the primary energy savings of the system compared to a conventional 
individual boiler and air-cooled chillers approach was estimated at 56.6 GWh, a 57% reduction; 
the same comparison on carbon estimated a savings of 10,119 tonnes of carbon, a 63% 
reduction against conventional approach (Ajutament de Barcelona, 2011).  
 
Figure 9: 22@ Districlima district heating and cooling system in 2012 (Districlima, 2012) 
Is this network governance?  
Returning to Sorensen and Torfing’s definition of network governance, the set of interactions 
described in this chapter meet their five aspects. There is a stable, horizontal articulation of 
actors with the same people and organisations involved over time. The organisations are 
interdependent but operationally autonomous; the analysis above describes how they need one 
another to build the system and recognise each other's capabilities and responsibilities. The 
strength of the urbanisme tradition as a 'cognitive framework' reduces conflicts of expectation 
and supports public leadership and initial investment. The network of actors is self-regulating 
through the bespoke concession contract and by developing price controls for residential 
consumers. And last but not least DHC is pursued as a environmental goal, helping the city 
reduce its carbon emissions and improve air quality. The former Director of Infrastructure in the 
22@ regeneration company confirmed: "The city council decided to support central heating and 
cooling systems, with all the benefits that this implied, because it also had a positive 
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environmental impact." (InterviewA3, 2012). The ideas competition is notable for providing a 
space for the governance network to neutrally explore options, focussing the final negotiations. 
Marshall argues that Barcelona has not seen a full transition to 'governance' away from state 
legitimacy compared to US or UK policy conditions (Urban Planning and Governance: Is there a 
Barcelona Model?, 2000) although he admits that the transition is most visible in strategic 
planning and has also affected the reality of the urban development schemes of the 1990s. The 
analysis of this case supports the mixed picture Marshall describes, with a local government 
unable to take unilateral action but easily able to envision, initially invest, and lead on a major 
infrastructure project without significant conflict, public concern, or disagreement.  
How can the role of planning be described?  
Planning organisations and planning interventions play a strong role in the formation of 
Districlima. The Planning Department and Barcelona Regional initiated the idea of DHC, 
indicated physical locations and a system design in formal policy and in the area masterplan, a 
market shaping intervention which coordinated land uses, new development, and energy 
sources. Through development control processes the Planning Department and 22@ BCN 
regulated the design of buildings to support DHC, instituted an infrastructure levy which raised 
funds for infrastructure investment, and encouraged connection in dialogue with building owners 
and developers; these are both market regulating and market shaping functions. The planning 
processes and organisations also play a mild capacity building role by using the policy setting 
process to establish an awareness of DHC. The capacity of the actor set to use planning 
organisations and interventions to support DHC is shaped by the history of strong urban 
planning and urban design in Barcelona; the actor set's institutional setting. The influence of this 
tradition cannot be understated, as the former Director of Infrastructure commented 
So, even if Pasqual Maragall was no longer in charge, the local team 
shared his sensitivity and this allowed us to… because this sensitivity 
is not easy to find, because it is all about investing public money in 
something that you don’t know whether it is going to work or not, but 
this is a socialist stance, which considers infrastructure, energy and 
urban planning are mechanisms to improve the city, this is what made 
it [DHC] possible. (InterviewA3, 2012) 
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Chapter 7. Burlington: The Challenge of Moving 
from Talking to Negotiating  
 
In 1978, voters in Burlington, Vermont, authorized its municipally owned electricity company to 
build a wood fired electricity power generating station adjacent to the city centre. Since that 
time, the idea of using the McNeil power station’s waste heat to heat downtown buildings, or the 
nearby hospital and university, has been explored with little success.  
Vermont is a city which prides itself on environmental consciousness, and city municipal plans 
dating back to 1985 mention the possibility of ‘community energy’ arising from McNeil. A 2012 
Burlington Climate Action Plan also lists ‘implementing the McNeil District Heating project’ as 
the fourth most effective carbon emissions avoidance strategy for the city.  
Then in 2007, a group of citizen-volunteers formed the Burlington District Energy Service 
(BURDES) committee, and restarted previous investigations into taking advantage of the 
underutilized heat from McNeil. They commissioned an experienced consultancy, Ever-Green 
Energy, to help them understand the options and to engage with local residents, potential 
customers, councillors, and city officers. Ever-Green Energy produced a detailed report in 2011 
and hosted a series of workshops with relevant stakeholders with the BURDES committee. 
However, the current political climate is uninterested in investing public funds in utilities, and as 
of September 2012 the project seemed to have stalled yet again. 
Figure 10 establishes the history of attempts to establish a district heating system in Burlington.  
Timeline of Burlington Case Study 
1981 Joseph C McNeil generating station begin burning wood to generate electricity. 
(Burlington Electric Department, 2012) 
1985 Burlington Municipal Development Plan mentions heat generation capacity of McNeil 
(Eldridge, Municipal development plan, 1985) 
1991 Burlington Municipal Development Plan says that the city will establish a district to be 
served by a mini-utility system from McNeil (Eldridge, 1991, p. 85) 
1994-
1998 
Early studies on the potential for district heating from McNeil conducted (Ever-Green 
Energy, 2011).  
1998 City Council resolution to reduce our emissions to 10% below 1990 levels and the 
creation of the first climate action plan (City of Burlington, 2012).  
2000 City’s first Climate Action Plan adopted (City of Burlington, 2012). 
2001 Burlington Municipal Development Plan says that Burlington Electric Department is 
studying the feasibility of district heating and cooling. (Eldridge, 2001, pp. VIII-4).  
2002 Further study on district heating (Ever-Green Energy, 2011).  
2007 Formation of the BURDES committee (Burlington District Energy Service, 2012).  
2011 Burlington Municipal Development Plan 2011 continues to promote district and heating 
and cooling served by McNeil (White, 2011).  
Report by ever green energy published, accompanied by 5 workshops (InterviewC2, 
2012). 
Figure 10: Timeline of Burlington case study 
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 Figure 11: Municipal Development Plan showing location of McNeil Power Station, from a 
photograph of the 2001 Municipal Development Plan, taken by researcher in 2012  
American planning and government institutional capabilities  
Burlington is the largest city of the state of Vermont, located in the north eastern 'New England' 
region of the United States of America. In 2010 the city had a population of 42,400, with a 
10,000 plus transient student population attending the University of Vermont. The city is a hub 
of a recognised economic area with a population of just over 200,000. The University and an 
associated teaching hospital are the main employers in the area.  
The state of Vermont has a reputation for being politically progressive and activist, particularly 
concerning issues related to the environment. Burlington residents also have a reputation for 
being environmentally minded; two of the interviewees agreed, and felt that the interest was less 
about self-reliance or climate change and instead linked to concerns about pollution, wildlife, 
and wasting resources (InterviewC3, 2012; InterviewC2, 2012).  
Relationships between local, state, and federal (national) government vary considerably across 
the United States; several political science research strands evaluate and describe the multi-
level relations of environmental management across the US (e.g. Lowry, 1992 and Lester, 
1995). On paper, federal powers enumerated in the US constitution are centred on fiscal, 
military and trade regulation issues. In practice, both the federal courts and federal control of 
fiscal redistribution have given the federal government additional powers on topics such as 
pollution and energy prices. The state level has significant control of energy, environment, 
business and daily life through regulation, incentives, and tax breaks, although state 
governments are fiscally constrained by statutory limits on borrowing and tax revenue.  
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Local government in Vermont follows ‘Dillions Rule’ whereby the local government is legally 
subordinate to the state government and whose powers are explicitly defined by state 
government. But this is far from a blanket hierarchical relationship; local governments are often 
given freedom to act outside their state mandated activities and are subject to significant 
influence by local politicians, particularly in the case of council-mayor municipal structures (as in 
Burlington) which emphasize local politics and mayoral powers. Peters and Pierre describe how 
local government in the US has significant governance potential, “given that it is able to govern 
both through traditional command and control techniques and through the less conventional 
formats associated with governance” (1998, p. 240).  
A parallel institutional structure exists for land use planning in Vermont, with limited federal 
control (the ‘taking clause’) (Schmidt & Buehler, 2007) and enabling state legislation – linked to 
funding grants - providing local municipalities with mandatory but wide-ranging authority to act 
on land use, transport planning, and a limited range of other land use topics including energy. 
Vermont is relatively unique in the US in having legislation (Act 200 of 1988) which restricts 
large scale development outside urban centres in the name of landscape protection; this reflects 
the state's environmental activism. At a local level, planning is institutionally separated from 
mayoral or political influence, with municipal planning policies and zoning codes developed by a 
municipal planning commission comprised of appointed citizen volunteers and approved by vote 
(Vermont Land Use Education and Training Collaborative, 2007). The development approvals 
process is carried out by a further separate volunteer commission in Burlington (City of 
Burlington, 2012). While planning is a public process, the policies are not approved by 
politicians and individual development approvals tend to be quasi-judicial with controls over 
public or political intervention (Davis, 2011).  
7.1 The Actors, and the Absent Actors 
This section introduces the primary actor set in Burlington's attempt to establish district heating 
(DH), describing the institutional setting, resources, and capabilities of each actor. Appendix C 
contains the codes and information sources which provided this understanding of actor powers 
and capabilities.  
The City of Burlington 
Burlington's local government is council-mayor form of government, where the mayor has the 
authority to carry out laws and ordinances, veto proposed municipal legislation, appoint 
department heads, recommend policy, prepare the annual budget, and chair the board of 
finance. The mayor is elected on a three year cycle. The council, in turn, has the authority to set 
city policy, pass legislation (subject to mayor's veto), approve the mayor’s budget, and set the 
annual tax rate (InterviewC3, 2012). There are 14 elected councillors across seven wards who 
serve either three or two year terms. The city can raise money for investment in infrastructure 
through bonds (InterviewP4, 2012). 
The city government has three departments or divisions which were identified as relevant for the 
creation of a DH system: the Community and Economic Development Office, the Planning and 
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Zoning Department, and the Public Works Department. The city operates its own electricity 
supplier, the Burlington Electric Department (see below), as well as its own local broadband 
network. The latter was poorly structured and lost the city a significant amount of money, 
lowering the Burlington’s credit rating and its ability to borrow funds for other projects. The 
political fallout from the broadband issues resulted in a Democratic mayor being elected in 
2012, and as a local journalist commented "made the public skittish about how much the city 
should be engaged with utilities and the duplication of private enterprise" (InterviewC3, 2012).  
In 2000 Burlington published a Climate Action Plan, which was updated and adopted by the city 
council in 2012. Included in this is a graph of the ‘carbon abatement value’ of efficiency options, 
with the McNeil DH project listed as option ‘D’, behind new construction energy standards and 
low-cost energy retrofit loans (City of Burlington, 2012, p. 17). 
Planning Department  
Burlington's Planning and Zoning Department is structurally separate from other city 
departments and the department head is appointed by a citizens committee, not the mayor 
(InterviewP4, 2012). In accordance with state legislation, Burlington prepares a Municipal 
Development Plan every five years (White, 2011). As an example of the extent of state control 
over municipal action, municipal plans are required to include an energy plan to be approved by 
the regional planning commission. Without state approval of the plan the municipality is not 
eligible to receive municipal planning grants through the Vermont Department of Housing and 
Community Affairs (Vermont Land Use Education and Training Collaborative, 2007).   
Since 1985 Burlington’s municipal development plans have included explicit reference to district 
heating using waste heat from McNeil (formerly known as 'community energy') (Eldridge, 
Municipal development plan, 1985). The plans encourage city departments to get involved if 
feasibility studies justify their engagement. The 2011 Municipal Development Plan reads as 
follows. 
BED, in conjunction with the Department of Public Works, continues to 
investigate the feasibility of developing district heating and cooling, or 
now known as “Community Energy,” within portions of the city. Areas 
under evaluation begin with the institutions on the Hill (UVM and 
FAHC), but could later include the city center and waterfront. Although 
not under consideration at this time, the concentration of industrial land 
uses along Pine Street may make this area another attractive location 
to provide this type of service. 
The concept for community energy is to replace natural gas and fuel oil 
as heat sources with hot water. Such a plan will utilize excess city 
water capacity, combined with energy and excess heat produced by 
McNeil Station, with an expansion to possibly include a small gas 
turbine in a later phase. Energy would be distributed underground to 
either heat or cool buildings within the district. If feasible, district 
heating and cooling is expected to provide a viable energy alternative, 
make use of existing water capacity, diversify the city’s energy mix, 
and make the city a more attractive and competitive location for 
business. 
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Establish an energy district if justified by the positive result of BED’s 
feasibility study of district heating and cooling. Lead agency: BED 
Secondary: Public Works. (Muncipal development plan 2011) 
Potential customers 
Two large institutions located within two miles of McNeil have historically been suggested as 
'anchor loads' or primary customers whose large energy demands can support initial investment 
in the pipes and connection infrastructure of DH (Eldridge, 2001; InterviewC2, 2012). The 
University of Vermont operates a large campus adjacent to the business district with over 
11,000 students each year. The University's website states that it is "strongly committed to 
conserving electricity, fuel, and water as part of its goals to become the "leading environmental 
university of the nation" (University of Vermont, 2012). Fletcher Allen Hospital is located slightly 
closer to McNeil and is both the major local hospital with 562 beds and the teaching hospital 
linked to the University (Fletcher Allen Hospital, 2012).  
Citizen activists - BURDES Committee 
The Burlington District Energy System (BURDES) Committee is a group of citizen-volunteers 
who are committed to taking advantage of the underutilized heat from the McNeil power station. 
Their explain their interest as follows:  
There is enough underutilized heat available from McNeil to heat most 
of the buildings in downtown Burlington with very little additional 
energy required. This would mean we could shut off all the furnaces, 
boilers and hot water heaters in downtown Burlington - homes, 
businesses and public institutions - and provide the heat to these 
buildings from the underutilized energy that is now expelled into the 
atmosphere at the McNeil Station. (Burlington District Energy Service, 
2012) 
Founded in 2007, the group includes former electric commissioners, the manager of McNeil 
station, interested residents, and representatives from Burlington's Community and Economic 
Development Office (Burlington District Energy Service, 2012). They have raised grant money 
from foundations and funds to do technical feasibility studies, meet regularly, and have hosted 
discussions with potential customers and local politicians to share the idea and potential of 
district heating (InterviewC2, 2012).  
Burlington Electric Department (BED) 
The city operates a local electricity distribution network serving almost 20,000 customers, called 
the Burlington Electric Department. BED is a municipal department of the city, governed by a 
five-person board of volunteer commissioners, who in turn are selected by the city council and 
mayor (Burlington Electric Department, 2012). BED is also partial owner of the McNeil 
Generating Station, a 50MWe wood-fired generating station located adjacent to downtown. One 
of the world's largest wood fuelled energy generating facilities, McNeil was constructed in the 
early 1980s following the 1970s’ energy price spikes in the USA (Burlington Electric 
Department, 2012); it was built with the physical capability to supply a district heating system 
(Baird, 2011). McNeil’s ownership is split between BED and other utilities; BED owns 50% but 
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does not have sufficient power to unilaterally make major decisions about the future of the 
McNeil Generating Station. (InterviewC2, 2012). 
 
Figure 12: Photograph of McNeil Generating Station (Cary, 2012) 
Ever-Green Energy  
In 2010 BURDES appointed Ever-Green Energy to advise on the technical feasibility of a 
heating system and the potential organizational structure. Ever-Green Energy are a non-profit 
consultancy associated with a community biomass scheme in St Paul, Minnesota; they exist to 
promote efficient district heating or cooling systems. They were hired by BURDES to evaluate 
and promote options for DH in Burlington (InterviewA4, 2012). Their work in Burlington was 
funded through a $70,000 federal stimulus grant (Baird, 2011).  
Absent actors  
A comparison of Burlington's primary actors for DH with other case studies highlights there are 
three categories of actors who are potentially absent from participating in discussions about 
district heating in Burlington: local elected representatives, and state, or national (federal) 
actors. The absence of local elected officials can be partially explained by their weak stature in 
Burlington's mayor-council government, but their absence from active participation in what is 
generally accepted to be an ‘environmentally minded’ town is noticeable.  
State government agencies are not primary actors, being neither directly nor necessarily active. 
Interviews with the BURDES committee (InterviewC2, 2012) and a local journalist (InterviewC3, 
2012) indicated that the primary actors saw state agencies as loosely supportive and interested, 
with a minor role envisaged was through a regulatory function - the approval of a DH system as 
a ‘public good’ utility and potentially as a customer of the DH through state owned buildings. 
The state government owns a number of office buildings in downtown Burlington and has a 
2020 target to be on renewable fuel for those buildings. Federal agencies are also absent; 
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interviewees suggested national policy focused on electricity distribution at the large scale to the 
detriment of district heating and cooling (InterviewC2, 2012). The Vice President of Ever Green 
Energy explained, “Energy policy in the US is primarily focused on the electric sector to the 
exclusion of all else" (InterviewA4, 2012). Another potential reason is more institutional: the lack 
of federal energy planning in the USA discourages incentives and regulation for DH at the state 
and local level.  
Market Government  Civic 
Ever-Green Energy 
Consultants 
City of Burlington: Community 
Economic Development Office 
BURDES Committee 
FA Hospital City of Burlington: Planning 
Department 
University of Vermont  
City of Burlington -BED   
Table 22: Set of primary actors for DH in Burlington 
7.2 Analysis of Actors and the Actor Constellation 
This section describes the self-identified and collective actor analysis. Appendix C contains the 
detailed stakeholder analyses matrices which are described here.   
7.2.1 Self-identified actor capabilities and preferences 
Turning to understand how the actors understand their role and each other, the self-identified 
actor analysis finds that on balance the actors in Burlington understand the benefits of DH, but 
none of the actors prefer to connect or prefers to build a DH system. There is a level of shared 
orientation about energy use and the potential for DH in Burlington, but this not matched by any 
self-identified preference by any actor to provide or develop DH or an explicit preference to 
purchase heat from such a system by potential customers.  
As an example, the City of Burlington is represented in the primary actor set by its Community 
and Economic Development Office (CEDO) which has a representative participate in the 
BURDES working group and has provided small funding to support the group (Burlington District 
Energy Service, 2012). While BURDES felt that previous CEDO representatives contributed 
political knowledge and astuteness to the BURDES activity (InterviewC2, 2012), the department 
does not have a responsibility to look at energy or infrastructure needs except from an 
economic perspective and it was not intending to lead on the creation of a DH system.   
The two potential major customers, the university and the hospital, have participated in 
conversations over many years about the potential of DH. But according to the BURDES 
committee, to date their facilities managers have preferred to operate a gas or oil fired heating 
systems within their respective campuses and have not accepted the economic or 
environmental cases for connecting to a DH system fuelled by McNeil.   
The Planning Department has supported the concept of district heating in the city plan since 
1985, calling more recently in plan to “Establish an energy efficiency district where appropriate; 
a ‘mini-utility system" that serves the electrical and thermal energy needs of one or more energy 
users and is scaled to match demand." (Eldridge, 1991). But as described above it does not 
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have the legal powers or technical capabilities to engage in negotiations with other actors who 
might build a DH system. Additionally, because of the organisational and legislative separation 
between planning and other city departments, the department does not feel it can influence city 
investment. The legal context of planning in the Vermont does not make the city plan legally 
binding, and the plan also does not determine city departmental spending. Therefore, the 
department sees itself as an independent ideas generator, but not as an organization that can 
bring other organizations and individuals together to make those ideas happen. The Director 
explained, "We spend a lot of time talking to people and thinking about what are some of the big 
ideas that we in the community out to be concerned about. And new ideas that we ought to be 
thinking about, how we might incorporate them here. And kind of facilitating those ideas moving 
forward." (InterviewP4, 2012). The Planning Department does not require new development to 
consider connecting to a potential DH system; it is unclear if it has that capability. The lack of 
major regeneration or growth near the power plant – which the city could leverage to support 
DH – also hinders the capabilities of the Planning Department to support DH.  
The research was not able to uncover what BED preferred to do about McNeil's heat, but the 
organization supported previous investigations in to a heating system. As a company who exists 
to distribute electricity on behalf of its customers, it does not have the organizational mandate or 
expertise to undertake a DH system (Burlington Electric Department, 2012). McNeil's plant 
manager described how the shared ownership of McNeil has limited BED's interest in reusing 
the waste heat from the power plant.  
One thing about McNeil is that its jointly owned by several utilities. 
Burlington Electric owns 50% and operates the facility, but they still 
have to listen to the needs and wants of the other owners. Some of 
those are public, and some of those are private. And they have quite  
different priorities. The private utilities are not as interested in doing 
things like district heating, they just want things that will be good for 
their stockholders. It's an interesting balance. (InterviewC2, 2012) 
BURDES exists as a citizens activist committee to promote the idea of a DH system with major 
potential customers such as the hospital and after several years of discussions it feels capable 
of performing a capacity building and promotion role. A representative commented "I'm feeling 
very good about where we are in terms of our understanding..." (InterviewC2, 2012). The group 
takes a medium-term, balanced viewpoint on the likelihood of building DH; recognising both 
economic and environmental benefits to the city. And while the group understands that building 
a DH system will require interested customers, political will, and potentially a third party energy 
company, it also recognizes that it does not have a preferred vision for how to bring all those 
actors together. A representative commented, 
We never got to the point of who would own it. Burlington Electric was 
promoting it, but operating it: never clear if property of city, or 
Burlington Electric. Some examples in the country have done it all 
those ways.  
Right now, based on what we now understand, the electricity 
department is going to provide the thermal energy and they will own 
the equipment to do that. But the district heating utility, whether its 
public or private, will somehow help fund, get the money from the 
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electric department, to be able to provide the thermal energy. Maybe 
we won't have these long term contracts and we will get loans, part of 
the money to the electric department to building the connection, but I 
think it's going to be a separate utility whether its public or private.  
Whether its not-for profit or private we don’t know yet. (InterviewC2, 
2012) 
BURDES sought the advice of Ever-Green Energy, a consultancy experienced in DH. In the 
self-identified actor analysis, they were the only actor that had a specific vision for how DH 
could be built out of McNeil and who should be involved. Given their background, Ever-Green 
Energy actively preferred a community-owned non-profit DH system; they saw this governed 
jointly by residents and politicians. When interviewed, the Vice President of Ever-Green Energy 
confirmed that they had the ability to evaluate legal, technical, and financial options for DH. 
Their 2011 report concluded a DH system could be built in Burlington that would provide cost-
effective heat as well as a good return on investment. “This study concludes that there is an 
opportunity to supply competitively-priced, renewable energy from McNeil Generating Station 
via a district system at current and projected natural gas and heating oil prices in Burlington” 
(Ever-Green Energy, 2011, p. 3).  
The Vice President interviewed believed that the next step in building a DH system was to 
engage with residents and politicians, starting with the benefits of DH: re-using waste heat, the 
creation of jobs, and the power of locally controlled energy (InterviewA4, 2012).  
When I say people, I'm talking government officials at a council level 
and at a mayoral level, councillors and their staff – help to understand 
why it’s important, what the benefits are. And once you get them 
enlisted and they understand the very basics of why district energy is 
a misunderstood or out of their normal frame of reference, show them 
why that infrastructure is worthwhile and useful and can promote 
community development. Then you can take it out to a wider 
audience. (InterviewA4, 2012)  
What are the actors' self-identified capabilities, orientations, and preferences?  
All five interviewees recognize the lack of customer demand and the absence of political 
engagement as constraints on further progress. BURDES and Ever-Green Energy were actively 
trying to bring them both into a discussion by hosting workshops and public meetings and by 
meeting with individuals to discuss potential. The lack of local politician interest and support was 
perceived as the biggest challenge to overcome because of the recent broadband utility failure 
which dampened local political interest in government owned utilities.  
Looking across the actors, the ACI analysis suggests that none have sufficient powers, 
capabilities or resources to negotiate for DH with; they can discuss options and engage others 
but they cannot build the a DH system with the current actor set and its limited resources. 
Particularly noticeable is that while one local government department was actively engaged in 
the BURDES committee and despite the city's history of owning energy distribution companies, 
there is no orientation within government departments to lead on the negotiations to build a DH 
system. This could be due to the orientation of local politicians who tightly control the activities 
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of the local government, or to a lack of interest by Burlington's government departments as they 
would be unlikely to directly benefit.   
7.2.2 Collective perspectives: A network with gaps 
The collective actor analysis continues to display this trend of uncertainty about preferences for 
delivering a DH system; all actors are aware of the environmental benefits but the commercial 
logistics and business case were found to be unclear in actor minds. Collectively, the actor set 
did not agree who should or could lead or own a DH system in Burlington.  
For example, BURDES is perceived by other stakeholders as a group of people committed to 
making DH work in Burlington; the local journalist felt that given the relatively small size of the 
town a small group can have influence (InterviewC3, 2012). All actors interviewed were aware 
of their presence and their attempt to pull together people to discuss and learn about the 
potential for a DH system. However no interviewee suggested BURDES should initiate a 
company to own or manage a DH system on a community basis. The same was felt of the 
BURDES advisors, Ever-Green Energy; they were seen to bring useful technical input, but not 
as active initiators of negotiations to build a DH system.  
The collective analysis also shows that Burlington Electric has a good reputation as an 
electricity distributor among the other actors. Its ownership of McNeil is seen as positive for the 
future potential of DH; with a caveat that BURDES recognised their control is limited given the 
other joint owners of the station (InterviewC2, 2012). A consensus among all interviewees was 
that Burlington Electric's support would be necessary to make DH happen, but they were not 
perceived as an organisation which would operate the DH system. Older feasibility studies 
indicated this as an option. But the most recent Ever-Green Energy study saw their role as 
supportive owner of the fuel source but not in control or managing the pipe network and billing 
operations (Ever-Green Energy, 2011). McNeil's plant manager is also hopeful that with recent 
changes to the ownership of the McNeil Generating Station, BED will become more actively 
supportive of re-using the waste heat from the power station (InterviewC2, 2012). 
The collective actor analysis of city government support further illustrates the lack of power and 
negotiative influence of government departments. The CEDO office in Burlington's local 
government is seen by others as under the direction of the mayor, and as a potential source of 
funding for the coordination of discussions about a DH system (InterviewC3, 2012; InterviewC2, 
2012). Interviewees recognised that mayoral or further city support would be needed before 
they could do more than attend meetings and support feasibility studies. The BURDES 
representative commented, "We know the guy who runs the public works department, if the city 
If the city wanted to take it on it would make a hell of lot of sense. They already have the 
expertise in house. But it isn’t at all obvious that the city has the stomach to do this" 
(InterviewC2, 2012). In contrast to its self-identified role, in the collective actor analysis the 
Planning Department is not seen by other actors as engaged in the promotion of DH. When 
asked, other interviewees acknowledged that the Planning Department had included the 
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concept in the plan and would need to be involved to manage rights of way for pipework in the 
street.  
Interestingly, the two potential customers are perceived by BURDES to be at the point of 
potentially changing their mind about connecting. Historical discussions with the university and 
the hospital had not been positive due to technical barriers and concerns about significant 
changes to estate engineering departments (InterviewC2, 2012). Therefore the 2011 study had 
prioritised a route which sought out multiple downtown businesses as customers before 
reaching the university and the hospital. But the same report had highlighted that if either the 
hospital or the university (or both) to be long-term anchor tenants and committed to purchase 
heat, this which would give certainty that up-front investment in pipework could be repaid. The 
report also concluded that the heat could be provided 30% cheaper than their current gas 
supply (Ever-Green Energy, 2011). 
The BURDES committee representative said that recently they heard of renewed interested in a 
DH solution from the university and hospital, after staff changes within the facilities teams and 
after the university purchased additional buildings (InterviewC2, 2012). Therefore BURDES is 
seeking to re-engage with the university and the hospital, approaching various employees about 
DH. "There are some personnel changes at university which makes it sound like they’d be more 
open minded and willing to do something like this." (InterviewC2, 2012).  
Market influences: Pushing and pulling a system into life 
The collective strategy analysis of market influences, regulation, and interventions confirms that 
the strongest market intervention to date is the capacity building by BURDES and their 
consultants, Ever-Green Energy. There is a marked absence of medium or significant influence 
through market mechanisms such as taxes, regulation and grant stimulation; to date such 
interventions have been in support of feasibility studies. Both BURDES and the planning 
department see their roles as having medium-levels of market shaping interventions by 
introducing and supporting the idea of re-using waste heat from McNeil.  
Significantly, in all four categories of market interventions mapped by this research there is a 
gap between expectations of other actors and actual implementation. This illustrates that, while 
actors perceive they could do more to influence the negotiations or market for DH, very few are 
acting on that potential. Also, when compared to other cases, Burlington's actors have a weak 
level of market regulation and market stimulation activity; fiscal interventions in support of DH 
are limited. These strategy analysis findings support the collective actor analysis which also 
presents a picture of extended engagement and knowledge sharing but an absence of clarity on 
who would purchase or build or own a DH system in Burlington.   
Summary of the actor constellation  
One defining feature of this case is its lack of change over 20+ years. The constellation is static 
and not aligned; strategies and preferences do not match and it requires change to be 
successful. Those who want to build the DH system (Planning Department, CEDO, BURDES, 
the manager of the McNeil power station) do not have the resources or power to leverage 
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engagement with others, and they have not yet figured out how to create those resources or 
inspire other actors. Also, among those who prefer building DH and are working towards doing 
so, there is no consensus on a strategy for investing or owning the DH system. There is a 
discussion of community vision but no agreed preference for what other actors should do. 
Despite the concept of DH existing in planning policy and the public press for many years, there 
is still uncertainty about who would need to be involved to establish a DH system.   
The collective actor analysis demonstrates that the actor set lacks both organisations who are 
interested in leading on the construction or management of a DH system, and customers who 
are interested in buying heat. While the local government has influence over the heat source, 
they are unable or unwilling to take a more active role in promoting DHC. However, despite the 
concept failing to gain traction since the mid 1980s, the BURDES group maintains hope that 
changes to the context will bring new actors into more supportive alignments. They expect that 
changes to McNeil ownership and personnel changes at the university and the hospital will lead 
to more interest in becoming customers. But the question still remains: a customer of what 
organisation?   
 
Figure 13: Photograph of entrance to McNeil Wood and Yard Waste Depot (Cary, 2012) 
7.3 Mode of Interaction: Talking not Negotiating  
How can the interactions be characterized?  
While case lacks active negotiations towards the construction of DH, it also lacks hierarchical or 
unilateral modes of interaction among the actors and can more accurately be characterised as 
'attempting to negotiate'. The BURDES committee and Ever-Green Energy are approaching 
district heating with orientations of altruism, hosting workshops to educate and interest other 
actors in 'problem solving' mindset where the discussion is about the best way to build a DH 
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system. Others such as the hospital and university have a more competition based orientation, 
and can be expected to be concerned about obtaining heating at a lower cost than currently 
through exchange-based negotiations. The city and BED can be described as more of a neutral 
mindset; there to support the discussion but not negotiate. These variations affect their ability to 
understand each other and to perceive next steps for the potential of DH in Burlington.  
What are the relational characteristics?  
The interviews portray irregular and weak interaction among the primary set of actors. While the 
BURDES group meets regularly, interactions with other actors seem to be infrequent and 
informal. These type of interactions reflect the case's struggle to move from talking to 
negotiating; without something besides knowledge to share the actors lack reasons to meet. An 
exception to the relational characteristics were the series of workshops hosted by BURDES in 
June 2011 to explain the findings of the Ever-Green Energy feasibility study and the potential of 
district heating in Burlington.   
7.4 Conclusions: the Challenge of Finding Power 
Is it a governance network without negotiation? 
The analysis illustrates how interactions among actors in Burlington on DH do not display 
governance network behaviours, at least to date. While the interactions are neither hierarchical 
nor unilateral, the exchanges described above are also not between interdependent actors. For 
example, local government officers can to some extent ignore BURDES because it does not 
seem to have local political support and it does not have other resources to enable significant 
activity. Likewise, BURDES lacks a strong lever of influence over potential customers without 
local political support. The case thus fails the first aspect of Sorensen and Torfing's definition of 
a governance network. They are stable, operationally autonomous actors, but not all agree that 
DH is a policy problem they must work together to address; there is no sense of common 
purpose.  
The remaining three aspects of the definition are met. Actors are interacting in a stable 
regulatory and conceptual context, they are self-regulating in that no authority is forcing the 
interactions, and the interactions are aimed at establishing DH as a solution to environmental 
concerns. Network behaviours are visible in the interactions, but the interactions have not been 
sufficient to create an constellation whereby action is taken to build the DH system. 
How can the role of planning be described?  
The Planning Department considers that it was instrumental in getting the city interested in 
climate change and the idea of district heating. "We manage a process that came up with a 
bunch of these ideas" (InterviewP4, 2012). However there is a disconnect between planning’s 
preferences (DH is a good thing for environmental reasons) as set out in formal policy, the 
current director's idea generation role, and the department's political and institutional capabilities 
to either support interactions, direct the market or direct other city departments. While it has a 
market setting intervention through city plans, it does not and other actors do not feel it has 
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legal, development or other financial resources to support creation of a DH system. There is a 
noticeable gap between planning authority's self-identified capabilities and preferences and 
other actor's identification of the Planning Department's capabilities and preferences. This can 
be at least partially attributed to the institutional context of the planning commission as separate 
from mayoral control, and to a general perception of planning as development control not 
forward planning.  
Summary  
The concept of using waste heat from McNeil power station to fuel a district heating system has 
been discussed since McNeil's construction in the late 1970's. While the physical capability for 
DH was built in, the political and organisational capability never evolved to enable installation 
and operation of the pipes or system, despite regular attempts by the planning authority and 
others arguing on energy efficiency grounds. Despite a very positive recent study, significant 
local press and a series of open workshops, the actor constellation has not yet shifted from 
talking about the idea to negotiating its construction. There is uncertainty about the preferences 
of potential customers and about general preferences for organisational control and 
management. There are two significant features which are slowing delivery of DH: absence of 
local political support, and the lack of market regulation or market incentives at state or local 
level.  
As of 2012, the concept of district heating using waste heat from McNeil remains dependant on 
the interest of a small group of individuals, lacking both institutionalization of the concept within 
departments and political engagement with local parties or elected officials. It is in danger of 
disintegrating without formal regulation or incentives, capacity building, and a greater preference 
to be involved from institutional and government actors. Because DH is not a common urban 
infrastructure in the US, delivering DH would require actors to change their preferences and 
actions. The Ever-Green Energy Consultant argued "I really think it’s an issue of leadership. 
Someone who understands how beneficial it can be and who persistently advances the cause." 
(InterviewA4, 2012).  Nevertheless, while the network has not created a constellation where the 
DH system is built, it also has to be understood as not succeeded to date – conversations still 
continue between actors and the potential still exists to change their perceptions and 
preferences 
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Chapter 8. Lerwick: Where Actors Wear Many 
Hats 
 
Lerwick is the capital and main port of the Shetland Islands, located more than 160km off the 
north coast of mainland Scotland. In the mid 1990s the Shetland Islands Council (SIC) was 
faced with the problem that its existing waste incinerator was aging and was unlikely to meet 
emerging European Union waste incineration and pollution directives.  
SIC commissioned a number of investigations into their options for waste management. The 
idea of using waste heat from the incineration was put forward and investigated by the council. 
In 1997, SIC decided to proceed with a waste-to-energy incinerator, with heat recovery from the 
incinerator for use within the town centre. SIC also contracts with oil companies operating in the 
area and with the Orkney Islands to burn their waste.  
The Shetland Islands Charitable Trust (SICT), which manages the compensation money from 
North Sea oil activities, along with European grants, provided the capital needed for a district 
heat pipe system and pumping station. Shetland Heat Energy and Power Limited (SHEAP), 
wholly owned by SICT, was created to own and operate the district heating system and 
interface with customers. The heat system commenced operating in 1998, and ran on heating 
oil for a year until the council owned incineration plant was completed and supplied heat to 
SHEAP. By 2009 approximately 1000 customers were connected, primarily residential but with 
110 non-domestic connections. In 2011 the heat capacity of the waste to energy incineration 
plant was reached; SHEAP continues to search for heat sources to enable the district heating 
system to expand further.   
A timeline of district heating in Lerwick is provided for reference.  
Timetable of Lerwick District Heating 
1991 Shetland Islands Council (SIC) began investigating options for waste management 
(InterviewG3, 2011). 
1996 Old Incinerators shut down (InterviewG3, 2011). 
1997 SIC decided to proceed with the Energy Recovery Plant (InterviewG3, 2011). 
1998 Shetland Heat Energy and Power started operating (Martin & Spence, 2010). 
2007 Numerous streets with 100% of properties connected to district heating (Martin & 
Spence, 2010).  
2009 1000 customers (Martin & Spence, 2010). 
2011 Have to stop taking customers as no more excess heat (InterviewS1, 2011). 
 Figure 14: Timetable of Lerwick District Heating 
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Figure 15: Location of Shetland in the North Sea (OpenStreetMap, 2013) 
 
Cultural and government context 
Lerwick is the capital and main port for the Shetland Islands, located off the north east coast of 
Scotland. The Shetland Islands are a region within the country of Scotland, currently managed 
through Edinburgh under a devolved administration within the United Kingdom. They are 
culturally influenced by Norwegian, Danish, and Swedish cultures and traditions, due to the 
Island’s fishing economy, prevailing sailing winds, and tides. The Islands are currently home to 
approximately 22,000 people, with 7,500 residents in Lerwick.  
Shetland Islands Council is a unitary authority without regional oversight. Both local and the 
regional government follow the British planning system, with strong land use control policy 
direction from the Scottish Parliament. The local plan has no binding legal status and while 
drafted by the local council and approved by local politicians, it must be in conformance with 
Scottish planning policy.  
8.1 The Actors  
This section introduces the organisations and individuals who comprise the primary actor set for 
Lerwick, describing their institutional setting, resources, and capabilities. Appendix C contains 
the codes and information sources which provided this understanding of actor powers and 
capabilities.  
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Shetland Heat Energy and Power Limited 
The Shetland Heat Energy and Power Limited (SHEAP) operates the district heating system as 
a for-profit trading company. It was founded with this purpose in 1998 (Shetland Heat Energy 
and Power Limited, 2011). All shares are owned by the Shetland Island Charitable Trust, acting 
as a social investor, who also own the pipes and distribution plant; SHEAP lease this on 
favourable terms, effectively serving as the management and customer interface company for 
the Shetland Islands Charitable Trust. SHEAP have also received grant funding from EU 
Thermie Fund, the Shetland Islands Council via the regional development agency and the 
European Regional Development Fund  (InterviewS1, 2011).  
Neville Martin as District Heating Manager has led SHEAP since its inception, and currently 
manages a staff of approximately five administrators and technical support (Shetland Heat 
Energy and Power Limited, 2011). The company buys heat from Shetland Islands Council's 
waste incineration as well as irregularly generating heat through backup or peaking plant, and 
sells heat to businesses and residents across Lerwick (Martin & Spence, 2010).  
Scottish and Southern Electricity 
Scottish and Southern Energy (SSE) is the local power generator and supplier to Shetland. It is 
also part of the SSE Group, United Kingdom’s largest non-nuclear energy generation company, 
a FTSE 100 company publicly traded on the LSE (SSE, 2013). SSE owns and operates an oil 
fired 67 MWe power generation station in Lerwick, which ‘dumps’ heat from the electricity 
generating process into Lerwick harbour (InterviewS1, 2011).  
European government 
The European Union is an actor in this network because of the influence of its environmental 
directives and the funding it provided to the council for a new incineration plant. Three council 
directives in the late 1980s and early 1990s affected existing waste incineration plants, setting 
air and pollution limits and establishing a series of deadlines in the mid 1990s for improvements 
to existing waste incineration plants. These were an impetus for Shetlands Council to revisit 
their waste strategy and build a new incineration plant (InterviewG3, 2011). The European 
Union also provided funding through a ERDF and Thermie grants towards a heat supply 
element of the new incineration plant (InterviewS1, 2011).  
Local government 
The Shetland Islands Council (SIC) is the local authority for Lerwick, and a major employer of 
the town with over 3,000 employees. It is responsible for establishing environmental standards, 
providing waste collection services and controlling new building development, among other 
typical local government services not relevant to this research (Shetland Islands Council, 2012). 
The council raises funds through locally administered council tax and harbour management 
fees, but is primarily resourced through national government funding, supplemented by 
European grants (Shetland Islands Council, 2012).  
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There are 22 elected councillors which govern the council through a committee system, all of 
whom are classed as politically independent. Elections follow the Scottish local government 
cycle with four year terms (Shetland Islands Council, 2012).  
Shetland Islands Council Planning Department 
The council has a Planning Department, which operates policy making, development control, 
and has specific heritage and marine functions within it. In 2011, the department worked to a 
Shetland Structure Plan (Shetland Islands Council, 2000) as well as Shetland Local Plan 
(Shetland Islands Council, 2004). Both documents mention and are supportive of the district 
heating system (which has been operational for 12 years), although there are no policies which 
explicitly protect the system or recommend or require connection to it. The department does 
have a level of regulatory control over district heating through local plan policy IND9 which 
requires non-public utilities to submit an application for pipe installations (Shetland Islands 
Council, 2000; InterviewP2, 2011).  
Shetland Islands Charitable Trust 
Shetland Islands Charitable Trust (SICT) is a charity established in 1976 through a £81m 
investment from oil companies as compensation for basing the Sullom Voe terminal in Shetland. 
The Trust’s aim is to provide public benefit in the areas of social care, culture and sports, 
environment, natural history, and heritage. It does this through grants with the dividends on it its 
investments in global stocks and by operating three subsidiary companies on a commercial 
basis; SLAP which invests in property, SHEAP the focus of this research, and a third company 
Viking Energy which invests in a renewables project (Shetland Island Charitable Trust, 2012). 
As of March 2012, SICT holdings totalled £217 million, and it distributes around £10 million 
annually (Shetland Islands Charitable Trust, 2013). 
At the time of establishing the district heating system, several SICT Trustees were also local 
councillors. Historically the relationship between SICT and SIC was close, with staff and 
programmes often shared between the two organisations.  
Wider non-primary actors  
Table 23 lists the primary actors; non-primary actors included a limited number of private sector 
consultancies who advised SHEAP and SIC. None are currently retained on a regular basis 
according to SHEAP (InterviewS1, 2011). An engineer at Gilbert Bain Hospital, was also 
interviewed to understand the perspective of a non-residential customer to SHEAP. The 
Hospital is one of two general hospitals in Shetland and a prominent building in the town. 
Hjatland Housing Association, the local social landlord, while not a major actor in establishing 
District Heating (DH), was contacted via email for this research. Hjatland have coordinated with 
SHEAP to extend heating pipes toward new housing development – they built over 117 houses 
in the late 2000's, in which DH system connections are installed as standard. 
Scottish and United Kingdom government organisations were not identified as primary actors for 
the research. Scotland as a semi-sovereign country within the United Kingdom is responsible for 
most day-to-day issues such as health, education, justice, spatial planning, and transport. 
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Foreign affairs, fiscal policy, and defence are managed in London through the UK parliament. 
Energy policy after the 1998 Devolution Act is predominately created and enacted in London but 
energy efficiency and renewables policies were devolved to Edinburgh (Murphy, 2007).  
Government Market Civic 
Shetland Islands Council – 
Councillors  
Shetland Heat Energy 
and Power Limited 
Shetland Islands Charitable 
Trust  
Shetland Island Council – Waste 
to Energy Plant 
Scottish and Southern 
Energy (Hydro) 
 
Shetland Island Council – Waste 
Services 
  
Shetland Islands Council – 
Planning Department  
  
European Union    
Table 23: Set of primary actors for Lerwick 
 
Figure 16: Photograph of harbour from central Lerwick (Cary, 2011) 
8.2 Analysis of the Actors and Actor Constellation 
This section describes the self-identified and collective actor analysis. Appendix C contains the 
detailed stakeholder analyses matrices which are described here.   
8.2.1 Self-identified actor analysis: Where's the conflict?  
In the self-identified actor analysis, three actors self-identify as actively engaged in building the 
Lerwick district heating system: SIC, SICT, and SHEAP. SIC see themselves as leading the 
development of the DH system, supporting the concept off the back of the waste incineration 
review (InterviewG3, 2011). They did have to actively learn more about DH and admitted that 
their original orientation was one of interest in the idea but no idea how to deliver a system. 
They turned to European examples to learn more, and council staff visited existing systems in 
Denmark (InterviewS1, 2011). The current SHEAP manager, formerly of SIC, said "someone 
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said what’s district heating and then the next thing myself and one or two others got instructions 
to go to Denmark and find out more about it, that was in 92 or 93 .... because I must admit that 
at the time being a water engineer with the coal board, the idea of pumping hot water around 
the town it was, I had never heard of it before and I must admit I thought it was ludicrous." 
(InterviewS1, 2011). Once SHEAP was established the council transferred the staff who had 
commenced the DH system over to be employed by SHEAP. 
With the redevelopment of an aging waste incinerator to meet European pollution standards, 
SIC sought to keep managing the waste for Shetland, the Orkneys, and the oil ships as this 
keeps jobs in Shetland. The Energy Recovery Plant manager explained "At that time really we 
had a major supply base with the off-shore industry here, and one of the key elements in 
keeping them here was incineration of waste. So it had an economic viewpoint as well as a 
waste management viewpoint, with trying to keep jobs on Shetland." (InterviewG3, 2011) The 
council's perspective was not led by an explicit local strategy or policy for incineration or DH. 
Formal policy support for DH came only in 1998 when the SIC Energy Unit published an Energy 
Plan which encouraged a more coordinated approach to energy management in Shetland, 
promoting renewable resources and the DH system (Shetland Islands Council, 2000).  
Further drivers behind incineration (as opposed to landfill or shipping waste off island) are 
stated by SIC to be both waste policy and environmental reasons (InterviewG3, 2011). Aware of 
European Directives for air quality and pollution control from incinerators, SIC also pursued an 
incinerator capable of DH supply. And because they struggled to find funds to build incinerator 
from within the council, they sought grants for DH as a further source of funding for the 
incinerator (InterviewG3, 2011).  
The orientation of the SICT is to support initiatives which benefit residents of Shetland; it is 
therefore interested in the environmental (waste, carbon), employment (job creation), and cost 
saving (for consumers) benefits of DH for Lerwick. SICT were willing to invest in SHEAP as a 
grant, and while they originally hoped to make a small profit from the investment in 2000 they 
conceded the capital investment in pipework as a grant; “If you do a sort of Shetland plc 
calculation it probably stacks up“ (InterviewS1, 2011).  
SHEAP, as an organisation formed to build and operate the district heating system, would prefer 
to expand the system to serve more customers if additional heat sources could be found  
(InterviewS1, 2011). They are proud of the benefits DH brings to Lerwick.  
About £1,000,000 per annum of the income from sales stays in 
Shetland rather than paying for oil which would go straight out of the 
economy. Just as importantly, local businesses are cushioned from 
the fuel price uncertainty helping to provide some stability. Up until 
recently we were creating around £700,000 of civil engineering works 
a year of which around 75% was local input with the remainder being 
materials. The district heating scheme directly employs six people. It 
out sources most of its maintenance works to the private sector. 
(Shetland Heat Energy and Power Limited, 2011) 
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Turning to the orientations of the Planning Department, an interview with a planning officer 
indicates that the general planning ethos is development friendly; the department sees its role 
as guiding people towards policy outcomes and being supportive. They perceive local plan 
policy IND9 as an information gathering and coordination policy rather than development 
control, as it enables them to help the various authorities combine roadworks. "As far as the 
development plan went, and the implementation of the scheme, it was coordinating everything 
to make sure that if you dug up king Harold street, it was once, and put in new sewer pipes, new 
water pipes, new district heating pipes, new electricity cables... everything went in one great big 
hole." (InterviewP2, 2011). However, the council’s Structure Plan does have as an indicator of 
success the number of properties connected to DH (Shetland Islands Council, 2000). The same 
planning officer described how the council in 2005 coordinated DH pipe installations with a re-
flagging and improvement project in the town centre (InterviewP2, 2011).  
Both SSE and the European Union government were identified by other interviewees as primary 
actors. SSE participated in the initial discussions for setting up the DH system in Lerwick 
(InterviewS1, 2011) but did not engage further by, for example, arranging for the waste heat 
from the power station to be used in the DH system. The EU government provided policy 
direction which encouraged incineration and use of its thermal output in DH through 
Environmental Directives, as described above.  
What are the actors' self-identified capabilities, orientations, and preferences?  
There are four ways in which the set of actors has a discernible effect on the construction of the 
heating system. One, through the existence of the SICT, SHEAP received substantial financial 
investment through a grant. Two, the council’s desire to continue management of waste and 
preference for incineration provides a source of ‘free’ heat to the system. Three, several 
individuals have dual responsibilities between the council SHEAP or SICT; e.g. trustees of SICT 
were also local councillors, SIC staff were transferred from SIC into SHEAP to run the DH 
system. This sharing of roles among private, government, and civic organisations reduces 
transaction costs in knowledge exchange and encourages shared preferences among actors 
And finally, the absence of a private sector energy company. While the council uses external 
(often Danish) consultants to investigate options and provide advice, they did not seriously 
consider contracting with a private energy company to run the heating system. Instead they 
trained existing council staff and created a non profit organisation to run the system (they are 
legally prohibited from doing so themselves). This strategy was influenced by individual 
orientations about large energy companies (negative experience with SSE, trips to other DH 
systems in the UK) and organisational orientations towards self-reliance on the island.  
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Figure 17: Photograph of the central pumping station for Shetland Heat and Power Limited (Cary, 
2011) 
8.2.2 Collective analysis: Identifying small conflicts   
The collective actor analysis identifies additional points of conflict, change, and consensus 
within the small actor set. A main point of conflict, which remains unresolved, is SSE’s lack of 
agreement to supply heat to SHEAP from the adjacent large oil fired electricity power plant. 
Despite initial involvement by SSE in SHEAP, efforts to push SSE to provide low cost heat from 
the power station have been unsuccessful “Neville has been badgering them for the last 12 
years…one way or another.” (InterviewS1, 2011). The perspective of the council and of SHEAP 
is that “They [SSE] realised the district heating isn’t a commercial activity in terms of the cost of 
laying pipes and what they’d recover from the heat.” (InterviewG3, 2011). SHEAP would prefer 
SSE to get involved because with the additional heat they could expand the system to further 
customers, but no direct mechanism exists by which the local council or community can force a 
large energy utility to get involved in a local DH system.  
On the other hand, there is strong consensus among all other actors about the socio-economic 
value of the DH system, and the appropriateness of SICT providing grant funding for it. SICT 
was seen, particularly historically, as an “arm of the council” (InterviewS1, 2011) and interviews 
indicate that they work closely together, sharing knowledge and strategies together 
(InterviewG3, 2011; InterviewS1, 2011; InterviewP2, 2011). The Energy Plant Manager 
perceived the situation as  
So we had to look at an alternative, so we went to Shetland Charitable 
Trust, to look at them viewing it as a sort of local economic 
development, under the Trust they can contribute to things that 
encourage the local economy, they can invest in things of that nature, 
so we went to them for them to build the network and lease the pipe. 
(InterviewG3, 2011) 
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The Waste Services Manager described the Trust's involvement as "The only way it could have 
been established" (InterviewG3, 2011) and noted that the trust has had to write off initial £2m as 
a grant, although the system breaks even now (InterviewS1, 2011).  
The council's preference towards DH was identified by others as initially quite mixed. While the 
council pushed for incineration, there were some individuals within the council who did not 
believe that DH would work. SHEAP's Manager remarked in an interview "One of the council 
officers, the technical officers, decided the district heating scheme was not going to work here 
… and to prove himself right he wouldn’t let the council offices connect…" While they did 
eventually connect, it was buildings owned by SICT such as the leisure centre which were first 
to be connected (InterviewS1, 2011).   
The collective actor analysis illustrates that over time the council and others have come to value 
and respect the service SHEAP provides. Customers are happy with the service; from the 
interviews and local newspapers, it is clear that residents and businesses generally prefer to 
connect where they can (Robertson, 2008). This was understood by interviewees as primarily 
due to fuel costs, where DH is generally cheaper than electric or other fuel sources (there is no 
gas supply). The engineer at Gilbert Bain Hospital also explained that DH makes his life easy; 
there are rarely any problems and if there are problems, he can ring up Neville, the manager at 
SHEAP (InterviewU1, 2011). 
When queried, interviewees recognised that the Planning Department plays a market regulating 
role through its requirement of application for and approval of pipe network installation. But this 
is seen as positive in that the council uses those powers to help coordinate with both other 
customers and with other streetworks such as repaving (InterviewS1, 2011). The benefit was 
detailed by the Energy Recovery Plant Manager; 
And District Heating had to apply for planning for all their routes 
because it’s still not classed as a utility, so it doesn’t have that 
legislative backing, and therefore it needs planning permission for 
everything it’s doing. In fact it was probably more contentious, the 
district heating than the incinerator to be honest, because the roads 
were going to get dug up for years. (InterviewG3, 2011) 
Market influences 
The strategy analysis of market interventions highlights that, on the whole, there were more 
market shaping and capacity building influences than market regulation or stimulation 
influences. The exceptions to this are the two main funders of the system – SICT and the EU 
Government  - who played market incentivisation roles. The only regulation of DH comes in the 
form of European incineration controls and through the nominal local planning approvals for 
control of pipe laying. Overall all four of Tiesdell and Allmendinger's types of market regulation 
are active in the case, although regulation is weak and predominately focused on the 
incineration plant. The biggest gaps between expected and actual activity lies with SSE; other 
actors expected SSE to be more engaged in market shaping type of activity.  
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Summary of  the actor constellation  
In summary, the collective actor analysis uncovers two significant changes in actor orientations 
and preferences during the establishment of Lerwick's DH system. Initial reactions to 
incineration supplying DH were mixed due to a lack of knowledge about DH infrastructure and 
uncertainty about technical feasibility. This became more favourable over time, following 
knowledge-gathering visits to Denmark and several public consultations. Secondly, following 
initial expectations and engagement with SSE as a secondary heat source or system partner, 
the council proceeded with DH without the SSE heat and with SICT as the funding body.  
8.3 Interactions and Negotiations: Problem Solving not Positive 
Coordination 
How can the mode of interaction be characterised?  
The actor constellation in Lerwick can best be characterised as problem solving in Scharpf’s 
categorisation of negotiation types. The discussions and preferences between actors tend to 
ignore distribution of monetary resources (who benefits or profits from investment) to focus on 
how to create value – how to address environmentally sound waste management and job 
creation while provide heating efficiently and cheaply. This is particularly demonstrated in 
SICT’s acceptance of the investment in the district heating system as a grant – the organisation 
is not there to maximise profit, but to benefit the Shetland community, and they are willing to 
‘lose’ money through grant funding infrastructure to do this. This kind of problem solving 
negotiation “depends on maximum openness, good communication skills, and mutual trust” (p 
131, Scharpf 1997); Lerwick's small island setting and multiple responsibilities by individuals 
across organisations enabled this approach to negotiations.  
What are the relational characteristics?  
The set of actors responsible for DH in Lerwick is comparatively small, with a lack of direct 
national engagement and the absence of a private sector DH company to operate the system. 
This is reflective of the ‘small island’ setting, isolated from larger political and economic centres.  
All interviewees commented on how Lerwick’s small size supported the creation of the DH. 
Neville Martin, the SHEAP manager, was known by name to all those interviewed and 
comments such as “it is easier to ring up Neville and explain if there’s a problem” (InterviewP2, 
2011) and “everybody knows everybody here” (InterviewS1, 2011) were frequently made in 
response to queries about why the DH succeeded. Neville himself made the point that once 
SHEAP started digging the pipes in a neighbourhood, new DH connections “sold” through word 
of mouth (InterviewS1, 2011).  
Another distinct feature of Lerwick's governance network is that several individuals wear ‘many 
hats’; e.g. simultaneously a local councillor, governor of a local school, and as a trustee of the 
SICT. As the planning officer remarked, “if you’re going to wear hats, wear a lot” (InterviewP2, 
2011). Wearing ‘many hats’ not only means that information sharing and capacity building about 
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the concept of DH was reduced within the network, but that organizational orientations tended 
to evolve together, reducing the potential for conflict.  
Shetland is not only a small place, but it is a fairly static place; the interviews showed that 
generally the same individuals were involved over time. As a result of this, long-term 
relationships are important and decisions were often made between people and personal 
relationships, rather than between companies and contracts. But it also increased pressure on 
delivery; as the financial controller for SICT commented,  
There were some stressful meetings, but we have now got the point 
where the scheme is sufficiently established, that the charitable trust 
will fund ahead for 3 years at a time on the basis of the business plan, 
but for about certainly 8 or 9 years, it was an annual funding rigmarole 
with the charitable trust and if Neville had upset too many people by 
digging up too many holes in front of councillors...It wasn’t always 
easy to get the money out of the trust. (InterviewS1, 2011) 
 
 
 
Figure 18: Photographs of heating pipe installation in Lerwick (Shetland Heat Energy and Power 
Limited, 2011)  
8.4 Conclusions: Tight Networks for Public Benefit  
The SHEAP system has been operating for 12 years and currently services over 1000 
customers in the town. The system is recognised locally for reducing fuel bills and maintenance 
costs, as well as creating employment and construction works for the local economy; SHEAP's 
own estimates are that it has repaid (to the local economy) its investment within seven years: 
"The cost of the district heating to date is about £13m. The benefits of the above amount to 
between £2m and £3m annually depending on the price of oil." (Martin & Spence, 2010). The 
challenge now for SHEAP is to find additional fuel or heating sources so that it can expand 
further and serve a larger portion of the town.  
 
 
124 
 
Is this network governance?  
Returning to Sorensen and Torfing’s definition of network governance, the process of building 
and operating SHEAP meets the majority of their criteria. The network is relatively stable, with 
almost no change to individuals and organisations. It is more horizontal than hierarchical in that 
it is not responding to policy or strategy from above but arising as a local response to a discrete 
challenge. The actors are technically operationally autonomous, but all admit that SIC and SICT 
were very closely linked when the network was conceived. The actors are self regulating in that 
that they continued negotiations over funding and behaviour, and given the small island setting 
were regulated through peer-pressure rather than national organisations. And very clearly they 
built the system for a shared, normative, concept of public purpose: cheaper heat for Lerwick 
businesses and residents, nineteen jobs from incineration, and five jobs in the management of 
SHEAP (Spence & Martin, 2011).  
Thus the governance network can be characterised as a very tight, influenced by daily 
interactions among a small set of actors over long periods of time, and by “policy solving” 
negotiations aimed at public benefit rather than a network where exchange of monetary 
resources predominated. Both aspects resulted in low levels of conflict between actors and a 
focus on delivering the DH system.  
The governance network building SHEAP had to overcame two barriers to establish a DH 
system. First an absence of strong market drivers (regulation, policy, incentives, etc) from 
Scottish or national actors. This was overcome by the formal institutional structure of the island 
with the engagement of SICT, support of European funding, and a more informal setting of the 
council's orientation towards self-reliance and responsible service provision on an island. The 
second barrier, which while downplayed by the actors during interviews, was the lack of 
previous experience with district heating and the effort and investment required to learn how to 
build and operate it. As a local councillor said, "I mean politically it was quite visionary, 
technically and financially as well, there was a fair bit of suck it and see in the end, there had to 
be…" (InterviewS1, 2011).   
How can the role of planning be described?  
The Planning Department can be described as only mildly market regulating, with planning 
permission required for pipe connections on a utilities control on a coordination basis. The 
department did retrospectively support the installation of the system in policy and practice, 
helping to coordinate streetworks in the downtown streets through development control. 
Compared to other cases, this is a fairly weak use of planning powers and tools, with no use of 
forward planning or spatial plan coordination of utilities or energy infrastructure to initiate the DH 
system.  
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Chapter 9. London, Elephant and Castle: Policy 
Entrepreneurs Amidst Conflict and Change 
 
In 2004 Southwark Council approved a masterplan for the Elephant and Castle area of London, 
in the form of a Supplementary Planning Guidance Development Framework. This document 
served as the basis for negotiations with a private sector developer to deliver a major 
regeneration programme in the area, demolishing an existing estate of 1,100 homes and 
shopping facilities, to be replaced with circa 5,000 homes, a new park, re-designed streets, and 
public realm. The regeneration programme is ongoing.  
Included in the Development Framework and based on a detailed environmental resource flow 
assessment was a goal to promote a zero carbon growth strategy within the confines of the 
development. This was envisaged to be partially achieved through the establishment of a public-
private joint venture company to provide district heating, cooling, water, and waste processing 
using renewable or low-carbon fuels. This multi-utility services company (MUSCO) would invest 
in the necessary energy centre and infrastructure in return for income from consumer sales, 
based on a 30 year concession to supply the area. Southwark Council's goal and the MUSCO 
system proposal deviated significantly from conventional masterplanning and precluded national 
planning policies on DHC, effectively placing this case at the forefront of UK energy planning.  
In 2006 Southwark Council launched a European procurement process with the aim of 
appointing a private sector utilities company to operate the MUSCO. Dalkia, a multi-national 
energy services company was selected in 2008 as the preferred MUSCO partner through a 
European negotiated procurement procedure. However, with the 2008 recession the timetable 
for redevelopment of the area collapsed, and a renegotiation of the concession commenced, 
based on the revised forecast for housing and commercial development. In early 2011 
Southwark Council took the decision to withdraw from the negotiations for the procurement of 
the MUSCO.  
For context, a timeline of the attempt to develop a district heating and cooling system in 
Elephant and Castle is provided in Figure 19.  
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Timeline of Elephant and Castle Case Study 
2003 Work begins on the Elephant and Castle masterplan (InterviewG1, 2011). 
2004 The London Mayor’s Energy Strategy announces a policy intention to increase 
the use of community heating in London (Greater London Authority, 2004).  
Southwark Council under liberal democrat control approves a development 
framework in the form of supplementary planning guidance (London Borough of 
Southwark, 2004) for Elephant and Castle which proposes to deliver heat, 
cooling and power through local generation and distribution, and sets at target of 
zero growth in emissions despite a development masterplan which increases 
building floor space by 300% (London Borough of Southwark, 2011). 
The GLA publishes the London Plan, with policies explicitly promoting CHP led 
heating and cooling systems (Greater London Authority, 2006). 
2004 - 
2006 
Detailed work on technology deployment and carbon savings for the MUSCO 
(InterviewP1, 2011; InterviewG1, 2011) . 
2006 May – Southwark Council elections result in no overall control, with a tie 
between Liberal Democrats and Labour.  
July - Southwark announced plans to provide locally generated heat, cooling, 
and electricity for the development through a MUSCO approach. MUSCO 
procurement procedures are launched (London SE1 website team, 2006).   
2007 Lend Lease appointed as regeneration partner.  
2008 A consortium led by Dalkia was selected as the preferred commercial partner for 
the MUSCO. The financial crisis resulted in a review of the regeneration 
programme (London Borough of Southwark, 2011). 
2009 Regeneration Department reorganised within LB Southwark’s executive 
structure (InterviewP1, 2011).  
2010 May - Southwark elections result in Labour gaining overall control of the Council.  
June - A revised offer from Dalkia, with a new proposal for the MUSCO 
concession (London Borough of Southwark, 2011). 
2011 February – Southwark Council takes decision not proceed with procurement of 
MUSCo (London SE1 Website Team, 2011).  
Figure 19: Timeline of Elephant and Castle case study 
Context: multi-level government and planning frameworks 
Elephant and Castle is an area of central London within the borough of Southwark; it is located 
south of the river, approximately two kilometres from Westminster and the City. Southwark is 
both the name for a neighbourhood in London and the name for a local government unit within 
London – the London Borough of Southwark.  
London’s complex multi-level governance arrangements are well documented, with Pimlott and 
Rao (2002) a useful text. Specific institutions and powers relevant to this case are explained 
below but in outline, civic functions are divided between a pan-London Greater London 
Authority run by an elected mayor, and 32 smaller area-delineated boroughs that operate on a 
council committee system with elected councillors. At a borough level, all but three boroughs 
operate a leader and executive system where the mayor’s role is symbolic (Newman & 
Thornley, 1996) and the leader of the council is an elected local councillor chosen from within 
the party. Both levels of elections tend to be fought according to UK national political party lines, 
with Ken Livingstone’s 2000-2004 term as an independent mayor a notable exception.  
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Control of development and land use in the UK is structured through a plan-led system, with 
local or metropolitan plans required to be in conformance with national policies(ODPM, 2005). 
Local authorities have higher levels of autonomy in making planning decisions than elsewhere 
in Europe, but within a clearly defined scope by national policy. The British planning system is 
characterised by Newman and Thornley (1996) as system based not on a firm legal grounding 
of government control of land but case law of negotiation between public and private 
organisations. At a national level, Department of Communities and Local Government (DCLG) is 
responsible for planning policy, housing and building regulations and DCLG policies influenced 
the backdrop to the Southwark masterplan in two ways. One, by mandating minimum energy 
standards for new housing their policies encourage developers to perceive DHC systems as a 
cost-effective way to address efficiency requirements in large developments. Secondly, through 
national planning policy document PPS1 supplement published in 2007 DCLG explicitly 
supported decentralised energy systems, including district energy fired via CHP or CCHP, and 
required local planning authorities to consider DHC in masterplanning future developments 
(CLG, 2007).  
Energy policy is spread across a number of national departments, and the UK government has 
instituted a patchwork set of targets, measures, and policies in support of CHP, community 
heating, decentralised energy, and renewables. Hinnels (2008) describe how the division of 
policies between departments and the trend to focus on individual technologies has failed to 
deliver market movement on CHP or DHC. Policy documents such as DEFRA's Strategy for 
Combined Heat and Power (2004) and the DTI's White Paper on Energy (2007) generally 
expect private sector large energy companies to deliver national energy policy aims and seek to 
influence the market by removing barriers, creating incentives, and setting targets.  
This case is also notable for spanning the late 2000's global financial crisis, which had a 
significant impact on the capacity and outlook of local, regional, and national government, 
private businesses, property developers, and financial institutions.  
9.1 The Actors 
This section introduces the organisations and individuals who comprise the primary actor set for 
the attempt to establish a MUSCO concession in Elephant and Castle, describing their 
institutional setting, capabilities, and resources. The research uncovered additional non-primary 
actors, such as law firms Grant Thornton and Herbert Smith, who advised Southwark Council on 
the procurement process, and Tibbalds Planning and Urban Design, who advised Southwark on 
the 2004 development framework. Notably absent are local residents and national government 
organisations; they were not identified as participants in discussions or negotiations for the 
proposed MUSCO. Appendix C contains the codes and information sources which provided this 
understanding of actor powers and capabilities. 
Greater London Authority  
The Greater London Authority (GLA) is the civil service body which supports the Mayor of 
London’s policies and the elected London Assembly. The Assembly consists of 25 members 
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who exist predominately to scrutinise and veto the mayor’s policies and budget. The Mayor of 
London is directly elected with responsibility for strategic direction of London, with specific 
powers over fire, police, planning, and transport. The mayor also has a duty to establish policies 
on transport, planning and development, housing, economic development and regeneration, 
culture, health inequalities, and a range of environmental issues including climate change, 
biodiversity, ambient noise, waste disposal, and air quality (Pimlott & Rao, 2002).  
The mayor’s planning powers are unique in the United Kingdom. The Greater London Authority 
Acts 1999 and 2007 require the boroughs to consult the mayor on planning applications that are 
of potential strategic importance to London, as defined by the government. The London 
boroughs also consult the mayor on their Local Development Frameworks (local plans). As of 
2007, the mayor has the power in major applications of direct refusal, to take over the 
application for his own determination or allow the planning authority's decision to stand (HM 
Government, 2008). Prior to that, the mayor only had the power to refuse applications, but could 
not take them for his own determination (House of Commons, 1998). 
 
Figure 20: Map of London with Elephant and Castle identified (OpenStreetMap, 2013) 
London Borough of Southwark and its elected local politicians 
At a local level, the London Borough of Southwark follows a leader and executive structure, with 
elected councillors determining major decisions and an executive or officer management 
function coordinated under a Chief Executive via series of committees headed by councillors. 
Councillors are elected every four years; the attempt to establish a MUSCO lasted over the 
course of three election cycles, through which the council leadership changed three times.  
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The council owns almost 50% of the housing in the borough area (London Borough of 
Southwark, 2006), and a large proportion of the land near the Elephant and Castle area 
(London Borough of Southwark, 2004). This ownership increases the councils authority over 
plans for the area. However the council's ability to spend and invest is constrained and directed 
by legislation and funds are handed down from national government (which comes from various 
sources but includes a redistribution of business rates and property taxation) rather than local 
taxation.  
Within the council, the primary department responsible for the Elephant and Castle regeneration 
project was the Regeneration Department (London Borough of Southwark, 2010). It established 
the goals and vision for the redevelopment and regeneration of the area, led the search for a 
private sector regeneration partner, and it was also responsible for planning policy and 
implementation within the project boundaries (InterviewP1, 2011).  
Southwark’s Planning Department sits within a ‘Regeneration and Neighbourhoods’ 
Department, alongside the Economic Development Department (London Borough of Southwark, 
2010). Southwark’s Planning Department has the authority to create a local spatial plan and 
local policies for development and physical investment; however their policies must be in 
conformance with national planning policy and the regional London Plan. The Planning 
Department approves or denies applications for changes of use and significant building 
alterations; through this approval process the authority can negotiate conditions on the private 
sector developers (Newman & Thornley, 1996).  
Interviews identified that the Finance Department was also important to the decision making for 
the MUSCO (InterviewP1, 2011; InterviewA2, 2011). The Finance Department reports directly to 
the Chief Executive of the council, although a 2010 organisation chart identifies the main role of 
the department as providing assistance and guidance to the council and other departments 
(London Borough of Southwark, 2010).  
Private sector actors 
A number of private sector consultancies advised all parties to the MUSCO negotiations. 
Interviewees identified Inventa Partners and Brian Dunlop Associates as particularly influential; 
both are SME consultancies. The former specialises in developing and delivering strategies for 
the funding of sustainable energy, electricity, waste, water, and telecommunications 
infrastructure (Inventa Partners). It advised Southwark Council on the MUSCO development 
and tendering process (InterviewA2, 2011). Brian Dunlop Associates is an engineering 
consultancy firm run by Brian Dunlop, a civil engineer. Brian advised Southwark Council on 
general sustainability, energy, and water aspects of the development framework masterplan for 
Elephant and Castle in 2003. He was subsequently retained until 2010 to advise on the 
procurement of the MUSCO (InterviewA1, 2011). 
The preferred MUSCO partner, Dalkia Bio-energy, is an international company which 
manufactures energy infrastructure and engines, and offers multi-utility services to private and 
public customers globally. In 2010 it had over 50,000 employees and annual revenue of £6.8 
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billion. It has a significant UK presence with over 1,000 employees. It is owned by Veolia 
environment and EDF, both global energy and environmental services companies with offices 
and a significant presence in London (London Borough of Southwark, 2011).  
Lend Lease is a global construction and development corporation, who was appointed lead 
regeneration partner for the Elephant and Castle Scheme in 2010 (Leader of the Council, 2010), 
following initial selection process in July 2007 (London Borough of Southwark, 2010). In June 
2009, at the time of signing the Regeneration Agreement, the company was valued at $3.9b 
USD (Leader of the Council, 2010). The Regeneration Agreement gives Lend Lease the 
responsibility to submit a planning application for the regeneration area, and then deliver the 
development in line with principles agreed with Southwark and an outline masterplan. In return, 
they receive a share of the profits and ownership in the area. (The details of the agreement are 
not publicly available.) 
Civic  
The Clinton Climate Change Initiative (CCI), was mentioned by press and several interviewees 
(InterviewD1, 2011; InterviewP1, 2011) as a participant actor seeking to establish the MUSCO 
system. The CCI created a ‘Climate Positive Development Programme’ which assists 
development projects to address the dual challenge of rapid urban growth and climate change. 
In May 2009, Elephant and Castle was designated as one of only 16 founding projects of the 
Climate Positive Development Program (Clinton Foundation); in this sense its role was to create 
international expectations for the project and to support the project with information sharing 
(InterviewC1, 2011).  
Market Government  Civic 
Brian Dunlop 
Associates  
Southwark Councillors (Elected) Clinton Climate Change 
Initiative 
Dalkia  LB Southwark Planning Department  
Inventa Partners LB Southwark Finance Department  
Lend Lease LB Southwark Regeneration Department  
 Greater London Authority and Mayor of 
London  
 
Table 24: Set of primary actors for London 
9.2 Analysis of the Actors and the Actor Constellation 
Following the methodology described in Chapter 5, this section describes the actor analysis for 
the attempt to establish a MUSCO system at Elephant and Castle and develops the actor 
constellation by considering the degree to which actor aspirations were compatible or 
incompatible with each other.  The detailed matrices described here can be found in Appendix 
C. 
9.2.1 Self-identified actor capabilities and preferences  
The self-identified actor analysis identifies there is wide if not unanimous initial support for the 
MUSCO approach to addressing energy demands in the regeneration of Elephant and Castle. 
The environmental benefit of a MUSCO is recognised and championed by the Regeneration 
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Department in the council. Across the actors, no organisation feels they have the ability 
(knowledge, certainty of return on investment, or political support) to deliver the proposed 
MUSCO singlehandedly and they accept the need for exchange-based contracts to deliver the 
system. The concept of procurement of MUSCO as concession offered by Southwark through 
European Union procurement procedures to a private sector energy company was not 
contentious and actors understood their roles and responsibilities in this approach. 
The Regeneration Department perceived themselves as leading on the concept and the 
procurement of a MUSCO system to achieve dual aims of lowering infrastructure costs and 
achieving environmental goals. However this perception took time to build and the department's 
ability to act was constrained. They first leveraged their regeneration strategy (in planning 
policy) to include the MUSCO as a market shaping strategy, and then discussed the concept 
with their preferred regeneration partner, Lend Lease. The former Regeneration Project Director 
noted that Lend Lease “were quite sceptical” about the MUSCO (InterviewP1, 2011) and instead 
the Regeneration Department approached private sector energy companies to build the 
MUSCO through a tender process, offering the council’s social housing demands for heating as 
consumers and some land for an energy centre (London Borough of Southwark, 2011). The 
Regeneration Department took responsibility for initiating the MUSCO but it also had other 
objectives for the Elephant and Castle project which took priority over environmental goals: 
financial returns, legal obligations, economic regeneration. These restricted its capabilities and 
strategy options for negotiations to build the MUSCO (InterviewG1, 2011). A further 
complication to the preferences of the Regeneration Department was the re-organisation of the 
council in 2009, which changed the structure of the department and resulted in the departure of 
the project director (InterviewP1, 2011). 
Southwark’s Planning Department, influenced by the Regeneration Department, established a 
goal of ‘net zero carbon’ growth and explicit support for a MUSCO solution within the 2004 
Elephant and Castle Development Framework (London Borough of Southwark, 2004) and 
subsequent local policy documents (London Borough of Southwark, 2008). The wider 
Southwark Plan (London Borough of Southwark, 2007) established the principle that the 
planning approvals process should be used to regulate energy performance in new buildings.  
Both the Planning and the Regeneration Department were influenced by national and regional 
policy goals for local decentralised energy; in particular the 2004 London Plan policy 4A.5: 
“Boroughs should ensure that all DPDs identify and safeguard existing heat and cooling 
networks and maximise the opportunities for providing new networks that are supplied by 
decentralised energy”. Formal national planning policy support for a MUSCO concept in 
planning policy only followed in 2007 (CLG, 2007). Mayoral policies were repeatedly supportive 
of CHP-fuelled district energy in new large developments in London (Greater London Authority, 
2004) (Greater London Authority, 2006). And the mayor’s preferred strategy was to use 
planning powers to influence developers and local boroughs, supported by two dedicated 
organisations to provide advice and funding.  
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Despite this external policy support for decentralised energy, Southwark was effectively learning 
as it went; every councillor and officer interviewed described an initial lack of knowledge or 
awareness about DHC or MUSCO procurement (InterviewE1, 2011; InterviewA1, 2011; 
InterviewP1, 2011).  
As a private energy company, Dalkia’s strategy for building and operating the MUSCO reflected 
their evaluation of upfront investment against expectations for long term income. Through the 
procurement process, it emerged that Dalkia was willing to take on some risk for future 
customers, but not all risk about security of future income; Southwark would have to stay 
involved politically and somewhat financially. This was accepted by the Regeneration 
Department but seen to be a problem by the Finance Department (InterviewP1, 2011). Also, 
when the economic recession reduced number of homes to be built as part of the regeneration, 
this negatively affected Dalkia’s income calculations and therefore ability to source funds for 
capital investment. Their preferred MUSCO shifted to have higher levels of government-owned 
housing and one larger energy centre instead of two linked ones (InterviewA1, 2011). 
What are the actors' self-identified capabilities, orientations, and preferences?  
The attempt to establish a MUSCO which included DHC was initiated by the Regeneration 
Department, who originated the idea and embedded it into the planning framework for Elephant 
and Castle. As a group, actors felt they had sufficient organisations involved; they did not 
identify significant gaps or roles in the delivery process. For example, there was no lack of a 
private sector energy company who was interested in contracting to build and operate the 
system, and no lack of consultants to advise the public sector. However, the absence of active 
national government actors actively supporting the MUSCO through regulation, funding or 
political resource is noticeable given national policy goals to promote DHC.  
Secondly, several of those interviewed identified the capability of actors as a factor in the failure 
to establish the MUSCO. The Regeneration Department spent significant time and costs 
learning from European systems such as Stockholm and Copenhagen; interviewees from the 
department believed the process could have been smoother and quicker if they had an existing 
template to replicate. In particular, the councillors did not have sufficient understanding of the 
MUSCO commercial set up or physical output to be comfortable negotiating a 30 year contract 
or promoting it to residents. A local councillor described his position as: “I ask, what is a 
MUSCO? How can I explain this to residents? Does it smell?...What is the benefit to the 
council?” (InterviewE1, 2011).  
Finally, over the course of eight years of attempting to procure and build a MUSCO system, the 
council staff and the councillors changed, and so did their preferences around Southwark’s 
responsibility in offering the concession. The length of negotiations weakened their support for 
long-term risk and in particular for the construction of an energy centre near the development 
area. In interviews, a councillor describes being conflicted between their responsibility to 
steward the council’s money wisely and the environmental goals of the MUSCO, which they 
eventually perceived to bring significant financial and political risk. He said “I thought it was 
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going to be a box underground somewhere in Elephant and Castle; now it was a nine story 
thing on a major road. Quite innocently, it grew... but ended up too big and I didn’t have political 
support for larger centre with more visual impact but with less profit” (InterviewE1, 2011).  
 
Figure 21: Indicative proposal for Heygate Street in Elephant and Castle (Moseley & Dunlop) 
 
 
9.2.2 Collective perspectives: Identifying conflicts 
The collective actor analysis shows that there was eventual agreement of Southwark Council as 
the appropriate organisation to lead on the concept and procurement of the MUSCO; however 
this agreement took time to build. Southwark used the planning process to formally set out the 
MUSCO goal and used the regeneration strategy and the public housing heating demands to 
create resource (land and customers) which could be exchanged with a MUSCO provider 
(London Borough of Southwark, 2011). Lend Lease remained a side participant to the MUSCO 
procurement process (InterviewP1, 2011) and the development agreement with Southwark 
required Lend Lease to connect their developments to the system if it was financially viable 
(Leader of the Council, 2010; InterviewD1, 2011).  
The Planning Department supports the Regeneration Department by conditioning permissions 
for development in the area to require connection to the MUSCO where technically and 
financially viable (InterviewA1, 2011); effectively regulating development to build a stronger 
customer base for the MUSCO. This was accepted by those actors interviewed as appropriate. 
This reflects the institutional setting of Southwark, where the council had created a separate 
Regeneration Department reporting directly to the Chief Executive to establish a masterplan and 
deliver development in Elephant and Castle; the Planning Department was only responsible for 
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development application determination and development control. The council's project director 
for the Elephant and Castle regeneration explained that the planning permissions were granted 
on the basis that the new developments would be able to connect to the MUSCO but could not 
be compelled to do so. In return, the council would provide the MUSCO system; a council report 
on the procurement of the MUSCO describes the organisation they would like established: “The 
general intention is that the company should operate commercially in such a way as to 
discharge the planning obligations created by the council’s adopted supplementary guidance” 
(London Borough of Southwark, 2011). 
However one department within Southwark did not share the Regeneration Department’s 
environmental goals or agree with the terms of the MUSCO contract: Southwark’s’ Finance 
Department, which had the power to support or approve such contractual obligations. The 
department did not understand the MUSCO or perceived it as financially risky for the council 
and were actively obstructive in the procurement process (InterviewP1, 2011). Interviews 
uncovered that this conflict was based in the conceptualisation of the role the Council should 
play in delivering the MUSCO and the level of financial risk or investment Southwark was 
prepared to take in infrastructure development. The former Regeneration Director described the 
conflict of orientation as “The politicians were being told by the finance team that we 
(regeneration) were now playing commercial development with the council’s resources and 
money, and putting the council potentially at risk” (InterviewP1, 2011). 
Compounding this preference conflicts between departments, the analysis detects a lack of 
understanding or visible support by local politicians for the MUSCO. This was acknowledged by 
the councillors as well as identified by the Regeneration Director as a factor in strategy 
evaluations. He said “They (the elected councillors) were never terribly clear what legal entity of 
MUSCO was. They understood the profit share with the development partner, but for the 
MUSCO they were less clear on council benefit” (InterviewP1, 2011). 
The perception of Lend Lease by other actors changes over time from initial neutrality, then to 
supportive, and then with the recession and the revised MUSCO proposal back into a neutral 
and then into a perceived non-supportive position. The original constellation was one in which 
Lend Lease were to take responsibility for delivering the MUSCO as part of their duties as 
regeneration partner. Once that was discounted and no actors expected them to be responsible 
for the delivery of the MUSCO, there was an expectation they would be supportive of a council-
led procurement on financial grounds, despite it being a ‘new’ approach to delivering 
infrastructure. However when the system evolved to require more land and a larger, more 
prominent, energy centre, other actors perceived that this affected Lend Lease support as Lend 
Lease assessed the change to have negative impacts on the financial performance of the 
development (InterviewD1, 2011; InterviewP1, 2011).  
Limitations and expectations of local and regional authorities  
The strategy analysis of market influences, regulation, and intervention revealed how all the 
actors, with the exception of Lend Lease and local councillors, identified 'market capacity 
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building' as a strategy towards delivery of the MUSCO system. This reflects the novel nature of 
the technology in the London context, where actors are still learning about how to procure and 
negotiate to build the system. Lend Lease and local councillors both only used market shaping 
strategies; they did not see a need to influence creation of the MUSCO further than provide 
authoritative support. Other market shaping forces were largely limited to the GLA and the 
councils local departments. Across all actors there is a marked lack of market stimulation and 
regulation activities (e.g. incentives, grants, land assembly or customer-bringing activity) which 
would have shared and reduced the financial risk and encouraged the actors to build the 
MUSCO.  
The analysis finds a significant amount of self-identified market capacity building which is not 
recognised by other actors as influential; this implies that the actor set is not learning from each 
other. While not included as a primary actor, national government departments continued this 
trend - they had self-identified capabilities and intentions to support shared infrastructure 
systems like the proposed MUSCO, but the research identifies they were not involved or 
influential at the project level.  
The mayoral authorities had more potential to influence a MUSCO than capacity building; they 
could have funded or applied political pressure to support the system (Greater London 
Authority, 2009). However, the analysis identifies that the role of the Mayor of London and the 
GLA is an area of strategy conflict, where mayoral organisations self-perception and other 
actors' external perceptions differ. While published documents state the mayor’s organisations 
had the capabilities and intention to play a strong supportive role by establishing policy, 
providing some seed funding, and sharing information, the mayoral organisations were 
perceived to be neutral and unsupportive by Southwark’s Regeneration Department, local 
councillors and the external consultants. The Regeneration Department at Southwark instead 
relied on international case studies and consultants for information and capacity building 
(InterviewP1, 2011).  
It was suggested by several of the actors interviewed that the MUSCO would have had more 
political will and understanding within Southwark if national or London political or organisational 
activity in support of the MUSCO had been stronger (InterviewP1, 2011; InterviewE1, 2011; 
InterviewG1, 2011). An exception to this was in the area of approving major planning 
applications, where the GLA’s planning policies for on-site energy use and support for district 
energy required prospective developers, the GLA and Southwark to agree on technical heating 
and cooling specifications which would support future connection to the proposed MUSCO 
(InterviewA1, 2011). 
How can the actor constellation be described?  
At a strategic level – what is the main role for each actor – there are no main conflicts between 
the aspirations and preferences of all actors. The private sector expects the council to formally 
procure the MUSCO from the private sector; the local authority expects that the mayoral and 
civic bodies can provide information and capacity support.  
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However, three types of discord can be identified within the overall constellation. One where 
actors are perceived to not deliver on their stated roles, effectively requiring other actors to pick 
up the slack within the constellation and do more to achieve the same result. The mayoral 
organisations mentioned above serve as one example; a second is the change in councillor 
support for the MUSCO as despite backing the idea initially, they did not understand or support 
the procurement or the final decision to commit to the contract.  
A second type of discord in the constellation is where a conflict in expectations led to a change 
in strategy by specific actors, but the governance network was sufficiently connected and 
resilient that the project continues. This was seen at the beginning of the MUSCO procurement 
process, where the initial thinking was that the regeneration partner could deliver the MUSCO 
as part of their activities. It quickly became apparent the council was better placed to lead, as 
the partner had little experience with MUSCOs and the council had better control of the public 
sector heating demand, access to road rights of way, etc. The roles and responsibilities of 
various actors changed, which required time and energy in negotiations, but in a way which 
enables the MUSCO delivery negotiations to continue.  
A third, and potentially more influential, source of conflict in the constellation is where a conflict 
of expectations is not resolved, and actors continue to disagree on their roles and 
responsibilities and preferences for achieving the policy goal. The interviews identified clear 
conflict in expectations between different departments within the council. The discord was not 
expressed over the strategic goal of a zero carbon development (i.e. not environmental versus 
financial), but over the level of fiscal investment and risk and political risk the council should 
take to deliver the MUSCO. The internal conflict over the level of risk and investment the council 
could make became both a barrier and a negative influence: because the council would not 
guarantee timing and amount of new housing (and therefore levels of heating demand), Dalkia 
proposed a revised MUSCO which had a larger more prominent biomass energy centre. This 
very visible infrastructure raised further political and investment (and knock-on effect on land 
value) concerns within the council about the system and ultimately led to the Southwark’s 
decision to withdraw from the project.  
9.3 Interactions: Formal Negotiations and Unstable Networks 
How can the mode of interaction be characterised?  
In a strict interpretation of the ACI framework, the policy solution for the MUSCO in Elephant 
and Castle is played out in a negotiated mode of interaction, neither hierarchical nor unilateral. 
But this overarching categorisation masks the variation of interactions within the case and a 
general trend from what Scharpf classifies as positive coordination and informal bargaining 
towards distributive, formal bargaining with veto powers.  
In establishing the concept of a MUSCO, the interaction between the regeneration department 
and design consultants can be described as a regular, fluid, and non-hierarchical design 
process aimed at solving a problem. Then as the interactions extended to include local 
councillors, Lend Lease, other Southwark departments, and local land developers they became 
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more structured knowledge-sharing and bargaining interactions, although they retained a non-
hierarchical direction. The Regeneration Department did not have sufficient power over other 
departments, councillors or external actors to instruct them to support the MUSCO system. This 
is attributable to the structure of local government in the UK and the officer-councillor 
relationships, and to the legal context of the planning system. While the UK planning system 
provides hierarchical direction and policy, the approval of development plans and development 
applications has significant room for bargaining. As an example, Southwark could not force 
potential local developments to agree to connect to the MUSCO, but they could negotiate 
alongside planning permission for agreement to connect if financially viable, and require an 
energy performance level which encouraged connection. 
The format of the MUSCO concession negotiations is determined largely by the formal EU 
procurement process. Interactions includes formal consultation on a published planning policy 
and the masterplanning vision, council meetings both public and private, and a range of 
bespoke meetings and reports to support the EU staged procurement tender. All these 
interactions are normal practice for a UK local authority which operates to national planning 
policies and to EU and UK financial, legal, and procurement rules, but they drive higher 
transaction costs for engagement, with private energy providers potentially spending several 
years in risky negotiation before securing appointment.  
What are the relational characteristics?  
The interviews indicate a high level of information sharing and frequent communication among a 
core set of actors directly involved in designing and procuring the MUSCO. The strengths of the 
communication within Southwark and with the development partner (Lend Lease) seem to be 
weaker. Communication within Southwark between different departments and with the officers is 
generally channelled through the former Regeneration Director and he admitted their 
communication on the topic of the MUSCO with councillors was irregular and low priority 
compared to other topics, such as social housing redevelopment (InterviewP1, 2011).  
The pattern and quality of negotiations – in particular the complexity and length of the EU 
procurement process, and the weak communication on the topic of the MUSCO between LB 
Southwark officers and the elected councillors – is likely to have been a causal factor in the 
decision not to proceed with building the MUSCO system. Both were identified as such by more 
than one interviewee. Also, the concentration of communication and knowledge through one 
individual led to less resilient negotiations, with the other network connections unable to 
continue functioning when that actor left.  
9.4 Conclusions: The Challenge of Changing Conditions 
The officers and consultant team at Southwark's' Regeneration Department attempted a novel 
form of infrastructure provision on a large regeneration programme in central London. They 
used the planning framework to establish a challenging environmental goal in the 2004 
Development Framework: "Promote a zero carbon growth strategy within the confines of the 
Elephant & Castle Framework Area" (p. 82) which necessitated a disruption of traditional 
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infrastructure provision and the engagement of new provider and financial structure. It was 
never going to be easy to build a new utility considering the novel nature of the MUSCO in 
Southwark, the scale of finance required and the number of actors involved.  
The challenges of network governance   
The set of interactions and actors for the attempt to establish a MUSCO at Elephant and Castle 
does not meet the first aspect, stability, of Sorensen and Torfing’s definition of network 
governance. The case is characterised by change in individuals (e.g. the project lead leaving, 
political elections) and in organisations (e.g. the Regeneration Department was disbanded) 
which negatively affected the negotiations and decision making processes.  
Apart from this, the network appears to fulfil the remaining aspects of Sorensen and Torfing's 
definition of network governance. The network was more horizontal than hierarchical in that 
while there was planning policy direction it did not unilaterally determine the council's decision 
making process or negotiations. The interactions between the actors are negotiations of 
framework agreements and concessions where the public sector needs the private and vice 
versa, making them interdependent but operationally autonomous. The rules of European 
procurement and the UK planning process determined much of the regulative, cognitive 
framework, providing the boundaries for self-regulation. And finally, the aim of the MUSCO 
concession was clearly in the public purpose – to deliver economic growth and housing without 
causing additional carbon emissions.  
However at least six major influences on the failure of the governance network are identified 
through the research analysis. One, the concentration of knowledge and willpower in one 
individual; this weakened the network over time. Two, the lack of knowledge and capability 
within the actor set; this goes beyond the entrepreneurial nature of the policy goal and is linked 
to more structural challenges of capacity within a local government normally divorced from 
energy and utility infrastructure management. Three, the lack of ‘house rules’ led to instability in 
actor preferences and strategies, and to delay in action. There was eventual agreement across 
all actors that Southwark Council was appropriate organisation to lead procurement of MUSCO, 
but this required a change of preferences and strategies which took several years. Four, 
conflicting strategies and changing preferences within the council departments and by local 
councillors created barriers for interaction and negotiations within the actor set. Five, the 
constraints of the formal European procurement procedure which became extended and 
cumbersome when applied to a changing financial context, changing regeneration scope, and 
changing political goals. Finally, the wider context of a dramatically changing economy 
influenced the scope and timing of the regeneration programme and had a knock on effect on 
the proposed scale of the MUSCO system as well as actor orientations towards large scale 
financial investment.  
How can the role of planning be described?  
The role of Southwark’s Planning Department is perceived by other actors as limited in relation 
to the Regeneration Department and the influence of the councillors. However the Regeneration 
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Department used planning procedures and interventions such as formal spatial policies, the 
masterplanning process, and planning application approvals to establish the relatively novel 
MUSCO concept, secure Southwark's financial stake in the potential MUSCO company, and 
encourage customers to connect. The powers of the Planning Department are used in both a 
‘market shaping’ sense (to establish the environmental goal and MUSCO principle in planning 
policy) and in a ‘market regulation’ sense to build a potential customer base by requiring new 
developments to meet specific technical standards or else connect to the heating and cooling 
elements of the MUSCO system.  
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Chapter 10. Toronto’s Deep Lake Water Cooling: 
Hierarchy in the Shadow of the Network  
 
Between 1972 and 1976, the City Council of Toronto connected six small separate district 
heating (DH) systems in expectation of building a downtown waste to energy incineration plant 
to fuel the combined heating system. The incineration plant was never built, but in 1982 the 
Toronto District Heating Corporation (TDHC) was formed as a non-profit entity wholly owned by 
Toronto City Council to manage the combined DH system.  
In the early 1980s the idea of using adjacent Lake Ontario as a source of cold water to cool 
buildings in downtown Toronto was proposed by Robert Tamblyn of Engineering Interface Ltd. 
Coinciding with a significant environmental movement in Toronto’s political parties, civic society, 
and civil servants, the concept was well received and discussed for many years; various 
organisations and individuals kept the idea alive and evolving.  
With the city-led redevelopment of downtown railway lands in the early 1990s, there was an 
opportunity to start a district cooling system by forcing the developers to build a small system. A 
few years later, the capacity of the initial district cooling system was expanded by joining it to 
the need to replace Toronto’s drinking water intake pipes. The railway lands are adjacent to the 
main water pumping station and the city's water intake pipes needed replacing. Toronto’s water 
is drawn from deep in Lake Ontario, where there is a cold and stable temperature of 4⁰C. 
A restriction on council spending authority required the capital investment for the water pipe and 
district cooling expansion to come from outside the city government. In 1997 Toronto City 
Council restructured the TDHC as a for-profit entity. In 1999 it the Ontario state pension fund, 
OMERS, invested $35 billion CD for a 57% ownership and the TDHC was renamed Enwave. 
The city has since sold its ownership in Enwave to private infrastructure company.  
In 2002, following a environmental impact assessment, the replacement of the water intake pipe 
was undertaken and the first building outside the railway lands, 1 University Avenue, was 
connected to Enwave's district cooling system in 2003. By 2011 the DLWC system served 68 
buildings in downtown Toronto, operating alongside Enwave’s retained district heating system.  
A timeline of the development of the Deep Lake Water Cooling (DLWC) system is provided in 
Figure 22.  
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Timeline of Deep Lake Water Cooling Case Study 
1972 -1976 District heating networks connected together (InterviewS3, 2012) 
1979 Councillors went on study tour of district heating in Denmark (City of Toronto, 
1979). 
1982 TDHC was created as an act of parliament as a not profit entity (City of 
Toronto Executive Committee, 1988) 
Early 1980s  DLWC Idea emerged from Robert Tamblyn (InterviewE3, 2012). 
1985 Official Plan for Railway Lands redevelopment approved, including 
‘encouraging’ district heating and cooling within the Lands (City of Toronto 
Executive Committee, 1988). 
1988 Toronto became the first city to adopt the target of reducing CO2 emissions by 
20%from 1988 levels by 2005 (Sustainable Energy Workgroup of the City of 
Toronto, 1999). 
1991-1993 DLWC Investigation group hosted by the Canadian Urban Land Institute 
(Canadian Urban Land Institute, 1993). 
1993-1994 DLWC idea evolved to link with drinking water (InterviewS3, 2012) 
(Sustainable Energy Workgroup of the City of Toronto, 1999). 
1996 Railway lands development commenced, chiller plant built (InterviewS3, 
2012). 
1997 Environmental Task Force formed to provide advice to Council. 
1997 Both former City and Metro Council approve plan proposed by TDHC to 
develop a district cooling piping system downtown, providing cooling through 
use of DLWC (City of Toronto, 1999). 
1998 Amalgamation of City and Metro Toronto.  
1999 OMERS and City of Toronto agree to be 50/50 shareholders in TDHC (City of 
Toronto, 2000); renamed Enwave.  
2003 First building connected -1 University Avenue (Canadian Press, 2003). 
2006 Metro Hall, the City’s 27 storey office building in Toronto, connected (City of 
Toronto, 2006). 
2012 DLWC serves over 68 customers with cooling (InterviewS3, 2012). 
Figure 22: Timeline of Toronto's Deep Lake Water Cooilng case study 
 
Context: Shifting local capabilities  
Toronto is Canada’s most populous city and the provincial capital for the state, or province, of 
Ontario. While the national political capital is Ottawa, and cultural capital in Montreal, Toronto is 
Canada’s main financial and business centre, and a ‘global city’ in the GaWC (Alpha) and 
Global Cities Index (2012, #16). As of 2011 the city has over 2.6 million inhabitants, with the 
greater metropolitan area over six million. Located on the north shore of Lake Ontario, the city 
has an extended waterfront with the business district located approximately one kilometre 
inland.  
The political and local government context is both clouded and defined by ‘amalgamation’, when 
in 1998 by provincial law the City of Toronto was created through the merging of six smaller 
municipalities. Driven by neo-liberal policies of provincial Ontario politicians who controlled local 
authority rights, amalgamation significantly affected electoral structures, public finances, 
planning policy and the civic relationships among city stakeholders. Janiero's 2012 article E 
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Pluribus Unum: Municipal Amalgamation and the City of Toronto and Frisken's 2008 book 
Public Metropolis provide useful recent overviews of amalgamation’s procedures and effects 
although neither discuss energy utilities. While provincial legislation defines local authorities and 
planning capacities, interviewees were clear that national and provincial government 
departments were not active participants in the creation of DLWC or active promoters of DH or 
decentralised energy in urban areas (InterviewC4, 2012; InterviewE3, 2012; InterviewG2, 2012). 
10.1 The Actors 
This section introduces the primary actor set in the delivery of DHC in Toronto, describing the 
institutional setting, resources, and capabilities of each actor. Appendix C contains the codes 
and information sources which provided this understanding of actor powers and capabilities. 
Toronto City and Metro government  
The amalgamated Toronto government operates a mayor-council system, with the mayor 
elected by popular vote as a Chief Executive. Local councillors are elected on the same four 
year timetable from geographical city wards and influence decision making through a ranked 
committee system, with the mayor leading the executive committee. No mayors were mentioned 
as directly engaged in the decisions around DLWC, however David Miller, mayor from 2003 – 
2010, is publicly recognised for his support of environmental ‘cleaner and greener’ initiatives 
(Boudreau, Keil, & Young, 2009). 
The city government has a number of departments which have been mentioned in relation to 
DLWC, including the Environment Office, the Budget Office, Toronto Water, the Facilities and 
Real Estate Division, and the Planning Department (Community Planning Office, 2006; City of 
Toronto, 2006; InterviewG2, 2012). The interviews indicate that while the Toronto Environment 
Office and Energy Efficiency Office are supportive of DLWC, they were not actively engaged 
(InterviewP5, 2012; InterviewG2, 2012) in the decision to invest and build DLWC.  
The Planning Department of the City of Toronto has the responsibility for developing and 
enacting the City Plan which provides both a growth development strategy and a land 
development approvals process for the city (InterviewP5, 2012). These are accompanied by 
more structured and codified ‘by-laws’ which control land uses, design, and the relationship to 
the public realm. The institutional context can be characterised as 'metropolitan land use 
management, building on literature comparisons with American cities (Frisken, 2008). Planning 
powers and context are defined by provincial laws, not at a national level. The general 
legislative structure requires municipalities to prepare a general plan, a land use zoning and 
subdivision by-law, and an approvals process. Special or specific plans can also be permitted. 
General plans include transport and civic infrastructure. Building regulations around health and 
safety – and to some extend energy efficiency – are set at provincial Ontario level (InterviewP5, 
2012). Filion (2002) and Boudrea, Kiel, and Young (2009) both provide relevant context and 
history on the powers and orientation of Toronto's Planning Department, documenting how the 
department follows a post-fordist pattern in municipal powers, away from rational 
comprehensive planning in the 1960s to a project-based approach with severely lessened 
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resources in both staff and regulatory power by the mid 1980s. Filion emphasises how the 
planning documents of the 1980s took a “powerful environmental stand” (p. 432) which 
continued through the 1990s.  
Toronto Water merits specific mention as the city department responsible for the supply of and 
the quality of water in the city. It acts as both a regulator and a utility, with oversight by 
provincial law (InterviewG5, 2012). 
 
Figure 23: Photograph of Toronto's downtown skyline (Taxiarchos228, 2008) 
Elected local officials 
Three councillors are repeatedly linked with DWLC in reports, interviews, and press statements 
or articles. Richard Gilbert served as first a city and then a metro councillor from 1976 to 1991, 
and is mentioned throughout that period in council reports, particularly when he served as 
Chairman of TDHC from 1982 to 1989. He later became president of for the Canadian Urban 
Land Institute, where he initiated the Deep Lake Water Cooling Investigation Group 
(InterviewE3, 2012). Jack Layton was councillor from 1982 until 1991, before he became the 
local member of Parliament in 2004 and head of the national opposition party. He was 
outspoken on environmental issues, chairing task forces and championing causes such as 
DLWC, which he supported through charettes, conferences, and public promotion (InterviewC4, 
2012). Dennis Fotinos was a local councillor from 1991 to 1999 who became Chairman of the 
TDHC before leaving politics to become Chair of and then Chief Executive of Enwave, the 
company which operates DLWC (Enwave Energy Corporation, 2011).  
Public utilities  
During the course of this case, the Toronto District Heating Corporation was restructured and 
became Enwave, the provider of DLWC. It began as a non-profit cooperative in 1982 (City of 
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Toronto Executive Committee, 1988); it was formed from smaller district heating systems at 
institutional complexes (City Services Committe, 1982) at the instigation of Toronto’s 
Commissioner of Works, eventually growing to provided steam-source heating via six plants 
serving over 100 institutional customers. The connection was made not for environmental 
reasons, but in expectation of the construction of a waste to energy plant which was under 
detailed consideration by the Council as a way to address Toronto’s landfill shortage 
(InterviewE3, 2012). 
Toronto Hydro is the municipal electricity distributor for Toronto; it was also enlarged through 
the merging of six municipal distribution companies in the 1998 Amalgamation. While 
incorporated, the sole shareholder is the City of Toronto (Toronto Hydro, 2012). Despite its 
name, Ontario’s provincial electricity supply is generated via mix of hydroelectric, coal, nuclear, 
and wind.   
Private sector actors 
The main private sector is Enwave, originally established as the TDHC non-profit cooperative. In 
1998 it became a private, for profit entity, owned jointly by an arm of the Ontario Municipal 
Employee Retirement System (OMERS) with 57% shares and the City of Toronto with 42% 
shares. The privatisation of Enwave brought the funds need to invest in the city water pipe 
intake and cooling equipment to establish the DLWC system. The total cost of the Enwave 
project in Toronto was over CD $235 million, including $175 million in capital costs and $55 
million for a new city water intake (Newman & Herbert, 2009).  
The Chief Executive was previously city councillor on the board of the previous TDHC. Enwave 
runs a seasonal business supplying chilled water and hot steam to downtown Toronto 
businesses; in the winter it pipes hot steam and in the summer it pipes cold lake water in a 
system which is linked to the city’s main pumping station for sewage and drinking water. In total, 
the “company owns and operates three modernized steam plants and a new state-of-the-art 
cooling plant in downtown Toronto. Enwave also manages a large district energy plant in 
Windsor, Ontario" (Enwave Energy Corporation, 2011).  
Unique to this case study, the Ontario government employee pension or retirement investment 
organisation is a significant actor. Known as the Ontario Municipal Employee Retirement 
System, the OMERS pension fund has over CD $55 Billion assets as of March 2012. The 
pension fund is an actor relevant to DLWC in two ways: primarily as an owner of Enwave jointly 
with the City of Toronto (Enwave Energy Corporation, 2011), and secondly as a customer of the 
DLWC system through its real estate investment arm, Oxford Properties (InterviewU2, 2012). 
Other private sector include the coolth customers of Enwave, the buildings and their owners or 
operators. These include the Steam Whistle Brewery, the Air Canada Metro Convention Centre, 
1 University Avenue, the Tridel residential development, and the Toronto-Dominion Centre.  
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Figure 24: Diagrammatic illustration of DLWC cooling system (Enwave Energy Corporation, 2011) 
Civic actors 
The research uncovered a civic actors supportive of the DLWC system, such as the Ontario 
Clean Air Alliance, a campaigning group which raised air quality as an issue in the city and 
indirectly supported DLWC (InterviewC4, 2012). Of worthy note were a series of civic 
environmental roundtables hosted by the city and metro governments. The roundtables 
consisted of city councillors, city staff, representatives from environmental agencies, citizens, 
environmental groups, and schools and were responsible for preparing an environmental plan 
for the city.  
Alongside these publicly posted discussion forums, the Urban Land Institute’s Deep Lake Water 
Cooling Investigation Group served as a civic forum to discuss DLWC outside City Hall. This 
latter group was formed by Richard Gilbert, a former councillor and Chairman of TDHC, in the 
mid 1990s to investigate options for the DLWC idea and involved representatives from local 
businesses, local environmental NGOs, city departments, and provincial ministries. (Canadian 
Urban Land Institute, 1993).  
Table 25 provides a list of the primary actor set for reference. 
Market Government  Civic 
Building Owners  
(customers of DLWC) 
City of Toronto (generally) Canadian Urban Land 
Institute- Deep Lake 
Water Cooling 
Investigation Group 
Enwave City of Toronto: Planning 
Department 
OMERS City of Toronto: Toronto Water  
Toronto Hydro Elected Councillors  
Toronto District Heating 
Corporation (TDHC) 
  
Table 25: Set of primary actors for Toronto 
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10.2 Analysis of the Actors and Actor Constellation   
This section describes the self-identified and collective actor analysis. Appendix C contains the 
detailed stakeholder analyses matrices which are described here.   
10.2.1 Self-identified analysis: Apparent agreement 
The self-identified actor analysis of how the actors collectively understand their role and each 
other finds consistently strong interest in DLWC as part of support for environmental quality in 
the city; this orientation cut across political, business, and city actors. Interviewees cite a public 
interest in the environment and the city’s civic environmental advisors (there were several 
official groups) as important in shaping actor orientations, such as councillor interest in DLWC 
(InterviewC4, 2012; InterviewP5, 2012). The city's environmental roundtables supported DLWC 
and saw district heating and cooling is a cost-effective and efficient way to heat and cool 
buildings (Toronto Environmental Task Force, 2000). They both formed and reflected a 
supportive civic awareness of environmental issues among residents, businesses, and city staff 
(InterviewP5, 2012).  A typical early 2000s city committee report on the DLWC proposals reads 
as follows: 
Using deep lake water as a cooling source will reduce the demand for 
electricity and enable removal of ozone depleting refrigerants from 
existing building cooling systems. Based on the estimated peak 
cooling capacity of 40,000 tonnes, carbon dioxide emissions would be 
reduced by approximately 30,000 tonnes per year, along with 
reduction in nitrous oxides, sulphur dioxide and fine particle 
emissions. There would also be economic benefits to consumers to 
the extent that district cooling using deep lake water is less costly than 
conventional cooling using electric chillers. (City of Toronto, 2000) 
After twenty years of discussions and options investigations, DLWC is understood by the actors 
as a good environmental goal. The focus of the actor set at therefore was not should the city 
build DLWC, but how should it be built; how to negotiate how to build it, where to find the capital 
investment required, and how to best leverage existing control over utilities, customers, and 
downtown land. The following paragraphs discuss the actor orientations to this problem; they 
describe a consensus for city leadership on creation of a DLWC system, supported by an 
institutional context of local government authority over local utilities.   
A history of city government ownership and control of utilities such as the electricity distribution 
utility, Toronto Hydro, and the TDHC help establish a conceptual precedent for direct action by 
the city in major utility infrastructure. But the municipal government's ability to build and operate 
DLWC was constrained by financial capability, particularly following the stresses of 
amalgamation in 1998 (InterviewE3, 2012). Instead, the city's ownership and ability to 
masterplan the railway lands during the late 1980s in downtown Toronto provided a source of 
power over resources DLWC. By establishing the potential in the masterplan and then requiring 
the developers of those lands to invest in and use a central chilling system, the city raised funds 
and created the first customers for the DLWC system (InterviewS3, 2012).  
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While the city government used its planning powers to support DLWC, the Planning Department 
within Toronto admitted their policies or spatial planning activities did not actively promote it. 
"Planning was made aware and we participated but we weren’t a driver at all" said a current 
project manager in the Planning Department (InterviewP5, 2012). A search of the city’s 
committee minutes unearthed at least one grant of building permission in 2006 which has a 
requirement of the permission that the building connect to DLWC (Community Planning Office). 
While supportive of the concept, the department's staff capability to act was constrained by staff 
cuts and amalgamation's significant technical exercise of merging six city plans and bylaw 
codes into the new City Plan (Boudreau, Keil, & Young, 2009; InterviewP5, 2012). This changed 
after DLWC was constructed; the 2010 City of Toronto Official Plan explicitly supports the 
DLWC in policy and encourages development to connect ‘where feasible’. And the city now 
employs a DHC specialist to support the planning and environment offices in developing new 
systems (InterviewP5, 2012). 
An interview with the Director of Toronto Water interview indicated Toronto Water was 
supportive of DLWC as a technical exercise which provides them with a larger and newer city 
drinking water pipe.  He described the situation as 
It adds complications to our operations but being a part of the city we 
understand the benefits of doing it and sometimes we do things for the 
greater benefit of the city because we are a division of the city. So 
we’ve gotten benefits from it, don’t get me wrong. There have been 
some documented benefits. We’ve gotten a new intake pipe that goes 
five kilometres out that gives us better cleaner water so that's a benefit 
and we’ve upgraded the island plant that was a seasonal peaking 
plant now it's a full year plant. (InterviewG5, 2012). 
Toronto Water sees their role as mildly regulating Enwave’s building and operation of plant to 
ensure clean drinking water, particularly the interface where cooling is removed for use in 
DLWC (InterviewG5, 2012). Another city capability not explicitly outlined above but which the 
Environment Office highlighted in interview was the city’s ability to sensitively manage the 
environmental permitting and assessment process required for new Lake Ontario pipeworks 
(InterviewG2, Director, Toronto Environment Office, 2012) on behalf of DLWC. 
The perspective of local elected officials was mixed. While influenced by civic and mayoral 
action for the environment, not all councillors were explicitly supportive of public sector 
investment in a district cooling system (Moloney, 2003). In the end they voted for investing and 
supporting DLWC, but this was after they saw additional benefit in an improved drinking water 
pipe (InterviewS3, 2012). The three former councillors interviewed for the research all preferred 
a public private partnership approach (compared to public only or private only); they felt that a 
fully private entity would not have risked building the system, and that a fully public entity would 
not have had sufficient upfront investment (InterviewS3, 2012; InterviewE3, 2012; InterviewE2, 
2012). One also believed that political (i.e. their) support was needed to make Toronto Water 
and Enwave share the pipe through a transfer agreement (InterviewE2, 2012). 
The private sector actors were also supportive and brought valuable skills and resources 
towards building and operating DLWC. TDHC had experience with building and operating a 
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district heating system in the downtown core, but recognised that its customers were not 
particularly happy with their financial management and billing approach (InterviewE3, 2012). 
There is a gap in understanding the full extent of OMERS resources and orientations towards 
DLWC over time, however they operate a specialist division to fund large scale infrastructure, 
and were publicly supportive of their initial investment. The company's real estate division 
(Oxford Properties) was also the first private sector customer of the system, with senior staff 
enumerating the benefits;  
Oxford is proud to lead our industry toward the use of renewable 
energy sources in office towers; however, the decision to 
adopt Enwave technology was also good business for our customer-
tenants. This energy supply will add value to the property in the long 
term. Our decision will also contribute towards the Kyoto targets for 
emission reduction, as well as eliminating the use of CFCs, avoiding 
significant capital outlay for equipment, and freeing up operational 
resources to focus on serving our customers. (Canadian Press, 2003)  
It is not just OMERS who cites a range of benefits for both property owners and occupiers; 
quotes from historical Toronto Star articles and press releases indicate other property owners 
and occupiers have historically been supportive for reasons of energy efficiency, air pollution 
and cost savings (Canadian Press, 2003). A Vice President of Oxford Properties sums the 
customer orientation up as: "There was our opportunity to act responsibility, there was our 
opportunity to have as it were guilt free air conditioning. So that that appealed, and....fixing 
future costs “ (InterviewU2, 2012). 
Finally, the DLWC Investigation Group final report set out a clear recommendation for the city to 
lead and ‘carry’ the creation of the DLWC system, coordinating federal and provincial agencies. 
The Group comprised a wide spectrum of potential actors, building owners (potential 
consumers), environmental NGO's, TDHC engineers, various city departments, and provincial 
organisations. The report considers options such as implementation by existing utilities and 
private sector property companies, but recommends that city should have the responsibility to 
coordinate DWLC and other cooling efficiency measures (Canadian Urban Land Institute, 1993). 
What are the actors' self-identified capabilities, orientations, and preferences?  
In the negotiations about how to implement DLWC, the actor set is a well rounded mix of public, 
private, and civic actors and contain a strong breadth of experience, funding, and political 
support. The analysis identifies five specific actor capabilities which supported the eventual 
creation of the DLWC system, alongside an institutional setting which was explicitly positive 
about changing the city to have less environmental impact. The history of city-supported district 
heating in Toronto gave customers, funders, and engineers' an awareness of the concept, as 
well as a grasp of the technical aspects of connections to buildings and the level of 
infrastructure and cost required to build the DLWC. This lowers the 'barrier to entry' for 
negotiations and discussions in the network.  
Similarly, the city council retained a level of control over the local electricity and water 
distribution utilities which overcame potential barriers. With Toronto Hydro, the council positively 
149 
 
influenced the potential competition for DLWC. The retention of Toronto Water as a public 
department of the council effectively meant the city owned a free source of cooling, although 
there was investment needed to upgrade the intake pipes and establish a coolth transfer plant.  
The fourth supportive characteristic of this actor set is the three local councillors who persisted 
in supporting DLWC over many years. This long term support by local elected officials 
effectively constituted the set of interactions which formed the governance network: recurring 
conversations, meetings, investigations which forced others to discuss their orientations and 
preferences about the DLWC concept. Finally, the introduction of a 'friendly' actor to provide 
investment and finance in the form of OMERS is important in overcoming constraints on 
capacity within the actor set.  
10.2.2 Collective perspectives: Negotiating a successful constellation over 
time  
When the analysis turns to look at the collective perspective it uncovers additional conflicts in 
preferences and expectations between actors. Two areas where potential conflict could have 
appeared but did not are also noticeable: part-privatization of TDHC from a government non 
profit, and involvement of Toronto Hydro. For the first, despite an acknowledgement from the 
Chief Executive of Enwave, that "one of the big challenges was convincing the city councillors to 
privatise the company" (InterviewS3, 2012) there was a clear picture of the positive expectation 
from a number of actors, civic groups as well as local politicians for the city to work with the 
private sector. Two interviewees voiced explicit distrust in provincial and municipal capability to 
handle such projects such as DLWC (InterviewC4, 2012; InterviewE3, 2012). But local 
councillors did find the approach easier when the funder was OMERS, effectively acting with the 
same values as the government; the Chief Executive explained it was communicated as, "We’re 
not really privatizing, we’re selling it to our pension fund." (InterviewS3, 2012).  
The collective actor analysis also uncovers a direct conflict among actor preferences about 
DLWC with Toronto Hydro initially preferring to compete with the DLWC concept and create 
their own DHC system. The electricity distributor sought to form their own cooling system before 
being instructed to desist by the city council (City of Toronto, 1999; InterviewG2, 2012), and 
then, allegedly upset at the council's support of Enwave, Hydro used the Environmental 
Assessment process to force a change in the management structure at Enwave (InterviewG2, 
Director, Toronto Environment Office, 2012). From Toronto Hydro's perspective, the city (who 
officially owns Hydro) was supporting a competitive venture, taking away potential customers. It 
required both hierarchical direction and distributive bargaining between ‘summit’ level staff to 
resolve this conflict, with Toronto Hydro quietly putting aside its competing cooling system.   
As for the remaining actors, their perceptions tended over time towards an alignment of 
preferences, but demonstrated some changes during the development of the DLWC idea into 
reality. On the whole, city councillors were consistently identified as important to the creation of 
DHC in Toronto. Interviewees recognised the benefit and contribution of individual councillors 
who were supporters of the idea; Richard Gilbert and Jack Layton were mentioned explicitly by 
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almost every interviewee as long-term advocates. Other actors also reiterated the need for 
general councillor support of investment in environmental programmes and policies. Councillor 
participation in the Environmental Roundtable and Canadian Urban Land Institute discussion 
group helped, but in the end it was not an environmental goal but a drinking water solution that 
brought wide-ranging support and the political will for the city council to direct Toronto Hydro 
and the Toronto Water department to support DLWC (Moloney, 2003; InterviewU2, 2012). 
Building owners were perceived as generally supportive and interested in the environmental 
benefit and long term cost savings of DLWC, but others recognised that they would need 
encouragement and fair negotiations about the costs and benefits of DLWC (Canadian Urban 
Land Institute, 1993). The contracts for cooling and or heating connection are twenty year 
contracts of significant value, and owners would be cautious because of the tradition of mis-
management by TDHC (InterviewU2, 2012). The Chief of Executive of Enwave explained, 
When I went out to the marketplace to start selling deep lake water 
cooling, there was massive customer resentment...The right thing was 
greater transparency on contracts, customer transparency 
involvement in the decision making process in terms of getting 
involved and understanding how district energy worked...That our 
efficiencies were better than theirs, and reliability. (InterviewS3, 2012) 
The city government as a whole was perceived to be interested in environmental measures, and 
recognised that property and buildings should be a focus for environmental resource and 
pollution policy alongside transport and consumer behaviour (Sustainable Energy Workgroup of 
the City of Toronto, 1999). There was a strong preference for the council to "lead by example" 
(InterviewE2, 2012) on the DLWC system, although with recognition the city was limited in its 
ability raise money due to provincial controls and therefore a joint venture approach was 
acceptable. However after privatization of TDHC into Enwave the city did not actively pressure 
building owners to connect, nor did it seek to connect all municipal property (InterviewS3, 2012).  
There was no significant opposition to DLWC and Enwave from other city departments. Toronto 
Water was perceived to be supportive because it needed a new drinking water intake, although 
several interviewees commented on the length of the coolth transfer negotiations; the 
department was concerned to protect the water quality. As Richard Gilbert a councillor 
remarked, "There were tough negotiations around water because the water people were 
fanatical...but they were eventually resolved" (InterviewE3, 2012). 
Enwave also deliberately changed the way it marketed and contractually provided heating and 
cooling to encourage customers; once cooling prices were fixed against inflation, the 'price 
hedging' proved very attractive (InterviewS3, 2012). “The vast majority of my counterparts who 
have had the opportunity to sign up to this have signed up to it” (InterviewU2, 2012),  
commented the Senior Vice President at Oxford Properties.  
The Planning Department was perceived by others as not as involved as it could have been; 
two interviewees suggested department could have used planning policy and energy 
masterplanning to encourage connection. Eventually connection to DLWC was recognised as a 
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social benefit and encouraged through development policies (InterviewS3, 2012). While it was 
recognised the department could have been more involved, its absence was also not seen as a 
barrier to development of DLWC.  
Market influences: The city influences the market  
The strategy analysis identifies that the primary actor set included all four categories of 
regulation – market shaping (councillor), market regulation (Toronto Water over the pipes), 
market stimulation (campaigns and price restructuring by Enwave), and market capacity building 
(Urban land institute, city-convened environmental experts, and the District Heating 
Corporation). Regulatory market intervention was the weakest of all four, with only a mild veto 
form arising from Toronto Water on water quality standards and a small number of planning 
development approvals which require new buildings to connect. Market shaping activity and 
strategies were the strongest categories displayed, with some incentivising pull strategies and 
these were mostly post creation of Enwave between potential customers and Enwave. Finally, 
capacity building activity could be found by almost all actors, this reflects Toronto’s civic and 
environmental awareness as well as the long gestation period for DLWC.  
In the collective strategy analysis there are no major gaps in what was expected of actors and 
what was actually delivered. Both interviews and publications such as the Environment Task 
Force Report (2000) saw a clear responsibility for the city council to lead, and the city eventually 
created a constellation of resources and orientations to succeed. And while a retrospective view 
of a successfully operating network is less likely to highlight failures, there was no mention of 
attempted regulation by the wider actor set – i.e. provincial regulation or incentives – which 
could have existed and failed to influence the creation of DLWC.  
How can the actor constellation be described?   
The actor constellation can be summarised as three separate arrangements over time. Starting 
in the mid 1980s, local councillors were inclined to support a technical idea because of their 
interest in the environment and they saw a potential benefit to an existing city-owned heat 
system. However the council lacked financial resources to build what was then envisaged to be 
a larger cooling system, and could not see immediate benefit for such an upfront cost. There is 
no sense that occupiers or others were publicly encouraging DLWC.  
Then in the early 1990s, the city used its land ownership to force developers to pay up front for 
a small portion of the cooling plant and to connect to the cooling system. At the same time, the 
DLWC investigation group and environmental roundtables place a more public expectation on 
city leadership to address cooling demand in Toronto. The benefit of the DLWC concept, 
however, is still assumed to only accrue to potential customers and the environment.  
In the late 1990s, the concept of linking DLWC with the city’s water intake brought a second 
benefit to city departments and the wider population, which local councillors recognised. 
However the city’s resources are further constrained by amalgamation, in which provincial 
responsibilities were handed to the city without parallel budget support. City councillors and city 
departments then privatise TDHC to raise financial capital from OMERS, and use their control 
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over Toronto Hydro and Toronto Water to direct their support and engagement. Enwave then 
negotiates with interested building owners for connection and long term supply.  
The actor constellation changes in response to conflict in preferences and strategies in at least 
two ways. One, Enwave adopted a more transparent and market sensitive pricing approach, 
which encouraged customers to participate in DLWC. Two, the city council went from being 
partially supportive of district cooling in Toronto to actively shape the market by instructing 
Toronto Hydro to desist from creating their own system. This overcame a conflict between 
Toronto Hydro as distributors of electricity and DLWC which replaces electricity used for chilling 
buildings with cold water distribution.  
10.3 Interactions: Hierarchical Direction to Positive 
Coordination 
How can the mode of interaction be characterised?  
Across the case there are several types of interactions visible: hierarchal direction through to 
positive coordination negotiations. The city's instruction in the railway lands development to fund 
the initial network was hierarchical, instructing the developers 'if you want to build, you must pay 
up front' (InterviewE3, 2012). The city's conversion of TDHC into Enwave with OMERS is a mix 
of styles in itself. It controlled the TDHC and effectively gave it no choice in the move to partial 
privatisation; while Enwave was officially a joint venture, with risk and value shared, this was a 
judgement call by OMERS on the potential value of the system, not a fair exchange of 
resources on a guaranteed income. OMERS saw the potential of a functioning cooling system 
and agreed a partnership as appropriate for them to bring in sufficient funds to build the pipes 
and the transfer station.  
While that value-based negotiation was occurring with OMERS, the city council exercised its 
control over other utilities to protect the potential value of Enwave. The council instructed 
Toronto Water to negotiate an energy transfer agreement with Enwave, which the council then 
approved (City of Toronto, 2001). These negotiations between Enwave and Toronto Water were 
described by interviewees as positive coordination: both parties wanted to achieve outcome, 
and both were concerned with fair settlement. But the city council's intervention was needed to 
start negotiations (InterviewE2, 2012). The city also formally instructed Toronto Hydro to stop 
competing with Enwave (City of Toronto, 1999); this was on paper an instruction, not 
negotiation, as the city is sole shareholder of Toronto Hydro. However Toronto Hydro's 
management threatened to make the environmental impact assessment (EIA) process difficult 
and "that led to a power play and the head of Enwave..was terminated his job and Toronto 
Hydro dropped their appeal for a bump up to a full EA" (InterviewG2, Director, Toronto 
Environment Office, 2012). This type of exchange, what Scharpf terms 'distributive bargaining' 
with side deals, are more characteristic of policy network exchanges within governments 
(Scharpf, 1997, p. 129).  
And finally, the way in which a newly formed Enwave negotiated with customers, incentivising 
them through inflation linked contracts and service commitments (InterviewE3, 2012) can be 
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characterised as positive coordination, without hierarchical direction from the city. Both sides 
recognise problems and issues, and are concerned with fair settlement, but they are inclined to 
engage and find a solution.  
What are the relational characteristics?  
While an exchange of resources – you pay this, I'll build that - is central to building a district 
heating or cooling system, this case study demonstrates the importance of non-exchange 
interactions in building a DHC system to support policy goals.  
The establishment of DLWC is characterised by a long gestation period with wide-ranging 
actors engaged in discussing options for a lake cooling system, and by the support of specific 
individuals over the period. Five specific individuals, two councillors, one commercial landlord, 
and two engineers, were consistently mentioned as promoters or champions of DLWC, working 
overtime to find a coalition that could build the system. Knowledge was shared and orientations 
shaped through non-political dialogue, with discussions hosted outside government (the 
Canadian Urban Land Institute working groups) and without forcing a decision through formal 
policy (and policy negotiations). When policy did emerge, via a civic environmental roundtable in 
2000, it was supportive of the approach taken by the city to establish Enwave (Toronto 
Environmental Task Force, 2000). "The City of Toronto had a special advisory committee on the 
environment which produced a number of reports on how Toronto could meet its greenhouse 
gas reduction targets. I joined about 1989, and that about the time those few years that we 
issued reports and I know Deep Lake Water Cooling was one of the solutions we supported." 
(InterviewC4, 2012).  
And those interviewed believed this individual support from all sides was important to making 
DLWC and Enwave happen. As the CEO of Enwave said, “So a lot of credit goes to Andrew 
MacAllan, you really need champions in all these organisations. You can’t make district energy 
work without champions, you need champions politically – there’s Jack, then Richard. When we 
created Enwave I was working on the inside. And they were working on the outside. You need 
political champions; you need business champions” (InterviewS3, 2012).  
10.4 Conclusions: Hierarchy in the Shadow of the Network 
On reflection, this case provides insight into the significant challenges of large investment in 
communal infrastructure in a modern policy context. DLWC had many supportive contextual 
factors and governance behaviours: the practice of collaborative policy making in CULI and the 
Environment Roundtables, a significant degree of public control over local utilities, advocating 
local politicians, a civic green movement, and a history of district heating. And a successful 
governance network would have not been built without supportive customers and supportive 
finance through OMERS. But nevertheless DLWC took approximately 20 years to go from idea 
to reality and in the end it required the city council to employ hierarchical powers (in 
development agreements and a straightforward mandate to departments) and political 
bargaining (with Toronto Hydro).  
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Figure 25: Screenshot of Enwave website illustrating the DLWC and steam systems (Enwave 
Energy Corporation, 2011) 
Is this network governance?  
Reflecting on this case in light of Sorensen and Torfing’s definition of network governance, the 
set of interactions and actors fulfils all of their defined qualities. The primary set of actors is 
relatively stable, including those councillors who did leave politics staying engaged through 
other organisations. Amalgamation created major change in the formal government reporting 
lines and functionalities; however individuals remained. The network interactions are more 
horizontal than hierarchical, particularly outside city council ownership, and the interactions are 
operationally autonomous. The city did not establish a grand plan or force customers to connect 
to Enwave but sought out an equal partner for investment and encouraged connection through 
the masterplanning and planning policy. The set of interactions displays numerous negotiations, 
(not only value-based negotiations) between the city council and OMERS, the city and Hydro, 
between Enwave and every customer for the price and conditions of connection but also 
negotiations of perspective – discussions about why DLWC should be supported. All actors 
operate within a similar normative framework, particularly the backdrop of amalgamation and 
shrinking public finance. Finally, the concept of DLWC as an environmental policy goal is 
recognised by all as providing not only cheaper energy but also public benefit in reduced 
electricity usage and carbon emissions. 
Looking at this case superficially, one could argue that the approach taken to deliver DLWC was 
simply part of a wider trend towards public-private partnerships in the face of reduced public 
sector power and financial capability. And clearly the political backdrop of Amalgamation and 
neo-liberal politics supported partial privatisation of TDHC. But to focus on the more hierarchical 
powers used by the City of Toronto would ignore and discredit the 20 years of open discussion, 
charettes, working groups, environmental advisory groups and council committee reports which 
influenced and in many cases structured the set of interactions between the city council, 
Toronto Hydro, Toronto Water, OMERS and TDHC which finally built the pipes into Lake 
Ontario, the transfer station, and the customer servicing system. If governance describes “a 
practice of coordinating activities among citizens, activist organisations, lobby groups, the 
private sector, and other stakeholders” (Sorensen & Torfing, 2007) the creation and operation of 
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Deep Lake Water Cooling in Toronto demonstrates that when public authorities are part of a 
negotiated consensus which provides the basis for coordination, they can subordinate hierarchy 
to the goals of the network.  
How can the role of planning be described?  
In this case, planning organisations and planning policies are less important than political 
activity and civic environmental pressures. Individuals in the Planning Department admit the 
department was not actively engaged, both lacking in time and knowledge to support. However 
a one-off urban masterplanning process for development land provides a method of market 
shaping and regulation intervention for the city to promote district cooling through its control of 
public funds and public lands. Planning interventions are therefore used to create DLWC, with 
planning policies which provided regulatory interventions (green building policies) and market 
stimulation incentives (recognition as a community contribution in negotiations) emerging some 
years later.  
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Chapter 11. Comparative Analysis  
 
This chapter compares findings and analysis across the five case studies described in Chapters 
6-10. It uses the components of ACI to examine features of all five cases, comparing these with 
the cases' ability to implement DHC. This comparative evaluation of variables in light of the 
policy outcome forms the empirical response to the research questions. The chapter first 
considers how governance networks support DHC by evaluating if particular actors, 
constellations or interactions are particularly conducive to delivering urban DHC. It then turns to 
the second research question to consider the effect of the institutional setting on the 
components of ACI and the delivery of DHC. It ends with a review of trends in planning 
organisations and interventions to response to the third research question.  
How the research employs Actor Centered Institutionalism  
Chapter 5 describes the usefulness of comparative studies in qualitative research and sets out 
how Scharpf’s Actor-Centered Institutionalism (ACI) framework informs the case study selection 
and  the analysis within each case. As illustrated in Figure 26, there are five components which 
drive policy outcomes in ACI:  
 A particular institutional setting, which influences the remaining variables  
 A specific policy problem, which drives the  
 Specified actors, capable of strategy building around  
 A constellation of actor interactions, which happen with limited knowledge but 
rationally 
 In particular styles, or characters, of interaction.  
 
 
Figure 26: Scharpf's (1997) Actor-Centered Institutionalism applied to DHC, copied from Chapter 4 
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For this research, the problem is defined as the delivery of a DHC system in an urban area, and 
the outcome is the success (or failure) of building and operating a DHC system. To structure the 
research, the institutional setting was limited to cases with both public and private actors 
engaged, the actor set in all cases includes local planning organisations, and the research 
posited that the ‘given mode of interaction’ is likely to be a ‘negotiated’ approach based on the 
type of policy challenge that DHC presents.  
11.1 How do Governance Networks Support DHC?  
To respond to this first research question, the comparative analysis considers the relationship of 
ACI's actors, actor constellations, and modes of interaction to the five cases' policy outcome of 
DHC delivered or not delivered. 
11.1.1  Is there a relationship between actors and DHC delivery?  
Which actors are involved? 
Comparing the primary actor sets across the cases, the similarities are more apparent than 
differences. Similar actors appear across the market and public sectors in all cases, while the 
civic actors are fewer and more variable. Table 26 below summarises the primary actor set in 
each case study.   
Looking first at market actors, consultants appear regularly, as do some form of private utilities 
companies. The comparison highlights that while governance networks in London and 
Barcelona included private multi-national energy companies, this specific type of actor is absent 
in Toronto, Lerwick, and Burlington. This did not affect the ability of Toronto or Lerwick to deliver 
DHC; in both cases the governance network organised local companies to build and manage 
the system, bringing in finance and knowledge from other actors. Burlington does not have a 
preferred pathway to deliver DHC through public or private utility company. The existence of 
OMERS as a state employee pension fund in Toronto's network is noticeable. Also noticeable 
but expected from the literature review is the relative absence of existing private sector utility 
companies from the primary actor sets. While Lerwick has Scottish and Southern Electric, they 
refused to supply SHEAP and their absence limited the size of the DH system. 
Turning to the second column and the scope of government actors, local planning departments 
can be expected to be involved given the research methodology and case study. National 
government actors are noteworthy by their absence, although actors in Lerwick identified the 
European Union as a primary pan-national actor. The inclusion of a public waste or water 
company in the government actor list tracks successful delivery of a DHC system; the 
implications of this are discussed below. The absence of political engagement by local 
councillors in Burlington's network is also noticeable; the link to network failure is described in 
Chapter 7.  
The primary civic actors are both fewer and more varied than other actor categories. Across 
these five cases, civic actors are not strictly necessary for successful governance interactions 
for DHC but they fulfil useful roles in three cases and were the leading organisation in the 
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Burlington network. The absence of direct engagement by international advocacy networks in all 
but London is noticeable, and does not correspond to Betsill and Bulkeley's concept of multi-
level governance.  
Grey indicates DHC not delivered; LG indicates local government. 
 Market Actors Government Actors Civic Actors  
Barcelona  Advisory consultants 
 Multi-national DHC and 
services company 
 
 LG - Planning Department 
 LG - Barcelona Energy 
Agency 
 Local councillors 
 Regeneration company  
 Metropolitan waste 
company 
 
Burlington   Potential institutional 
customers  
 Advisory consultant 
 Local electric utility, 
partially LG owned 
 LG - Planning Department 
 LG – Community 
Department 
 Citizens 
advocacy 
group  
Lerwick  Local DH company  
 Nationwide energy 
company  
 LG – Waste Department 
 LG – Works Department  
 LG – Planning Department 
 Local councillors 
 Pan-national government 
 Local 
Charitable 
Trust 
 
London  Regeneration partner – 
multi-national company 
 Multi-national DHC 
company  
 Advisory consultants  
 LG - Regeneration 
Department 
 LG - Planning Department 
 LG – Finance Department 
 Local councillors 
 Metropolitan government  
 Global city 
environment 
network 
 
Toronto  Large commercial 
customers  
 State employee private 
pension fund 
 Local electricity utility (LG 
owned) 
 DHC company 
 Pre-existing DH company 
(LG owned) 
 LG - Water Department.  
 LG - Works Department.  
 LG – Planning Department 
 Local councillors 
 LG - local government 
generally 
 National 
land use 
think tank  
 
Table 26: Summary of primary actor sets in the five cases 
Through this cross case analysis, an argument emerges that the understanding and 
preferences of local councillors have an influence on the outcome of governance networks for 
DHC. Local councillors are primary actors in all successful cases. In two cases they actively led 
the idea by searching out funding or finance or convening discussions about options. And local 
politician support was absent in the two unsuccessful cases, in one case despite active 
leadership from a local government department. In London the lack of understanding by 
councillors came through clearly in the interviews as contributing towards antagonistic 
preferences and the collapse of negotiations; in Burlington the councillors are not yet engaged. 
In the successful cases the local councillors are either pro-active lobbyists for the system 
(Toronto) or became aware and supportive following sustained discussions with municipal 
employees (Lerwick and Barcelona).  
159 
 
Challenges to engaging local elected officials in governance networks for DHC include the 
technical complexity of DHC and the particularly local nature of the systems. While DHC 
systems can be city-wide, they are constrained by the amount of fuel and cost of installation and 
tend to be smaller than city boundaries and likely to clash with existing 'territories' such as 
borough or ward boundaries. Even in the cases of Barcelona and London where DHC systems 
are envisaged as integral to a regeneration programme they were not expected to serve all 
residents in the regeneration area. The nature of DHC as an environmental goal helps gloss 
over its uneven distribution, but DHC can be a challenging goal for local politicians to support 
when it is not intended to be available to all.  
A second finding from this comparative analysis is that the successful cases explicitly sought 
organizations to provide the financial investment necessary to build the DHC pipework. In 
Barcelona it was the multi-national DHC company, in Lerwick the Charitable Trust and in 
Toronto a private pension fund. The literature review highlighted how the large upfront costs of 
DHC is a significant barrier to policy implementation and this need for specific finance is borne 
out through the case analysis.  
Does the shape of the actor set make a difference?  
Considering the actor sets across the case has shown that there is some, but not considerable, 
variation in the type of actors engaged in DHC delivery. There does not also seem to be one 
'right' collection of actors which will lead to a successful governance network outcome of 
building and operating a DHC system. There are also no patterns of groups of actors which 
repeatedly correlate with success or failure. However there are discernible trends and important 
individual actors. The network needs active local government and supportive local elected 
officials. Knowledge of DHC is also a very helpful aspect of actor sets; all the cases sought out 
consultants, other knowledgeable actors, or actively self-taught to enable sufficient knowledge 
and understanding of DHC infrastructure and procurement options. Civic actors can be helpful, 
but they do not need to be advocacy or community groups; friendly or supportive private sector 
firms can play similar roles. And finally, governance networks for DHC do not seem to need 
multiple 'levels' of actors: national or multi-national support is not required; this point is 
discussed further below.   
While there is no right actor set, successfully building DHC is linked to key actors having 
sufficient resources or capabilities to have a stake in the governance network. A recurring 
theme in the case studies was how important resources and capabilities are across all primary 
actors for successful negotiations. Sorensen and Torfing mention this quality in the supporting 
text to their definition of governance networks, writing that "In order to become part of a 
particular governance network the political actors must demonstrate they have a stake in the 
policy issues at hand and that they can contribute resources and capacities of a certain value to 
the other actors" (2007, p. 9); the cases suggest this quality is important and should be explicit 
in their definition.  
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Burlington and Barcelona are informative, but by no means the only cases which demonstrate 
how important it is that actors who ‘convene’ the network and promote DHC are in possession 
of some kind of resource, capable of not only setting the market, but regulating, incentivising, or 
bargaining into it. The absence of resources to negotiate with hinders the BURDES committee 
in Burlington; they can only convene discussions, not offer something of exchange value to 
potential customers or DHC operators. In Barcelona, the city council used planning interventions 
and the Forum of Cultures project to establish the concept, encourage potential customers, and 
raise funds for initial investment; all of this is directly attractive to Cofely (and others) as 
operators of DHC networks. Scharpf also describes this 'something of value' characteristic as a 
condition of successful governance networks. In Games Real Actors Play the first limit of 
governance networks is described as "voluntary negotiations involve only those parties that 
have something to contribute that is of value to others" (1997, p. 146). 
11.1.2 Actor constellations: Aligning resources and benefits for success  
Scharpf proposes actor constellations in ACI as "the crucial link between substantive policy 
analyses and interaction-oriented policy research” (1997, p. 69) but comparing across cases for 
links between constellations and DHC system delivery is not straightforward. Constellations are 
a theoretical representation of level of conflict or alignment in the actor set which incorporate 
both actors' powers and actors' willingness to act. (p. 84). They are a static picture of how the 
actor set perceives the policy problem, each other, and their potential options to achieve the 
policy goal, a picture of whether their aspirations and preferences are compatible with one 
another. It is helpful to compare how actor constellations changed within the cases to 
understand how governance networks overcome conflicts or successfully aligned resources.  
The analysis of the 22@ district in Barcelona describes how historical traditions of low conflict 
and high collaboration among urban development actors continued into the alignment of 
resources and preferences for creating the Districlima DHC system. Once the concept was 
enshrined in the regional vision and masterplan, the analysis finds little conflict or significant 
change to actor resources and willingness to act over time.  
Burlington's actor constellation has two unresolved areas of conflicting expectations; those who 
wish to build the DH system do not have the resources or power to leverage other actor 
engagement, and secondly within existing actors is there is uncertainty about preferences for 
ownership and management. It is a difficult actor constellation to change; the market and 
regulatory forces in Burlington are relatively neutral (they do not push or resist DH) and the 
orientations of potential institutional customers seem resistant to change. But the actor sets' 
overall orientations towards environmental and community concerns could sway the 
constellation in the future by improving customer perceptions and elected governmental actors’ 
willingness to negotiate.  
Toronto's constellation changes over time; originally the actors positively approached DLWC as 
a purely environmental goal, but lacked resources to negotiate the construction. Some activity 
occurred through this constellation in the railway lands; but it was when the councillors 
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perceived other benefit (a new water intake pipe) from DLWC that significant change to the 
governance network occurs. Resources were found by bringing in new actors and orientations 
became more supportive, with willingness to negotiate spreading to additional actors.  
In Lerwick, despite the failed attempt to engage a local power station in supplying heat to 
SHEAP, the remaining constellation was successful; a tight network of actors using existing 
relationships who are not overly concerned with achieving fair value negotiations. Actor 
orientations tend towards solidarity and altruism, therefore once the concept of DH is accepted 
through knowledge sharing, the network coordinates to find a solution.  
The analysis of the proposed MUSCO in London describes three aspects of change and conflict 
within the constellation. There was discord between preferred strategies and expectations of 
several actors, some elements of which were overcome through knowledge sharing. Then 
Southwark's resources to negotiate with changed, requiring new approaches to negotiation. And 
the conflict of preferences about the MUSCO within the council, built on different orientations 
about of the purpose of a local authority in such negotiations, was a key aspect of the failure of 
negotiations.   
What do the actor constellations show about governance networks?  
The five cases show the variety of conflicts that can happen within governance networks, but 
also demonstrate the potential of governance networks to evolve towards success. The cases 
underscore that altruism does not drive governance networks and that aligning resources and 
benefits is important to successful negotiations; those who have the capability to make DHC 
happen should benefit from its construction. Actors begin negotiating when benefits accrue to 
specific organisations rather than being dispersed across the network or city. London and 
Burlington in particular show that conflicts of expectation need particular care and attention. 
When conflicts are based in beliefs about the purpose of that actor, it is unlikely that altruistic or 
even 'you will see a small benefit' arguments will suffice to change orientations; not all 
institutional barriers can be overcome through negotiations.  
11.1.3 Mode of interaction  
This section turns to the final factor in ACI, considering if there are kinds of interaction which are 
particularly conducive to the delivery of DHC infrastructure in cities. Scharpf recognises four 
modes of interaction, of which negotiated agreements are only one. Chapter 4 explains how 
Scharpf describes and characterises negotiation types. The research design selected for cases 
with negotiations between public and private actors, and while the cross case analysis confirms 
this selection, it also shows there is variation within negotiation, from a public sector-led 
hierarchal direction with bargaining to a very loose negotiation based almost purely on 
contractual exchange.  
The case study analyses describe how Toronto and Barcelona contain significant 'positive 
coordination' negotiations, which require transparent 'fair settlement' discussions to recognise 
the existence and legitimacy of the benefits and negatives on all sides. In Toronto, the local 
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government also uses a hierarchical mode of interaction to intervene in other actor behaviours 
and a ‘distributive bargaining’ mode with side deals to address interdepartmental concerns. In 
Barcelona the main interactions to build the network between Cofely and the city council are 
'positive coordination' negotiations with regulation and package deals to control distributive 
issues. However this is supported by a public sector mandate on property developers to build 
and fund the infrastructure in return for additional floorspace.  
Chapter 8 classifies Lerwick as 'problem solving' negotiations, focused on creating shared value 
where some actors are willing to lose out for the sake of the whole set of actors. London started 
out with 'positive coordination' negotiations through the EU procurement procedures, but 
retreated over time to 'distributive bargaining with veto powers', where projects have to be 
equally beneficial to both sides to succeed. Burlington is more difficult to characterise, as the 
actors are not yet at the state of negotiation over resources. The activities of BURDES are trying 
to generate a positive coordination state, where benefits to individual actors as well as an 
overall value to the city is recognised.   
Table 27 sets out the type of negotiations seen in the cases; unsuccessful case are shaded in 
grey. 
Case Study Negotiation Type 
Barcelona Positive coordination 
Burlington Attempting positive coordination 
Lerwick Problem solving  
London Positive coordination, then distributed bargaining 
Toronto Various 
Table 27: Summary of types of negotiation seen in the case studies 
Overall, this cross-case comparison of the modes of interaction in these cases show the 
promise of 'positive coordination' negotiations in governance networks for DHC. This trend can 
be said to define network governance; 'positive coordination' negotiations which seek both a 
shared value and a fair exchange of resources sit between pure contractual exchange and 
hierarchical direction. The cases therefore show that governance network negotiations correlate 
with successful creation of DHC systems, although other types of interaction and negotiation are 
needed to generate the actors powers and resources behind the 'positive coordination' 
negotiations to build DHC.  
The challenge of 'positive coordination' negotiations is that they are not a quick solution and the 
"battle over distribution is likely to interfere with the mindset that is conducive to joint learning" 
(1997, p. 133). Scharpf describes how it is helpful for negotiations in governance networks to try 
and separate out discussions of purpose and discussions of exchange. This is effectively what 
the actors in Toronto and Barcelona were able to achieve through charettes and the ideas 
competition, respectively. The importance of creating spaces for information exchange without 
negotiations is described further in the next section. 
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11.1.4 Relational characteristics  
Chapter 2 discussed how network governance theorists propose that there is link between 
quality of network patterns and policy outcomes; that the quality and type of interaction between 
actors has a direct influence on the outcome of the negotiations. This proposition requires 
further investigation; both Adger and Jordan (2009) and Lowndes (2009) call for empirical 
research into this causal inference as a focus of future policy research. Chapter 4 describes 
how the thesis incorporated this dimension of interaction quality into the conceptual framework 
and research design with the concept of 'relational characteristics', modifying ACI to include this 
within the modes of interaction component.  
Relational characteristics are the patterns and quality of interactions among purposeful actors; 
e.g. do all actors negotiate with all other actors? Are some actors at the centre of negotiations? 
Do the actors negotiate or exchange more than once? This section of the comparative analysis 
examines the relational characteristics exhibited in the case studies to understand if they are 
linked to the ability of the governance network in each case to deliver DHC. Characteristics of 
size, duration, density, and centrality are explored through a qualitative comparison among the 
five cases. Table 28 provides a summary of the following comparison.  
Size is a straightforward characteristic to explain; based on the number of actors in the primary 
actor set for each case study. Table 12 in Chapter 5 provides a list of the primary actors 
engaged in each case. Using this, Lerwick and Burlington are considered small networks 
compared to Barcelona and London at a medium size with Toronto a large network. Smaller 
networks can benefit from lower transaction costs and smooth knowledge sharing, as Lerwick 
demonstrates. However unless they are able to grow, as Toronto did, they may struggle to find 
sufficient resources to build infrastructure.  
Duration as a characteristic of cases in this research refers to the length of active knowledge 
exchange and negotiations before the DHC infrastructure is built. Graded against each other, 
Barcelona and Lerwick are considered to be of short duration as both took less than seven 
years. London is considered to be medium duration at eight years before cancellation of the 
negotiations. Toronto and Burlington are both considered to be of extended duration as the 
creation of DHC systems was discussed for over 15 years.  
Density and centrality are characteristics of networks whose definitions come from Social 
Network Analysis (SNA). Density, a ratio of the number of interactions in a network with total 
possible ties (Marsh, 1998), is a measure of frequency of interaction against the maximum 
interactions possible. A quality of low, medium, and high is judged from interview responses 
regarding the number of meetings and interactions which were held, compared with a 
theoretical maximum based on the size of the primary actor set. Burlington and London are 
considered to have low density. Barcelona and Toronto are considered to have a medium 
density of interactions. Lerwick is considered to have a high density of interaction, which is to be 
expected given the multiple roles of actors in a small island setting.  
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The SNA characteristic of centrality attempts to capture the property of actors in terms of their 
links with others (Freeman, 1979). For this characteristic the cases are ranked against one 
another on a simple 'central' or 'dispersed' judgement. Barcelona, Lerwick, and London are 
considered to be 'central' networks which displayed a significant concentration of knowledge 
and power in an individual or organisation. Toronto and Burlington are considered more 
dispersed networks. While centrality can indicate strong useful leadership, it is not always a 
positive thing; networks where knowledge and power are centralised in one individual can lead 
to a block of progress, or be vulnerable to changes in that individual's circumstances.   
Deliberate non-negotiation space 
A further influential relational characteristic which emerged during the interviews through 
interviewee comments is the existence of conceptual spaces for detailed discussions about 
DHC delivery options without exchange-based negotiations. In Barcelona this took the form of a 
knowledge gathering 'ideas competition' to discuss policy implementation, hosted by the 22@ 
development company before embarking on a formal procurement process.  
When the 22@ started, before the Forum, we did what we call an 
ideas competition. We told the world market "Gentlemen, we would 
like to create a network of central heating and cooling but we do not 
know if the business plan it’s going to work and how it should be 
done." Thanks to the idea competition we realized that we could not go 
for the “all-or-nothing” approach. In this competition we received about 
twelve or fourteen bidders, and three or four of them were very good. 
(InterviewA3, 2012) 
Toronto's DLWC evolution included a series of similar non-negotiation 'spaces': small design 
charettes held by councillors, large working groups hosted by think tanks, and energy 
roundtables hosted by the city. The purpose of all of these was to convene a diverse set of 
organisations and individuals who would be affected by or supportive of DLWC and discuss 
options for the engineering, ownership, and investment in the system. These parallel the 
Barcelona 'ideas competition' in that the discussions are not about forming DLWC as a policy 
goal but about options for implementation. For example, the Canadian Urban Land Institute 
working group evaluated before discounting (among other options) an approach where the 
DLWC system would be owned and managed by landlords and developers.  
In Burlington, Barcelona, and Toronto, interviewees recognised the benefits of such 'non-
negotiation' spaces as contributing towards network formation by engaging new actors and 
providing interaction spaces where the preferences and strategies of actors could evolve and 
change. While non-negotiation spaces did not lead to direct solutions or agreements, the 
activities increased the problem-solving capacity of the network by sharing knowledge among 
actors. In two of the cases, the discussion formats were hosted by local government officials or 
local councillors.  
Analysis of Lerwick and London did not uncover these kinds of interactions. In Burlington the 
2011 workshops hosted by Ever-Green Energy were intended to lead towards these 'non-
negotiation' interactions, but were at the stage of discussing whether district heating was 
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feasible and should be a policy goal, not yet discussing options for implementation. It is likely 
that Lerwick's trust-based, small, and stable network served as a substitute for non-negotiation 
discussions about implementation options; the characteristics of the network seems to have 
provided both problem-solving and knowledge consolidation functions.  
Do network relational characteristics influence policy outcomes? 
This section has compared the case studies against one another on a spectrum of relational 
characteristics, searching for normative patterns of interaction in network governance. Table 28 
summarises the comparison. The analysis is comparative rather than absolute, but the cases 
investigated in this research suggest that the network governance literature hypothesis is 
correct and that the quality and type of interactions within governance networks can influence 
their outcome.   
Size and duration do not seem to be significant in the cases studied. But density does appear to 
be important in creating a successful network for building DHC infrastructure; the two 
unsuccessful cases are considered to have low density. While this characteristic could be a 
straightforward reflection of the importance of positive collaboration, where low density indicates 
conflicting or uninterested interactions; at a minimum it suggests a pathway to successful 
networks: actors could support the policy goal by meeting or speaking frequently. A challenge of 
governance networks is how to generate this density of interaction.  
As for centrality, while there is not a pattern which correlates with successful delivery, it can be 
either a challenge or an opportunity. In Lerwick the interviews indicate that a highly centralised 
network was a positive factor, with trust-based relationships facilitating both the system setup 
and its operation. In London the concentration of knowledge and coordination into one individual 
was ultimately a challenge; not everyone understood what was going on which created 
resistance, and then when that individual left, the network collapsed.   
 Size  Duration Density Centrality  Implementation discussions  
Barcelona Medium Short  Medium  Central  Discussions before negotiation 
stage. 
Burlington  Small  Extended  Low  Dispersed    
Lerwick Small  Short High  Central  
London Medium Medium Low Central  
Toronto  Large Extended Medium  Dispersed  A series of discussions leading 
to negotiations. 
Table 28: Comparison of relational characteristics across the case studies 
Another type of interaction which seems to correlate with successful networks is the existence 
of a deliberate 'non-negotiation space' for discussions and exchange of knowledge about 
options for implementation. This was cited as important in both Toronto and Barcelona; it is 
what Burlington is trying to create. This 'space' seems to have been absent in London. Creating 
such 'non-negotiation' spaces are not low cost or easy to do but they provide a time and a place 
for actors to learn about each other's preferences, and to gather more resources (or further 
actors) if needed. Such interaction spaces effectively lower transaction costs in negotiating 
incorrectly during formal bargaining. These spaces also help overcome the 'positive 
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coordination' problem described above, of needing to have both shared value and fair value 
negotiations by providing space for shared value discussions.  
11.1.5 Summary: How do governance networks support implementation of 
DHC? 
Overall the comparative analysis findings support the literature review in demonstrating 
governance network behaviours as an empirical phenomenon in policy delivery. The cases 
show that government policy tools such as regulation, incentives, and capacity building are not 
sufficient in and of themselves for delivering DHC and it requires governance networks which 
include collaborative negotiations between the public and private sectors at a local level within 
cities to deliver DHC.  
Governance networks are demonstrated to be a flexible form of policy implementation: different 
arrangements of governance networks seem to work and types of actors change across the 
case studies. There is no one right actor set or structure to negotiations for building DHC 
systems in an urban context. This flexibility allows for change in network strategies and for the 
introduction of new actors or new resources so that those with resources to construct DHC 
systems align with actors who wish to see it constructed and who will benefit. When the benefit 
of DHC accrues to specific organisations or actors rather than being dispersed across the 
network or city, the governance network moves from talking to negotiating. This exchange of 
resources is at the heart of governance networks for DHC and implies that for actors require 
resources to bargain with if they are to have influence in structuring or driving governance 
networks for DHC.  
The comparative analysis also highlights the importance of support from local elected officials. 
All three successful case studies had supportive local councillors or politicians over time. The 
case studies also demonstrate how the format and quality of exchange and negotiations 
influences delivery of DHC. Positive coordination negotiations, dense actor networks, and the 
existence of non-negotiation spaces can be correlated with successful implementation of DHC.  
While this section has highlighted how the actors, actor constellations, negotiations, and 
relational characteristics of governance networks support implementation of DHC, the findings 
are difficult to extrapolate to all cases of network governance. For example, the relational 
characteristics which correlate with successful delivery of DHC could be particular to 
governance networks for urban infrastructure and fail to correlate with other policy goals.   
11.2 How does the Institutional Setting Influence the Delivery of 
DHC?  
While Scharpf explicitly developed ACI to link actor and institutionalist approaches, his 1997 
book Games Real Actors Play does not give the institutional setting the same level of detailed 
explanation or focus as he does for the other three influencing variables. For him, the 
institutional setting is not a theoretically defined set of variables, but instead is a "term to 
describe the most important influences on the actors, actor constellations, and modes of 
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interaction" (p. 39). For this research, institutions within ACI are understood as rule systems that 
structure actor behaviour; they can have a more formal character as rules sanctioned by legal 
framework or public authorities as the ‘administrative systems’ of Newman and Thornley (1996), 
or a more informal character as norms, conventions, and expectations: the social conventions of 
Lowndes (1996).  
Chapter 3 introduces important institutional influences in the context of planning and DHC 
systems. This section develops this understanding further by examining the significant formal 
and informal influences in the case studies. It begins by comparing the effect of actor 
experience and cost of fuel before turning to compare the influence of institutional context on 
local government and planning organisations across the five cases. 
11.2.1 History and cost of fuel: Effect on actors and negotiations  
Two institutional contextual influences discussed in Chapter 3 on the formation of actor 
preferences and orientations emerged as particularly important through the case study analysis: 
the relationship of the proposed DHC system to existing heating or cooling fuels, and previous 
experience with DHC among the actor set. These influences were identified in the literature 
described in Chapter 3, and their importance was borne out through case study interviews.  
The relationship of the proposed DHC system to existing fuels has two aspects: the source of 
fuel for the DHC system, and the consumer price of the DHC system versus other options for 
heating and cooling buildings. In Barcelona, Burlington, Lerwick, and Toronto the source – or a 
significant source – of heat or coolth for the DHC system exists, but negotiations were needed 
with the actors who control that fuel to build the infrastructure to connect the source to the DHC 
pipework, and negotiations were needed over the price the DHC operator would pay to use that 
fuel. In Barcelona, Lerwick, and Toronto the local government owns or significantly controls 
access to this fuel, and the negotiations were inter-departmental. While in Burlington, the local 
government's non-majority stake in the biomass power generator hindered development of a 
DH system. In London the MUSCO concession negotiations required the private sector energy 
company to build the power generator and provide the fuel. The need to build a generating plant 
as part of the DHC system contributed to the complexity of the negotiations and to negative 
local councillor preferences about the system.  
The five cases suggest that the pre-existence of a government fuel source for DHC does not in 
and of itself define the actor constellation nor drive the success of delivering DHC. However 
government ownership or control over the fuel source influences government and other actor 
preferences for DHC and can provide a resource for government to bring to negotiations with 
the private sector to build and operate a DHC system.  
The relationship of the cost of DHC to consumers versus other sources of heat and coolth also 
appears to affect actor preferences and strategies; however the effect tends to be on the growth 
of the DHC system rather than the negotiations to build it. In Lerwick and Toronto, DHC 
organisations are able to offer cheaper and more fixed prices to their customers compared to 
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other fuel options available. This has been attractive to customers and supported system 
expansion. In Barcelona the municipality supports DHC by regulating the heating to be cheaper 
than a gas reference case. This encourages private businesses and homes to connect, 
supporting network expansion. In London and Burlington, the relationship of proposed DHC 
prices to existing fuels is unclear. This is due in London to multiples changes to the proposed 
DHC network and in Burlington to the lack of detailed negotiations on the DH system to date. 
As for experience with owning and managing infrastructure, Toronto is the only case study 
where actors have previous experience with DHC. Toronto's existing DH system provided a 
reference point for DLWC and brought at least two supportive influences to the governance 
network: technical engineering expertise about the potential for a cooling network, and a 
positive preference for a cooling network among many councillors. A lack of experience or 
awareness of DHC was explicitly identified by interviewees in the remaining four cases as a 
barrier to creation of DHC. In Burlington the lack of general awareness about DHC as a feasible 
solution affected progress; the BURDES group regularly cited the need for further studies and 
expert advice to convince potential customers and local government that it is a viable, profit-
making solution. The Ever-Green Energy consultant in Burlington remarked on the issue of 
technical complexity and experience with DHC.  
It’s part of the challenge. It’s not an interesting subject I'll say. Until 
you really – people don’t understand the benefits, the why do I care 
about it. In St Paul we hosted over 700 people for tours. And a lot of 
them are just people that are not industry experts or professionals in 
any way – just community development folks or politicians or 
members of the community that are interested, what is this here in the 
entertainment district. And time and time again you see the lights go 
on. We just have a standard talking point. And at some point they say 
“This is really brilliant, why don’t other communities do this?" 
(InterviewA4, 2012) 
The lack of knowledge results in political resistance to new infrastructure, increased 'transaction 
costs' for the governance network and longer timescales for negotiation. Actors in all four cases 
bought advice on DHC from consultancies or brought in new individuals to work within local 
government.  
Table 29 summarises how fuels and history shaped the orientation of actors for reference. 
Cases which were unsuccessful in establishing DHC systems are shaded in grey. 
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  Fuel Relationship to other 
fuels 
History with DHC 
Barcelona  Heat from waste 
incineration.  
 Existing.  
 Low cost. 
 Municipal influence.  
 Gas CHP; purpose 
built.  
 City mandate that price 
from DHC network is 
cheaper than reference 
case.  
 Significantly cheaper 
than fuel oil.  
 Very minor – one small 
scheme.  
Burlington   Heat from wood 
incineration.  
 Low cost.  
 Municipal influence.  
 Gas only recently arrived.  
 Not that cheap for 
domestic, unclear if DH 
cheaper for institutional 
customers.  
 None.  
 Recent telecoms crisis 
reduced preference by 
voters for city to get 
involved in infrastructure. 
Lerwick  Heat from waste 
incineration. 
 Low cost.  
 Municipal control.  
 No gas.  
 Cheaper than electric 
boilers and radiators.  
 None.  
London  Gas, then biomass 
CHP.  
 To be constructed. 
 Confused and changed 
through project.  
 Unclear if DHC 
cheaper.  
 None.  
Toronto  Lake cooling.  
 Free and renewable.  
 Municipal influence. 
 Also gas CHP; 
purpose built.  
 Gas cheap.  
 Electricity prices rising 
fast. Therefore fixed 
price cooling attractive.  
 TDHC experience; 
councillors, customers 
understand the idea.  
 Customers perceived 
DH reliable if expensive.  
Table 29: History and fuel: institutional influences on actor orientations and preferences  
11.2.2 Government actors 
Chapter 3's discussion of the institutional context of DHC proposes that the formal institutional 
structures and informal 'house rules' of government actors would influence actor resources and 
powers as well as patterns of interaction in governance networks for DHC. In each case studied, 
there are formal limits on local government resources and powers which preclude the local 
government from building DHC themselves; these demand governance network patterns of 
behaviour. Those limits vary from operational controls over the remit and powers of local 
government to fiscal controls over government borrowing and spending. Within a broad context 
of private ownership of power, gas, and water utilities and public management of waste, the 
level of local government influence over utilities varies considerably across the cases. The 
following text discusses how the institutional context affects local governments across the five 
cases and considers how such context supports or hinders DHC. 
Chapter 6 demonstrates how Barcelona's informal tradition of multi-level and cross-agency 
collaboration for events-based planning supports the creation of DHC in the 22@ district. The 
consortia approach and the creation of an independent regeneration company pulled together 
planning, housing, and development powers. Mayoral and political support was still needed to 
give authority to the arrangement (the mayor is the chairman of 22@ regeneration company) 
but this is not a formal role which influenced orientations or brought resources. Instead the 
mayor and his deputy mayors provide glue to the network to ensure collaboration between local 
government departments and other government organisations involved in the DHC system. For 
example, a deputy mayor of Barcelona City Council is also the vice president of the regional 
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company which manages waste in the Barcelona area. This facilitated the 22@ regeneration 
company to negotiate with the waste incineration plant for the use of waste heat for the DHC 
system, and consequently that the initial fuel source was cheaper in price than gas or electricity. 
The informal institutional glue results in the DHC system being more attractive to potential 
energy company operators.  
Burlington's local government structures are very different picture, with a comparatively limited 
set of capabilities and resources. In the USA, local government is legislatively restricted to a 
narrowly defined set of capabilities by Dillon's Rule and an the absence of state or national 
policies supporting DHC results in little access to government funding for Burlington to connect 
the McNeil power station to a DHC system. Potentially, Burlington's mayor could use his 
influence over local taxation of land and energy to create incentives to connect, or raise money 
through a public bond, but these are weaker market influences than an ability to procure a 
concession for DHC, and they require explicit voter support. Chapter 7 also describes how the 
mayor's ability to direct local government staff restricts municipal support for DHC. Without 
mayoral support it would be difficult for Burlington's local government to actively support DHC 
with money, knowledge or the exercise of procuring a new utility.   
Even if the mayor did want to procure a DH system, Burlington's local government has limited 
resources to support this ambition. It does not have significant ownership of local property or 
strong connections with the two largest local energy consumers. The city has only partial 
ownership of the McNeil electricity generating station. And the city's recent attempt to establish 
a local telecoms company resulted in a negative perception of local government influence in 
utilities and restricted the fiscal borrowing capabilities of the city.  
In Lerwick, Chapter 8 describes how the informal house rules of 'doing it ourselves' and 
'wearing many hats' underpinned the resources available to Shetland Council and the positive 
coordination mode of interaction that supported the DH system. For example, the 'do it 
ourselves' orientation meant that the council preferred to directly manage waste and own the 
incineration plant; this provided a fuel for the DH system. Alongside this, the councils' ownership 
or influence with of many commercial and civic buildings in the area meant large customers 
were encouraged to connect. A further supportive informal context was the stable and non-party 
politics of councillors, which underlined the consistent preferences of the council. There are 
limits though; the council's lack of control or influence over the privately owned electrical power 
generation and distribution in Lerwick has limited the size of the DH system.  
Chapter 9 describes how metro-level knowledge and environmental policy influences 
Southwark's local government and consultants to support DHC, but also describes how the 
mayoral powers are legally limited to approval of large developments. Both the metropolitan 
government and the local council do not own or significantly control existing utilities, nor 
potential fuel sources such as outputs of waste streams. However Southwark owns a large 
amount of land and housing in the regeneration area, including social housing, whose heat 
demands were attractive to potential MUSCO operators in concession negotiations. National 
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government controls over capital spending and European regulations about large scale 
government procurement also constrained local government resources, preferences, and 
modes of interaction within MUSCO negotiations. Finally, because the negotiations for the 
creation of the MUSCO spanned eleven years, the council's statutory four year election cycle 
also acted against a consistent local government approach as councillors and political 
leadership changed.  
With Toronto, the post-amalgamation municipal government had informal support through an 
environmentally minded mayor and selected councillors who influenced government 
departments through public campaigns and council instructions. This political support survived 
across election cycles in the form of two consistently re-elected councillors. Chapter 10 also 
identifies other formal institutional contexts behind the council as influential on the DLWC 
system: the city could control local utilities in a way not seen in all other cases; the water 
company was a division of Toronto's municipal government, the city owned 100% of the local 
electricity distribution company, and it controlled a existing non-profit DH system.  
Local and metropolitan government on their own  
Another feature of the cases was the weak influence from actors above the local level: from 
metropolitan, regional, national to multi-national. There was some multi-level knowledge sharing 
and mutual support through local and metropolitan government in London and Barcelona. 
Lerwick also had EU financial support. The case of Barcelona was the most connected at a 
metropolitan level, as individual politicians provided a connection between regional waste 
management and the regeneration company.  
But looking beyond the metropolitan government actors, the engagement of multiple scales 
drops to a low level. London had the Clinton Climate Change Institute, Lerwick had European 
Union funding, and Barcelona had nominal support from the national government through minor 
capital investment but on the whole government policy, capacity building, or financial support is 
absent.  
11.2.3 Planning organisations  
Chapter 3 suggests that the formal, legal context of planning organisations should have a strong 
influence on their participation in governance networks. On the whole, the cases support this, 
but also illustrate that informal influences have an effect. The following text evaluates the 
influence of the institutional setting on planning organisations across the five cases.  
Chapter 6 describes how historical conventions of planning behaviour as well as existing local 
government, legal, and technical planning actors in Barcelona are instrumental in shaping the 
capability of the actor set and the mode of interaction towards a successful outcome. The 
'urbanisme' tradition of detailed forward planning and plan-making in Barcelona, existing for 
over 30 years against a backdrop of major events, meant that the city and its advisors had 
individuals and organisations with the legal mandate and the technical capability to set detailed 
infrastructure requirements and tightly control the volume and design of real estate being built in 
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the 22@ regeneration district. The existence of Barcelona Regional as a neutral, technical 
organisation informally linked to the city council also brought crucial knowledge of energy 
infrastructure and masterplanning capacity to the local municipal planning department and to 
local politicians.  
Alongside the creation of real estate value and infrastructure finance through detailed control of 
growth, the mandated development control process required discussion about district heating 
and cooling connections with developers that helped reinforce city investment in the network. 
And the urbanisme context of focusing growth and investment activity around large events 
drove the structure and terms of engagement for the initial DHC system, increasing the capacity 
of the 22@ public regeneration company. The existence of the Forum of Cultures became a 
public reason to direct government investment in the initial pipe network and the connection to 
the Tersa waste facility. As a result, the 22@ company possessed a DHC system that was 
attractive to a private sector energy company in tendering the concession to extend the network. 
The strong market shaping and market regulating features of planning in Barcelona have a 
significant positive influence on the capacity of planning to support DHC and on the perceptions 
and responses of other actors.  
And the influence of the institutional setting on planning in Barcelona goes beyond this formal 
structure into significant informal influences. As Chapter 6 describes, Barcelona's history of 
planners becoming politicians or politicians becoming planners generates local political capacity 
in the form of masterplanning knowledge which supports large scale regeneration investment. 
These informal conventions of strong physical planning enabled the city to publicly promote the 
policy goal (the DHC network should be built) and through planning policy and development 
control created resources (likely DHC customers, initial DHC infrastructure) for city government 
to negotiate with the private sector with to build Districlima.  
Burlington has a radically different planning system, roughly characterised as state-defined and 
focused on zoning of land uses. Chapter 7 describes that the city is required by state law to 
include energy plans in the municipal development plan; this public mandate creates a form of 
planning capability for the local planning commission to discuss climate change and energy 
issues. This is where the concept of district heating has remained in the consciousness of the 
local government. However the development of planning policy is organisationally divorced from 
local political leadership and local government strategy and, in comparison with other cases, the 
planning system brings very little else to the actor set and to the capacity for interaction. Public 
control of development design and function within the development plan is not as strong as in 
the other cases, based in a looser land use zoning categorisation. And the lack of strong 
development control policies mean that even if there was major new development near a DHC 
system in Burlington is unlikely that the planning commission could require the development to 
connect.  
London and Lerwick, while both operating under a broadly similar legal planning framework, 
have different planning traditions which affect the strategies pursed in each case. In the British 
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planning system, local authorities are encouraged to create local spatial plans to guide 
development and protect heritage and the environment; and while the norms of plan creation 
encourage discussion and negotiation between public and private sector on the content, the 
plans are legally a vision for land use which is contestable.  
Despite this context, the British planning system is used to create both market capacity and 
local government 'resources' for negotiations for the MUSCO in London. Chapter 9 describes 
how the council's significant ownership of land use in the area gave the regeneration 
masterplan weight. The large amount of residential development proposed in the masterplan for 
the area provided the resource of potential customers to the local authority in its MUSCO 
concession negotiations; residential heating demands are valuable to potential private sector 
energy companies. Traditions of masterplan formation also created a requirement for discussion 
and interaction between local authority planners and local councillors about environmental 
issues such as DHC, providing an opportunity for the regeneration officers to establish 
environmental goals in policy. Development approval processes enabled the local planning 
department to require of private developers a limited commercial commitment to connect to the 
proposed MUSCO system. 
In Lerwick, despite a similar legal context to London, the planning organisations and processes 
did not provide the same level of influence on actor capacity or governance network 
interactions. The lack of large scale development in the town and tradition of a development 
friendly attitude meant that planning neither acted as a process to create a preference for district 
heating nor created capacity or potential customers for the heating system. However, Chapter 8 
describes how the local authority used the development control process and planning policy to 
support extension of the DH system to new customers. The comparison with London 
demonstrates that formal institutional context does not have a straight parallel to success; 
despite similar legislative and planning contexts the different outcomes in London and Lerwick 
are determined by network relational characteristics and external influences. 
The institutional context of Toronto's planning system is quasi-British, with an established and 
legal process for strategic land use management but with a more rule-based approach to 
development control. Building on literature comparisons with American cities (Frisken, 2008) it 
can be characterised as 'metropolitan land use management' to highlight Canada's greater 
concern with metropolitan growth. Chapter 10 describes how civic activists and politicians 
(rather than the Planning Department) used city ownership of land and the development 
approvals process to raise finance and require the first customers to connect. These funds and 
customers become resources for the city council when they approached OMERS pension fund 
for a further expansion of the system. 
The shape of planning: The limits of formal and informal context in a governance 
network  
The case studies demonstrate how planning's formal institutional context is a strong influence 
on the capabilities, orientations, and modes of interaction of planning and local government 
actors. In Barcelona, London, and Lerwick there is formal, legal capacity for planning to 'market 
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shape' and strategically plan for DHC infrastructure, supplemented by a varied ability to regulate 
or incentivise other actors in negotiation. In Burlington, the legal framework discourages 
regulation of DHC infrastructure by planning organisations and discourages planning 
organisations from engaging with political and local government actors.  
As the literature review suggested, planning's formal and legal capabilities (e.g. masterplanning 
and development control) are shown to be a significant influence the governance network's 
ability to build a DHC system. The formal institutional context of planning shapes governance 
networks for DHC in at least three important ways. It shapes the content of plan (e.g. does it 
need to include energy) and the ability of planning organisations to initiate governance networks 
for DHC through planning for energy infrastructure. It shapes the range of topics that can be 
controlled through development approval; this influences the local government's ability to 
negotiate with the private sector to build DHC. Finally, formal institutional context shapes 
organisational relationships with other actors, particularly local politicians and the ability of 
planning procedures to align with local government activity and political leadership. While the 
formal, legal context of planning is influential it cannot be singled out as a causal factor in the 
ability of networks to deliver DHC, as Lerwick suggests a case where the DHC system could 
have proceeded without planning organisations or planning interventions engaged. 
The informal setting of planning practices also proves to be influential on the ability of the 
governance network to deliver DHC, as Barcelona and the difference between the difference 
between London and Lerwick cases show. In all cases, the informal context shapes the use of 
formal planning interventions and the technical capacity of actors. Informal settings tend to 
influence actor orientations and modes of interaction more than they influence actor resources 
and powers. While it is difficult to extrapolate on such a small set of cases, these five suggest 
that formal institutional settings are more influential than informal context on planning's influence 
on governance networks for DHC. Control of land is central to conceptions of government and 
society; changes which affect control of land in support of DHC are likely to need to be formal. 
The next section explores how the influences affect the roles of planning in delivering DHC. 
In summary, Table 30 outlines how the institutional context influences the role of local 
government and planning organisations, listing broad planning typologies and key points about 
the structure of local government. Cases which were unsuccessful in establishing DHC systems 
are shaded in grey. The table summarizes content from the case studies in the previous 
chapters and reflections above.  
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  Planning 
Typology  
Structure and capability of local government 
Barcelona Napoleonic – 
‘urbanism’ 
tradition  
 Powers defined in national law 
 Mix of control between city, metro and state; dual political / 
executive structure with strong mayoral oversight 
 Partial ownership of waste incineration  
Burlington  Land use 
zoning  
 Fiscal federalism: national dictate capability of local  
 Mayor- council form of government  
 Organisational boundaries between planning and 
management  
 Partial ownership of local electricity generation and 
distribution  
Lerwick British   Powers defined through national legislation  
 Council committee system 
 Ownership of waste incineration  
London British   Powers defined through national legislation  
 Mix of control between borough, mayor; council committee 
system  
 No utility ownership or control 
Toronto Metropolitan 
land use 
management  
 Metro constrained by provincial legislation and funding 
 Mayor-led ranked committee system 
 Control electricity distributor, water company and district 
heating  
Table 30: Significant contextual influences on planning and local governments 
11.2.4 Summary: How does the institutional setting influence the delivery of 
DHC?  
The analysis finds that governance network patterns of interaction alone do not drive successful 
implementation of DHC, and institutional context strongly influences the ability of actors to 
successfully build DHC systems. For planning organisations, formal institutional setting 
influences such as the scope and enforceability of development control seem to be more 
relevant than informal influences such as historical experience with DHC. For other local 
government actors such as officers and elected officials, the picture is not as clear and there 
seems to be a fairly equal level of influence between informal and formal context.  
Three institutional trends are identified as particularly relevant to DHC. First, the existence of 
local government control or influence over low cost fuel sources; this influences the preferences 
of other actors and shapes negotiations. Second, history or experience with DHC is helpful but it 
can also be bought or brought into the shared understanding of the actor set. Third, the 
existence of formal planning powers to govern land use and control development has a strong 
influence on other actors. Building a DHC system does not necessarily require these contextual 
factors, but they lower the barriers to DHC from existing institutional structures and facilitate the 
negotiations between customer, provider, and regulator.  
The analysis also describes a significant variation in levels of local government influence over 
utilities across the case studies, and how national policy or regulatory support for DHC was 
absent or relatively inconsequential. The implications of both findings in light of existing 
literature are considered in the next chapter.  
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11.3 What is the Role of Planning in Delivering DHC?   
As was prefigured by the desktop review and literature review, the five case studies 
demonstrate a wide range of activity by planning organisations, and an equally broad spectrum 
of planning interventions to support creation of DHC. In this section, the roles for planning 
organisations are discussed before turning to the use of planning interventions.  
11.3.1 Planning organisations 
The case studies demonstrate a spectrum of roles for planning organisations from a weak role 
of coordinating pipework installation to reduce disruption (Lerwick) up to a influential role of 
designing a DHC system and including it in legally binding plans (Barcelona). The most 
common role visible in the case studies is the establishment of DHC as a planning policy goal 
for specific areas within a city, followed by the spatial coordination of land use, DHC locations, 
and pipeworks, and development to support a particular DHC system. These can both be 
described as 'market shaping' interventions under Allmendinger and Tiesdell's categorisation, 
and in governance networks they support the formation of a governance network by bringing 
actors together to create the policies, and by giving other actors a technical goal to discuss and 
negotiate over.  
In Barcelona, London, and to some extent Burlington, the concept of DHC was established as a 
goal for a specific area of the city during a spatial planning visioning process which engaged 
local politicians and other stakeholders. In Barcelona, DHC as a goal was linked to wider 
economic and social regeneration aims for improved urban infrastructure. In London DHC as a 
policy goal was positioned as an innovative environmental technology, and the links between 
DHC and political aspirations for the regeneration district are weaker. In Burlington, the concept 
of a downtown heating system had been established in spatial planning visions for the city since 
1985 as an environmental goal, but the structural separation of planning organisations from city 
management and the weak development control powers of planning resulted in a series of plans 
which failed to engage local politicians and other stakeholders in DHC discussions or 
negotiations.  
These cases illustrate how the institutional contexts such as legal and legislative frameworks or 
culture and tradition influence the market shaping and associated governance network 
formation role of planning organisations. Both Barcelona and London have local and 
metropolitan government frameworks where planning organisations can produce detailed 
masterplans and they used this to control private sector investment in development. The 
different roles that emerged in the two cities are a result of degrees of legal formality of their 
plan and the cultural traditions of planning in each case. The two cases also suggest that the 
level of physical detail included in the spatial planning formation process affects the outcome; 
this is discussed further below.  
Planning organisations in Toronto played a subordinate role to visioning exercises undertaken 
by other actors, particularly at the inception of the network. While planning policy was eventually 
177 
 
developed to support DLWC and encourage customer connections and the city government 
used local authority ownership of land to compel connection and investment in initial plant, the 
initial role for planning organisations was not a market shaping one which engaged other actors 
in the concept and vision for DHC in the railway lands. Later planning policies encouraged 
developments to connect through guidance, energy efficiency requirements, and recognition of 
connection as a social contribution.  
The ability to enforce development control polices and the use of development incentives 
through legal powers are also visible as a role for local planning organisations. The control of 
new construction is a planning intervention across all five cases, but it is used to create different 
roles for planning organisations in each case. In Barcelona development control powers were 
used to provide expert guidance for developers on what to build and used to raise funds for 
infrastructure, therefore reducing the city's expenditure on DHC. In London the strongest 
development control power resided in the metropolitan planning authority, but was used by both 
local and metro planning organisations to provide guidance on potential DHC connections and 
to encourage connection through legal agreements. In both cases while connection to DHC was 
not mandated by planning organisations these arrangements gave a level of certainty to private 
sector DHC companies about future customer demand. In Lerwick development control powers 
were used by the planning organisation not to control new development but to coordinate the 
laying of DHC pipe with other activities to reduce disruption.  
Not leading, but initiating and forming governance networks?  
Table 31 provides a summary of the roles of planning organisations and the use of planning 
interventions; unsuccessful cases are shaded in grey. It helps to illustrate that in the five cases 
studied, planning organisations rarely lead or participate in negotiations to build DHC, but they 
often play an important role in initiating the governance network. This points to a combination of 
roles for planning organisations which sometimes, but not always, have success in initiating 
discussions, exchange, and negotiations among a network of actors who can shepherd a DHC 
network towards construction and operation. Planning organisations which take on market 
shaping roles such as including DHC in spatial plans, and combine that role with supportive 
development control (market regulation or market stimulation) interventions support the delivery 
of DHC systems by initiating governance networks and creating market certainty for private 
sector actors.  
The analysis cannot conclude that absence of market shaping planning activity or absence of 
plans and policies by planning organisations is a cause of failure to establish a DHC system. 
Nor the opposite, that the presence of market shaping activity by planners is necessary for 
successful delivery of DHC. In Scharpf's vocabulary, the capabilities, strategies or actions of 
planning organisations did not prove to be an explanatory variable on the successful creation of 
DHC systems. The lack of a direct explanatory correlation for planning organisations could be 
due to the small-n problem, the limited number of case studies. But another reason for the lack 
of direct connection is that in some cases, other actors took up planning roles and used 
planning interventions in the absence of planning organisation activity.  
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Case  Barcelona Burlington Lerwick London Toronto 
Planning 
Typology 
Napoleonic 
urbanism  
Land-use 
zoning  
British British Metropolitan 
land use 
management 
Planning 
Organisation 
Roles 
Policies for 
DHC with 
develop.; 
Coordination 
of DHC, land 
use & develop 
in plans; 
Creating 
certainty; 
Raising funds  
Policies for 
DHC 
Reducing 
disruption  
Policies for 
DHC with 
development; 
Coordination of 
DHC, land use 
& development 
in plans; 
Creating 
certainty 
Policies for 
DHC with 
development 
Planning 
Interventions 
by planning 
organisations 
Strategic 
planning 
process; Area 
masterplan 
process; 
Development 
Control; 
Infrastructure 
Levy 
Strategic 
planning 
process; 
Consultation 
Development 
control; 
Coordination 
of DHC 
installation 
Area 
masterplan 
process; 
Visioning and 
design 
exercises; 
Consultation; 
Development 
Control  
Area 
masterplan 
process; 
Development 
control; 
Development 
incentives;  
Planning 
Interventions 
by non- 
planners 
Technical 
masterplan; 
Consultation 
with DHC 
providers 
Citizen-led 
consultation; 
Visioning & 
design 
exercises; 
Expert 
guidance  
Coordination 
of DHC, land 
use & 
development; 
Expert 
guidance 
Coordination 
of DHC, land 
use and 
development 
Consultation; 
Visioning & 
design 
exercises; 
Coordination 
of DHC, land 
use & develop; 
Infrastructure 
levy 
Planning roles 
- Allmendinger 
and Tiesdell 
Market 
Shaping; 
Market 
Regulation; 
Market 
Stimulation 
Market 
Shaping 
Mildly Market 
Regulating 
 
Market 
Shaping; 
Market 
Regulation 
Market 
Shaping; 
Market 
Regulating 
 
Table 31: Summary of the roles of planning in the case studies 
11.3.2  The importance of planning interventions  
Table 31 also summarises the range of planning interventions displayed in the case studies. 
The analysis found regular use of planning tools and processes by other, non-planning, civic, 
private, and local government actors. For example, in the case of Burlington the citizen 
volunteer group engaged stakeholders in consultation and drafting strategic and spatial plans 
for the connection of the power station and the major customers. Burlington Planning 
Department was not active in this process. In Barcelona, the local government's regeneration 
company used the infrastructure masterplan produced by the planning consultant and the city's 
planning department to involve potential DHC providers in discussion and negotiations about a 
government concession for the provision of DHC. In Toronto, the analysis indicates that the use 
of planning interventions by non-planning organisations was taken even further: charette style 
consultations, visioning, and design exercises as well as coordination of DHC infrastructure with 
land use and development happened outside the city's planning department, predominantly by 
local councillors and business interests. In Lerwick, the pipe routing plan proposed by SHEAP 
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was the subject of much informal discussion and coordination with private and government 
actors. This indicates the tools of planning are useful and valuable methods of negotiating or 
engaging within governance networks for DHC.  
The power of spatial plans for DHC: Does quality and content matter?  
Planning organisations and other actors use the development of spatial plans which included 
DHC as a powerful tool in forming and directing governance networks. The formation of such 
plans can support discussions between actors about DHC, and the publication of plans sets 
expectations of other actors down on paper, even if details are negotiated at a later date.  
The municipal spatial plans for Elephant and Castle in London, Lerwick, Toronto, 22@ 
Barcelona, and Burlington are each different in the level of detail they provide about DHC and 
how it integrates with other land uses. Lerwick, Burlington, and Toronto mention DHC as a goal 
and identify in words an area of the town which could be suitable for DHC connection or 
extension, but they do not map this or suggest individual buildings (and by implication the 
private owners of those buildings as potential customers) in the plan. The Elephant and Castle 
2004 Development Framework identifies the goal of a zero carbon growth as well as vague 
potential energy centre locations and a potential delivery mechanism. This spatial plan evolved 
into site specific plans and regeneration agreements which include detailed DHC system maps 
and consider potential energy centre locations. This contrasts with spatial planning for the 22@ 
district, where Barcelona City Council consulted on and publicly adopted a spatial plan as well 
as a detailed infrastructure plan which includes DHC; the latter has word-based policies as well 
as maps identifying pipe routes and drawings of technical connection details between buildings. 
This cross case comparison suggests that a technical plan of the infrastructure network which 
considers 'energy mapping' (determining heat or cooling loads in existing buildings) and 
planning for locations for DHC pipework and energy centres set into the urban fabric leads to 
smoother governance negotiations and a more successful outcome.  
Visioning as capacity building and non-negotiation space?  
The process of developing spatial, land use or strategic plans, and gaining agreement for them 
requires other actors, such as local politicians and local residents, to consider the implications of 
the plan. For example, which private sector customers might be connected, or how large the 
network should be. In ACI vocabulary this activity informs the orientations of other actors and 
influences actor strategies of action; Scharpf considers that these type of exchanges are critical 
for adjusting actors towards agreement.  
The process of creating spatial plans is theoretically an opportunity for non-negotiation space; a 
platform for conversations about goals and procurement without simultaneous discussions 
about who pays for what. But the cases studies do not demonstrate this activity within spatial 
planning hosted by government planning organisations. In Barcelona and London the spatial 
planning process results in physical visions of how DHC could be built, but the final spatial plan 
is not an agreement about the ownership of DHC or what kind of organisation should build the 
energy centre or pipes. Further discussion, negotiation, and 'non-negotiation' spaces are 
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needed to refine options and strategies about how to deliver DHC. Instead, this exchange of 
information and refinement of preferences and strategies for other actors during the process of 
plan formation can be called network capacity building.  
Planning regulations and incentives: Network formation and government capacity  
Government control or guidance over urban development timing, form, and function (e.g. 
development control, development incentives, and development levy planning interventions) all 
prove to be useful planning interventions in many cases. These kind of market regulating and 
stimulation interventions have a network formation aspect in that by controlling urban 
development they provide local governments with resources for negotiations with DHC 
providers in the form of potential energy consumers and/or investment funds.  
In particular, area masterplans or development frameworks which include a detailed temporal 
aspect to spatial planning are noticeably influential in governance networks for DHC. In London, 
Toronto, and Barcelona detailed plans for the size and timing of development were used to 
support the creation of a DHC network. In London and Barcelona, the potential new customers 
for DHC in the new development become a bargaining tool in negotiations with a private energy 
company. The extent to which both local municipalities have the capability to enforce or 
encourage connection to the DHC system is important in providing certainty about future income 
for the DHC operator. In London, the level of public housing potentially under construction, 
where DHC consumers could be guaranteed, became a critical aspect of the negotiations with 
Dalkia; when the housing numbers changed, so did the proposed DHC approach and costs. 
This can also be seen in Toronto, where local government officials supportive of DHC identified 
the development of the government owned railway lands near an existing fuel source (the water 
pumping station) as an ideal time to commence the DLWC network.  
The government's ability to intervene in new development form and function also provides 
significant market stimulation or market regulating functions to planning organisations and other 
actors. In Barcelona the Special Infrastructure Plan includes a development tax on new 
floorspace which raised money for public infrastructure investment, as well as a requirement for 
developments to build in the basement structures for potential DHC connection. In London, 
major developments are required to meet an energy efficiency standard and DHC was 
recommended as the preferred solution for that. In Toronto, design controls were not initially 
employed to support DHC, however some years later DHC was formally recognised as a 
community benefit and thereby encouraged in new downtown development.  
Even where there is not significant new development, the control of minor development is still 
used to support DHC systems. In Lerwick the planning authority used control over 
refurbishments or minor development to encourage connection by private building owners. They 
also used approval rights over pipework installation to support the DHC network by coordinating 
pipework installation with other streetworks to reduce disruption. In Burlington local government 
authorities have less ability to intervene in private development and did not exercise any powers 
to do so for DHC. 
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Patterns in use of planning interventions  
Table 32 is compiled from the strategy analysis in the five cases and details the planning 
interventions which are used in support of DHC systems by both planning and other, non-
planning, actors. Unsuccessful cases are shaded in grey. It illustrates that there are no 
overarching patterns in the use of planning interventions which correlate with successfully 
creating a DHC system. The development of spatial plans through consultation is used in every 
case to help establish DHC as a policy goal alongside other place making goals; this is likely to 
reflect the case study selection criteria for active planning activity. However, market regulating 
and stimulating interventions are also visible in every case except Burlington, where the cross-
case analysis suggests that the lack of government influence over private development or 
financial incentives for DHC is a barrier to government support of DHC. Barcelona and London, 
which pursue a concession arrangement to procurement of DHC, show a potential link between 
the success of the negotiations for DHC and the existence of a detailed planning-led energy 
plan linking consumers and energy sources.  
What Table 32 does not convey very well is the strength of planning interventions in initiating 
successful governance networks for DHC and in creating resources for other actors to negotiate 
with. The analysis of the five case studies indicates that planning's market shaping interventions 
(e.g. spatial planning, land use planning) are more powerful tools for initiating successful 
governance networks for DHC than market regulating or stimulating interventions (e.g. 
development control) interventions.  
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Key: √ used by government planning organisation; † used by other organisation  
 Barcelona Burlington Lerwick London Toronto 
Significant 
development?  
Yes No No Yes Yes 
Planning 
characterisation 
Napoleonic Land-use  British British Metropolitan  
Procurement of DHC Concession N/A Community Concession Joint Venture 
Market Shaping            
Spatial plan with DHC 
as economic goal  
√      √    
Spatial plans with 
DHC as environmental 
goal prior to start of 
network 
√  √   † √    
Land use planning 
which allocates land 
for DHC 
√       † √  
Land use plan which 
identifies consumers 
√ †  †  †  † √ † 
Discuss options with 
other actors in process 
of developing plans 
(consultation and 
visioning) 
 † √ †  † √ †  † 
Market Regulation            
Development control 
encourages or 
requires 
√    √  √  √  
Market Stimulation           
Infrastructure levy 
generates funds 
√         † 
Capacity Building            
Technical coordination 
of delivery   
√ †  †  †  †  † 
Expert guidance on 
DHC infrastructure for 
other actors  
 †  †  †  †  † 
Table 32: Detail of planning interventions used in support of DHC in the case studies 
11.3.3 Summary: What is the role of planning, in relation to market, civic, and 
to other government organisations, in delivering DHC systems?  
The capacity of planning organisations and processes to support DHC is rooted in their 
suitability and legal ability to control and coordinate land use between urban actors in specific 
locations. Because the research design selected for case studies with planning activity 
supporting DHC, the thesis cannot conclude that the absence or presence of planning 
organisations or interventions is in itself an explanatory factor.  
However the comparative analysis illustrates the network-creating power of spatial planning 
processes for DHC. The market shaping interventions of planning, and particularly the process 
of creating land use plans which identify energy consumers and allocate land for DHC, seem to 
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be important for successfully delivering DHC. These interventions focus the governance 
network on a specific location and scale, highlighting actors (third party as well as potential 
providers or consumers) whose resources and orientations need to be considered. By defining 
infrastructure needed for environmental goals with respect to the potentials and constraints of 
specific urban areas, planning can shape the expectations of other actors.  
Of planning's varied processes and interventions, the market shaping interventions (e.g. spatial 
planning, land use planning) prove to be more powerful in initiating successful governance 
networks for DHC than market regulating (e.g. development control) interventions. It does help 
to have both, but the market shaping interventions are more successful in influencing other 
actors, influencing their orientations and preferences and their willingness to engage in the 
governance network. This leads to quicker and less contested negotiations. 
Planning's regulation and incentive interventions also support local government positions in 
exchange-based governance negotiations by providing resources to bargain with. In two of the 
five cases, planning regulation of development creates valuable potential customers which the 
local government explicitly uses to attract private sector funding and knowledge for DHC. In two 
further cases similar regulation supports the extension of an existing the DHC system. It is 
unlikely that other local government regulatory or incentive powers (e.g. citizen advice or local 
taxation) could have the same weight in creating a DHC system as the planning system's ability 
to influence the energy efficiency and energy source of new or refurbished buildings in a specific 
urban area. However without the absence of case studies which did not have planning policies 
and interventions in the research design it is difficult to draw strong conclusions in this area.  
In conclusion, the case studies and comparative analysis reveal there are specific, constructive 
roles for planning organisations and planning practices in creating urban DHC systems. These 
roles are driven by the scale of DHC infrastructure versus traditional government boundaries, 
the association of DHC to specific locations and land uses, and the ability of governments to 
use planning interventions to shape future development. Planning organisations rarely lead 
negotiations or governance networks for DHC, but planning interventions are used to initiate 
governance networks for DHC and to shape the negotiations between public, and private 
sectors within the network. An important observation from the research is that market and civic 
actors also find planning interventions and processes useful in governance networks to deliver 
DHC; it does not have to be planning organisations.  
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Chapter 12. Research Contribution: Conclusions 
and Reflections   
 
The objective of this research was to explore relationships between private, civic, and public 
actors in delivering an urban energy infrastructure, DHC, as an environmental policy goal. It was 
particularly focused on the role planning organisations and practices can play in governance 
networks for DHC. Designed to respond to a call in governance literature for research on the 
"concrete manifestations of policy making" (Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003, p. 10), the thesis 
analysed five international case studies across varied legal and institutional structures. By 
rejecting the notion that governance networks always succeed and including failed attempts to 
establish DHC systems, the research has deepened understanding of planning's capacity to 
support DHC systems. It has also evaluated how governance networks support capital intensive 
policy goals and suggested contributions towards scholarly discussions of institutional influence 
on utility infrastructure in cities.  
Actor-Centered Institutionalism was used as a conceptual research framework to enable the 
analysis to distinguish between structural (institutional) and intentional (actor) effects on the 
governance networks and the role of planning in the case studies. Through the ACI framework, 
the cross-case comparison and the inclusion of failures, this thesis has been able to go some 
way towards what Healey calls the "difficult act of generalising about the relation between 
governance capacities, approaches to spatial strategy-making, and outcomes" (2007, p. 172).  
This chapter summarises the research findings and reflects on the contribution of the research 
to policy, practice, and theory. It begins with a concise summary of the empirical findings 
presented in Chapter 11, responding to each research question. Section two evaluates the 
chosen research methods. It then considers implications of the findings for theory and future 
research, before concluding in section four with specific results which could be useful for policy 
makers and planning professionals.  
12.1 Summary of the Empirical Findings of the Research 
This section summarises the key empirical findings of the research as described in the case 
studies and comparative analysis of Chapters 6-11.   
Governance negotiations for DHC  
The research sought to understand how features of modern policy making and delivery 
constrain or enable the delivery of DHC, asking in research question one, How do governance 
networks support the implementation of district heating and cooling systems?. The 
research findings support the literature review in describing governance network behaviours as 
an empirical phenomenon in policy delivery. While the research design selected for the 
propensity of governance behaviours with both private and public actors engaged in delivering 
DHC, the cases nevertheless demonstrated that formal negotiations of cash and material 
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resources between private, civic, and public actors were successful in creating DHC systems. 
Government policy tools such as regulation, incentives, and capacity building were not sufficient 
in and of themselves and governance networks with collaborative negotiations between the 
private, civic, and public sectors were required to build and operate DHC systems.  
Nevertheless, different arrangements of governance networks seem to work for DHC. Actors 
can change between case studies; there is no one right actor set or structure to negotiations for 
building DHC systems in an urban context. The comparative analysis identified a number of 
actor orientations and actor capabilities which support governance networks for DHC. The 
primary actor orientation which correlated with DHC delivery in the cases was supportive local 
elected officials. Two of the three cases studies also highlighted the potential capability of actors 
sitting in a middle ground between private and public sector to bring supportive finance for DHC 
to the governance network.  
The literature review described how Adger, Jordan, Lowndes, Hajer, and Wagenaar call for 
empirical research into how governance network behaviours and network structure influence 
policy outcomes. The research findings suggest that the quality and type of interactions within 
governance networks for DHC can influence their outcome. The density of interactions among 
actors and the existence of non-negotiation spaces for knowledge and exchange of strategies 
between actors both correlated with successful implementation of DHC systems. Non-
negotiation spaces facilitated evolution of the governance network by aligning resources and 
benefits and strengthening shared preferences among actors before they entered into fair value 
negotiations. The case study findings also support Scharpf's identification of positive 
coordination negotiations as the most promising orientation in voluntary networks: actors should 
have shared goals and also recognise the need for a fair distribution of resources.   
The institutional setting influences the delivery of DHC systems  
The research also sought to understand how formal and informal context affected actors and 
negotiations, asking How does the institutional setting influence the delivery of district 
heating and cooling systems?. The literature review explored how the privatisation of utilities 
and variation in government legal frameworks affect the ability of governance networks to form 
and manoeuvre to deliver DHC systems. While the comparative analysis found that institutional 
context strongly influences the ability of actors to deliver DHC systems, it also established that 
context did not dominate negotiations and actor-level factors were at least equally important.  
The strongest influence of the institutional setting was through how local elected officials 
perceived local urban infrastructures and through the potential for municipal control over a local 
fuel source for DHC. Knowledge about DHC was also important to the governance network, 
although this was obtained through actor learning and by expanding the network to include 
more knowledgeable actors. The formal, legal context of planning organisations and practices 
was also found to be a particularly strong influence on other actors and the ability of governance 
networks to deliver DHC. Noticeably, national government organisations and international 
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knowledge networks were not identified as significant actors, directing network exchange 
characteristics, or influencing other actor opinions.  
The roles of planning in delivering DHC 
The literature review suggested that the research was unlikely to find a straightforward answer 
to the third research question, What is the role of planning, in relation to market, civic, and 
to other government organisations, in delivering district heating and cooling systems? 
The comparative analysis described a relatively similar set of roles for planning organisations 
which sometimes, but not always, successfully initiated or supported governance networks for 
DHC. Chapter 11 concluded that planning organisations rarely participated in negotiations in 
governance networks for DHC systems, but that interventions of spatial and land use planning 
were, importantly and usefully, used to initiate governance networks for DHC and to shape the 
negotiations between other private, civic, and public actors.  
Planning organisations and interventions shaped governance networks by establishing the 
concept of DHC in a specific physical place and at a specific scale, thereby building a relevant 
actor set. They then affected the capabilities and strategies of other actors through incentives 
and regulation, and supported the patterns of interaction in governance networks through 
planning processes.  
The comparative analysis also suggested that planning's role in establishing policies for DHC 
and aligning DHC systems with specific land uses and new development was more important 
than planning's ability to regulate new development. While the latter supported DHC by creating 
certainty about customers, or potentially raising funds for investment, those interested in 
creating a DHC system needed to start somewhere; they started by understanding the local 
physical constraints and opportunities in a changing urban context. Planning's masterplanning 
process and outcomes were needed to understand the place-based potential for DHC; universal 
incentives and regulation for DHC were unlikely to have been sufficient in the cases studied.  
The variations in institutional context for planning across the cases illustrated the strong 
influence of formal and legal boundaries on the capacity of planning organisations and 
interventions to effectively support DHC. In particular, formal context affected the capacity of 
planning organisations to initiate governance networks by structuring the scope and influence of 
land use plans which coordinate consumers, fuel, and space for DHC.  
12.2 Reflections on Research Methods  
The use of a conventional comparative research structure and stakeholder analysis methods, 
paired with a rigid conceptual framework, proved both straightforward and fruitful in generating 
relevant findings. The rigour required to distinguish and separately code the capabilities, 
orientations, and strategies of each actor uncovered insights into why actors behaved the way 
they did. The comparative methodology was particularly helpful in illustrating the variety of ways 
that governance networks can begin, evolve, succeed, and fail. 
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On balance, the data gathering and interview approach taken proved to be effective in gathering 
the contextual, opinion-based information that the analysis sought. However the scale of 
information sought in each case was not easily obtained, and there remained minor gaps as 
individuals had left organisations and could no longer be reached. For example, in Toronto a 
key local politician who supported DLWC over many years died in 2011 before the interview 
process began. As described in Chapter 5, the researcher's choice to select cities where 
sufficient information could be obtained in the English language significantly limited the scope of 
case study selection and variation in the institutional setting. The trial of Social Network Analysis 
methods was discontinued after the challenge of establishing consistent boundary conditions 
proved too difficult for cross-case comparison in the large-scale 'messy' actor sets.  
The benefits and limitations of Actor-Centered Institutionalism  
ACI proved a helpful conceptual framework to analyse the cases. It enabled the researcher to 
visualise a ‘network’ perspective of how multiple actors approach interactions with each other 
without losing sight of the institutional effects on the network. Perhaps ACI's strongest feature 
was how it provided a structure to compare actor sets and actor strategies between cases, 
highlighting differences and similarities. Scharpf's detailed descriptions of modes of interactions 
and characterisations of types of negotiations also proved critical to uncovering the importance 
of non-negotiation spaces and distinguishing between general governance patterns and 
networks of negotiations. The researcher recommends the ACI framework for practice-oriented 
research on governance patterns of interaction, particularly although not exclusively suitable for 
multiple case analysis.  
However, four significant limitations were encountered in the use of ACI. The first is ACI's 
relatively weak conceptualization of the institutional setting and its potential effects on actors, 
constellations, and modes of interaction. The research findings correlate with Scharpf in that 
institutional settings are a '5th variable' which influence all other variables. However compared 
to the description of actors and modes of interaction, Scharpf's treatment of the institutional 
setting is conceptually light and he does not define or characterise his rule systems or how they 
influence the actors, constellations, and negotiations. This weakness potentially stems from 
ACI's origin in European policy studies, where the institutional setting is roughly similar. When 
looking at international case studies where legal systems, histories, and ways of working are 
fundamentally different, the importance of the institutional setting in defining other ACI variables 
takes on greater importance.  
A second limitation of ACI is the absence of a 'relational characteristic' variable; recognising 
formally that the quality and quantity of interactions can affect the success of governance 
networks. This was identified during the thesis literature review and the ACI framework and 
research design was modified to include this conceptual premise. The research findings on the 
importance of density and stability in interactions suggest that future use of ACI should continue 
this modification.  
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Third, ACI assumes a fairly static contextual background to policy development and 
implementation, and does not have an explicit mechanism to allow for significant economic, 
social or government changes (e.g. recession, change in political party control). Such factors 
shape actor orientations and behaviours and the actor constellation, but change is not included 
in the conceptualization of the institutional setting or any other of ACI's variables. This research 
dealt with change by giving room in the stakeholder analysis for actor orientations and actors to 
evolve; but other analysis methods may not be so flexible. Future research using ACI should be 
aware of this limitation and design data collection and employ analysis methodologies to respect 
wider social, political, or economic changes which might affect the governance network.  
Finally, the research analysis finds that Scharpf's game theoretic approaches as described in 
Games Real Actors Play (1997) obscure complex real-world relationships between actors. The 
researcher has respect for how the game-theoretic aspects of his approach contribute to 
characterisations and to descriptions of negotiation types and actor arrangements. His 
theoretically derived characterisations proved well-founded and supported by this research 
findings and interpretations; for example the identification of non-negotiation space matches 
well with his identified need for "procedural separation of both types of interaction" (p135). And 
certainly such theoretical modelling of potential negotiations could provide insight into potential 
avenues for negotiation in a context where the policy goal itself is not certain; such as in 
Burlington. However on the whole the game-theoretical modelling is not explained satisfactorily 
in his book, and the simplification it suggests proves to be unnecessary for understanding real 
world situations. The games and graphs he describes are not constructive for undertaking 
analysis of detailed actor orientations and constellations. Instead what proves to be important is 
understanding, in each case, what actions could change actor opinions and at what point actors 
will start negotiating. Future researchers should respect Scharpf's conceptions of negotiations 
and his framework, but in a practical application of ACI following his game-theoretic tactics 
could potentially obscure understanding of governance networks.  
Limitations of research on energy infrastructure for environmental goals  
The title of this thesis employs the word 'capacity' deliberately, as a reminder of the ability of 
planning interventions to support DHC systems and of the importance of institutional context in 
defining the ability of planning to create, shape, and influence governance networks for DHC. 
Planning's capacity lies in its suitability to promote DHC as a policy goal and its legal ability to 
engage other actors.  
But capacity also calls to mind to Earth's carrying capacity and the natural limits of an 
environment to sustain itself. And the research findings suggest practical and policy implications 
for understanding how cities can address this planet's carrying capacity. They also hint that 
significant change to urban energy use could require greater interventions than policy goals and 
public-private negotiations. But the research findings are necessarily limited by the research 
structure which sought to understand patterns of actor behaviour within existing institutional 
contexts, where DHC was a published policy goal.  
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12.3 Reflections on Theory and Implications for Future 
Research  
The research design focused on empirical analysis in response to multiple calls for practice 
oriented research in governance literature (e.g. Jordan, 2008; Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003; 
Sorensen & Torfing, 2007). In the absence of extensive academic research on the role of 
planning or governance networks in delivering DHC systems, this thesis contributes to 
understanding how governance networks support DHC and describes in detail the potential 
influence of one actor, planning, on the ability of the network to deliver DHC.  
12.3.1 Contribution to explanatory ambitions of governance network research 
The research contributes to governance network research by evaluating the robustness of 
governance as an observed phenomenon in urban policy and investigating the link between 
quality of negotiations and the outcome of governance policy. On balance, the case study 
analysis supports Chapter 2's contention that the ‘new spaces of politics’ that drive governance 
patterns in policymaking apply equally to the barriers and opportunities of delivering DHC. Not 
every challenge was present in every case, but on the whole the cases contend with non-
hierarchical policy development which requires positive collaboration and negotiation between 
public and private, unease about state power, framing of technical issues to the general public, 
and weak trust in political leadership. Burlington and Lerwick, both smaller cities with more 
interconnected personal networks, struggled less with trust and with the technical nature of 
DHC. The research shows that government policy tools such as regulation, incentives, and 
capacity building are not sufficient in and of themselves to overcome the challenges of modern 
policy making and delivery for urban infrastructure. Successfully building DHC needs 
collaborative but explicit negotiations of time, capabilities, and resources between multiple 
public and private actors in a local context.  
A definition of network governance 
Chapter 2 also introduced a definition of network governance. To inform critical discussion, this 
section turns to consider whether or not Sorensen and Torfing's definition provides a useful 
characterisation of governance networks in the cases studied. Sorensen and Torfing first posit 
that governance networks are “a relatively stable horizontal articulation of interdependent but 
operationally autonomous actors” (2007, p. 9). The unsuccessful case studies, London and 
Burlington, do not correspond to this first aspect of their definition. Chapter 9 describes how the 
changes to local authority structure, individual leadership, and local political leadership created 
instability and barriers to proceeding with a complex procurement process in Elephant and 
Castle. In Burlington, the actors are not yet interdependent; there is a heat source and there are 
potential customers but they have not yet agreed they need each other. The successful case 
studies conformed to this aspect of the definition, suggesting that stability and interdependency 
are critical to successful of policy delivery of DHC through governance networks. 
The case analysis also uncovered two important qualities of actors which are not explicitly 
included in this first aspect of Sorensen and Torfing's definition. One, that governance networks 
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are a mix of private, semi-public, and public actors; governance for DHC still needs elected 
government leadership. And secondly, that functioning governance networks require actors with 
resources or capabilities to negotiate with; exchange of information is not sufficient. If resources 
are required to initiate and maintain negotiations in governance networks, this raises questions 
about the extended privatisation of government services; could, over time, cities lose the ability 
of public actors to effectively participate in governance networks? This finding also raises 
questions about the potentially limited role of capacity building or general ‘convening’ activities 
in governance networks. There little point in getting actors together to talk or to learn about DHC 
if those convening are not in possession of resources such as money, customers, or regulatory 
power to influence the behaviour of others. 
Secondly, Sorensen and Torfing propose that actors interact through negotiations “that combine 
elements of bargaining with elements of deliberation” which "facilitates learning and common 
understanding" (p. 10). The only case which completely lacked negotiations was Burlington, as 
Chapter 7 describes. The remaining four cases exhibited a range of deliberation, discussion, 
and detailed negotiations, often several sets of negotiations. As a third aspect, Sorensen and 
Torfing posit that governance interactions happen within a “relatively institutionalised 
framework”, an “amalgam of contingently articulated ideas, conceptualisations, and rules” (p. 
10). This is a broad conception of an institutional framework, ranging from legal regulations 
through to common hopes. It is perhaps the weakest element of their definition of governance 
networks, as it is hard to envision any policy discussions, whether they be hierarchical 
government or non-exchange policy networks, that happen outside such a framework.  
Sorensen and Torfing's fourth defining aspect of governance networks as "self-regulating" (p.9) 
gets to the heart of how governance networks differ from hierarchical policy implementation. 
The relative absence of direction from 'higher' government levels in all the cases studied 
supports this aspect of a definition for governance networks. Finally, Sorensen and Torfing 
define governance networks as solving policy problems which "contribute to the public purpose" 
(p.10). The research selected the five case studies for an explicit awareness that the proposed 
DHC system has an environmental benefit; therefore this aspect is not comparable in this 
research.  
Table 33 provides a summary of case studies against Sorensen and Torfing’s definition of 
governance networks. The unsuccessful cases are shaded in grey. This review suggests that 
Sorensen and Torfing's definition is a robust characterisation of functioning governance 
networks which achieve urban infrastructure policy goals, although it could benefit from 
refinement and strengthening in specific areas to enhance its explanatory ambitions. The 
definition should be refined to clarify that actors should have resources or capabilities to 
negotiate with; governance networks are exchange based. And that for DHC as a policy goal, 
local elected officials should be engaged and supportive in the governance network. Aside from 
these aspects, the research demonstrated that the definition can helpfully predict the propensity 
of a network to establish and achieve its infrastructure policy goal. This examination also 
underlines how further research could focus on the second aspect of their definition, interaction 
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through negotiations, as the research findings suggest there are normative interaction 
characteristics for infrastructure as an environmental policy goal. 
Defining Aspects  Barcelona Burlington  Lerwick London Toronto 
1) Relatively stable horizontal 
articulation of interdependent 
but operationally autonomous 
actors  
Yes Not inter-
dependent 
Yes Not 
stable 
Yes 
2) Who interact through 
negotiations 
Yes Not yet Yes Yes Yes 
3) Which take place in 
regulative, normative, 
cognitive, and imaginary 
framework 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
4) That is self regulating within 
limits set by external 
agencies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
5) Which contributes to 
production of public purpose  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Table 33: Comparison of cases against Sorensen and Torfing's definition of a governance network 
Where next for network governance?   
Three potential avenues for further study into the potential of governance networks to deliver 
policy goals are recommended. First, on the importance of non-negotiation 'space' for 
development of actor preferences and strategies. Is this a common feature of governance 
networks, or is it particular to capital-intensive infrastructure? Are separate dialogues needed 
within all governance networks? How exactly do non-negotiation spaces support or influence 
actor conceptions of policy goals and therefore willingness to negotiate?  
Second, the research's findings on the link between the quality of governance network patterns 
and the policy outcomes would benefit from further study. Future research should both 
challenge the findings on the importance of density and explore relational characteristics further 
with other analysis methodologies such as Social Network Analysis. Questions include: is 
density of interaction important for all policy goals? Can more quantitative methods be applied 
to comparative research in messy policy problems? Are there implications for policy and 
practice of the need for high levels of density in interactions?  
Third, on the extent of the importance of local government leadership for DHC. Is this identified 
trend specific to DHC; could, for example, air quality goals be achieved without local elected 
officials? Does supportive political leadership need to be local; could it be regional or national? 
The cases studied imply that for a place-based infrastructure such as DHC the governance 
leadership does need to be local, but further research is needed on this aspect of governance 
networks. 
12.3.2  Implications for Institutional Theory   
The comparative analysis in Chapter 11 suggests the influence of the institutional setting on the 
role of planning and other actors is strong, but also that there is no aspect of the institutional 
setting which guarantees success or that is more influential than other aspects of ACI. This 
indicates that Scharpf was correct to place the institutional setting as an overarching influence 
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on actors, actor constellations, and interactions. Positioned this way as the 5th aspect in ACI, 
the research was able to understand how the institutional setting influenced actor capabilities 
and the mode of interaction separately from influencing actor behaviours; distinguishing 
structural and intentional effects.  
Low carbon energy infrastructure and the role of government  
Chapter 3 described work by Bulkeley and Betsill (2013) and Bulkeley, Marvin, Hodson, Castan 
(2010) and others on cities and climate change which suggests that understanding and 
influencing urban energy infrastructure is central to a low carbon future (Guy, Marvin, & Moss, 
2000). Consequently, seeking a low carbon future challenges the current relationship of the 
government to the control of energy infrastructure in urban areas (Spath & Rohracher, 2010; 
Bulkeley, et al., 2009). The five cases studied in this thesis were selected for their identification 
of DHC as an environmental policy goal and on balance show that cities are struggling to use 
climate change and low carbon goals as a means and a rationale to take greater control over 
utilities and local material resource use.  
For example, Burlington's Planning Department attempted to use the local plan for energy 
considerations, but lacked other market regulations or incentives to support plan objectives; 
local politicians and the municipal government were unwilling to grow control infrastructure on 
environmental grounds. Barcelona's and London's municipal authorities did grow their control 
over resource use through the spatial planning of energy and waste infrastructure but this was 
limited to defined areas of the city. Toronto's City Council, supported by a strong civic 
environmental ethos, had the most success in using environmental goals as a rationale for 
changing urban energy infrastructure. Lerwick, with its isolated location and strong financial 
resources, retained more local government concern and responsibility for local service provision 
than other cases. In this research, the role of planning with regards to control of infrastructure 
for environmental goal demonstrates small steps towards an increasing role of governments, 
but with the government as better regulator and better initiator, not as provider.  
Exiting utilities infrastructure and the spectrum of control  
Chapter 3 also discussed socio-economic literature on the implications of the privatisation of 
utilities infrastructure (e.g. Marvin, Graham, & Guy, 1999; Offner, 2000; Adams C. , 2007; 
Hodson & Marvin, 2010) which stresses that in a neo-liberal energy market, privatized utilities 
are often managed by supra-national companies, with no local interest or representation. They 
describe how this has negative consequences for the ability of local authorities or local 
communities to influence or control material resource flows managed by these utilities. In the 
cases studied, not all existing utilities were managed by supra-national private companies; but 
where they were the "low levels of statutory control and influence" (Marvin, Graham, & Guy, 
1999, p. 154) by local authorities were apparent as a challenge for the governance network. For 
example, in Lerwick, the local government sought the engagement of the electricity provider, a 
multi-national energy company, but were unable to attract them to supply the network with 
waste heat from the local power station. This limited the size of the network and potentially 
increased the cost that consumers pay by requiring additional investment in backup and peak 
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heating plant. From an environmental perspective it is a waste of resource: the power station 
discharges hot water from electricity production into the harbour.  
The cases also demonstrated that the challenge of creating new DHC systems with respect to 
existing utilities is not just one of seeking to engage large privatised utilities to build DHC or 
provide heat. There were also challenges of competition with existing local energy companies. 
In Toronto the existing city-controlled electricity distribution company sought to compete with 
DHC; the balance of power between city hall and the distribution company was contested and 
required negotiation by senior local politicians. While in Barcelona, the use of the waste utility as 
low cost fuel for Districlima brought new purpose to existing utility-government relationships. 
The local waste incineration plant was managed (through a series of ownership structures) by 
the metropolitan government, and political links were called upon to engage the plant in fuelling 
Districlima through a thermal exchange agreement.  
Together these cases indicate that for governance networks for DHC, actors need to recognise 
the contested and uneven nature of utility influence and control; that the 'splintered' and 'hidden' 
nature of material resource control is a challenge for the creation of DHC systems. The barriers 
identified by Marvin and others are strong, and more complicated than they seem at first glance. 
The complex and uneven nature of utilities ownership affects not only actor powers and 
resources but also actor perceptions and orientations about what others should do and 
therefore strategies for delivery. There is also an argument that the complexity of influence and 
control over local utilities demands engagement from local elected officials in governance 
networks for DHC; that public leadership can bring some utilities into the network negotiations 
either by control (e.g. Toronto) or influence (e.g. Barcelona). This latter point deserves future 
study and exploration, as it does not feature strongly in current socio-economic or technical 
literature on urban utility infrastructure.   
12.3.3 The capacity of planning for environmental goals  
The research findings have upheld the proposition of Chapter 1 that the scale of new DHC 
systems calls for local government involvement and the use of planning powers and capabilities. 
The research has also shown that some local governments recognise that proposals for urban 
form, as coordinated through the planning process, have implicit energy associations which 
require consideration of alternative forms of energy infrastructure provision. 
The research findings also support the argument that DHC as an environmental goal occupies 
an unusual position in the scale of cities. It is not a technology such as photovoltaic panels 
which individual property owners can undertake, nor is it an issue for national or regional 
government such as large scale electricity generation. DHC is often a technology which serves 
an area that is smaller than the city boundary, and it requires a fine-grain understanding of 
constraints and opportunities of a place. There are physical and occupational constraints for 
connection, such as bridges or rivers, and opportunities controlled by local authorities in roads 
and rights of way. There are opportunities of supply in local geological energy sources or local 
human-made infrastructure. There are local issues of heating or cooling demand linked to 
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specific land uses. As the Technical Director for the Barcelona Energy Agency commented, "In 
the end the problem is not an energy problem to be solved, it is an urbanism problem that has to 
be solved. How to develop the network, how to open the streets to install all the pipes and link 
the programme to urban development timelines" (InterviewG4, 2012).  
The literature review describes how an understanding of the role of planning organisations and 
processes in shaping, creating, and regulating urban utility infrastructure for environmental 
goals is only beginning to emerge. This research contributes to understanding in this area, 
outlining in detail the roles that planning organisations and planning interventions can play in 
supporting government policy around urban utility infrastructure. It also highlights how planning 
activity cannot be seen in isolation and that the success of interventions and practices is linked 
to other organisations' perceptions of government intervention in urban development and to 
conceptions of the role of government in managing resource use. The international perspective 
of this research should broaden the applicability of the research findings for practice and for 
further research. While identifying the potential of planning interventions and organisations in 
creating and focusing governance networks, the research also portrays a relatively limited set of 
planning methodologies and practices for energy masterplanning.   
The research findings therefore recommend further theoretical considerations of the potential of 
municipal land use planning to support urban environmental goals. Planning studies should 
investigate links between the spatial coordination potential of planning and wider considerations 
of sustainable development in cities. These links could be explored at both structural or 
functional levels; challenging the scope and purpose of spatial planning and the capacity of land 
use coordination and masterplanning for policy goals such as increasing renewable generation 
or flooding. What would a legal framework for planning that supported local government control 
over urban utilities look like? Are there particularly helpful typologies of plan-making (e.g. city 
economic plans, detailed local plans) which effectively support different environmental policy 
goals?  
One area recommended for further exploration is whether the methods and goals in transport 
planning could be transferred into a role for planning energy flows, low carbon generation, and 
efficient energy use. The field of transport planning is well developed in rationale for both state 
control of movement and for methodologies for coordinating land use, movement of goods or 
people, and investment. There is perhaps much to be learned through cross-fertilisation; not 
only modelling tools but also contextual and conceptual approaches which might support city 
governments in addressing climate change and energy management.  
The potential for planning systems to support community ownership and activity for energy 
infrastructure could be explored further, investigating how collaborative and communicative 
planning approaches might usefully support governance networks for DHC. It is unclear if the 
relative absence of a capacity building role for planning in the cases studied arises from the 
capital-heavy nature of DHC or if the design of this research potentially excluded the role 
through case study selection.  
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Finally, there are potential links between the role of planning, governance networks, and the 
public-private partnership literature on infrastructure delivery. This public-private partnership 
literature is well developed, with typologies of approaches, theoretical discussions of social 
health, inequality, and sustainability, and practical suggestions for government enabling and 
regulation of large infrastructures. It would be prudent to understand if methods and identified 
practices from that body of literature could be incorporated into understanding the potential of 
planning to support governance for environmental infrastructure goals.  
12.3.4 Implications for splintered urbanism and planning as an intermediary 
or enabler of transitions  
Chapter 3 outlined potential roles for planning and DHC in a context of privatised utilities. Offner 
argues in Territorial Deregulation: Local Authorities at Risk from Technical Networks that there 
are potentials for planning to control infrastructure: "Without public space there would be no 
network" and therefore "Real authority for regulating the activities of the network operators 
exists...linked to the quality of the proprietor of the public domain" (2000, p. 177). The former 
proved true for DHC, in that DHC required right of way approvals for pipes installation through 
streets and public realm. However the power of planning to regulate DHC pipe networks through 
rights of way "is more a question of forbidding than encouraging" (2000, p. 178); a negative 
power to say no. This is not a helpful power over DHC as an environmental policy goal; it does 
not encourage DHC systems to be created.  
Offner's second point was that to "control the network hubs is to control the structure of the 
network, and, therefore, to give oneself ‘bargaining power'" (2000, p. 178); for DHC this 
corresponds with the control of occupied space (e.g. major energy consumer, or require new 
dwellings to connect). Did the market interventions of planning give government bargaining 
power via network hubs over the creation of DHC? The research findings suggest that yes, the 
control of energy use in buildings through the control of new development does give local 
governments bargaining power in DHC. The case studies also suggest, as does Offner, that 
local governments do not always recognise, or seek to use even when they do recognise, this 
power over utilities.  
Chapter 3 also discusses how Guy, Marvin, Medd, and Moss build a case for the importance of 
intermediaries "developing novel ways of dealing with perceived defects" (2011, p. 210) in 
enabling change to the governance of urban energy infrastructures. While they do not explicitly 
mention planning organisations, the cases analysed in this research suggest that planning 
organisations and processes can play that transformative role. For example, Barcelona's 
Planning Department changed the governance of urban resource use through the publication of 
the Special Infrastructure Plan. Chapter 11 elaborates how planning organisations and 
interventions support DHC systems; a significant role is through broadening the scope of land 
use considerations of planning to include energy use and to set infrastructure goals.  
But the cases also illustrate other actors as intermediaries. In Toronto the local councillors 
undertook intermediary functions by hosting charrettes and cross-sector working groups; the 
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local pension fund who provided finance for DLWC sat between provider, regulator, and 
consumer although not with particularly transformative goals. The research findings also support 
their point that intermediaries can be vulnerable; London shows how contextual changes reduce 
the capacity of intermediaries and how focusing support for DHC in one individual created a 
fragile governance network. 
The research findings suggest ways to make planning organisations as intermediaries more 
effective. One, recognise that planning's market setting and intervention powers can spatially 
coordinate infrastructure in specific places. Two, the strong influence of the institutional setting 
on planning systems suggests that planning intermediaries need to understand the boundaries 
and potentials of their formal powers and capacities over DHC. However this research also  
identified limits to intermediaries in transition goals; planning or other intermediaries might help 
establish goals and support DHC, but actors need resources to bargain, and intermediaries (as 
neither consumer nor provider nor regulator) will rarely have sufficient resources to control or 
drive the creation of DHC systems in negotiation-based governance networks.  
In a similar vein, Quitzau, Hoffmann, and Elle (2012) discuss how planning processes can have 
similarities to niche support of transitions, creating 'protected spaces' for technological 
innovation in support of environmental goals. In their concept of 'niche planning', "planners 
make strategic efforts to create and nurture technological niches, but where the strategic work is 
performed – not as a strategic niche management process – but as an integrated part of the 
spatial planning approach" (p. 1052). This research selected for cases in which DHC was an 
established policy goal; nevertheless the findings support their conclusions that transitions 
management can be "practised as an integrated part of local planning processes" (p. 1057). 
And that, at least for DHC systems, planning processes are uniquely placed to function as a 
contextually specific supportive framework.  
12.4 Implications for Policy and Practice 
This thesis finds that there is a role for planning organisations and planning practices in shaping 
urban energy infrastructure; this role is driven by the scale of such infrastructure versus 
traditional government boundaries, the association of DHC to specific locations and land uses, 
and the ability of governments to use planning interventions to shape future development. Each 
of these factors has implications for policy and for the practice of planning. The locally specific 
and cross- or sub- boundary nature of DHC creates political and administrative challenges for 
DHC as a policy goal. Planning practice has experience in overcoming these conceptual 
boundaries for other issues (e.g. housing provision) through the activities of spatial planning and 
development control. The findings imply that urban policy should encourage the use of planning 
tools and practices to influence energy flows and infrastructure in cities. Existing practices and 
methods of planning for other topics should and could be applied to energy masterplanning. 
Policy recommendations  
Chapter 11 described roles for planning organisations and planners in delivering DHC. Including 
energy infrastructure and consumption patterns in spatial planning and land use processes is 
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recommended as the most important role because it can initiate governance networks for DHC. 
But the market regulation and incentive interventions of planning are also important, particularly 
for areas of new urban development. Informal or legal traditions about market intervention for 
environmental goals might constrain planning activity, but the successful case studies show that 
when coupled with supportive local elected officials, market regulations and incentives can be 
powerful drivers for creating DHC.  
The findings raise questions about the appropriate scale for future planning policy which 
integrates energy concerns. Historically arrangements of scale in planning have often taken 
economic (region), historical (conservation), or ecological (watershed) dimensions. Many 
countries already have national polices for energy efficiency, feed in tariffs, and the location of 
large scale generation. This research suggests that some energy efficiency concerns - the 
sharing of waste or excess heat, localised generation or the use of DHC - should be addressed 
through fine grain district energy plans.  
This case study analysis described how other actors perceive of planning organisations and 
their role in energy management. With the exception of Barcelona, the planning departments 
are not assumed by other actors to be a particularly useful organisation even when the process 
of public sector planning for DHC was perceived to be important. To some extent this stems 
from the emerging nature of energy as an important resource for cities to manage, and from a 
historical focus of planning organisations on land use and urban growth. However this 
perception should be tackled within both urban policy, theory, and practice because issues of 
sustainable development are now predominately urban and, as this research shows, there is an 
important role for planning in managing resource use in urban areas. Publications such as 
Planning for Sustainable Cities (UN-HABITAT, 2009) and the C40 Cities report Climate Action in 
Megacities (2011) have begun to illustrate the potential of planning organisations and 
interventions in addressing environmental concerns, but the message about the positive 
environmental potential of proactive visions for urban development still has far to spread. 
Finally, the research reinforces the importance of understanding the existing landscape of 
energy ownership in supporting DHC. And while this is emphasised by Offner, Marvin, Graham, 
Guy and others, the case studies illustrated that the complexity of energy governance has not 
overtly cascaded into practical recommendations or urban policy. This could be remedied 
through practical guidance and by broadening social studies of urban infrastructure to include a 
more detailed understanding of the potential of spatially minded intermediaries. In both practice 
and theory, one route to understanding energy in cities is through mapping of 'chains' of 
influence and focusing on intermediaries who create new formats of practice and engagement, 
as recommended by Guy, Marvin et al.  
The case studies also identified that knowledge and understanding of DHC is a challenge for 
planners, other local government employees, and local elected officials. Publications such as 
the TCPA's Community Energy: Planning, Development and Delivery (2008) and Energy: 
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Looking to the Future. A Tool for Strategic Planning (Sherriff & Turcu, 2012) seek to address 
this but more could be done by both academic and professional bodies. 
Implications for the practice of delivering DHC in cities  
The research reinforces how urban government and urban governance of energy infrastructure 
are both critical to achieving greater sustainability in cites. On reflection the cases illustrate a 
limited level of power and capability in local authorities over local utility infrastructure. Given the 
significant influence of formal institutional settings on actor capabilities, national and 
international advocacy should be calling to give local government actors more powers and 
capacity over utility infrastructure. The research suggests that if DHC is sought as an 
environmental policy goal, the governance network will have a greater chance of success if city 
governments understand and seek more influence over local fuel sources (e.g. waste), promote 
a better understanding by local elected politicians, and seek to gain a level of influence over 
non-local private energy utilities.  
As a minimum, the following four actions would be helpful for supporting the implementation of 
DHC networks. One, adapt the scope of planning activities in the city to require the planning 
department to undertake energy mapping as part of standard spatial planning activity, 
prioritising areas of regeneration or development. In areas with large scale development or 
regeneration, the planning department should use all available market interventions to support 
DHC. This could range from encouraging and raising awareness through to mandating the 
construction of DHC pipework and a tax to pay for the generating plant. Two, undertake a 
programme of education for local councillors and relevant local government employees about 
DHC, emphasising the benefits to them and their constituents.  
Three, host open discussions with energy companies, interested local residents, and local 
government employees about the potential for DHC in specific places, but without any 
commitment about who pays for what. Planning officials could potentially facilitate this 
engagement, building on public engagement methodologies for urban design and other 
planning activity. This research has shown that these non-negotiation spaces help create a 
shared goal for DHC and enable better understanding of actor preferences and capabilities. And 
finally, require local government officers to develop an action plan for the use of any waste heat 
or local energy sources in the city and for the creation of DHC networks wherever heat or 
cooling densities prove sufficient. This could outline, for example, whether the authority intends 
to build the network itself, operate a concession approach, or support local residents in creating 
locally owned energy companies. It should include an awareness of ownership of existing 
utilities.  
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Appendix B: Interview Pro-Forma 
 
UCL FACULTY OF THE BUILT ENVIRONMENT 
THE BARTLETT SCHOOL OF PLANNING 
Semi-Structured Interview Questions 
1. What is the aim or purpose of you / your organisation, in your own words? (open-ended) 
2. How would you characterise your organisation? (prompted from list below) 
a. Local (government) authority 
b. Planning authority 
c. National government authority 
d. Campaigning organisation 
e. Residents or civic organisation 
f. Business group 
g. Individual business 
h. Energy company  
i. Consultant / Advisor 
3. What kind of policies, incentives or regulations are you aware of that support the XX 
DHC system? (open-ended, prompt with knowledge from desktop review if necessary) 
4. What kind of knowledge exchange or direct funding are you aware of that support the 
XX DHC system? (open-ended, prompt with knowledge from desktop review if 
necessary) 
5. What has you / your organisations role been in delivering the XXX DHC system? (open-
ended)  
6. What kind of resources could you or your organisation have contributed?  
a. Time? 
b. Capital (funds)? Land?  
c. Knowledge / Expertise?  
d. Political or policy capacity?  
e. Coordination ?  
f. Regulation? 
7. Which did you contribute? (prompted from answers to previous question)  
8. What kind of actions could you or your organisation have undertaken in relation to the 
delivery of the XX DHC system? (prompted from list below) 
a. Collaborate with other groups or individuals?  
b. Tax or regulate other groups or individuals?  
c. Provide incentives for other groups or individuals?  
d. Deliver the DHC scheme (fund, procure, build or operate)?  
e. Knowledge sharing?  
f. Agree or disagree to connect?  
g. Other?  
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9. What kind of actions did you or your organisation undertake in relation to the delivery of 
the XX DHC system? (prompted from list below) 
a. Collaborate with other groups or individuals? If so, who? And how? 
b. Tax or regulate other groups or individuals? If so, who? And how? 
c. Provide incentives for other groups or individuals? If so, who? And how? 
d. Deliver the DHC system (fund, procure, build or operate)? How?  
e. Knowledge sharing?  
f. Agree or disagree to connect?  
g. Other?  
10. Given the situation today, what kind of result would you prefer? (open-ended) 
11. Which other organisations or individuals have been involved in delivering, or creating 
the environment for delivery of the DHC system? (open-ended) 
a. Are there specific individuals within those organisations who have been 
involved? (if necessary) 
12. How did you communicate ore engage with other organisations or individuals regarding 
the system? Conferences, workshops, emails, meetings? (prompted with suggestions) 
13. Of the organisations you mention in Question 11, what kind of actions and activities did 
each of them do in relation to this district energy system? What was their role? What do 
you think they should have done? (prompted, interviewer to complete the following 
table, adding organisations if needed).  
 Organisation 
A  
Organisation 
B 
Organisation C 
What was their role?    
What kind of powers or resources did 
they have? Over other actors?  
   
What did they do?    
What should they have done?     
Did your organisation collaborate with 
any of these? Was this formal? 
   
Did your organisation’s aims or activities 
conflict with any of these?  
   
 
14. Did urban planning policy or the planning department influence the discussions or 
outcome regarding XXX DHC system?  (open-ended) 
a. If so, how; what powers or capabilities did they have and what did they do?  
(open-ended) 
b. If not, why? (open-ended) 
15. Did other government organisations influence the discussions or outcome of the XX 
DHC system?  (open-ended) 
c. If so, how; what powers or capabilities did they have and what did they do?  
(open-ended) 
d. If not, why? (open-ended) 
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Appendix C. Analysis Details 
 
Chapter 5 explains the data analysis approach. This appendix contains the four stakeholder 
analysis matrices for each case study. The self-identified actor and collective actor identified 
actor matrices have been converted from a table format into text to facilitate inclusion in this 
appendix.  
As an example, a sample of the Barcelona Self-Identified Actor Matrix is shown for illustration 
purposes, which corresponds to the text in Section 1.1 below.  
Actor Capabilities (1) Orientation (2) Preferences (3) 
Districlima Company which 
operates and 
extends DHC 
network in 22@ 
district..... 
Created for the purpose 
of operating the 
network. ..... 
Set up district heating and cooling 
network for use in heating, air 
conditioning and...... 
Cofeley / GDF 
Suez (also 
Agbar) 
Main shareholder 
of Districlima 
network. Also own 
Aguas ..... 
It is good thing for cities 
to be using district 
systems, and .... 
 
 
Tersa  The waste 
incineration 
company, owned 
....  
  
Barcelona 
Regional 
An urban planning 
agency which is 
separate ..... 
Environmental issues 
should be ..... 
Took advantage of Forum to 
implement infrastructure ideas. 
Negotiated with ...... 
 
In all cases, the number system is as follows: 
1: Capabilities  
2: Orientation (towards DHC) 
3: Preferences (for how they or others should be involved in delivering DHC)  
1. Barcelona 
1.1 Self-Identified Actor Matrix  
Districlima 
1: Company which operates and extends district heating and cooling network in 22@ district. 27 
or 30 year concession. Able to charge building occupiers to connect. Prices regulated by city on 
annual basis. (Districlima, 2012) 
2: Created for the purpose of operated the network. (Districlima, 2012)  
3: Set up district heating and cooling network for use in heating, air conditioning and sanitary 
hot water. Using waste heat reduces greenhouse gas emissions. Other benefits: reduction in 
refrigerant losses, reduction in noise and vibration, null visual impact. It's a pioneering project 
for Spain, but it is not futuristic or risky. (Districlima, 2012) 
CEO, Districlima 
1: DC works because it has political support, customers and financing. Large amount of finance 
needed to make investment in network creation. Limited in what prices they can charge to 
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customers. Right to make a profit during concession, but do not own and cannot sell network. 
(InterviewS2, 2012) 
2: 2004-2007 was a technical period; now DC is in more of an operational and long term 
expansion phase. Barcelona is a good city to do this in because it is growing and it is 
innovative. Sees district heating and cooling as a social responsibility issue – it is efficient and 
quit and healthy (water). (InterviewS2, 2012) 
3: District heating and cooling is a good solution because it solves the problem in a local area 
with a local source of energy. DC is a good solution – public investment needed first, but then 
private to run it. Best way to develop the project is to keep talking and communicating with 
businesses and politicians. His role is to do that and to manage the company. (InterviewS2, 
2012) 
Cofeley / GDF Suez (also Agbar) 
1: Main shareholder of Districlima network. Also own Aguas de Barcelona (Agbar). Has the 
money to finance, even in ‘crisis’ – though shared with banks. (Gargante, 2010) (Mestrallet, 
2011) 
2: It is good thing for cities to be using district systems, and they offer special district network 
services – they want to grow in this area in Spain. They expect to lose money in the first 10 
years. (Gargante, 2010) (Mestrallet, 2011) 
3: No data 
Tersa  
1: The waste incineration company, owned by the Area Metropolitana (bigger than BCC) 
(InterviewA3, 2012) 
2: No data 
3: No data  
Gas Natural 
No data 
Barcelona Regional 
1: An urban planning agency which is separate from BUP but which predominately works for 
BUP. Shareholders are public agencies and institutions like the City Council. Wrote Barcelona 
Energy Improvement Plan and 22@ Special Infrastructures Plan.  (Barcelona Regional, 2012) 
2: Increasing complexity of urban planning – energy and environmental issues should be 
integrated within urban planning.  (Barcelona Regional, 2012) 
3: No data 
Head of Energy Infrasturcture, Barcelona Regional 
1: Responsible for energy infrastructure planning in Barcelona Regional. Has a small team. 
Made the feasibility studies for district energy network. (InterviewA3, 2012) 
2: Environmental issues should be addressed through strategy and plan, not the environmental 
impact assessment. Spent many years investigating co-generation and district systems for 
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Forum and then 22@. Makes sense to take advantage of existing infrastructure at Forum, 
managed with Tersa – more of a political agreement - but not with other plant. (InterviewA3, 
2012) 
3: Took advantage of Forum to implement infrastructure ideas. Negotiated with city council and 
Tersa to use waste heat as part of Forum infrastructure, always with vision to extend. 
(InterviewA3, 2012) 
Barcelona City Council  
1:Two separate organisational levels: political and executive. Deputy mayors (political) take on 
departmental ‘leadership’. (Ajutament de Barcelona, 2011) 
2: Energy efficiency measures and investment are good – particularly in context of other 
European cities. Through the Energy Improvement Plan, published objectives to reduce 
atmospheric emissions and consumption of non renewable energy. They have a leadership role 
in supporting initiatives and a change in attitudes in the city, and believe that the city should use 
its power to regulate new installations. (Ajutament de Barcelona, 2011) (Ajutament de 
Barcelona, 2002) 
3: Instructed Barcelona Regional to write the Plan for Energy Improvement in Barcelona. 
Approved plan, which includes Districlima. Energy infrastructures like Districlima are smart and 
efficient in energy, economic and environmental terms. (Ajutament de Barcelona, 2011) 
(Ajutament de Barcelona, 2002) 
Imma Mayol i Beltran  
1: Former Deputy Mayor for Environment and Former Head of Energy Agency. (Ajutament de 
Barcelona, 2011) 
2: Recognises that 22@ existing infrastructure (energy and telecommunications) not sufficient. 
Cities – public administration – must lead to reduce energy patterns in cities. “Barcelona must 
by driven by a type of energy that ensures our city’s way forward to a new and more sustainable 
global energy model” . (Ajutament de Barcelona, 2011) (Barelona Energy Agency, 2012) 
3: The utility infrastructures that are needed to rejuvenate the 22@ district are in the Special 
Infrastructure Plan. . (Ajutament de Barcelona, 2011) 
Barcelona Energy Agency 
1: Public agency responsible to Deputy Mayor, funding comes from Ajutament. Identify and plan 
for efficient local energy use. Promote sustainable energy demand and renewables. Works 
alongside Spanish and Catalan agencies. In charge of delivering Barcelona Energy 
Improvement Plan, general framework for work of BCC in matters of energy policy. (Barelona 
Energy Agency, 2012) (Ajutament de Barcelona, 2011)  
2: Promote Districlima (and other networks). European policy & European green city initiatives 
in this area are a consideration. Believes cities have a crucial role to play in better energy future. 
Citizen understanding and awareness is important. (Barelona Energy Agency, 2012)  
3: Energy goals should be integrated into urban planning and land distribution. Districlima is one 
of 55 projects included in 2002 Energy Improvement Plan. (Barelona Energy Agency, 2012)  
Technical Director, Barcelona Energy Agency 
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1: Idea for Districlima came from within municipality various departments including BUP and 
AEB – technicians first. Only 5 technicians in the agency. No national or European funding. (He 
previously worked for ICAEN on the Districlima Board)  (InterviewG4, 2012) 
2: Positive – the AEB has a long term vision for the city with energy networks connected. 
Recognise that it is difficult to implement., particularly the ‘first’ because of lack of knowledge 
and understanding. See themselves as partners with the Urban Planning Department for district 
heating and cooling.  (InterviewG4, 2012) 
3:Agency and urban planning department conceive of idea, design the infrastructure, and then 
tender a public concession to take project forward. PPP works for this kind of concession. AEB 
role is to manage Energy Plan and then to work with BUP to discuss Districlima with developers 
during planning permission stage.  (InterviewG4, 2012) 
22@ BCN  
1: Did the urban planning that the city council had legal rights to (took those over). And 
supported developers. And also did projects themselves. Created by BCC to promote and 
manage 22@ transformation. Covered 198,26 Ha, 115 blocks, 1159626 m2 of land, investment 
in infrastructure: 180 m Euros. (InterviewA3, 2012) (Barcelona City Council, 2012) 
2: The aim is to influence the development through investment and regulation. Recognise the 
significance of the 22@ regeneration project and the importance of the infrastructure plant to 
making it happen. (InterviewA3, 2012) (Barcelona City Council, 2012) 
3: Worth trying to implement where they could. (InterviewA3, 2012) 
Former Director of Infrastructures, 22@ BCN 
1: Ability to invest money in public projects, approve building and infrastructure design for 
private projects. Had to follow some procurement policies, but not competitive dialogue. Did not 
know the best way to make the central heating and cooling network work. A 100% municipal 
company but it is a trading corporation and acts in the private market. Money from three 
sources: infrastructure fees for new approvals, city council, and funding from utility companies. 
(InterviewA3, 2012) 
2: Residential and regeneration demand for heating not happening fast enough initially. 
(InterviewA3, 2012) 
3: First they did an ideas competition to understand more about options. Districlima works 
because: political will, rising energy costs, and the 22@ regeneration means there is demand 
from new buildings to support growth. Very supportive, and thinks more cities in Europe should 
have the district systems. Compares them to street lighting as a service the municipality should 
provide. They are good means to an end. Needed the Forum project to make Districlima work. 
He would have preferred an extension to the Forum concession, but in the end 22@ did a new 
concession for the extension of the network. (InterviewA3, 2012) 
Institute for Energy Diversification and Saving 
1: Part of Spanish ministry for the Economy. Participated in the creation of the Barcelona 
Energy Improvement plan. . (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2012) 
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2: Supported Barcelona Energy Improvement Plan. The Municipalities have a great 
responsibility to deliver energy efficient technologies. (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2012) 
3: No Data 
Catalan Energy Institute  
1: Support initiatives and action programmes for knowledge and development of energy 
technologies including renewables that improve efficiency. Funded by Catalan state. (Ajutament 
de Barcelona, 2002) 
2: No data 
3: No data 
Barcelona Urban Planning Functions  
1: Department of Ajutament de Barcelona executive structure. Creates city and neighbourhood 
plans. Coordinated Special Infrastructure Plan for Poblenou and Modification of General Plan to 
create 22@ district. Sets regulations for new build and refurbishment construction and building 
use, also in 22@ set infrastructure creation regulations. (Barcelona City Council, 2000) 
(Barcelona City Council, 2000) (Ajutament de Barcelona, 2011) 
2: Create plans and establish regulation in accordance with city General Plan and with national 
and state legislation. For 22@, the infrastructure needs renewal. This should be financed by 
profit from regeneration and densification. They should design and then instruct how to create a 
large number of infrastructures including energy. Include DC in their planning process, as part of 
creation of new district, to ensure that development does not have a negative impact on the 
environment. (Barcelona City Council, 2000) (Barcelona City Council, 2000) 
3: Urban Plans should be drawn up with criteria of sustainability, and the Special Infrastructures 
Plan sets out how private developers and city projects should design for and economically 
support creation of centralised air conditioning and hot water network. “To achieve the 
development of this project it is essential to co-ordinate a broad Special Infrastructure Plan 
which will act upon public areas as well as private community ones, determining surface land 
and underground land aspects. The content of the Plan will include aspects related to the water 
cycle, use and production of energy, cold and heat processes.” (Barcelona City Council, 2000) 
(Barcelona City Council, 2000) 
Spanish National Government (various)  
No data 
Organisation Forum des Cultures  
1: Co-organised by BCC, the Catalan Government, and SS. UNESCO is main partner. (Forum 
Barcelona, 2012) 
2: No data 
3: Wanted infrastructure (sewage and incineration) to form part of site. Otherwise says nothing 
explicit on old websites which still exist. (Forum Barcelona, 2012) 
Building Owners /DC Customers 
No data  
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Elected Councillors & Mayors / Politicians generally  
1: No data  
2: Barcelona has low CO2 emissions per capital, but more effort required – and will be 
challenging. (Ajutament de Barcelona, 2011) (Ajutament de Barcelona, 2002) 
2: “A real example of our commitment to being a benchmark for sustainable and smart urban 
development.” Change in energy model can be demonstrated through new urban districts like 
22@. Approved 22@ plan and infrastructure plan. (Ajutament de Barcelona, 2011) 
1.2 Collective Actor Maxtrix 
Districlima 
1: Owned by GDF, but also have Tersa and Acbar and institutional support. Able to invest for 
many years before making a profit. Had the experience of GDF in creating district heating and 
cooling networks. (A3) (H602) 
2: Brings many environmental improvements, such as efficient use of waste energy, reduction of 
greenhouse gases, reduction of refrigerant losses, reduction in noise and vibration. Also 
provides economic advantages to building owners. More expensive to retrofit in regeneration 
than to install in new neighbourhood. Hardest element is how to start, how to raise awareness, 
and how to encourage people to connect. (H602) (InterviewA3, 2012) 
3: They should run the concession, operating the existing OFC system and trying to extend it 
with the City’s help as the 22@ district is developed. Should offer prices that are cheaper than 
other ways of heating and cooling (reference case). The concession is for 30 years and 
expectation that same approach will be continued after that. (InterviewG4, 2012) (Barcelona 
City Council, 2000) (InterviewA3, 2012) 
Cofeley / GDF Suez (also Agbar) 
1:Only a few companies like GDF have mindset and funding to invest in long term concessions. 
Payback time could be 20 years. Technologically less aggressive than other companies, but 
financially sound and respected in Barcelona. (InterviewA3, 2012) 
2: Was in a privileged position to win 2
nd
 concession after winning the first. They like partnering 
with the public sector because it gives them confidence that the project will go ahead and 
smoothes difficult areas. Their existing presence in Barcelona is relevant to success of DC. 
(InterviewA3, 2012) 
3: They won the first contract, to operate the Forum Network. They were seen as a good choice 
to do this – had the good technical knowledge and the money. Now the main shareholder in 
Districlima. (InterviewA3, 2012) (InterviewG4, 2012) 
Tersa  
1: Have heat source – operate incineration plant and produce steam. Responsible to Area 
Municipality Have a 20% share in Districlima. Were planning to extend the plant at the time of 
the Forum. (InterviewS2, 2012) (InterviewA3, 2012) 
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2: They will lose money on the steam generation but make it back by the selling of the heat. 
They are influenced by the council but not fully – they are more influenced by Area 
Metropolitana. (InterviewA3, 2012) 
3: Have a heat transfer agreement with the city and then Districlima and also own some shares. 
Their share is to demonstrate the public partnership angle, and oblige the city to be supportive. 
(InterviewA3, 2012) 
Gas Natural 
1: Supply natural gas to some (but not all) of Barcelona. (InterviewG4, 2012) 
2: Not supportive – will see DC as a competitor. (InterviewG4, 2012) 
3: No data 
Barcelona Regional 
1: They are contracted to write the Energy Improvement Plan. Had the experience of the people 
who managed the Olympic Games. Willing to be adventurous and take a bet. (InterviewA3, 
2012) (Ajutament de Barcelona, 2002) 
2: No data 
3: Support through development of Special Infrastructure Plan. (InterviewA3, 2012) 
Barcelona City Council  
1: A first class city organisation. Powers include urban development ordinances, direct 
investment, campaigns to boost private actions, cooperation, etc. Invests directly in highways 
and public space improvements. Cannot mandate connection to DC. Able to approve urban 
plans. Able to finance initial elements of network and design basic idea with internal knowledge. 
(InterviewA3, 2012) (InterviewS2, 2012) (H602) (Ajutament de Barcelona, 2002) 
2: Following external energy and carbon commitments, the council is supporting renewables 
and efficiency more and more. The energy plan demonstrates this. Supportive through the 
urban planning process, and in the street works it does – creating infrastructure and pipes on 
behalf of DC sometimes. As a beneficial network for all the citizens of Barcelona; the 
administration has the obligation to develop this and provide service. Through the OFC, funded 
the initial infrastructure for Districlima. They should (and did) provide the initiative. (InterviewA3, 
2012) (InterviewG4, 2012) (Barcelona City Council, 2012) (InterviewS2, 2012) 
3: They should/did incorporate energy criteria into urban planning and come up with the idea for 
the projects. (approved special infrastructure plan) They should/did run the district heating and 
cooling network as a concession. Through OFC, they should/did fund the initial network (crucial) 
and negotiate the connections to Tersa for the Forum. Then DC should/did run that network and 
the extension as a concession, with BCC on the board to help connections. They – with AEB – 
should establish prices for district energy on an annual basis and otherwise regulate. Financed 
the OFC network and the first three kilometres of the network. (InterviewA3, 2012) (InterviewG4, 
2012) (InterviewS2, 2012) 
Barcelona Energy Agency 
1: Manage the Energy Improvement Plan and projects arising from that Plan. (H631) 
226 
 
2: No data 
3: Help the district heating and cooling supplier develop the network, alongside BCC and BUP. 
(InterviewG4, 2012) 
22@ BCN  
1: No data 
2: Important that district heating and cooling is part of their innovative vision for the area. It is 
necessary to redo the infrastructure in the area. (Ajutament de Barcelona, 2002) (InterviewS2, 
2012) 
3: The city council and 22@ should be instructing and educating developers about Districlima. 
The city council in the end has the concession, but TT should guide this and coordinate with 
urban redevelopment. (InterviewS2, 2012) 
Former Director of Infrastructures, 22@ BCN 
1: Had a very deep knowledge of the infrastructure and the process . (InterviewA3, 2012) 
2: No data 
3: No data 
Institute for Energy Diversification and Saving 
1: Have a 5% shareholding in Districlima. Public corporation which promotes alternative energy 
at state (national) level . (InterviewA3, 2012) (InterviewS2, 2012) 
2: Supportive as part of their remit – but more from an image perspective than real help. 
(InterviewA3, 2012) (InterviewS2, 2012) 
3: Has issued recommendations but has not developed clear policies to promote district heating 
and cooling systems. (InterviewA3, 2012) (InterviewS2, 2012) 
Catalan Energy Institute  
1: Have a 5% shareholding in Districlima. Public agency which promotes alternative and 
efficient energy at catalan level. (Ajutament de Barcelona, 2011) (InterviewG4, 2012) 
2: Supportive as part of their remit – but more from an image perspective than real help. 
(InterviewA3, 2012) 
3: No data 
Barcelona Urban Planning Functions  
1: Ability to draft district energy initial plan with support from BR and AEB. (InterviewG4, 2012) 
2: Have a long term vision for district energy network in Barcelona. Understand the concept and 
are supportive. Leverage redevelopment permissions to pay for some of infrastructure 
investment, and establish vision in legal plans. (Barelona Energy Agency, 2012)(InterviewG4, 
2012) 
3: They establish levels of energy efficiency for new buildings in 22@ district, which can be met 
through district network. They need to be involved to plan out the network with the urban growth 
and to connect users with DC idea during development phase. “At the end it is not an energy 
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problem to be solved it is an urbanism problem that has to be solved” (Sagarra & Ruyet, 2006) 
(InterviewG4, 2012) (Barcelona City Council, 2000) (InterviewS2, 2012) 
Spanish National Government (various)  
1: Have jurisdiction over energy in Spain (not state/regional). (InterviewA3, 2012) (InterviewG4, 
2012) 
2: No data  
3: Were not mentioned as ‘lacking’ in support.  
Organisation forum des cultures  
1: Organisation by which Barcelona promoted chance in the area. It had a number of public 
buildings which it could use to connect. (InterviewA3, 2012) 
2: Controversial event, but enabled transformation of east of city. Served as an excuse to make 
the public sector investment. Existence of Forum and public investment in buildings is a big 
opportunity to make DC work. (H613) (InterviewA3, 2012) (InterviewS2, 2012) 
3: Promotes and supports energy initiatives, including setting up district heating and cooling 
network. Use of the Forum buildings as big base load – through BCC investment - provided 
boost to DC process. (InterviewA3, 2012) (Ajutament de Barcelona, 2002) 
Building Owners / Districlima Customers 
1: Have money and also the heat or cooling usage. In charge of internal servicing to buildings. 
Most customers are businesses, institutions or large residential buildings. (Districlima, 2012) 
(InterviewS2, 2012) (InterviewG4, 2012) 
2: Cannot be forced into connecting, but they do not know about the option and it is different 
from the tradition of individual generation and cooling. Efficiency is not important to them, but 
they should be interested if DC provides a cheaper solution in the long term because their 
occupiers will be. If a developer, they should contribute towards infrastructure. They should like 
the simplicity, space saving, and reliability- but it takes several years of demonstrating this. They 
should be interested in lower emissions because of energy ratings, but it will cost them more up 
front. Two developers resisted at first. It was hard to convince them that the initial costs would 
be worth it. (InterviewA3, 2012) (InterviewG4, 2012) (InterviewG4, 2012) 
If a developer, they should design the service connections as established in the Infrastructure 
Plan, and also pay costs towards wider infrastructure as part of development permissions. They 
should sign 10 year contracts, but actually the contract is ‘longer’ because it hard to back out. 
DC think they should be obliged to connect. (InterviewA3, 2012) (InterviewG4, 2012) 
(InterviewS2, 2012) (Barcelona City Council, 2000) 
Elected Councillors & Mayors / Politicians Generally  
1: Deputy mayors are the presidents of TT and AE. They provide the will to make public 
capabilities work. The legacy of the Olympic planning is still there – knowledge and capability in 
the politicians to understand the process and strategy. (InterviewA3, 2012) 
2: Very difficult to convince them (the first time) that they should support Districlima. Having their 
participation and support is critical to success. The energy plan which they committed to help 
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establish their support. Also saw DC as a way to avoid unsightly individual chillers in building 
windows. One interviewer saw them as interested because of their ‘socialist’ stance towards 
urban investment. (InterviewA3, 2012) 
3: Their support is/was necessary to make public investment happen. Saw it as a great 
opportunity in the end, despite political risks and ‘new’ angle to technology. Did not want to 
force building owners, scheme should rest on its own merits and cheaper costs. (InterviewA3, 
2012) 
1.3 Self-Identified Strategy Matrix 
 Market 
Shaping 
(4)  
Market 
regulation 
(5) 
Market 
Incentives 
(6) 
Market 
capacity 
(7) 
Districlima + 0 + ++ 
Cofeley/GDF U U U U 
Tersa  U U U U 
Gas Natural U U U U 
Barcelona Regional +++ 0 U + 
Barcelona City Council  +++ ++ ++ +++ 
Imma Mayol i Beltran  U U U + 
Agència d’Energia de Barcelona ++ + 0 +++ 
22@ BCN  +++ ++ 0 ++ 
Institute for Energy Diversification 
and Saving 
+ 0 0 + 
Catalan Energy Institute  + 0 + + 
Barcelona Urban Planning 
Functions  
+++ +++ U + 
Spanish National Government  U U U U 
Organisation forum des cultures  + 0 0 + 
Building Owners DHC Customers U U U U 
Elected Councillors & Mayors / 
Politicians generally  
+ 0 0 + 
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1.4 Collective Strategy Matrix 
 Market 
Shaping (4)  
Market 
regulation (5) 
Market 
Incentives (6) 
Market 
capacity (7) 
 Potent. Actual Potent. Actual Potent. Actual Potent. Actual 
Districlima U U U U ++ ++ + ++ 
Coefeley/GDF ++ ++ 0 0 0 0 ++ ++ 
Tersa  ++ ++ 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Gas Natural 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Barcelona Regional + ++ 0 0 0 0 + + 
Barcelona City 
Council  
+++ +++ +++ ++ ++ +++ ++ ++ 
Imma Mayol i 
Beltran  
U U U U U U U U 
Agència d’Energia 
de Barcelona 
++ ++ 0 0 0 0 +++ ++ 
22@ BCN  U U U U U U ++ ++ 
Institute for Energy 
Diversification and 
Saving 
+ +   + +   
Catalan Energy 
Institute  
+ +   + +   
Barcelona Urban 
Planning Functions  
+++ +++ ++ ++   + + 
Spanish National 
Government  
U U + 0 0 0 U U 
Organisation forum 
des cultures  
+ + + + ++ +++ + + 
Building Owners 
DHC Customers 
U U U U U U U U 
Elected Councillors 
& Mayors / 
Politicians 
generally 
++ ++ 0 0 0 0 + ++ 
 
1.6 Actor Code References  
Actor Reference 
Districlima DC 
CEO, Districlima DS 
Cofeley / GDF Suez (also Agbar) GDF 
Tersa  TR 
Gas Natural GN 
Barcelona Regional BR 
Head of Energy Infrastructure, Barcelona Regional GR 
Barcelona City Council  BCC 
Imma Mayol i Beltran  IMB 
Agència d’Energia de Barcelona AEB 
Technical Director, Barcelona Energy Agency MT 
22@ BCN  TT 
Former Director of Infrastructure, 22@ BCN  RS 
Institute for Energy Diversification and Saving IDAE 
Catalan Energy Institute  ICAEN 
Barcelona Urban Planning Functions  BUP 
Spanish National Government (various)  SS 
Organisation forum des cultures  OFC 
Building Owners / Customers BO 
Elected Councillors & Mayors / Politicians generally  BC 
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1.7 Codes  
 
20 
21 
22 
23 
AEB1AEB 
AEB1BCC 
AEB2AEB 
AEB2BCC 
AEB2BUP 
AEB3AEB 
AEB3OFC 
AEB4AEB 
AEB4BCC 
AEB4BUP 
AEB5AEB 
AEB5BCC 
AEB5OFC 
AEB7AEB 
AEB7OFC 
BC1BCC 
BC1BR 
BC2BC 
BC2BO 
BC2TT 
BC3BC 
BC4BC 
BC4BCC 
BC7TT 
BCC1AEB 
BCC1BCC 
BCC2BCC 
BCC3BCC 
BCC3DC 
BCC3DS 
BCC4BCC 
BCC5BCC 
BCC6BCC 
BCC7BCC 
BR1BR 
BR2BR 
BR3TT 
BUP1BCC 
BUP1BUP 
BUP2BCC 
BUP2BO 
BUP2BUP 
BUP3BCC 
BUP3BO 
BUP3BUP 
BUP3DC 
BUP4BCC 
BUP4BUP 
BUP5BUP 
DC1BCC 
DC1BO 
DC1DC 
DC2BO 
DC2DC 
DC2OFC 
DC3DC 
DC3BO 
DS1BCC 
DS1BO 
DS1DC 
DS1DS 
DS1GDF 
DS1ICAEN 
DS1IDAE 
DS1TR 
DS2BC 
DS2BCC 
DS2BO 
DS2DC 
DS2DS 
DS2GN 
DS2OFC 
DS2TT 
DS3BCC 
DS3BO 
DS3BUP 
DS3DC 
DS4BC 
DS4BCC 
DS4ICAEN 
DS4IDAE 
DS4TR 
DS5BC 
DS5BCC 
DS6BCC 
DS6DC 
DS6OFC 
DS7DC 
DS7DS 
GDF1GDF 
GDF2GDF 
GR1BCC 
GR1BR 
GR1DC 
GR1GDF 
GR1GR 
GR1IDAE 
GR1OFC 
GR1RS 
GR1TR 
GR2BCC 
GR2BO 
GR2BR 
GR2DC 
GR2DS 
GR2GR 
GR2ICAEN 
GR2IDAE 
GR2OFC 
GR2TR 
GR3BCC 
GR3BR 
GR3GDF 
GR3TR 
GR4BCC 
GR4BR 
GR4GR 
GR4TT 
GR5BCC 
GR6DC 
GR6OFC 
GR7BR 
ICAEN1ICAEN 
ICAEN2ICAEN 
IDAE1IDAE 
IDAE2IDAE 
IDAE3BCC 
IDAE4IDAE 
IDAE7IDAE 
IMB1BCC 
IMB1DC 
IMB1GDF 
IMB1ICAEN 
IMB1IDAE 
IMB1TR 
IMB2BUP 
IMB2CC 
IMB2DC 
IMB2IMB 
IMB2TT 
IMB3DC 
IMB3IMB 
IMB4BCC 
IMB4BUP 
IMB5BCC 
IMB5SS 
IMB6BCC 
IMB6DC 
IMB6SS 
IMB7BCC 
IMB7DC 
IMB7IMB 
MT1AEAB 
MT1AEB 
MT1BC 
MT1BCC 
MT1BO 
MT1BUP 
MT1DC 
MT1GDF 
MT1ICAEN 
MT1MT 
MT1SS 
MT2AEB 
MT2BC 
MT2BCC 
MT2BO 
MT2BUP 
MT2DC 
MT2DCC 
MT2GDF 
MT2GN 
MT2MT 
MT3AEB 
MT3BCC 
MT3BO 
MT3BUP 
MT3DC 
MT3MT 
MT3SS 
MT4AEB 
MT4BCC 
MT5AEB 
MT5BCC 
MT5BUP 
MT5SS 
MT6SS 
MT7AEB 
MT7BUP 
MT7DC 
MT7GDF 
OFC1OFC 
OFC3OFC 
OFC7OFC 
RS1BC 
RS1BCC 
RS1BR 
RS1DC 
RS1GDF 
RS1OFC 
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RS1RS 
RS1SS 
RS1TT 
RS2BC 
RS2BCC 
RS2BO 
RS2BR 
RS2BUP 
RS2DC 
RS2GDF 
RS2OFC 
RS2RS 
RS2TT 
RS3BC 
RS3BCC 
RS3BO 
RS3BR 
RS3BUP 
RS3RS 
RS3TT 
RS4BC 
RS4BCC 
RS4BR 
RS4BUP 
RS4TT 
RS5BCC 
RS5BUP 
RS5DC 
RS5TT 
RS6BCC 
RS6DC 
RS6OFC 
RS7BC 
RS7BCC 
RS7BR 
RS7RS 
RS7TT 
TR1TR 
TT1TT 
TT2BCC 
TT2TT 
TT4BUP 
TT5BUP 
 
2. Burlington  
2.1 Self-Identified Actor Matrix  
Ever-Green Energy / MB 
1: Substantial experience in organisation of renewable community–based large energy systems 
in St Paul, Minnesota. Ability to evaluate technical potential of options as well as legal, financial 
viability of options. (Ever-Green Energy, 2011) Appointed by BURDES committee with funding 
from a mix of sources. Mission driven company with the goal of creating efficient district energy 
systems to benefit communities. (InterviewA4, 2012) 
2: Very supportive – see waste heat as untapped resource that is being wasted. As hired by 
BURDES, to use their experience to evaluate technical potential of options as well as legal, 
financial viability of options. Concluded that network could be built that provides cost-effective 
heat as well as a good return on cost investment. (Ever-Green Energy, 2011) Believe you have 
to take residents on ‘journey’ of understanding – but that you begin by explaining the benefits to 
politicians. (InterviewA4, 2012) 
3: Advise local governments, politicians and residents and help organise the new network 
system. Not only feasibility studies and help from a consulting standpoint, but also have the 
potential to get involved with active management and opportunistically help to improve these 
systems. Prefer a community owned non profit network with politicians and customers 
representatives on a board of governors. (InterviewA4, 2012) 
State 
No data 
Burlington city generally  
1: Burlington has a city council-mayor form of government. (City of Burlington, 2012). 
2: No data 
3: No data  
BE Burlington Electric  
1: A municipal department of the City of Burlington. Directly governed by a five-person Board of 
Electric Commissioners, who are selected by the City Council and Mayor of Burlington. 
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Vermont’s largest municipally owned electric utility, serving almost 20,000 customers. Partial 
owner of McNeil. (Grimes, 2011) 
2: No data 
3: No data  
McNeil 
1: Jointly owned by BED (50 percent), Central Vermont Public Service (20 percent), Vermont 
Public Power Supply Authority (19 percent) and Green Mountain Power (11 percent). Can burn 
wood or natural gas. At full load, the plant can generate 50 megawatts (MW) of electricity. 
(Grimes, 2011) 
2: No data 
3: No data  
Burlington Community and Economic Development Office 
1: Administering Community Development Block Grants and Urban Development Action Grants 
(City of Burlington, 2012) 
2: No data 
3: No data  
BP Burlington Planning and Chief Planner  
1: Prepares municipal plan every 4 years according to state statute – plan presents vision for 
development over next 10-20 years. (White, 2011) (Eldridge, 1985) Powers given by VSA title 
24, chapter 117. “Purpose of planning: focusing public attention and raising public involvement 
on fundamental development aspects of the city. . Not appointed by the mayor. Ability to 
develop land use policy as well as land use regulations. Ability to develop strategic ideas and 
convene discussions about future of city. (InterviewP4, Director of Planning and Zoning, City of 
Burlington, 2012) 
2: Support district heating and cooling if feasible – see it beneficial as alternative energy source, 
diversification of cities energy mix, and part of being a competitive location for business. 
Considered important in climate change mitigating and abatement options. (Eldridge, 1985) 
Planners originally instrumental in getting the city interested in climate change and talking about 
what the city should do. See their role as management of process that comes up with ideas and 
encouraging them, but not responsible for making ideas like district heating happen. 
(InterviewP4, Director of Planning and Zoning, City of Burlington, 2012) 
3: Include district heating in city visions and planning, but Burlington Electric is the primary 
organisation to deliver network (White, 2011) (Eldridge, 1985). Try to keep the BURDES 
network going and keep an eye out for opportunities that present themselves (InterviewP4, 
Director of Planning and Zoning, City of Burlington, 2012). 
BURDES Committee 
1: A group of citizen-volunteers who are committed to taking advantage of the underutilized heat 
from the McNeil Electric Generating Station. Raised grant money from foundations and funds to 
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do feasibility study work (BURDES, 2012) (Burlington District Energy Service, 2012). After 
several years of activity, understand major issues and technical details. (InterviewC2, 2012) 
2: Very supportive - exist to promote a district heating network which uses waste heat from 
McNeil to serve downtown and/or the university and hospital. “Our citizen's committee believes 
that district heating service for the Burlington community using heat from the McNeil Station is 
an important step to reduce our carbon footprint and provide energy security in the coming 
years.”  (BURDES, 2012) (Burlington District Energy Service, 2012). Understand it will take time 
and political will, and will not happen overnight. (InterviewC2, 2012) 
3: Organise studies to identify a practical solution. Promote both technical options based on 
energy demand inventory as well as consider options for structure of organisation to run the 
network. Engage with potential large customers (BURDES, 2012) (Burlington District Energy 
Service, 2012). Open regarding future ownership of heating network – can see several options 
working both private and non-profit approach. Do not see themselves as future owners. 
(InterviewC2, 2012) 
Local Journalists 
1: Local journalists. (Baird, 2011) (Picard, 2011)  
2: Positive, imagining how it could work in Burlington and identifies benefits for fuel diversity.  
(Baird, 2011) (Picard, 2011)  
University of Vermont 
1: Academic and residential campus. Student and staff population approx 13,000. (University of 
Vermont, 2012) 
2: Strongly committed to conserving electricity, fuel, and water as part of its goals to become the 
"leading environmental university of the nation." Significant heat usage. (University of Vermont, 
2012)  
3: : Campus buildings are tied into a centralised heating system, with over 8.8 miles of high 
temperature hot water systems. (University of Vermont, 2012) 
Fletcher Allen Hospital  
1: Non-profit hospital serving local residents and providing advanced care to wider state 
population. Partnership with University of Vermont. Significant heat usage. (Fletcher Allen 
Hospital, 2012) 
2: No data 
3: No data  
Residents 
No data 
2.2 Collective Actor Matrix  
Ever Green Energy 
1: Technical knowledge and experience of designing and operating wood and waste fuelled co-
generation plants. (InterviewC2, 2012) 
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2: No data 
3: Advise city, committee and residents on how to establish district heating network. 
(InterviewC2, 2012) 
State 
1: State level planning provides technical system and advice, not much authority. Ability to 
convey certificate of public good – benchmark of utility status. Stimulus funds. Own buildings in 
downtown and have 2020 target to be on renewable fuel for those buildings. (InterviewC3, 
2012; InterviewP4, Director of Planning and Zoning, City of Burlington, 2012) 
2: Perceived as interested and supportive, but not actively. For local buildings, aware and mildly 
interested in being a customer. (InterviewC3, 2012) (InterviewC2, 2012) 
3: Approval of certificate of public good would be approval of project. Potentially as source of 
long-term loans for public projects. Also as a customer for federal buildings downtown. 
(InterviewC3, 2012) (InterviewC2, 2012) 
Burlington city generally  
1: Political leadership on issue. Mayor is elected at large every 3 years and appoints number of 
city staff. City councillors serve 2 year terms and act on boards or commissions. Ability to raise 
money for investment in BE projects through bonds. Local finances constrained by bad credit 
rating. Does not own many buildings. (InterviewC3, 2012) (InterviewA4, 2012) (InterviewC2, 
2012) 
2:Currently neither obstructive nor supportive. Need to be very supportive to make customers 
and finance work and explain to residents what is happening. Current Mayor likes the idea but 
thought it needed a concrete financial future and would not finance it without customers. 
Concerned about financial impact on city credit and budgets. (InterviewC3, 2012) (InterviewC2, 
2012) 
3: Older plans suggest the city should develop and energy budget and manage both 
consumption and local generating capacity. City municipal support needed before further 
customer engagement. Public works department would coordinate pipework installation in 
streets. Would not be a major customer of heat. (InterviewC3, 2012) (InterviewC2, 2012) 
Burlington Electric Department 
1: Owns McNeil and have residential presence. Partially owned by city municipality – seen as 
positive and also a limiting factor as have to listen to other owners – 2/3 vote for major projects. 
Provided funds for feasibility reports. With political support, raise money for power investment 
through bonds. Well managed and liked. Funded previous studies with state money granted. 
(Gertler, 1978) (InterviewC2, 2012) 
2: Perceived as support essential to make the network happen. Older plans suggest they should 
consider social and environmental costs of energy options. Supportive of feasibility studies on 
using thermal energy from McNeil. Varied owners likely to be supportive, but unknown in detail. 
“not huge advocates but if something makes sense let's do it” – require further information on 
feasibility. (InterviewA4, 2012) (InterviewC2, 2012) (Eldridge, Municipal development plan, 
1985)  
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3: Older plans give them responsibility for developing feasibility of network and leading on 
implementation if appropriate. Not seen as full leader - perceived as partner in final organisation 
which would run this, or other options for management. They would invest in and own the 
thermal generation plant but not be solely in control of pipe network, billing and operations. 
(InterviewA4, 2012) (Eldridge, Municipal development plan, 1985) (Ever-Green Energy, 2011) 
(InterviewC2, 2012) 
McNeil 
1: Waste heat is a great opportunity. Sufficient to meet needs of downtown Burlington. 
(InterviewA4, 2012) (Ever-Green Energy, 2011)  
2: No data 
2: No data 
Burlington Community And Economic Development Office 
1: Operate under the wing of the Mayor. Provided funds for feasibility reports. Staff attend 
BURDES Meeting. (InterviewC2, 2012; InterviewP4, Director of Planning and Zoning, City of 
Burlington, 2012)  
2: No data 
3: More active role in implementation of these kind of initiatives. (InterviewA4, 2012) 
BP Burlington Planning and Chief Planner 
1: Manage rights of way access. (InterviewC2, 2012)  
2: No data 
3: No data  
BURDES Committee  
1: Group of people committed to making district heating work. Obtained $140,000 funds for and 
commissioned latest feasibility study. Because of size of town, small group can have influence. 
(InterviewC3, 2012) 
2: Committed to identifying a practical solution that leads to the creating of a renewable-fuelled 
community energy system in Burlington using the underutilized thermal energy from the McNeil 
Station. (Ever-Green Energy, 2011)  
3: Pull together the people and ideas and knowledge. (InterviewA4, 2012) 
Local Journalists 
No data 
University of Vermont 
1: University with approximately 13,000 staff and students. Large heating consumption – 
potential customer who would be important for network. (Ever-Green Energy, 2011)  
2: Historically not supportive as wanted to retain their existing generation plant associated 
engineering jobs. Interest depends on natural gas prices. Potentially more interested now than 
in past (Ever-Green Energy, 2011) (InterviewC2, 2012) (InterviewA4, 2012) 
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3: Be an anchor tenant which created enough demand to make pipe investment feasible. Sign 
up for long term contract to purchase heat from network on terms more favourable than natural 
gas (Ever-Green Energy, 2011) (InterviewC2, 2012). 
FA Fletcher Allen 
1: Large heating consumption - potential customer who would be important for network (Ever-
Green Energy, 2011).  
2: Unclear intentions with regards to future connection and/or technical compatibility. But 
expressed interest in continuing the discussions (Ever-Green Energy, 2011) .  
3: Be an anchor tenant which created enough demand to make pipe investment feasible. Sign 
up for long term contract to purchase heat from network on terms more favourable than natural 
gas. To date, they have preferred to operate a gas or oil fired small steam heating network. Now 
slightly interested in connection to McNeil potential network (InterviewC2, 2012) (Ever-Green 
Energy, 2011).  
Residents 
1: 2/3 use natural gas for heating; previous electric or coal use. High proportion of rental 
properties and students in town. Value conservation and effective resource utilization and local 
solutions. Vote on financial loans and bonds for major projects. Aware of McNeil station as 
wood fired. (Ever-Green Energy, 2011) .  
2: Interested in environmental issues – therefore potentially interested in waste heat and climate 
change reasons for district heating. Self-reliance reason is there, but subsidiary to general 
environmental concerns. Also expectation that they will be sceptical of city ownership and costs 
because of Burlington Telecom. (InterviewC3, 2012) (InterviewP4, Director of Planning and 
Zoning, City of Burlington, 2012)  (InterviewC2, 2012) (Ever-Green Energy, 2011).  
3: They would vote on finance (bonds) or city investment. Marginal interest in scheme to date, 
although public meeting in 2011 was enthusiastic. (InterviewC3, 2012) (InterviewC2, 2012)  
(InterviewP4, Director of Planning and Zoning, City of Burlington, 2012) 
2.3 Self-Identified Strategy Matrix  
 Market 
Shaping (4)  
Market 
regulation (5) 
Market 
Incentives (6) 
Market 
capacity (7) 
Ever Green Energy 0 0 0 +++ 
State U U U U 
Burlington city generally  U U U U 
Burlington Electric  U 0 0 0 
McNeil 0 0 0 0 
BC community dept + U + U 
BP Burlington Planning 
and Chief Planner 
+++ + + ++ 
BURDES   ++ 0 0 +++ 
Local Journalists 0 0 0 0 
University of Vermont 0 0 0 0 
FA Fletcher Allen 0 0 0 0 
Residents U U U U 
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2.4 Collective Strategy Matrix  
 Market Shaping 
(4)  
Market 
Regulation (5) 
Market 
Incentives (6) 
Market Capacity 
(7) 
 Potent. Actual Potent. Actual Potent. Actual Potent. Actual 
Ever Green 
Energy 
0 0 0 0 0 0 +++ +++ 
State 0 0 ++ ++ ++ + + + 
City of 
Burlington 
Generally  
++ 0 0 0 ++ 0 + 0 
Burlington 
Electric  
++ + 0 0 0 0 ++ ++ 
McNeil 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Burlington 
Community 
dept 
+ + 0 0 + + 0 0 
Burlington 
Planning and 
Chief Planner 
+ 0 + 0 0 0 0 0 
BURDES  ++ +  0 0 0 0 +++ +++ 
Local 
Journalists 
0 0 0 0 0 0 ++ ++ 
University of 
Vermont 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
FA Fletcher 
Allen 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Residents 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
2.5 Actor Code References 
Code Name 
 Market 
EGE Ever Green Energy 
MB Senior Vice President, Ever Green Energy  
 Public / State 
S State generally (incl public board of approvals) 
B City Government of Burlington Generally  
BS Former Community Development Officer 
MN McNeil Generating Station 
BE Burlington Coop Electricity 
JI Manager of McNeil Generating Station 
BC Burlington Community Economic Development Office  
EA Community Development Officer 
DW Director of Planning and Zoning, Burlington  
BP Burlington Planning Dept  
 Civic 
BURDES Burlington District Energy Service  
JS Local Resident on BURDES committee 
KP Kevin Pickard, Journalist 
FP FREE Press (editorial unnamed) 
JB Joel Banner Baird, Journalist  
UV University of Vermont 
FA Fletcher Allen Hospital  
R General Residents  
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2.6 Codes 
 
20 
21 
21] 
22 
B1B 
B2B 
BC1BC 
BC4BC 
BC6BC 
BE1BE 
BE4BE 
BE4R 
BED4R 
BM2B 
BP1B 
BP1BE 
BP1BP 
BP1R 
BP2B 
BP2BE 
BP2BED 
BP2BP 
BP2BURDES 
BP3B 
BP3BE 
BP3BP 
BP4BP 
BP5BP 
BP6BP 
BP7BP 
BURDES1BURD
ES 
BURDES1FA 
BURDES1UV 
BURDES2BE 
BURDES2BURD
ES 
BURDES2UV 
BURDES3B 
BURDES3BURD
ES 
BURDES3EGE 
BURDES7BURD
ES 
BURDES7EGE 
DW1B 
DW1BP 
DW1BURDES 
DW1DW 
DW1S 
DW2B 
DW2BC 
DW2BE 
DW2BP 
DW2BURDES 
DW2R 
DW2S 
DW2UV 
DW3BP 
DW3R 
DW3UV 
DW4BC 
DW4BP 
DW5B 
DW5BP 
DW5S 
DW7BP 
DW7BURDES 
EGE1B 
EGE1BC 
EGE1BE 
EGE1BURDES 
EGE1EGE 
EGE1FA 
EGE2B 
EGE2BE 
EGE2BURDES 
EGE2EGE 
EGE2FA 
EGE2R 
EGE3BUDES 
EGE3BURDES 
EGE3EGE 
EGE4BURDES 
EGE7BE 
EGE7BURDES 
EGE7EGE 
FA1FA 
FP1BE 
FP1R 
FP2BE 
FP2R 
JB1B 
JB1BE 
JB1BP 
JB1BURDES 
JB1R 
JB1S 
JB2B 
JB2BE 
JB2EG 
JB2JB 
JB2JI 
JB2R 
JB2S 
JB3JI 
JB3R 
JB5BP 
JB5S 
JI1BE 
JI1BURDES 
JI1R 
JI2B 
JI2BE 
JI2BURDES 
JI2FA 
JI2JI 
JI2R 
JI2UV 
JI4B 
JI6S 
JS1BC 
JS1BE 
JS1BURDES 
JS1FA 
JS1JS 
JS1R 
JS1S 
JS1UV 
JS2B 
JS2BE 
JS2BURDES 
JS2FA 
JS2JS 
JS2S 
JS2UV 
JS3B 
JS3BE 
JS3BURDES 
JS3EGE 
JS4B 
JS4BP 
JS4BURDES 
JS5S 
JS6S 
JS7BURDES 
JS7EGE 
JS7JS 
JS7S 
KP1BURDES 
KP2BURDES 
MB1BURDES 
MB1EGE 
MB1M 
MB1MB 
MB2B 
MB2BE 
MB2BURDES 
MB2EGE 
MB2ENE 
MB2MB 
MB2R 
MB3BURDES 
MB3EGE 
MB4BP 
MB4BURDES 
MB6S 
MB7B 
MB7BURDES 
MB7EGE 
MB7JB 
MN1MN 
UV2UV 
 
3. Lerwick  
3. 1 Self-identified Actor Matrix 
Scottish Hydro/SSE 
1: Leading electricity and gas company (private) operating in the UK and Ireland. Generation, 
transmission, distribution and supply of electricity. Production & distribution of gas and other 
energy services. (SSE, 2013) 
2: No data 
3: No data 
SHEAP (also NW) 
239 
 
1: Lease DH kit from SICT. Serving district heating to both domestic and non-domestic 
properties since 1998. Money from thermie, charitable trust and Europe. Trust are financial 
backers. SICT breaks even with lease of kit, profits, employee costs etc. Learned about DH- 
originally thought it silly., Went to Denmark. Was originally a council officer in charge of 
engineering and new works. 6 Staff, 4 technical. Could handle 100 connections a year. 
(InterviewS1, 2011; Martin & Spence, 2010; Shetland Heat Energy and Power Limited, 2011)  
2: Operate system. Get customers (now have waiting list) to sign up. Bill customers, provide 
them with heat. Wanted a large town ring main, took a while to connect up. Currently searching 
for an additional (cheap) energy source. No mains gas to compete with, so cost generally 
cheapest heating source (flux over time). Finances and return on investment not so good, but 
good for Lerwick. (InterviewS1, 2011; Martin & Spence, 2010; Shetland Heat Energy and Power 
Limited, 2011)  
3: Build network to customers. Currently considering how to expand (need cheap heat). Original 
plan to serve whole town, through a ring approach. This was reduced to main pipeline. Hoping 
to start up connections again in 2013. Built out as much as heat output allows – require further 
source of heat to expand further. District Heating is appropriate for Lerwick. Start with 
commercial customers (non-residential) as residential more difficult. Not involved inside the 
houses due to lack of resources. (InterviewS1, 2011; Martin & Spence, 2010)  
SICT  
1: Set up in 1974 , recreated in 1997. Original payment £2m, total payments over £81m. 
Charitable Status. Can invest in subsidiary companies, stock market, for benefit of Shetland 
residents (specified areas). EU money for incinerator. £1 million from community energy 
programme – 1/3 shared w social housing. (Robertson, 2008; Shetland Island Charitable Trust, 
2012)  
2: Invest in a district heating scheme as it would provide an economic and environmental benefit 
to the whole of Shetland. Get return on lease from SHEAP – would be ‘profit’ (tax free) – to 
charitable trust. (Robertson, 2008; Shetland Island Charitable Trust, 2012; InterviewS1, 2011)  
3: Own DH infrastructure. Originally seen as neutral investment, but conceded in 2002 
investment was grant. Should keep expanding. (InterviewS1, 2011; Martin & Spence, 2010)  
Gilbert Bain Hospital 
1: Hospital was connected when current engineer joined; he understands the basics but doesn’t 
have to get involved in running it. (InterviewU1, 2011) 
2: Happy. Rarely has problems, if he does he calls Neville. (InterviewU1, 2011) 
3: No data 
SIC  
1: Did not know about DH – went to Danish for expertise. Also spoke to Univer. Dundee and 
others. Hosted open dialogue about waste incineration & DH plans. Skilled individuals to 
evaluate environmental externalities. Owns waste to energy plant & has to deal with waste 
policy. Cannot sell hot water to customers. (InterviewG3, 2011; Martin & Spence, 2010) 
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2: Shetland Energy Plan (1998) promotes energy efficiency and sustainability. Had to replace 
existing incinerators. Landfill was not a good solution because of long term EU policy. Managing 
waste of off-shore industry keeps jobs in Sheffield. Recovery of heat essential in thermal 
efficiency of waste incineration - part of managing environmental externalities. Incineration 
without recovery same as landfill in environmental terms. Discussed with SH about taking heat 
from power station. Considered SICT as partner, as linked to economic development. 
(InterviewG3, 2011; Martin & Spence, 2010; Shetland Islands Council, 2000) 
3: Policy Action Plan supports DH scheme. Success indicators in structure plan include number 
of homes connected to DH scheme. Incineration good for relationship with north sea oil 
companies. Head and Power (from incineration plant) the preferred option from early on. 
Council tenants have option of district heating or electric storage heaters. (Shetlands Islands 
Council, Planning Service; InterviewG3, 2011)  
SIC - Waste to Energy Plant  
1: WS: Council’s budget for incinerator got reduced. But ERDF funding helped incinerator be 
built. Level of knowledge influenced by Europe. JG: Council led incineration discussion & 
negotiations with neighbours. Council struggled to find funds to build incinerator. Got ERDF 
funds. (InterviewG3, 2011; Martin & Spence, 2010) 
2: No incentive to do power only. Cost neutral to do heat also. European directives pushing 
them to do waste to energy. Right thing to do environmental terms. Shetland prefers to be self 
sufficient. DH likely to be more contentious than incineration (historic). JG: Liked incineration – 
could see EU policy, also didn’t make sense to ship off-isle. Recovery of heat essential in 
thermal efficiency of waste incineration - part of managing environmental externalities. 
Incineration without recovery same as landfill. Incinerator with heat not more expensive. 
Discussed with SH about taking heat from power station. (InterviewG3, 2011; Martin & Spence, 
2010) 
3: Designed waste to energy incinerator so that has to be connected to DH to be able to 
operate. This for environmental reasons. (InterviewG3, 2011) 
Scottish Government – generally 
1: Set overarching waste and energy policies. (Scottish Environmental Protection Agency, 2003) 
2: No data 
3: No data 
European Government – Generally 
1: ERDF & Thermie Funding. (European Commission) 
2: No data 
3: No data 
SIC Planning Generally (incl BB) 
1: Create policies that support or inhibit DH. DH required permission as not a statutory utility. 
Planning powers in this area relate to fact DH is not statutory utility and require permission. 
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(InterviewP2, 2011). Try and facilitate projects through coordination. Input into strategic 
documents such as structure plan and waste strategy. (Murray, 2011; Shetland Islands Council, 
2004) G406 
2: Policy requires notification of pipes. (Shetland Islands Council, 2004). Sees Planning at 
coordinating role – dig up king Harold street one (combine with other infrastructure works). Sees 
development (DH included) as positive - “we’re pro development”. (InterviewP2, 2011) 
3: Success indicators in structure plan include number of homes connected to DH scheme. 
Local Plan references extension of DH scheme as part of energy initiatives. (Shetland Islands 
Council, 2004). Development plan & implementation office – coordinating everything.. Guide 
and persuade. Possible as small place. (InterviewP2, 2011) 
3.2 Collective Actor Maxtrix  
Scottish Hydro/SSE 
1: Own power station with heat wastage (20 – 30 MW). 60% of output is heat and is dumped 
into atmosphere. Expectation but uncertainly about replacement power station – location, size, 
etc. (InterviewG3, 2011; InterviewS1, 2011; Shetland Times, 2008)  
2: Initially interested in either owning or participating in heat network (could see heat). Would 
make power station cleaner and greener than it might otherwise be. Stated in press that spare 
energy in new plant can be used in DH scheme. Hydro board part of project at start . Thinking 
about it in relation to new station (not yet built). (InterviewG3, 2011; InterviewS1, 2011; Shetland 
Times, 2008)  
3: Discussed for 3 years but did not commit. Also did not build new station. Uncertainly about 
new station hampered their involvement. “They realised the DH isn’t a commercial activity in 
terms of the cost of laying pipes n what they’d recovery from the heat.” (InterviewG3, 2011; 
InterviewS1, 2011; Shetland Times, 2008)  
SHEAP – General 
1: Got some of ERDF money for incinerator (900k), also separate European thermie (£1M) 
funds and some of community energy programme (EST). £2m grant money from Trust. Take 
(pay for?) heat from incinerator, lease pipes from Council. Had to build up knowledge over time 
- still rely on Danish expertise now and then. (InterviewG3, 2011; InterviewS1, 2011)  
2: Established as social Investment by Trust to build and operate network, but expected to get 
investment back. The only way it could have been established (capital investment) was through 
Trust (several people mention). Original plan was to serve the entire town off a ring main. 
(Robertson, 2008; InterviewG3, 2011) 
3: Customers happy with service and scheme. Leases kit for £20k a year from SICT, pays 
profits over to SICT. SICT at least breaks even. Serving over 1,000 customers. NM Runs 
SHEAP. Responsible for negotiating pipe layouts with landlords and city. (Robertson, 2008; 
InterviewG3, 2011) 
SICT – general 
242 
 
1: Have oil money. Can do charitable things or investments in Shetland with approx 20% of total 
trust investment fund. Can invest in and encourage projects which support the local economy. 
(InterviewS1, 2011) 
2: Looking for return on investments (20% on local investments, on 30 year basis), but also 
gave £2m initial grant. See district heating as good investment in local economic development. 
Initially was annual funding, but eventually accepted on long term basis. Generally in alignment 
with council objectives due to shared contacts and members. (InterviewG3, 2011; InterviewS1, 
2011; Robertson, 2008)  
3: Established SHEAP as social investment and invested in it. Expecting to get all money back 
on establishment but not necessarily make a profit. In 2002 accepted some investment as grant. 
Currently breaking even on heating income / staff costs / leasing of pipes. Stacks up in 
“Shetland PLC terms”. (InterviewG3, 2011; InterviewS1, 2011)  
Gilbert Bain Hospital 
1: Use heat. (InterviewS1, 2011) 
2: More interested than council buildings. (InterviewS1, 2011) 
3: Significant customer of heat. Start with commercial customers (non-residential) as residential 
more difficult. (InterviewG3, 2011; InterviewS1, 2011)  
SIC – general 
1: Responsible for waste policy. Own heat source (waste to energy incinerator) for DH network. 
Budget was very tight in ’93, and looked to Europe for funding of incinerator. Sent people to 
Denmark to learn more about district heating and incinerators. Cannot sell hot water to 
customers. (InterviewG3, 2011; InterviewS1, 2011; Martin & Spence, 2010)  
2: Pro-development. Required to remove existing incinerator, supportive of new incinerator. Pro-
incineration for waste policy reasons and tradition. Considered environmental impacts of 
incineration. Heat connection not significantly more costly than a power only option. . Influenced 
by Europe for waste policy. Did not have the money to fund the heat network installation. Mixed 
opinions about connecting council buildings to the network originally. (InterviewS1, 2011; 
Robertson, 2008; Scottish Environmental Protection Agency, 2003)  
3: Build incinerator with support of local residents. Incinerator should use heat recovery for 
district network on environmental, efficiency and cost grounds. Did not automatically give ‘heat’ 
as ‘customer’ to SHEAP. Eventually did. (InterviewS1, 2011; Martin & Spence, 2010)  
Scottish Government – generally 
1: Not a source of information or support. Inland revenue was regular in tax terms. (InterviewS1, 
2011) 
2: Existing financial support required renewables or low carbon technologies to be connected to 
the grid (unhelpful). Waste policies behind European requirements. (InterviewG3, 2011; 
InterviewS1, 2011)  
3: Point out as exemplar project. (Martin & Spence, 2010) 
European Government – Generally 
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1: Source of funds for infrastructure projects. Source of environmental policy. (InterviewS1, 
2011) 
2: EU Directive on Incineration drove replacement of old with new. (InterviewG3, 2011) 
3: Incinerator received ERDF funding. (InterviewG3, 2011; Martin & Spence, 2010) 
SIC Planning Generally 
1: Coordinating of public works. Has to approve pipe routes. (InterviewG3, 2011; InterviewS1, 
2011)  
2: Pro-Development. SHEAP is not a statutory utility so policy must regulate pipe works and 
planning permission required for laying of pipes. (note lack of mention of incinerator as issue). 
(InterviewG3, 2011) 
3: Part of coordination of king Harold street works – heating pipes and repaving installed at 
same time. (InterviewS1, 2011) 
Residents 
1: Had choice about connection (except in new build). Had to pay for connection and in-home 
infrastructure. (InterviewS1, 2011) 
2: Practical folk, see a need for it. Seen as part of lanes street refurbishment. Costs less than 
higher oil costs and cheaper than electric. Plumbers initially weary but over time became very 
good promoters of scheme. (InterviewG3, 2011; InterviewS1, 2011; Robertson, 2008; 
InterviewP2, 2011; Shetland Heat Energy and Power Limited, 2011)  
3: Accepted it. Now seen as added value to homes (listed in sales adverts). More given choice 
accepted it over time (70% of street). Initially neighbourhood may have accepted it because of 
Norwegian links. No objections to incinerator (had one previously). Waiting list for connection. 
(InterviewG3, 2011; InterviewS1, 2011; InterviewP2, 2011; Shetland Heat Energy and Power 
Limited, 2011)  
3.3 Self-Identified Strategy Matrix  
 Market 
Shaping (4)  
Market 
Regulation (5) 
Market 
Stimulation (6) 
Market 
Capacity 
building (7) 
Scottish Hydro/SSE + 0 0 0 
SHEAP – General 0 0 ++ +++ 
SICT – general + 0 + 0 
Gilbert Bain Hospital U U U U 
SIC – general +++ 0 ++ +++  
Scottish Government – 
generally 
+ U 0 U 
European Government – 
Generally 
+ ++ ++ U 
SIC Planning Generally ++ ++ 0 ++ 
Residents U U U U 
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3.4 Collective Strategy Matrix  
 Market Shaping 
(4)  
Market 
regulation (5) 
Market 
Stimulation (6) 
Market capacity 
building (7) 
 Potent. Actual Potent. Actual Potent. Actual Potent. Actual 
Scottish 
Hydro/SSE 
++ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SHEAP – 
General 
0 0 0 0 ++ ++ +++ +++ 
SICT – general ++ + 0 0 ++ +++ 0 0 
Gilbert Bain 
Hospital 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SIC – general ++ + 0 0 +++ ++ +++ +++ 
Scottish and 
UK 
Government – 
generally 
+ 0 0 0 ++ + + 0 
European 
Government – 
Generally 
+ + ++ ++ ++ ++ U U 
SIC Planning 
Generally 
0 0 + + + + 0 0 
Residents 0 0 0 0 0 0 + + 
 
3.5 Actor References  
 Treating JI, JS and WS as COUNCIL  
 NW as own 
 JG as SHEAP OR SICT  
Actor Reference 
Scottish Hydro/SSE SH 
SHEAP General Manager NM 
SHEAP – General Sheap 
SIC – general Council 
SICT – general Trust 
SICT – financial Controller JG 
Gilbert Bain Hospital HE 
Hjatland Housing Association – Director PL 
SIC - Waste to Energy Plant – Director WS 
SIC – Energy manager  JS 
SIC – Waste Services – Director  JI 
Scottish Government – generally SG 
European Government – Generally EG 
Robert Henderson - Local Councillor (SICT, SIC) RH 
Richard Nickerson – Local Councillor  RN 
SIC - Planning Officer  BB 
SIC - Planning Generally Planning 
SIC - Previous Planning Officer  FM 
Residents R 
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3.6 Code List 
20 
21 
22 
BB1BB 
BB1planning 
BB2BB 
BB2council 
BB2planning 
BB2R 
BB3R 
BB4BB 
BB4council 
BB4NM 
BB4planning 
BB5BB 
BB5planning 
BB7BB 
BB7planning 
Council1Council 
COUNCIL1COUNIL 
COUNCIL1PLANNING 
COUNCIL2COUNCIL 
COUNCIL2EU 
COUNCIL2FOE 
COUNCIL2R 
COUNCIL2SG 
COUNCIL3COUNCIL 
COUNCIL4COUNCIL 
COUNCIL4SH 
Council4Trust 
COUNCIL6SG 
Council7Council 
EG4EG 
EG5EG 
EG6EG 
HE1HE 
HE2HE 
HE3Sheap 
J17COUNCIL 
J2SH 
JG1Council 
JG1Sheap 
JG1Trust 
JG2Council 
JG2Sheap 
JG2Trust 
JG3R 
JG3Trust 
JG6Council 
JG6ECC 
JG6EG 
JI1COUNCIL 
JI1PLANNING 
JI1SHEAP 
JI1Trust 
JI2COUNCIL 
JI2R 
JI2SG 
JI2SH 
JI2SHEAP 
JI2Trust 
JI3R 
JI3SEHAP 
JI3SH 
JI3SHEAP 
JI4COUNCIL 
JI6SG 
JI7COUNCIL 
JS1Council 
JS1JS 
JS1SG 
JS1trust 
JS2Council 
JS2JS 
JS2R 
JS3R 
JS4COUCNIL 
JS4COUNCIL 
JS5ECC 
JS5SG 
NM1Council 
NM1EG 
NM1NM 
NM1R 
NM1SG 
NM1Sheap 
NM1Trust 
NM20 
NM2Council 
NM2ECC 
NM2HE 
NM2NM 
NM2R 
NM2SG 
NM2SH 
NM2Sheap 
NM2Trust 
NM3Council 
NM3NM 
NM3R 
NM3Sheap 
NM3Trust 
NM4Council 
NM6Council 
NM6ECC 
NM6EG 
NM6EU 
NM6R 
NM6SG 
NM6Sheap 
NM6Sheat 
NM7Council 
NM7NM 
NM7R 
NM7Sheap 
PLANNING3PLANNING 
PLANNING4PLANNING 
PLANNING5PLANNING 
PLANNING5SHEAP 
R2COUNCIL 
R2TRUST 
SG2COUNCIL 
SG2SH 
SG2Trust 
SG3SH 
SG4SG 
SH1SH 
SHEAP1SHEAP 
SHEAP2R 
SHEAP2SHEAP 
SHEAP3SHEAP 
SHEAP4SHEAP 
SHEAP6R 
SHEAP6SHEAP 
TRUST1TRUST 
TRUST2R 
TRUST2TRUST 
TRUST3SHEAP 
TRUST3TRUST 
TRUST4TRUST 
TURST1TRUST 
WS1Council 
WS1EG 
WS1NM 
WS1Planning 
WS1SG 
WS1sheap 
WS1trust 
WS1WS 
WS2Council 
WS2planning 
WS2R 
WS2SH 
WS2trust 
WS2WS 
WS3council 
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WS3Council 
WS3HE 
WS3Planning 
WS3R 
WS3SH 
WS3trust 
WS3WS 
WS4Council 
WS4EG 
WS4PLANNING 
WS4SG 
WS4SSG 
WS4WS 
WS5Planning 
WS5R 
WS6 
WS6Council 
WS6ECC 
WS6EG 
WS6HE 
WS6SG 
WS7council 
WS7NM 
WS7WS 
WSHE
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4. London  
4.1 Self-Identified Actor Matrix 
DBIS / BERR 
1: Publish national policy. Influence amount of financial support provided to renewables or DHC 
schemes through national incentive schemes. Influence central government spending on energy 
towards carbon neutrality. (DTI, 2003; DTI, 2007) 
2: Support energy market, business and promote a low carbon economy through national policy. 
Technical and structural challenges to decentralised energy. Distributed energy can potentially 
lower emissions, increase diversity of supply and lower costs. It would be a significant change 
from status quo. (DTI, 2003; DTI, 2007) 
3: Introduce some economic reforms to promote decentralised energy, including CHP, through a 
private sector ‘market’ for delivery. Goal is remove barriers and create level playing field. (DTI, 
2003; DTI, 2007) 
Clinton Climate Change Initiative  
1: Raise profile of scheme, share information about other schemes (InterviewC1, 2011)  
2: Promote examples of leadership at an international level, knowledge sharing is key to helping 
cities address climate change.  (InterviewC1, 2011) 
3: Advise, sharing knowledge and provide external recognition.  (InterviewC1, 2011) 
Dalkia Bio-Energy  
1: Technical knowledge of delivery, and corporate finance to fund some (not all) of scheme 
delivery. (Dalkia, 2008) 
2: Make profit out of providing energy through a contractual relationship with the local authority. 
(Dalkia, 2008) 
3: Changed their approach over time – from centred on Elephant and Castle to centred on 
Aylsebury. This was in response to likely build time and programme delay. (Cllr Fiona Colley, 
2011) 
DCLG 
1: Set national planning and community strategy, generate new laws and regulations, administer 
incentive schemes; provide guidance. Plays a key role in supporting government environmental 
objectives. (CLG, 2007; Ellis, 2008)  
2: CHP is an efficient form of decentralised energy. State a national community energy objective 
to be delivered at local level by public sector and provide some financial support. (CLG, 2007; 
Ellis, 2008) 
3: Set national planning framework for local authorities to take forward in their areas and 
regulate new building energy emissions. Use the planning system to encourage the private 
sector and local authorities to deliver community energy. (CLG, 2007) 
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DEFRA 
1: Set national climate change strategy and promote low carbon or efficient energy generation 
(until 2008). Recognised that CHP target / promotion not working. (DEFRA, 2007) 
2: They should promote promote a low-carbon economy through national policies (prior to 
2008). CHP potential is large, but there are a number of barriers to delivering more district 
energy in the UK. (DEFRA, 2007) 
3: Support increasing use of CHP and its role in community energy schemes through quality 
assurance, fiscal incentives, and changes to licensing (prior to 2008) (DEFRA, 2007) 
Greater London Authority (Mayor of London) / London Development Agency 
1: Regional government with some powers over local councils. Set vision for district energy and 
provide information on energy, heat loads, and the potential for district energy. Ability to regulate 
major new development, SP planning policy, and GLA development for energy efficiency and 
use of DHC Some ability to direct funds to support schemes. (Greater London Authority, 2009; 
Greater London Authority, 2004; Greater London Authority, 2005)  
2: Decentralised energy is not appropriate in all circumstances, but can deliver significant cost 
and energy savings. Evolved from activist to business enabling. Did consider delivering DHC 
through a partnership with EDF, but it did not live long. Through London plan, should direct 
borough planning departments to support DHC in major developments. (Greater London 
Authority, 2006; Greater London Authority, 2005; Greater London Authority, 2009; Greater 
London Authority, 2007)   
3: CHP is a good solution for cutting carbon emissions and should be main priority approach. 
Strongly planning policy which requires new major development to consider DHC and achieve 
energy efficiency standards. Encourage boroughs to consider, and encourage private sector 
with information and seed funding; grant fund where possible. Set up two different agencies to 
promote and deliver DHC. Delivery based off GLA direct/controlled development. (Greater 
London Authority, 2006; Greater London Authority, 2007; Greater London Authority, 2005; 
Greater London Authority, 2009) 
London Energy Partnership  
1: Independent consortium of boroughs and energy companies to provide knowledge and 
connections. Established by GLA. Produced reports. Existed until mid 2009. (London Energy 
Partnership, 2007; London Energy Partnership)  
2: Own study concluded large scale DCH led by CHP is the best option for London carbon 
reductions in cost terms. Aimed to serve as best practice sharing forum. (London Energy 
Partnership, 2007; London Energy Partnership; London Energy Partnership, 2006)  
3: Promoted large scale DHC projects. A better understanding of finance, skills, and heat 
mapping will support community energy. (London Energy Partnership, 2007; London Energy 
Partnership, 2006) 
Brian Dunlop Associates 
1: Consultant advisor to LB Southwark – technical knowledge and analysis. Advised on energy 
and water approach and technical specification from 2003 to 2010; contributed to resource flow 
249 
 
assessment and concept of MUSCO. Has knowledge of other UK DHC schemes such as 
Woking. (InterviewA1, 2011) 
2: DHC is best approach for E&C regeneration to address environmental issues. If the project 
takes too long to deliver, momentum will be lost and the politics will have changed. 
(InterviewA1, 2011) 
3: Supportive of multi-utility infrastructure concept. Local Authority should take control and drive 
the scheme through planning and perhaps even control operation. The energy centre / district 
approach was the most cost effective reductions in £/kgCO2. DHC schemes need a champion 
who understands both financial and engineering sides (based on understanding of other DHC 
schemes). (InterviewA1, 2011) 
Inventa Partners 
1: Able to develop commercial models for emerging technology implementation. Able to (and 
appointed to) help Southwark find alternative financing for MUSCO (and generally new 
infrastructure) for Elephant and Castle. (InterviewA2, Director, Inventa Partners, 2011) 
2: Appointed to (being paid to) find a way to finance and commercially deliver the MUSCO and 
energy centre. (InterviewA2, 2011) 
3: Supportive of MUSCO concept. They should be establishing commercial structure and 
advising Southwark on strategic approach to reducing up- front cost. (InterviewA2, 2011) 
Lend Lease 
1:Finance, development knowledge and experience with other similar schemes. Provided a view 
on the procurement process; did not make decisions on which energy company or decision to 
withdraw. (InterviewD1, 2011) 
2; Global construction and development company; generate profit from development to local 
standards. Will connect if financially viable (that was agreed in the development agreement). 
Publicly supportive of MUSCO after appointment but before financial agreement signed. 
(InterviewD1, 2011) 
3: Neutral; agreed to connect if financially viable. Accepted the obligation on development to 
connect to the MUSCO only if financial viable. (InterviewD1, 2011) 
Local Landowners/developers 
No data 
Southwark Council Generally (combination of Councillors and Officers) 
1: Owns almost 50% of housing stock in the borough and a significant proportion of land near 
Elephant and Castle. Constrained by local authority finance controls over the way capital 
expenditure is constructed. (InterviewE1, 2011) 
2: A climate change strategy identified that CHP led district heating is the best way to achieve 
carbon reduction goals. The MUSCO approach demonstrate the Council’s commitment to 
sustainable redevelopment of Elephant and Castle. (London Borough of Southwark, 2006) 
3: No data 
Southwark Council Regeneration  
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1: Control land assets, housing (heat loads) and regeneration programme (remit to redevelop) in 
the area. 500,000m2 mixed use development envisaged, 75% owned by council. Ability to 
secure land and pipe routes needed for energy centre. A level of control over planning 
processes in the area . Leadership for regeneration and support of politicians (at first). Lacked a 
lot of information about MUSCO / DE systems, particularly at the beginning. (InterviewG1, 2011; 
InterviewP1, 2011) 
2: DHC schemes should be non-political. Saw DHC as a way to reduce infrastructure costs and 
achieve environmental goals simultaneously. That a scheme could be developed which would 
be economically advantageous for both the council and for developers. Got very excited about 
it. “One of those objectives was to achieve zero carbon. A second objective was to bring forward 
regeneration of the area. A third objective was to be ensure that in doing all that the councils 
financial and legal obligations were met.”  “Minded to take responsibility for it”. (InterviewG1, 
2011; InterviewP1, 2011) 
3: Create special purpose vehicle to deliver CHP-led MUSCO energy and environmental 
services and deliver net zero carbon growth. (London Borough of Southwark, 2004; London 
Borough of Southwark, 2010; InterviewG1, 2011). Set vision and terms for procurement, offering 
it as a concession over 30 years to the private sector to run and install. The MUSCO would 
have been an umbrella organisation - with LBS representation on the board, bought through 
offering the land to the organisation - for series of contracts for the different service aspects. As 
the private sector development became less certain, minded to link the MUSCO with public 
sector housing redevelopment to make the project less risky. (London Borough of Southwark, 
2011) 
Southwark Council Planning Department 
1: Create and enforce planning policy which requires major and minor developments to achieve 
energy efficiency standards. Establish environmental goals such as avoiding pollution and 
reducing energy use in masterplan for E&C (London Borough of Southwark, 2009; London 
Borough of Southwark, 2004). Can obligate developers to specific payments or actions 
associated with development (London Borough of Southwark, 2008).  
2: Explicit support of CHP fuelled DHC at the site (in the regeneration masterplan) as part of a 
commitment to zero carbon growth. The planning approvals process should be sued to regulate 
energy performance in new buildings, following reductions, efficiency, and clean energy. 
(London Borough of Southwark, 2007; London Borough of Southwark, 2009). “The regeneration 
of the Elephant & Castle and the scale of development envisaged provides a perfect opportunity 
to introduce and adopt a range of innovative measures to minimise energy consumption” 
(London Borough of Southwark, 2004) 
3: Supports MUSCO approach. Use the development framework and approvals process to 
require new development to be compatible with the MUSCO. “The priority is for developments to 
contribute to the success of the energy strategy for the opportunity area as a whole, and, in 
particular, to supply energy efficiently through the use of district wide Combined Heat and 
Power or Combined Cooling Heat and Power systems" (London Borough of Southwark, 2008).     
(London Borough of Southwark, 2004) 
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Southwark Council Finance Department  
No data 
Southwark Councillors 
1: Council has significant number of council-owned residential properties. Because re-supplying 
council housing does not get national grant, do not have money to regenerate or re-home 
tenants living in old/bad properties. Needed private sector to fund regeneration of E&C area. 
Unclear about the details of a MUSCO , the financial organisation, or what it might look like; lack 
of knowledge about DHC systems. (InterviewE1, 2011) 
2: Carbon – good thing to address, cutting edge – good for Elephant and Castle. The Elephant 
and Castle regeneration is a unique opportunity to delivery cheaper locally generated heat and 
power (London SE1 website team, 2006) (Pugh, 2010). But unclear about details and more 
concerned about social housing rebuilding and overall regeneration. Some political pressure to 
be ‘green’ and distinctive. Assumed it would be ‘unseen’ technology – a box underground 
somewhere. (InterviewE1, 2011) 
3: “Liked the sound” of MUSCO and accepted officer advice about target and MUSCO 
approach. Part of ‘here’s our masterplan, who wants to build it’ thinking; that council’s role was 
to establish the project and stand back, making some kind of return. (InterviewE1, 2011) When 
the (now labour) councillors rejected the Dalkia proposals and the MUSCO concept, they 
committed to continuing the ‘net zero carbon’ goal (London SE1 website team, 2006). Liberal 
Democrat councillors contested the cessation of the MUSCO work (London SE1 website team, 
2011).  
4.2 Collective Actor Matrix  
This matrix summarise the perception of each actor by all other actors. It groups responses from 
all actors and from the desktop research, so that each specific actor is described in a collective 
way by all the other actors. 
1: Capabilities and Resources 
2: Orientation towards DHC 
3: Preferences for how they should be involved in DHC 
DBIS / BERR 
No data - not mentioned by others 
Clinton Climate Change Initiative  
1: No data  
2: Should promote the zero carbon growth goal and support initiative with knowledge about 
other schemes  (Lend Lease, 2011)  
3: They should not be involved in delivering the scheme, but should be kept in the loop. 
(InterviewD1, 2011) 
Dalkia Bio-Energy  
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1: Given scale of project and long-term concession, can build, design, finance and operate 
MUSCO. A figure given for up-front investment was £30 million. As the scheme grew 
(connection with Aylesbury Estate) they needed further conversations with their banks. In2010, 
council decided they were not capable of delivering or financing MUSCo. (London Borough of 
Southwark, 2011; InterviewA1, 2011; InterviewA2, 2011)  
2: They (and others) were interested in tendering for and going through procurement for 
MUSCO. They were willing to take a significant amount of risk to deliver the MUSCO, but 
needed some certainty customers would be built (new development) or linked up to existing 
social housing. Became more interested in doing bio-fuel energy. Also more interested in 
electricity-led rather than heat-led scheme. (InterviewE1, 2011)(London SE1 website team, 
2011).  (London Borough of Southwark, 2011) 
3:Dalkia (or any non-government energy company) should deliver (preferred provider) and 
operate scheme under a concession approach from London Borough of Southwark. As 
commercial house building changed in the recession, that Dalkia and MUSCo needed to 
connect with more social housing for guaranteed customers and potentially a bigger biomass 
fuelled scheme – 1 large energy centre instead of 2 linked ones. In 2010, council decided they 
should not be involved. (InterviewA2, 2011; InterviewG1, 2011) (InterviewP1, 2011) 
DCLG 
1: Set policy. Did not engage directly in scheme. (InterviewP1, 2011) (Greater London Authority, 
2007) 
2: Do not mandate CCHP (Greater London Authority, 2007). Support MUSCo style 
arrangements on environmental and cost grounds (London Borough of Southwark, 2004). 
Policy changes (Code for Sustainable Homes standards) confused thinking about MUSCO. 
(InterviewG1, 2011)  
3: Did not mandate MUSCo approach from national level, but should have. (InterviewP1, 2011) 
DEFRA/ECC 
No data 
Greater London Authority (Mayor of London)/ London Development Agency 
1: Did not provide funding or direct engagement, but was seen as supportive and influential at a 
strategy, political ‘influence’ level. Saw their power as “All assistance short of help”. 
(InterviewP1, 2011) Several actors commented they lacked the technical capability and 
personal resources to help with the detail. However London Plan set renewables requirement 
for major developments and was supportive of DHC schemes; therefore major developments 
negotiated with LBS and/or GLA about connection to MUSCO. (InterviewA1, 2011)  
2: Supportive at civic strategy, political and technical planning level, although political support 
clouded by different political parties in control. Appointed E&C as 1 of 4 energy action areas. No 
direct role for them to play in delivering scheme, role was through planning permission for major 
applications (InterviewA1, 2011) and influence on major stakeholders such as Lend Lease. Did 
support a ‘London ESCO’ approach in 2004-2007 which tendered for E&C but did not proceed 
with procurement process. (InterviewP1, 2011) 
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3: Through negotiation with LBS, GLA allowed future connection to MUSCO to count towards 
London Plan requirements for major developments. Communication between technical teams 
and planners on major applications in E&C area supported MUSCO; they used London Plan 
policies to support the scheme (InterviewG1, 2011). Originally there was potential for a LDA 
backed ESCo to be the main provider, but that did not go very far (InterviewA2, 2011). Over 
time, they were seen to back off direct support as they focused energies on other potential DE 
schemes in London. Some sense that they could have been more supportive and engaged than 
they were, even if only at a political level (InterviewP1, 2011). 
Brian Dunlop Associates 
1: Technical side, advising Southwark Regeneration. Developed engineering side of scheme to 
procurement and enabled discussions with developers at planning stage. (InterviewP1, 2011) 
2: Supportive, and very good at advising Southwark Regeneration. (InterviewP1, 2011) 
3: Technical advisor to Southwark and neutral party communicating between various people 
within LB Southwark to drive forward deal with Dalkia. (InterviewP1, 2011) 
Inventa Partners 
1:Advise on how to make new technology commercially feasible. Understood commercial 
model. (InterviewP1, 2011)  
2: Advise Southwark Regeneration. (InterviewP1, 2011) 
3: Financial advisor to Southwark. (InterviewP1, 2011) 
Lend Lease 
1: Money and knowledge to be regeneration partner – build houses. Create significant housing 
in a regeneration area – create private sector market from scratch. Abilities and resources 
decreased with recession. Unsuccessful experience with DHC system in other part of London. 
One particular director understood the potential of the MUSCO.  (InterviewA1, 2011) (Leader of 
the Council, 2010) (InterviewC1, 2011) 
2: Struggled to tender for energy element when originally included in masterplan (Different risk 
and profit structures mean that property developers not interested or capable) and initially quite 
sceptical, because it was added complexity to their work. But then became supportive of non-LL 
MUSCO concept as way to reduce infrastructure cost (particularly specific individual in LL was 
supportive). This support decreased over time after change in leadership in LL and Southwark; 
two risks: ability to deliver MUSCO on time and impact of energy centre (visually) on 
regeneration area. Also concerned about potential change to regulatory framework. (London 
Borough of Southwark, 2011) (InterviewE1, 2011)  
3: They did not want to be the delivery agent, but would supportive if made financial sense for 
them. Initially supported MUSCO through regeneration agreement. In recession, they changed 
number of homes likely to be built - this increased risk for procurement of MUSCO; they 
unwittingly damaged success of MUSCO. With larger energy centre they were unsupportive, 
due to land take and visual impact. (InterviewA1, 2011) (InterviewE1, 2011) (InterviewG1, 2011) 
Eventually MUSCO included in regeneration agreement between LL and SR only ‘if financially 
and legally viable’. (London Borough of Southwark, 2010) 
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Local Landowners/developers 
2: Would be supportive if economically advantageous to connect. Would be concerned about 
large energy centre (industrial use/visual impact) on major road (impact on value / 
neighbourhood). (InterviewG1, 2011; InterviewA1, 2011; London Borough of Southwark, 2007)   
3: London policies expected developers to get involved in establishing local energy networks. 
Southwark Planning and CLG policies expected developers to work with the council to realise 
zero growth strategy. Southwark regeneration wanted them to sign up to the MUSCO through 
S106.  (CLG, 2007) (Greater London Authority, 2007) (London First, 2008). 
London Energy Partnership  
No data 
Southwark Council Generally 
No data 
Southwark Council Regeneration Department  
1: Lead role for MUSCO and Regeneration delivery; owned 70% of land and large amount of 
social housing (InterviewA1, 2011). Ability to make decisions about content of Development 
Plan, MUSCO approach, preferred energy company, and involvement of consultants 
(InterviewD1, 2011). Significant control over planning department in Elephant and Castle area 
(InterviewE1, 2011). Able to ‘drive things forward despite Southwark rather than with them’. 
Individual skills varied, but Chris Horn specifically strong capabilities: “When he left and the 
department was dismantled it became less able to push the project forward” (InterviewA2, 
2011). Lack of funding for MUSCo because concept was new. Had legal powers to develop 
district heating network. (London Energy Partnership, 2007) 
2: Very supportive and pushed idea to local councillors, particularly Chris Horn because it was a 
way to deliver funding for infrastructure from private sector and also achieve environmental 
goals (InterviewA2, 2011). Thought it should be delivered by the private sector, but Southwark 
needed to retain some control to financially support MUSCO (guarantee housing) and to ensure 
concession delivered appropriately (InterviewA1, 2011). Searched for other funding besides 
land investment to have a greater stake in the final MUSCO organisation (InterviewA2, 2011). 
Considered several procurement routes (joint venture, etc). (London Energy Partnership, 2007) 
3: Following several years of considering options, Southwark Regeneration would manage 
Southwark’s offer of a concession through a formal procurement process. After legal advice, 
they followed ‘negotiated EU procedure’. (InterviewA1, 2011). Then Southwark Council would 
invest the land to have a stake in the MUSCO. Southwark would have only a minor non-
controlling stake in MUSCo, driven by value of land they could bring to concession (InterviewA2, 
2011). The council should also have a say in price regulation. (InterviewE1, 2011) 
Southwark Council Planning Department 
1:The planning system can be a useful tool for encouraging renewables and connecting to CHP 
networks (London Energy Partnership, 2007). While technically responsible for planning policy 
and application determination, Regeneration department led masterplanning process in the area  
(InterviewA2, 2011). National and London government expected plans to include local 
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decentralised energy (Ellis, 2008) (Greater London Authority, 2004). Participated in discussions 
about conditions for specific applications with GLA (InterviewA1, 2011). Not involved in 
procurement process. (InterviewP1, 2011) (InterviewG1, 2011) 
2: Neither supportive nor unsupportive; worried about risk to project but more concerned with 
detailed planning policy (InterviewP1, 2011). Department saw their role as regulating 
development, which included energy issues as directed by GLA policy (InterviewA1, 2011).  
3: Department wanted a standard set of rules they can apply to each planning application they 
have to determine (InterviewP1, 2011). National and London government expected them to 
regulate new development for connection or renewables (DTI, 2007) (Greater London Authority, 
2004). Supportive in that they published 2004 SPG which includes resource flow analysis and 
net zero carbon growth – this established goal. Technical documents for interfacing 
requirements with private sector developers (InterviewA1, 2011). 
Southwark Council Finance Department 
1: Ability to approve or decline contractual agreements the council enters into. (InterviewP1, 
2011) 
2: Did not understand MUSCO. Risky commitment for Council to make (InterviewE1, 2011). Do 
not understand why Council need to maintain involvement in MUSCO. Not supportive and 
actively obstructive. All they really wanted was for us to spend as little money as possible to sell 
sites, to provide capital, to bolster the council’s financial positions.”  (InterviewP1, 2011) 
3: Probably recommended to councillors to pull out of MUSCO. (InterviewP1, 2011) 
Southwark Councillors 
1: Aware of DHC (existing on older council estates) (InterviewA2, 2011) but did not have 
knowledge of how to deliver it new on large scale or understand what ‘zero carbon’ meant. 
Liberal Democrats seen to be unused to political power (usually in opposition). (InterviewP1, 
2011) 
2: Like the idea (particularly liberal democrats), but never confident about defending it or 
supporting it when issues came up (size of energy scheme, concern about shared 
infrastructure). This changed when the energy centre plans were published (very large) and the 
finance department became worried about long term investment and risk and impact on 
development values (InterviewP1, 2011). They could no longer see political benefit of 
supporting scheme (InterviewG1, 2011).  
3: Consultants and Regeneration department wanted them to approve idea and Dalkia proposal 
(InterviewA2, 2011). Before 2008, no political obstruction. After 2008, impossible to get political 
support for MUSCO (InterviewP1, 2011). Priority was to deliver regeneration of area and bolster 
councils financial position. Eventually labour-led council takes the decision to back out of 
MUSCO procurement because they were concerned about risk (InterviewA2, 2011). 
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4.3 Self-Identified Strategy Matrix  
Ranked on scale of 0 (none), + (minor), ++(medium), +++ (significant). U indicates unknown.  
 
 Market 
Shaping 
(4)  
Market 
regulation (5) 
Market 
Incentives 
(6) 
Market 
capacity (7) 
D BIS / BERR ++ + + ++ 
Clinton Climate Change Initiative  + 0 0 +++ 
Dalkia Bio-Energy (or the final 
MUSCO provider) 
0 0 0 0 
DCLG ++ ++ 0 0 
DEFRA + + ++ + 
Greater London Authority / London 
Development Agency 
+++ +++ 0 +++ 
London Energy Partnership  + 0 0 +++ 
Brian Dunlop Associates 0 0 0 ++ 
Inventa Partners 0 0 0 ++ 
Lend Lease + 0 0 0 
Local Landowners/developers U U U U 
London Borough of Southwark 
Generally  
+ U U + 
Southwark Council Regeneration 
Department 
+++ +++ + ++ 
Southwark Council Planning 
Department 
+++ +++ 0 ++ 
Southwark Council Financial 
Department  
    
Southwark Councillors +++ 0 0 0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
257 
 
4.4 Strategy Matrix (Collective) 
 Market Shaping 
(4)  
Market 
regulation (5) 
Market 
Incentives (6) 
Market capacity 
(7) 
 Potent. Actual Potent. Actual Potent. Actual Potent. Actual 
D BIS / BERR 0 0 + 0 0 0 0 0 
Clinton Climate 
Change Initiative  
0 0 0 0 0 0 ++ 0 
Dalkia Bio-Energy 
(or the final 
MUSCO provider) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DCLG 0 0 ++ + 0 0 + 0 
DEFRA 0 0 0 0 ++ 0 + 0 
Greater London 
Authority / 
London 
Development 
Agency 
+++ + ++ + ++ + + 0 
Brian Dunlop 
Associates 
0 0 0 0 0 0 ++ ++ 
Inventa Partners 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Lend Lease +++ + 0 0 0 0 + 0 
Local 
Landowners/devel
opers 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
London Energy 
Partnership  
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Southwark 
Council 
Regeneration 
Department 
+++ ++ ++ ++ + + + + 
Southwark 
Council Planning 
Department 
++ ++ +++ +++ + + 0 0 
Southwark 
Council Financial 
Department 
+++ 0 0 0 ++ 0 0 0 
Southwark 
Councillors 
++ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4.5 Actor Code References  
Actor Reference 
D BIS / BERR BIS 
Clinton Climate Change Initiative  CCI 
Dalkia Bio-Energy  D 
DECC ECC 
DCLG CLG 
DEFRA FRA 
Greater London Authority / Mayor of London  L 
Brian Dunlop Associates B 
Inventa Partners I 
Lend Lease LL 
Local Landowners/developers/residents P 
London Energy Partnership  LEP 
Southwark Council Regeneration  SR 
Southwark Council Planning Department SP 
Southwark Council Finance Department  SF 
Southwark Councillors SC 
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4.6 Codes 
B1B 
B1D 
B1I 
B1L 
B1LL 
B1SC 
B1SP 
B1SR 
B21 
B2B 
B2CLG 
B2D 
B2I 
B2L 
B2LL 
B2P 
B2SP 
B2SR 
B3 
B3B 
B3D 
B3L 
B3LL 
B3SR 
B4L 
B4LL 
B4SP 
B4SR 
B5CLG 
B5L 
B5SP 
B5SR 
B6SP 
B6SR 
B7B 
B7L 
B7SP 
BIS1BIS 
BIS1D 
BIS1L 
BIS1LBS 
BIS1SP 
BIS2BIS 
BIS2LBS 
BIS2LC 
BIS3BIS 
BIS3CLG 
BIS3LBS 
BIS3SP 
BIS4BIS 
BIS5BIS 
BIS6BIS 
BIS7BIS 
CC1L 
CC1LL 
CC1SR 
CCI1L 
CCI1LL 
CCI1SR 
CCI2CCi 
CCI3CCI 
CCI7CCI 
CLG1CLG 
CLG1LBS 
CLG1SP 
CLG1SR 
CLG2CLG 
CLG2SP 
CLG3CLG 
CLG3LBS 
CLG3P 
CLG3SP 
CLG3SR 
CLG4CLG 
CLG5CLG 
CLG5LBS 
CLG5SP 
D2D 
D2SR 
D3D 
ECC1ECC 
ECC1L 
ECC1LBS 
ECC2LC 
ECC3CLG 
ECC3L 
ECC3LBS 
ECC4ECC 
EFRA1EFRA 
EFRA2EFRA 
EFRA6EFRA 
EFRA7EFRA 
I1B 
I1D 
I1I 
I1L 
I1SC 
I1SP 
I1SR 
I2D 
I2I 
I2L 
I2LL 
I2SC 
I2SF 
I2SR 
I3D 
I3L 
I3SC 
I3SR 
I7B 
I7CLG 
I7I 
I7SR 
L1CLG 
L1L 
L1P 
L2D 
L2L 
L2P 
L2SP 
L3L 
L3P 
L4L 
L5CLG 
L5L 
L5SP 
L6ECC 
L6L 
L7L 
LBS1LBS 
LBS2LBS 
LBS2SP 
LBS3SF 
LBS3SP 
LBS4LBS 
LBS5L 
LBS6EFRA 
LBS6FRA 
LBS7EU 
LBS7LBS 
LEP1D 
LEP1LEP 
LEP1SP 
LEP1SR 
LEP2D 
LEP2L 
LEP2LEP 
LEP2SR 
LEP3LEP 
LEP4L 
LEP4LEP 
LEP5BIS 
LEP5L 
LEP5SP 
LEP6L 
LEP6SP 
LEP7LEP 
LL1D 
LL1LL 
LL1SR 
LL22 
LL2CCI 
LL2LL 
LL2SR 
LL3CCI 
LL4SR 
LL5SR 
LL7CCI 
P1L 
P1P 
P2L 
P2P 
P3D 
P3L 
P3LBS 
P3P 
P3SP 
P4L 
P4LBS 
P4SP 
P5ECC 
P5L 
P5P 
P5SP 
P6ECC 
P6L 
P7L 
P7P 
R1SC 
SC1D 
SC1SC 
SC1SR 
SC2D 
SC2L 
SC2LL 
SC2SC 
SC2SF 
SC2SR 
SC3LL 
SC3SC 
SC3SF 
SC3SR 
SC4SC 
SF3SF 
SP1LBS 
SP1SP 
SP2CLG 
SP2L 
SP2LBS 
SP2P 
SP2SP 
SP3P 
SP3SP 
SP4SP 
SP5L 
SP5SP 
SP6SP 
SP7SP 
SR1 
SR1B 
SR1CLG 
SR1D 
SR1I 
SR1L 
SR1LL 
SR1SC 
SR1SP 
SR1SR 
SR2 
SR20 
SR21 
SR22 
SR22SR 
SR2B 
SR2CLG 
SR2D 
SR2L 
SR2LL 
SR2P 
SR2SC 
SR2SF 
SR2SP 
SR2SR 
SR3B 
SR3CLG 
SR3D 
SR3LL 
SR3P 
SR3SC 
SR3SF 
SR3SP 
SR3SR 
SR4BIS 
SR4CLG 
SR4D 
SR4L 
SR4LL 
SR4SP 
SR4SR 
SR4SR  
SR4SP 
SR5CLG 
SR5SC 
SR5SP 
SR5SR 
SR6L 
SR6SP 
SR6SR 
SR7 
SR7B 
SR7L 
SR7LL 
SR7SC 
SR7S
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5. Toronto  
5.1 Self-Identified Actor Matrix 
1: Capabilities (Resources) 
2: Orientation (towards DLWC, and the role they should play)  
3: Preferences  
Enwave 
1:Market interested because chillers at end of life. Also more commercial offices built new than 
residential. Lot of demand for cooling equipment.. Non regulated monopoly. Previously known 
as Toronto District Heating Company; owned jointly by City of Toronto and Omers. Served 
heating customers, operating 3 steam plants and 140 buildings, but not all happy. (City of 
Toronto, 2001) (Enwave Energy Corporation, 2011) (Enwave, 2005) (City of Toronto, 2000) 
2: Would like to provide DLWC. Start incrementally building the network. Contracts are for 20-30 
years, so stable income but at 9-10% return on investment.. DLWC will enable city to cut 
amount of coal –fired electricity it consumes. Don’t need regulation because the customers are 
very sophisticated. Privatization brought the capital and resources to develop Deep Lake Water 
Cooling (Enwave Energy Corporation, 2011)  
3: They should help fund drinking water pipe, then build the equipment to take cooling from 
drinking water, then operate network & sell cooling for customers. Do not operate internal 
building systems. Value proposition in the marketplace is - environmentally friendly heating and 
cooling. Totally renewable cooling, environmentally friendly heating. (InterviewS3, 2012) 
Chief Executive, Enwave 
1: Became chairman of TDHC then Enwave. MBA. Former councillor. Had heard of deep lake 
water cooling from c:ouncillor experience. Convinced OMERs. Convinced OS to enable 
privatisation. (InterviewS3, 2012) 
2: Preferred public private partnership approach (compared to public only or private only); a fully 
private entity would not have risked it, and a fully public entity would not have had sufficient 
upfront investment. (InterviewS3, 2012) 
3: Drove privatisation - originally motivation was to get city investment in TDHC back. Wanted to 
become sole provider of steam heat and deep lake water cooling to downtown Toronto. 
(InterviewS3, 2012) 
OMERS (merged with Senior Vice President for summary table) 
No data 
Toronto District Heating Corporation 
1: A very shoestring operation; we had a board that met monthly. And everything was properly 
reported to the board, Kevin the then president did everything. 80% everything and 20% me 
(InterviewE3, 2012). Non-profit cooperative established to provide efficient and environmentally 
260 
 
friendly heating to institutional government buildings in downtown Toronto. Had exclusive right 
to sell steam thermal energy in downtown Toronto. (City of Toronto, 1999) 
2: Supportive – regularly investigated cost options. Seen as part of reducing Toronto’s impact 
on the environment and climate change. (Enwave Energy Corporation, 2011) 
3: Investigated options, but eventually converted into a private company called Enwave to gain 
access to investment funds. (City of Toronto Executive Committee, 1988) 
Ontario Clean Air Alliance  
1: DLWC not terribly new – helped history of TDHC. Good thing – helped with smog public 
health care crisis. Private ownership can work very well if it is properly regulated. (InterviewC4, 
2012) 
2: Only involved in ETF, which supported DLWC. (InterviewC4, 2012) 
Environmental Task Force & Environment Roundtable  
1: Responsible for preparing a comprehensive environmental plan for the city in the late 1990’s. 
Made up of City Councillors, City staff, representatives from environmental agencies and 
citizens representing business, labour and environmental groups, school boards, universities 
and schools across Toronto. Created by City councillors. (Toronto Environmental Task Force, 
2000) 
2: District heating and cooling is a cost-effective and efficient way to heat and cool buildings. 
(Toronto Environmental Task Force, 2000) 
3: No data  
Deep Lake Water Cooling Investigation Group  
1: Active for 2 years (1991-1993) to investigate deep lake water cooling possibilities. Funded by 
the Canadian Urban Institute. Engaged BO, NGO’s, TDHC, Various city organisations and 
provincial organisations. (Canadian Urban Land Institute, 1993) 
2: Positive. Existed to explore options for making DLWC happen. (Canadian Urban Land 
Institute, 1993) 
3: The Group recommends that a district cooling system be established to serve buildings in 
and near downtown Toronto, preferably based on deep lake water cooling (DLWC). This should 
be led or coordinated by the city government. (Canadian Urban Land Institute, 1993) 
Toronto Star 
No data 
Better Buildings Partnership 
1: City of Toronto programme; works with owners and managers to promote high energy 
performance. (Better Buildings Partnership) 
City of Toronto 
1: Owned THDC; did not have enough money / limited in ability to raise money / to invest in full 
DLWC. Invested in engineering and legal expertise to conduct studies and enable investment. 
(City of Toronto, 1999) (City of Toronto, 2010) (City of Toronto, 2001) 
261 
 
2: Different elements of the city different levels of support; but no significant opposition. 
Maintaining the security, quality and purity of the City’s water supply remained paramount. 
Environmental issues and carbon reduction is important. (City of Toronto, 2010) (City of 
Toronto, 2001) (City of Toronto, 2007) 
3: Sold half of TDHC to enable investment to create DLWC, but agreed to maintain some 
interest. Provided some land Enwave for plant. Became customer of Enwave for city downtown 
buildings some time after it started. (City of Toronto, 2010) 
City of Toronto Planning 
1: Planning governed by provincial legislation. Plans must be approved by council. Operates the 
green development standard. Governs development in varied ways, including environmental 
performance. (InterviewP5, 2012) (City of Toronto, 2010) (City of Toronto, 2006) 
2: Try to be forward thinking and help the city, using tools at their disposal. Green Development 
standard encourages DLWC. (InterviewP5, 2012) 
3: Aware, and supportive due to city’s environmental goals, but they were not a driver. 
(InterviewP5, 2012) 
Director of Planning and Zoning 
1: Project manager with land use policy that pertains to environmental issues ; city wide policy. 
(InterviewP5, 2012) 
City of Toronto Energy Efficiency Office  
1: Responsible for developing and co-ordinating the implementation of an energy efficiency and 
conservation strategy for Toronto. Review technical submissions by Building owner with respect 
to Energy Efficiency. (InterviewP5, 2012) 
2: Founded after DLWC built. Helps developers and the city identify options in new 
developments for DH/DH. (InterviewP5, 2012) 
3: No data 
City of Toronto Councillors 
1: Govern city investment and strategic decisions. Adopt or reject reports from city officers an 
city committees. (City of Toronto , 2006) (City of Toronto, 2001)  
2: Adopted City’s environmental plan which includes promoting district heating and cooling 
including DLWC. Different councillors had varied levels of support, but as a group they agreed 
to invest in DLWC through city owned TDHC. Supportive of DLWC as a renewable resource. 
Environmental issues and carbon reduction is important. (City of Toronto Executive Committee, 
1988)  
3: Approved plan. Approved financial investment in studies and in the restructuring of Enwave 
into private and the joint venture with OMERS. Decided Enwave should be preferred DC 
provider. (City of Toronto, 2000) (City of Toronto Executive Committee, 1988) (City of Toronto, 
1999) (Moloney, 2003) 
Richard Gilbert 
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1: Visited European systems. Councillor of metro and city Toronto. CEO of TDHC. After politics 
became Head of Canadians Urban Institute. (InterviewE3, 2012) 
2: Very supportive of amalgamating heating networks to use waste to steam energy. Then 
actively kept idea alive through Canadian Urban Institute. (InterviewE3, 2012) 
3: No data 
Joe Pantalone 
1: 1980 City of Toronto councillor. Last 7 years assistant Mayor. Chair of a number of 
committees. (InterviewE2, 2012) 
2: Council needed to make Toronto Water and Enwave share the pipe. Required major political 
support. (InterviewE2, 2012) 
3: No data 
City of Toronto Environment Office 
1: 21 staff. Mandate to support environmental priorities of city and community. Also has 
reporting requirements to Province.  (InterviewG2, 2012) 
2: Had to explain benefits and lack of negative impact to Island community carefully. 
(InterviewG2, 2012) 
3: Supportive – promoted scheme with residents. (InterviewG2, 2012) 
Director, Environment Office 
1: Managed the environmental assessment of the new pipe intakes. (prior to TEO) 
(InterviewG2, 2012) 
2: Ongoing debate with Toronto Water for the provision of potable water for expansion of the 
plant and providing more cooling power. And that debate sort of rages on. (InterviewG2, 2012) 
3: No data 
Building Owners Generally 
1: Own buildings which consume energy. Manage that energy or at least some part of it on 
behalf of tenants.  
2:  No data.  
3: The renewable fuel element of it is important to them and their customers. That plus price 
hedging is a positive driver and can influence property values. Also they have the benefit of 
getting rid of chiller space so more rentable floor area. (InterviewU2, 2012) (Canadian Press, 
2003) 
3: Once it was demonstrated that it would work practically and the contracts / pricing were fixed 
against inflation, others signed up. (InterviewU2, 2012) 
Senior Vice President, OMERS 
1: Responsible for office property investments in Toronto. Had experience with change in fuel 
(coal – gas) and district heating (approx 17 years). Managed Oxfords’ properties whose chillers 
were coming to end of life and up for replacement. (InterviewU2, 2012) 
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2: Saves capital cost of replacing air conditioning equipment. Contract enables him to hedge 
future electricity costs – which he expects to rise. But tough call to make – entrusting third party 
to basic service to ‘customers’. Makes no difference that Omers is investment owner. 
(InterviewU2, 2012) 
3: Was first adopter with One University Building. Good business case to invest – and 
environmental reasons as well. (InterviewU2, 2012) 
Tridel 
1: Linking up to Enwave is part of building green residential buildings. There are noise benefits 
as well use of renewable energy and increase in energy efficiency. Generate residential sales 
from Enwave connection alone. (Cordileone, 2003) 
2: No data 
3: Want to connect their condominiums. (Cordileone, 2003) 
Toronto Water 
1: City department responsible for drinking water and sewerage. Own water intakes now 
(although Enwave built) . Can shut down intake plant and therefore Enwave’s system. Have 
state licence to operate drinking water system; this limits Enwave. (InterviewG5, 2012) 
2:  No data 
3: Needed some formal agreement between Enwave and Toronto Water to govern engineering 
interface and ensure they meet their state licence requirements. (InterviewG5, 2012) 
Director, Toronto Water 
1: Joined city in 2003; became manager in 2005. Have technical agreement which governs 
Enwave’s relationship with drinking water facilities. (InterviewG5, 2012) 
2: Neutral; Formal, technical relationship with Enwave to ensure drinking water purity. Sees 
benefit s- a new intake pipe so cleaner water and expanded capacity. (InterviewG5, 2012) 
3: No preference on how owned as long as technical agreement in place. (InterviewG5, 2012) 
Ontario Province (various authorities) 
1: Sets policy and legislation for Ontario energy and planning sectors among others. Through 
the Ontario Energy Board, regulates prices of gas and after 1998 electricity. (Blakes, 2008) 
2: No data 
3: No data 
Ontario Hydro 
1: Province owned electricity generation, transmission and some distribution functions. 
Dismantled in 1988. (Blakes, 2008) 
2: No data 
3: No data 
Toronto Hydro 
1: Owned by City. (sole shareholder). Electricity distribution for the City. (Toronto Hydro, 2012) 
2: No data  
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3: Entered into a joint venture (the Northwinds Project) with a private company, Unicom Thermal 
Technologies, and the Ontario Hydro Services Corporation to develop ice plants to produce 
cooling energy to be used in a district cooling system. (City of Toronto, 1999) 
5.2 Collective Actor Influence Matrix  
1: Capabilities  
2: Orientation  
3: Preferences  
Enwave 
1: Previously TDHC, distributed steam energy. (InterviewE3, 2012) 
2: Not a new idea – and there are good benefits: capital costs, reliability, hedged against future 
greater than inflation increasing in energy costs, and you have environmental benefits. Lake 
water cooling is renewable, helps reduce electricity generation and smog from coal. TW thought 
E were focused on getting it done quickly cheaply and showing shareholder returns. Initial city 
support and then partial privatization is appropriate for a big but new investment. Good benefit 
for the city with the new drinking water intake. (InterviewU2, 2012) (Moloney, 2003) 
(InterviewS3, 2012) (Enwave Energy Corporation, 2011) (InterviewC4, 2012) 
3: They should operate renewable cooling for environmental reasons (reduces energy 
consumption by 90% for cooling compared to traditional chillers) and because of their history of 
running district heating. Good that they agreed to fix cooling costs over contract to index – 
eased concerns about price changing. The pricing model where prices are fixed and subject to 
CPI was a very important element. TW is concerned need to keep drinking water in mind; have 
agreement about this but city should own intakes at end of day. Several post 2004 documents 
suggest the system should expand further. (InterviewC4, 2012) (InterviewS3, 2012) 
(InterviewE3, 2012) (City of Toronto , 2006) (City of Toronto, 2003) (City of Toronto, 2006) 
OMERS (merged with Senior Vice President for summary tables).  
1: Have a very long term horizon and resources to invest. (InterviewS3, 2012) (City of Toronto, 
1999) 
2: They like infrastructure as a long term investment, like DLWC. expect a 9 per cent to 10 per 
cent rate of return over a 20-year amortization period. Great investment for them. Seen by city 
as very supportive of Enwave, including potential expansion beyond initial DLWC. (InterviewS3, 
2012) (InterviewU2, 2012) 
3: They were the idea investors because they waited 6 years to make a profit before we started 
turning the corner. City councillors approved of their shareholding and investment in Enwave. 
(InterviewS3, 2012) (Canadian Urban Land Institute, 1993) 
Toronto District Heating Corporation 
1: Function governed by Ontario legislation. Reliable in service, but prices not hedged and 
subject to last minute adjustments. Lots of good ideas, but never made any money. Bleeding 
red ink- owed the city 30 million dollars. Legally and structurally difficult to raise money for 
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capital growth. (Sustainable Energy Workgroup of the City of Toronto, 1999) (InterviewE3, 
2012) 
2: Not sure they should expand from steam into cooling without some change. Privatization 
seen in good light. Idea of city combining all district heating systems into one came from Ray 
Bremner- focus on energy from waste. Able to get a lot of support from the community to 
privatize TDHC because we need to find money to build deep lake water cooling (InterviewS3, 
2012) (InterviewE3, 2012) 
3: Lack of trust between customers – perhaps not the best to lead DE. Should deliver or support 
delivery – be the preferred provider for city cooling. The city’s ownership of TDHC should lead 
to cost effective heating and also to a gain in the value of the city’s investment. Should 
restructure into privatized Enwave in order to delivery DLWC. “Since the City has already 
invested $33 million over the years in TDHC, it makes sense to protect its investment and 
maximize it to the fullest extent possible.” (InterviewS3, 2012) (Toronto Environmental Task 
Force, 2000) (Sustainable Energy Workgroup of the City of Toronto, 1999) (City of Toronto, 
1999) (City of Toronto, 2006) 
Ontario Clean Air Alliance (Jack Gibbons ) 
No data 
Environmental Task Force & Environment Roundtable  
1: Advised city of Toronto; created by city council. Looked at greenhouse gas emissions. Great 
deal of citizen participation in environmental objectives ; Incubating ideas. Members: Chaired by 
a councillor the members were appointed citizens who had an interest in the environment and 
then there was a staff group formed to support it. (InterviewC4, 2012) (InterviewE3, 2012) 
(InterviewS3, 2012) (InterviewP5, 2012) 
2: They were supportive – alongside many other things. “So when it came time for government 
approvals, leading environmentalists of the day were supportive, and that was helpful.” 
(InterviewS3, 2012) 
3: Raise awareness, set it in the city environmental plan. (InterviewP5, 2012) 
Deep Lake Water Cooling Investigation Group  
No data 
Toronto Star 
No data 
Better Buildings Partnership 
No data 
City of Toronto 
1: Funds BBP. Various departments had to give lots of time and effort to get the legal and 
engineering agreements signed. Needs to engage with all stakeholders around energy future for 
Toronto. Limited in goals by ability to raise money – province controls taxes and funding. 
(Toronto Hydro, 2012) (Moloney, 2003) (InterviewU2, 2012) (Better Buildings Partnership) 
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2: Interested in environmental matters, a big advocate for reducing climate change emissions, 
and saw property and buildings as a big area. Should be in charge of ‘carrying’ DLWC idea and 
process. This builds on THDC ownership, but also from environmental perspective city should 
make it happen any way possible. Various departments should be involved – not just 
Environment. Public health, planning, economic development. (Canadian Urban Land Institute, 
1993) (InterviewS3, 2012)  (Sustainable Energy Workgroup of the City of Toronto, 1999) 
3: Did not actively promote with building owners. Should be leading creation of network and 
cooling system. Wanted the city to share investment with private company . Built the beginning 
of the network at Air Canada Centre. All agencies should be promoting district heating and 
cooling. City should ‘lead by example’ to support company. Councillors eventually instructed city 
(various departments) to enter into agreement with TDHC/Enwave and for the privatization. 
(InterviewU2, 2012) (Sustainable Energy Workgroup of the City of Toronto, 1999) (Toronto 
Environmental Task Force, 2000) (City of Toronto , 2006)   
City of Toronto Planning 
1: Central to the city’s long term environmental health and should be involved with the planning 
for hits. Building guidelines require developers to comply. (Sustainable Energy Workgroup of 
the City of Toronto, 1999) 
2: No data  
3: Should be defining and establishing areas appropriate for DHC. Should use planning process 
to improve energy efficiency above provincial standard. (InterviewG2, 2012) (Sustainable 
Energy Workgroup of the City of Toronto, 1999) 
Director, Planning and Zoning 
No data 
City of Toronto Energy Efficiency Office 
1: No data 
2: No data  
3: Their mandate should be expanded to all forms of energy generation and distribution in the 
city. (Toronto Environmental Task Force, 2000) 
City of Toronto Councillors 
1: Should know about energy issues and be engaged in discussions. Their instruction needed to 
proceed with Enwave agreement and project. Their support needed to make Toronto Water and 
Enwave share a pipe.  (Enwave, 2005) (Moloney, 2003)  
2: They were looking it a from an engineering problem and how can we get our drinking water 
solved not a wonderful district cooling project. One of the big challenges was convincing the city 
councillors to privatise the company. Initially some were hesitant but most eventually came 
around. (InterviewP5, 2012) (City of Toronto, 1999) (InterviewE3, 2012) 
3: Did not actively promote with building owners. Agreed that railway lands was a good place to 
start cooling network. Less concerned about privatization with OMERS, city pension fund, 
involved. Should push city to work only with TDHC (& not hydro) – did that Voted to use water 
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infrastructure money to support DLWC and Enwave because it bought them a new pipe. 
(Moloney, 2003)  (InterviewE2, 2012) (Sustainable Energy Workgroup of the City of Toronto, 
1999) 
Richard Gilbert 
1: Attended charrettes as a councillor. Very smart man, great guy. Big long term goals – see the 
big picture. Not your traditional politician. (InterviewS3, 2012) (InterviewC4, 2012) 
2: Very supportive & long term advocate. A champion of district energy in many forms – 
believed in energy conservation and efficiency as a good thing for the city and the world. 
(InterviewS3, 2012) (InterviewC4, 2012) 
3: Glad to have a champion for the idea like him. (InterviewS3, 2012) 
Joe Pantalone 
No data  
City of Toronto Environment Office 
No data 
Director, Environment Office 
No data 
Building Owners Generally 
1: Only interested with new buildings or refits for end of life plant. And Quite a few buildings’ 
chillers were at end of life and needed replacing – due to property life cycle. Do care about 
environment. (InterviewU2, 2012) (InterviewS3, 2012) 
2: Particularly compelling for condominium owners because saves capital costs on construction 
– which means greater profit for builders. Must trust Enwave to be reliable and cost effective 
over 20 years; can be difficult given TDHC history. Reason to be cautious – not a common thing 
to do, a huge contract by value, and needs careful thought. Initially, massive resentment due to 
TDHC history. Would be interested in fixing prices. Not resistant. (InterviewS3, 2012) 
(InterviewU2, 2012) (InterviewG2, 2012) (City of Toronto Executive Committee, 1988) 
3: Did not want to get involved themselves: “utilities are not our business”. Expected to be 
sceptical of ability of TDHC to handle given previous price issues, and many technical and 
insurance concerns. But also many positives around prices and running costs – also 
environmental. “the vast majority of my counterparts who have had the opportunity to sign up to 
this have signed up to it.” (InterviewU2, 2012) (Canadian Urban Land Institute, 1993) 
Senior Vice President, OMERS 
1: No data 
2: The 20 year contact is a hedge against future energy price increases. Even if it isn't cheaper 
now, if energy prices spike in the future, his buildings will save significantly on energy costs. 
(Cordileone, 2003) 
3: “Andrew is the reason that oxford buildings connected to Enwave.” A huge proponent of 
Enwave and DLWC. Agreed to be the first one to connect. With One University Avenue, an 18-
storey building. (InterviewS3, 2012) 
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Toronto Water 
1: No data 
2: They were supportive to get new intake pipe because the old intake pipe they had was 
becoming in need of replacement. Concerned about drinking water. (InterviewG2, 2012) 
3: Eventually supportive after long negotiations about water safety and engineering. 
(InterviewG2, 2012) 
Director, Toronto Water 
No data 
Ontario S Province (various authorities ) 
1: Offer energy savings funds to building owners. Should fund research and business case 
establishment for district cooling. Regulate water drinking quality and energy prices (to varied 
extent) and hence Toronto Water. Control amount of money that city and TDHC can raise via 
borrowing. (City of Toronto Executive Committee, 1988) (Better Buildings Partnership) 
2: They probably would have tried to totally privatize it (conservative government). They were 
supportive. They had to pass the Toronto District Heating Corporation Act which was the 
legislation that created Toronto District Heating Corporation. (InterviewE3, 2012) (InterviewS3, 
2012) 
3: They should not be involved. They have a energy regulation function and had to approve 
extended remit of THDC to cooling and then privatization. (InterviewE3, 2012) 
Ontario Hydro 
1: Provincial owned generation and distribution company. Dysfunctional. (InterviewE3, 2012) 
2: Not conservation minded. (InterviewE3, 2012) 
3: No data 
Toronto Hydro 
1: City-owned energy distribution utility. Great capability for transition to more sustainable 
energy. (Community Planning Office, 2006) (InterviewC4, 2012) 
2: Not seen an positive light generally. Tried to form their own district cooling company while 
TDHC was being privatized. They were upset about Enwave building network without open 
market competition. (InterviewE2, 2012) (InterviewG2, 2012) (InterviewE3, 2012) 
3: Did not want them involved in running DLWC – distrust of them but also it would compete 
with their electrical load and they could have just shut Enwave down. Initially thought they could 
partner with TDHC to help deliver cooling network. But then after conflict the city decided it 
could back only one company – Enwave. City directed Toronto Hydro to align its marketing 
activity to support Deep Lake Water cooling as the cooling base load source. (InterviewC4, 
2012) (InterviewS3, 2012) (Sustainable Energy Workgroup of the City of Toronto, 1999) 
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5.3 Self-Identified Strategy Matrix  
This matrix defines how each actor perceives their potential options around Deep Lake Water 
Cooling, given institutional constraints and powers. Their self-identified potential options are 
ranked on scale of 0 (none), + (minor), ++(medium), +++ (significant). U indicates unknown.  
 Market 
Shaping (4) 
Market 
regulation (5) 
Market 
Incentives (6) 
Market 
capacity 
(7) 
Enwave (DF) ++ 0 +++ +++ 
OMERS  U U U U 
Toronto District Heating 
Corporation 
++ 0 ++ ++ 
Ontario Clean Air Alliance + 0 0 + 
Environmental Task Force & 
Environment Roundtable  
+ 0 0 ++ 
Deep Lake Water Cooling 
Investigation Group  
+ 0 0 ++ 
Toronto Star 0 0 0 0 
Better Buildings Partnership 0 0 ++ ++ 
City of Toronto +++ + + ++ 
City of Toronto Planning ++ + + + 
City of Toronto Energy 
Efficiency Office 
n/a n/a + ++ 
City of Toronto Councillors +++ + +  
City of Toronto Environment 
Office 
0 + + + 
Building Owners Generally  0 0 0 0 
Director, OMERS 0 0 0 ++ 
Toronto Water ++ ++ 0 0 
Ontario Province (various 
authorities) 
+ + + (for BO)  U 
Ontario Hydro U U U U 
Toronto Hydro U U U U 
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5.4 Collective Strategy Matrix 
The collective matrix summarises what all actors perceive of other actors potential and actual 
interventions with respect to the Deep Lake Water Cooling project. Their collectively identified 
potential options are ranked on scale of 0 (none), + (minor), ++(medium), +++ (significant).  
 Market 
Shaping  
Market 
regulation  
Market 
Incentives 
Market 
capacity  
 Potent. Actual Potent. Actual Potent. Actual Potent. Actual 
Enwave (DF) ++ ++ 0 0 +++ +++ ++ ++ 
OMERS  +++ +++ 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Toronto District 
Heating Corporation 
++ ++ 0 0 ++ ++ +++ ++ 
Ontario Clean Air 
Alliance 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Environmental Task 
Force & Environment 
Roundtable  
+++ +++ 0 0 0 0 ++ ++ 
Deep Lake Water 
Cooling Investigation 
Group  
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Toronto Star 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Better Buildings 
Partnership 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
City of Toronto +++ +++ + + ++ +++ +++ ++ 
City of Toronto 
Planning 
+ + ++ + + + + ? 
City of Toronto 
Energy Efficiency 
Office 
+ 0 0 0 + ? +++ + 
City of Toronto 
Councillors 
++ ++ + + ++ ++ ++ + 
City of Toronto 
Environment Office 
0 0 0 0 0 0 + + 
Building Owners 
Generally 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Director, OMERS  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Toronto Water 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ontario Province 
(various authorities) 
++ 0 ++ ++ ++ ++ 0 0 
Ontario Hydro  0 0 + + 0 0 0 0 
Toronto Hydro ++ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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5.5 Actor code references  
Actor Code 
Enwave E 
Chief Executive, Enwave DF 
OMERS O 
Toronto District Heating Corporation TDHC 
Ontario Clean Air Alliance (Jack Gibbons) CAA / JG 
Environmental Task Force & Environment Roundtable  ETF 
Deep Lake Water Cooling Investigation Group  DCIG 
Toronto Star TS 
Better Buildings Partnership BBP 
City of Toronto T 
City of Toronto Planning TP 
City of Toronto Planning Officer JW 
City of Toronto Energy Efficiency Office (FC) TEE / FC 
City of Toronto Councillors TC 
Richard Gilbert Former Local Councillor RG 
Joe Pantalone Former Local Councillor JP 
City of Toronto Environment Office TE 
Chief Executive, Clean Air Alliance LO 
Building Owners Generally BO 
Director, OMERS AM 
Tridel Tri 
Toronto Water TW 
Director, Toronto Water LD 
Ontario Province (various authorities) OS 
Ontario Hydro OH 
Toronto Hydro TH 
 
 
5.6 Codes 
20 
21 
22 
23 
AM1AM 
AM1BO 
AM1E 
AM1O 
AM1T 
AM1TDHC 
AM2AM 
AM2BO 
AM2E 
AM2O 
AM2T 
AM2TC 
AM2TDHC 
AM2TH 
AM2THDC 
AM3AM 
AM3BO 
AM3E 
AM3O 
AM5T 
AM7AM 
AM7O 
AM7T 
AM7TDHC 
AM7THDC 
BBP1BBP 
BBP1OS 
BBP1T 
BBP6BBP 
BBP7BBP 
BO2BO 
BO2E 
BO3E 
DCIG1OS 
DCIG1T 
DCIG2BO 
DCIG2T 
DCIG2TDHC 
DCIG3BO 
DCIG3DCIG 
DCIG3OS 
DCIG3T 
DCIG4DCIG 
DCIG4OS 
DCIG4T 
DCIG5OS 
DCIG6OS 
DCIG7DCIG 
DCIG7T 
DF1BO 
DF1DF 
DF1E 
DF1O 
DF1RG 
DF1TDHC 
DF1TH 
DF1THDC 
DF24 
DF2AM 
DF2BO 
DF2DF 
DF2E 
DF2O 
DF2OS 
DF2RG 
DF2T 
DF2TC 
DF2TDHC 
DF3AM 
DF3DF 
DF3E 
DF3O 
DF3OS 
DF3T 
DF3TDHC 
DF3THDC 
DF4E 
DF4O 
DF4OS 
DF4T 
DF4TP 
DF5E 
DF5OS 
DF6E 
DF6OS 
DF6T 
DF6TC 
DF6TP 
DF7E 
DICG6OS 
E1E 
E1O 
E1T 
E1TC 
E1TDHC 
E2E 
E2O 
E2TDHC 
E3E 
E4O 
E5E 
ETF1ETF 
ETF1T 
ETF1TDHC 
ETF1TP 
ETF21 
ETF22 
ETF2ETF 
ETF2T 
ETF2TDHC 
ETF3T 
ETF3TC 
ETF3TDHC 
ETF3TEE 
ETF3TH 
ETF3TP 
ETF4ETF 
ETF4TP 
ETF5T 
ETF5TP 
ETF6BBP 
ETF6TP 
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ETF7ETF 
ETF7T 
ETF7TEE 
ETF7TP 
FC1FC 
FC1TEE 
FC2O 
FC2T 
FC2TEE 
FC7TEE 
HO1HO 
JF7ETF 
JG1E 
JG1JG 
JG1OH 
JG1RG 
JG1T 
JG1TDHC 
JG1TH 
JG2E 
JG2JG 
JG2OH 
JG2RG 
JG2T 
JG2TDHC 
JG2TH 
JG3ETF 
JG3JG 
JG4ETF 
JG4T 
JG7JG 
JG7T 
JP1JP 
JP1T 
JP1TC 
JP1TH 
JP1TP 
JP2E 
JP2T 
JP2TH 
JP3TC 
JP4T 
JP7T 
JW 
JW1ETF 
JW1JW 
JW1TP 
JW2E 
JW2ETF 
JW2T 
JW2TC 
JW2TP 
JW3TP 
JW4ETF 
JW4TP 
JW5OS 
JW5TP 
JW6OS 
JW6TP 
JW7TP 
LD1LD 
LD1TW 
LD2E 
LD2OS 
LD2TW 
LD4T 
LD5OS 
LD5TC 
LD5TW 
LO1E 
LO1LO 
LO1OS 
LO1TE 
LO1TW 
LO2BO 
LO2E 
LO2ETF 
LO2LO 
LO2O 
LO2RG 
LO2T 
LO2TC 
LO2TE 
LO2TH 
LO2TP 
LO2TW 
LO4T 
LO5OS 
LO5TE 
LO5TP 
LO6TE 
LO7TE 
OH1OH 
OS1OS 
OS1TDHC 
OS5OS 
OS6OS 
OS7OS 
RG1DCIG 
RG1OH 
RG1RG 
RG1TDHC 
RG1TH 
RG2DF 
RG2E 
RG2OH 
RG2OS 
RG2RG 
RG2T 
RG2TDHC 
RG2TH 
RG2TW 
RG5OH 
RG7T 
RG7TC 
T1E 
T1O 
T1T 
T1TDHC 
T1TH 
T2E 
T2T 
T2TDHC 
T3E 
T3T 
T3TDHC 
T4E 
T4T 
T4TC 
T5T 
T6E 
T6T 
T6TC 
T7T 
T7TE 
TC1OS 
TC1T 
TC1TC 
TC1TDHC 
TC2BO 
TC2E 
TC2ETF 
TC2T 
TC2TC 
TC2TDCH 
TC2TDHC 
TC2TH 
TC3E 
TC3O 
TC3T 
TC3TC 
TC3TDHC 
TC4ETF 
TC4O 
TC4T 
TC4TC 
TC4TDHC 
TC5OS 
TC5TC 
TC6TC 
TC7T 
TDHC1TDCH 
TDHC1TDHC 
TDHC2TC 
TDHC2TDHC 
TDHC3TDHC 
TDHC5OS 
TDHC6TC 
TDHC7TDHC 
TE1TE 
TE2E 
TE2T 
TE2TE 
TE3BBP 
TE3T 
TE6TE 
TE7TE 
TEE1BPP 
TEE1TEE 
TEE2TEE 
TEE7TEE 
TH1T 
TH1TH 
TH2TH 
TP1TP 
TP2TP 
TP4TP 
TP5TP 
TP6TP 
TP7TP 
TS1E 
TS1T 
TS1TC 
TS2AM 
TS2BO 
TS2E 
TS2TC 
TS3TC 
TS4TC 
TS6T 
WJWT 
 
